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Introduction:
The Intersection of Conflict, Agriculture  
and Extension
Paul E. McNamara* and Austen Moore*
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois, USA
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Conflict, Agriculture, Poverty  
and Hunger
Armed conflicts have existed throughout 
human history, and are as varied as the con-
texts in which they occur. Conflicts can be 
short or long term, intense or sporadic, lo-
calized or widespread (Strand and Dahl, 
2010). However, evidence suggests that the 
dynamics of conflict have changed in recent 
decades. Whereas many conflicts have his-
torically occurred between governments 
(Lacina, 2004), internal conflicts are now 
the most common ‘model of mass violence’ 
since World War II (UNEP, 2002: 1).
The emergence of internal conflict has 
direct links to poverty, hunger and agricul-
tural development. First, it is essential to 
understand that poverty, hunger and agri-
cultural  development are closely related 
and that gains in agricultural productivity 
and food security lead to improvements 
in  poverty and hunger indicators. Global 
trends in poverty and hunger, disaggregated 
by region and country, clearly show this re-
lationship (FAO, 2015). The International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 
found that a 10% increase in yields created 
a 7% reduction in poverty across the African 
continent and that a 1%  increase in per 
 capita agricultural GDP had more than five 
times the impact on poverty reduction than 
GDP increases in other sectors (IFAD, 2013). 
Furthermore, the 2008 World Development 
Report showed that the impact of agricul-
tural growth on poverty increased as in-
comes decreased, or that the poorest seg-
ments of the population benefit the most 
from agricultural development (Ligon and 
Sadoulet, 2008). Hunger indicators closely 
track those of poverty (World Bank, 2015).
Furthermore, progress in agricultural 
development and corresponding impacts on 
poverty and hunger are drivers of economic 
growth, contribute positively to a range of 
social factors and have been shown to  reduce 
the probability of internal conflict ( Collier, 
2007). In contrast, failure to develop agricul-
tural sectors contributes to worsening pov-
erty and hunger indicators. Often these fac-
tors lead to perceptions of  social injustice, 
lack of social mobility and few opportun-
ities to address social inequality, which 
‘make society a fertile terrain for conflict’ 
(UNEP, 2002: 3). In fact, Collier (2003) found 
that a 5% decrease in yearly economic growth 
and the corresponding poverty increases led 
to a 12% increase in the probability of internal 
xii P.E. McNamara and A. Moore 
conflict. Accordingly, the world’s poorest 
countries are typically those most prone to 
conflict (Waters et al., 2007).
The majority of the poor are concen-
trated in agriculture, and correspondingly 
most armed conflicts occur in regions and 
nations with very high dependence on the 
agricultural sector (Zaur, 2006). Recent epi-
sodes in Rwanda and Côte d’Ivoire closely 
followed major drops in production and the 
agricultural GDP (Zaur, 2006). This demon-
strates the importance of the productivity of 
the sector. Similarly, where food security is 
low, people become increasingly desperate 
and willing to turn to violence to feed them-
selves and their families. Food price spikes 
in 2008 and 2011 resulted in protests and 
sporadic violence in many developing coun-
tries (Lagi et al., 2011). This correlation veri-
fies that ‘hunger anywhere threatens peace 
everywhere’ (Swaminathan, 1994: 104).
Post-Conflict Periods  
and the Cycle of Conflict
Countries emerging from conflict face con-
siderable challenges. The effect of conflict 
on nations’ development is striking, erasing 
‘years of positive development in the blink of 
an eye’ (Zaur, 2006: 3). This leads to a regres-
sion of development indicators in virtually 
all areas, including education, healthcare 
and infrastructure (UNEP, 2002). Poverty 
levels also often increase considerably as a re-
sult, with rural populations typically the most 
affected (UNEP, 2002).
Despite impacts in many sectors, the 
detrimental effects on agriculture have per-
haps the direst consequences, especially 
where populations are primarily dependent 
on agriculture for their food supply and live-
lihoods. During conflicts, farmers are dis-
placed from their crops and livestock, supply 
chains collapse and local/regional markets 
become inaccessible due to security con-
cerns, and much of the agricultural labor 
force—particularly young men—are con-
scripted or recruited into conflicts that take 
them away from food production (UNEP, 
2002). On average conflict leads to an annual 
12.3% decrease in productivity (Zaur, 2006), 
with smallholder farmers generally the most 
severely affected (UNEP, 2002).
Decreases in the food supply then ex-
acerbate hunger, especially among displaced 
and rural peoples (Wiggins and Leturque, 
2010). Conflict is therefore considered ‘the 
underlying cause of acute or lasting food 
 insecurity situations in many countries’ 
(UNEP, 2002: 3). When conflicts are longer 
lasting, more intense, widespread and de-
structive, countries can face food insecurity 
impacts that can last for years beyond the 
conflict itself and require considerable time 
to rebuild infrastructure and return to 
pre-conflict production levels.
Conflict creates a vicious cycle. The 
conditions that foster conflict (e.g. poverty, 
hunger) are often worsened by the violence 
itself (USAID, 2009), creating a dynamic 
that is difficult for nations to escape. 
 Collier (2007: 177) writes ‘around half of 
all civil wars are post-conflict relapses’, il-
lustrating the magnitude of this challenge. 
Post-conflict development that addresses 
the underlying factors causing conflict is 
essential to breaking this cycle and moving 
countries towards development, peace and 
stability.
Agriculture as a Post-Conflict  
Development Strategy
Development in the post-conflict period re-
quires multifaceted strategies that address a 
range of areas and sectors affected by con-
flict. Post-conflict development needs to tar-
get the socio-economic conditions (e.g. pov-
erty, hunger) that contributed to and were 
exacerbated by the conflict (USAID, 2009), 
but also be ‘conflict sensitive’ in its program-
ming to promote reconciliation, rehabilita-
tion and stability (Zaur, 2006). As a result, 
agricultural development plays a central 
role in post-conflict development strategies 
(UNEP, 2002).
Often the primary agricultural goal of post- 
conflict governments as well as donors—
such as IFAD, United States Agency for Inter-
national Development (USAID), World Bank—in 
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the early post-conflict period is stimulating 
rapid agricultural productivity and food pro-
duction gains. This approach reduces the 
issues of food insecurity and hunger that 
often impede progress towards development 
and peace, and alleviates the need for (and 
eventually replaces) emergency food assist-
ance (UNEP, 2002; USAID, 2009). Interven-
tions that promote large-scale production 
schemes for staple crop production, agricul-
tural intensification, mechanization and the 
use of improved technologies are common 
(Longley et al., 2007; USAID, 2009). Food 
production interventions may also include a 
transition from food aid to seed aid to main-
tain food security and promote increases in 
local food supplies.
A second approach targets poverty 
through the development of agricultural live-
lihoods and requires a range of complemen-
tary strategies to improve incomes (Scoones, 
1998; Longley et al., 2007). Commonly, ef-
forts to improve agricultural livelihoods 
are  coupled with interventions that streng-
then value chains and improve farmers’ 
access to markets. Value chain strengthen-
ing programmes are designed to allow do-
mestic production to replace high food aid 
and food importation, which proliferate 
during the post-conflict period. Governments 
and donors seek to facilitate a transition 
to foodstuffs that are produced domestic-
ally by  rebuilding local markets and market-
place processes, linking producers or farmer- 
 based organizations to buyers, restricting 
dumping of cheap foreign foods and creating 
pro- producer policies (Maconachie and 
Binns, 2007).
Third, agricultural development is tar-
geted at addressing issues of displacement, 
reintegration and unemployment, which are 
frequent problems for post-conflict countries. 
Agriculture has been shown to be the sector most 
capable of reincorporating displaced peoples 
and former combatants, thereby promoting 
 stability and peacebuilding ( Maconachie and 
Binns, 2007). Because rural peoples are most 
commonly displaced and combatants are 
often recruited from agrarian areas, reintegra-
tion requires  creating livelihood options and 
employment opportunities for groups that 
have  little experience outside of agriculture 
(Longley et al., 2007; Blattman and Annan, 
2011). Programmes that help displaced peoples 
return home and resume agricultural produc-
tion can stimulate agriculture after conflicts 
( Maconachie and Binns, 2007). Other devel-
opment initiatives seek to create agricultural 
opportunities for women—especially widows 
and female-headed households—in the agri-
cultural sector (Maconachie and Binns, 2007).
Reincorporation of youth and espe-
cially former combatants is especially chal-
lenging. In many cases, former fighters re-
locate to urban areas where they find other 
livelihood options or face high unemploy-
ment instead of returning to rural and agri-
cultural lifestyles (Maconachie and Binns, 
2007). Depletion of youth in the agricultural 
workforce can affect short-term agricultural 
productivity, food security, poverty and 
peace during post-conflict rehabilitation 
(Collier, 2003). High concentrations of un-
employed youth can also threaten long-term 
stability. Programs that encourage youth 
and former fighters to re-join the agricul-
tural workforce can address these issues 
and are commonly implemented in post- 
conflict settings (USAID, 2009; Blattman 
and Annan, 2011).
Agricultural Extension in Post-Conflict 
Development
Agricultural extension plays a fundamental 
role in advancing all of the aforementioned 
objectives of post-conflict agricultural de-
velopment (Waters et al., 2007). Tradition-
ally, extension focuses on four broad object-
ives: (i) disseminating new technologies 
and agronomic practices around the na-
tional staple food crops; (ii) increasing farm 
incomes through increased agricultural in-
tensification and small-scale value addition 
activities; (iii) developing farmers’ social cap-
ital, especially in the form of functioning 
groups, associations, cooperatives and farmer- 
based organizations; and (iv) training and 
capacity development in natural resource 
management (Swanson and Rajalahti, 2010). 
These objectives closely mirror the agricultural 
development goals of the post-conflict period.
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At the end of a conflict in a poor coun-
try, there is usually a dire need to reach 
smallholder farmers with inputs, advisory 
services, credit and marketing support, and 
to re-establish agricultural infrastructure 
and services eroded through the conflict. 
Agricultural extension services are often 
pressed into service for this objective. In the 
absence of conflict, extension systems in-
volve many different extension actors— 
including Ministries of Agriculture, non- 
governmental organizations (NGOs), private 
sector organizations, research institutes and 
universities—delivering services, informa-
tion, technologies, capacity development 
and adult education to farmers using a var-
iety of methods and approaches (Swanson 
and Rajalahti, 2010). Post-conflict extension 
more commonly occurs either through dir-
ect delivery of services on donor-funded 
projects delivered by Ministries of Agricul-
ture, or through NGOs that may in some 
cases utilize seconded Ministry of Agricul-
ture extension staff to deliver projects. Thus, 
public sector extension services in a post- 
conflict setting are often on the frontline of 
reaching rural people with public services 
and providing initial post-war contact with 
government programs.
This provision of public extension 
represents an opportunity for new govern-
ments to establish legitimacy and reinforce 
their reputation by providing needed so-
cial services. In poor countries, extension 
has many of the characteristics of a public 
or ‘merit’ good, a good deemed important 
for people to receive despite their inability 
to pay for it. Thus, extension services not 
only become one of a post-conflict coun-
try’s primary anti-poverty programs— 
especially in the context of high poverty 
where many of the poor people have a con-
nection to agriculture—but also contribute 
to reconciliation and peacebuilding (Umali- 
Deininger and Schwartz, 1994; Collier, 
2006; Swanson and Rajalahti, 2010).
In total, agricultural extension services 
can improve the productive capacity of 
food-insecure farmers, advance sustainable 
livelihoods at a crucial time, facilitate 
 reintegration and reconciliation among rural 
peoples, and promote peace and stability 
(Scoones, 1998; Collier, 2006; Longley et al., 
2007). Establishing effective and stable ex-
tension institutions and processes are there-
fore common goals of many post- conflict 
agricultural development strategies (e.g. 
Blaikie et al., 1977; UNEP, 2002; Zaur, 2006; 
USAID, 2009; USIP, 2013).
Background and Rationale  
for the Collective Volume
Extension plays a crucial role both in pro-
moting agricultural development and in 
preventing conflict and supporting post- 
conflict recovery. Increasing development 
attention has therefore been paid to im-
proving agricultural sectors and rural live-
lihoods. At the 2009 L’Aquila Summit, 
world leaders pledged US$20 billion to 
agricultural development (United States 
State Department, 2012). The US Feed the 
Future initiative was created largely in re-
sponse to the US commitment to the 
L’Aquila accord and placed agricultural 
development at the center of the Obama 
administration’s global development agenda. 
USAID is tasked with implementing 
Feed the Future, and agricultural develop-
ment programs are central to its strategy in 
all 19 countries served (Ho and Hanrahan, 
2011). Other major donors— including the 
UK’s Department for International Devel-
opment (DFID), the German Corporation 
for International Cooperation (GIZ) and 
the Japanese International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA)—have followed suit in pri-
oritizing agricultural development (DFID, 
n.d.; GIZ, n.d.; JICA, n.d.). Agricultural ex-
tension is a key component of these ef-
forts.
The Modernizing Extension and 
 Advisory Services (MEAS) project was 
awarded in 2010 and ran until 2016, under 
the umbrella of USAID’s Feed the Future 
initiative. The goal of the MEAS project 
was to help transform and modernize ex-
tension and advisory systems to increase 
farm incomes and enhance the liveli-
hoods of the rural poor. MEAS worked 
closely with both public and private sector 
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extension systems and services in more 
than 50 countries, promoting cost-effective 
as well as financially and institutionally 
sustainable extension services, supporting 
extension policy design and reform, build-
ing the capacities of extension profes-
sionals and service providers, conducting 
action- oriented research designed to im-
prove extension service delivery and facili-
tating field-level interventions intended to 
demonstrate innovative extension ap-
proaches and practices.
Although MEAS did not have a man-
date to work with specific countries, the 
project ultimately discovered that countries 
with recent histories of conflict—where ex-
tension systems were particularly weak, ser-
vice provision mechanisms were disrupted 
and needed strengthening, and institutions 
required support and rehabilitation— tended 
to request MEAS assistance. This realization—
along with the aforementioned connections 
between agricultural development and ex-
tension in preventing and addressing issues 
of conflict—provided the impetus for this 
book.
This collective volume is intended to: 
(i) explore the role and potential of agricul-
tural extension in post-conflict countries; 
(ii)  investigate the experience and issues 
 involved with rebuilding extension sys-
tems in post- conflict settings; (iii) examine 
the impact of different extension policy ap-
proaches and practice in such settings; and 
(iv) identify the key elements needed to ef-
fectively rebuild agricultural extension 
systems and programs in post-conflict con-
texts. Exploration of these topics can help 
inform governments, practitioners and aca-
demics in extension policy making and 
programming, and contribute to post- 
conflict, political science, international 
 development and agricultural extension 
literature.
The following chapters seek to capture 
learning from the MEAS project but also to 
engage experts in the field of global exten-
sion, in particular those with extensive ex-
perience in countries in various stages of 
emergence from conflict. Each chapter is 
written as a country-specific case study that 
provides a descriptive account but also ana-
lyzes strategies, successes and failures, and 
lessons learned. The book concludes with a 
global synthesis chapter that ties together 
the learning from the individual case stud-
ies into a set of cohesive global themes and 
commonalities.
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Background to the Conflict
Conflict and agriculture have been intertwined 
in the Republic of Liberia since the country’s 
formation by repatriated slaves from the 
USA and subsequent independence in 1847 
(Pham, 2004; CIA, n.d.). Early in its history, 
Liberians of American descent dominated 
the political process and began to annex 
lands that traditionally belonged to indigen-
ous groups (Humphreys and Richards, 2005; 
MoA, 2007). The Americo-Liberian minority 
eventually controlled many of the nation’s 
most productive agricultural lands and nat-
ural resources (Unruh, 2009).
Many Americo-Liberian landowners prac-
ticed a plantation-style agricultural model, 
while most indigenous farmers either served 
as labor on large-scale plantations or practiced 
small-scale farming. The plantation model 
led to relative productivity in staple and 
cash crops into the late 1970s (MoA, 2007). 
Liberia became a net exporter of sugar cane, 
cocoa, palm oil and rubber.
This period also represented the peak 
of agricultural extension in Liberia. During 
the late 1970s, the World Bank heavily funded 
training-and-visit extension to spread Green 
Revolution technologies in Africa (Swanson 
and Rajalahti, 2010). Liberia received World 
Bank funding to expand its extension work-
force and place officers in every county, district 
and klan (township), dramatically increas-
ing the number of farmers reached by exten-
sion information (MoA, 2007). Funding was 
also used to enhance domestic agricultural 
research through the Central Agricultural 
Research Institute (CARI) in Bong County 
and Cuttington University, Liberia’s leading 
agricultural institution (FARA, n.d.).
However, benefits were not felt by all 
Liberians. Highly productive plantations and 
lucrative export agreements allowed the 
Americo-Liberian minority group to accumulate 
further wealth and prosperity (Sawyer, 2005), 
while indigenous Liberians became dispro-
portionately poor (Pham, 2004;  Humphreys 
and Richards, 2005; GRC, 2007). Notably, 
the Liberian government authorized the lease 
of 100,000 acres of prime agricultural land 
to the US-owned Firestone Company in 
1926, an arrangement that was subsequently 
 criticized for benefitting ‘elite’ Americo- 
Liberians while displacing indigenous farmers 
(Saha, 1988).
Similarly, extension services did not 
reach all Liberians equally. The Green Revo-
lution model and corresponding technology 
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transfer approach encouraged large-scale 
agriculture, and services were often directed 
towards plantation-style farming systems 
(Saha, 1988; Pham, 2004). Indigenous farm-
ers’ role as laborers or practitioners of small-
scale subsistence agriculture meant that 
extension services were seldom tailored to 
their needs (MoA, 2007). This disparity con-
tributed to mounting tensions, especially in 
rural areas where food security was lowest.
Political, economic and ethnic tensions 
ultimately led to full-scale conflict in 1980, 
when indigenous military leaders led a coup 
that toppled the Liberian government. The 
following 25-year period saw ongoing internal 
conflict, widespread human rights violations 
and devastating destruction (Humphreys 
and Richards, 2005; CIA, n.d.). Peace was 
re-established in 2003 under a transitional 
government, followed by elections in 2005 
(MoA, 2007; World Bank, 2013).
The Liberian civil war devastated the 
country, erased years of development (UNDP, 
2005) and crippled the Liberian economy 
(Humphreys and Richards, 2005). Post- 
conflict Liberia had few options to promote 
development, economic growth and poverty 
reduction or to address other effects of the 
war (Blattman and Annan, 2012).
Liberia’s recent Ebola epidemic further 
complicated post-conflict challenges. A total 
of 10,666 cases and 4806 deaths were recorded 
during the outbreak, which occurred from 
20 March 2014 to 9 May 2015 (WHO, 2015). 
The epidemic had considerable implica-
tions for Liberia’s development, agricultural 
productivity and economic growth. In fact, 
Ebola is expected to cause development in-
dicators (e.g. Human Development Index, 
poverty, life expectancy) to decline for the 
first time since 2005 (UNDP, 2015).
Post-Conflict Agricultural Context
As other post-conflict economic sectors strug-
gled to rebuild, many Liberians reverted to 
small-scale agricultural production. In a 2007 
report, the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) 
described food crop production as Liberia’s 
‘most important source of livelihood’ (p. 13) 
and reported that agriculture was the main 
income-generating activity of 74% of Liber-
ians. In 2013, the agricultural sector still made 
up 76.9% of the national gross domestic 
product (GDP) (CIA, n.d.).
Liberia also has significant potential for 
agricultural growth. The country contains 
huge amounts of arable lands and fertile 
swamps due to topsoil accumulation (FAO, 
n.d. b). Liberia receives 240 cm (94 inches) 
of precipitation annually (FAO, n.d. a), an 
extremely high amount relative to other West 
African countries. Improved water manage-
ment and usage of arable land could increase 
production, food security and livelihoods for 
Liberian farmers (MoA, 2007).
Despite its importance and potential, the 
agricultural sector was also devastated by the 
Liberian civil war. Overall production 
levels of rice, cassava and maize were much 
lower than before the war (FAO, n.d., c), and 
food security dropped to crisis levels for many 
Liberians. During the early post-conflict 
period, food aid was provided to address 
emergency shortages, but little was done to 
improve domestic production. By 2007, food 
insecurity still affected 80% of rural house-
holds (MoA, 2007), with people displaced by 
conflict up to 20% more food insecure 
(Ghimire et al., 2013). Female-headed house-
holds, the number of which increased due to 
conflict, also showed lower productivity per 
hectare and correspondingly lower food secur-
ity and income levels (Ghimire et al., 2013).
Staple crop production declined for 
several reasons. Large landholdings and 
plantation systems were targeted during the 
conflict as symbols of oppression and mar-
ginalization (Unruh, 2009). Plantations were 
often abandoned as owners and laborers 
were displaced, and post-war land-rights 
issues made restarting plantation agriculture 
problematic.
Efforts to restart large-scale production 
have centered on farmers’ groups and produ-
cers’ organizations. However, virtually all ex-
isting farmers’ groups dissolved as farmers 
were displaced during the conflict, and a slow 
and difficult reintegration and reconciliation 
process made their revival and rehabilita-
tion during the early post-conflict period dif-
ficult (Fearon et al., 2009). Farmers’ groups 
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are more viable today, but are still affected 
by community dynamics and post-conflict 
tensions.
The conflict also changed the character-
istics of rural labor. Rebel movements primar-
ily originated in rural areas and also in the 
three counties (Bong, Lofa and Nimba) con-
sidered the nation’s breadbasket (Humphreys 
and Richards, 2005; Stack and Brabazon, 
2008). Since these were the epicenter of 
fighting, rural peoples in this region were 
displaced and fled towards neighboring 
Guinea or the coastal capital of Monrovia. 
Nearly half (45.5%) of Liberians displaced 
from these areas fled to Guinea, where many 
resettled or remain in refugee camps (Ghimire 
et al., 2013). As a result, many rural areas were 
underpopulated when the fighting ceased.
Prior to the war, young men had com-
prised much of the agricultural workforce. 
However, many rural youth were displaced 
or mobilized into armed groups (Stack and 
Brabazon, 2008). Post-conflict youth are 
largely uninterested in agriculture, prefer-
ring economic activities in other sectors or in 
urban areas, and often lack the requisite 
skills to succeed in the sector, even if they 
do express a desire to join the workforce 
( Blattman and Annan, 2012).
As a result, the overall demographics of 
the rural agricultural workforce changed. The 
majority of farmers in post-conflict Liberia 
are older than 50 (USAID, 2008b), and most 
are women (MoA, 2008b). These groups are 
less suited to labor activities common to 
plantation systems (MoA, 2007). Furthermore, 
female-headed households are generally 
poorer (MoA, 2007) and less able to employ 
workers (Moore, 2014). Because the work-
force made reinstituting plantation-style 
agriculture untenable, the majority of post- 
conflict agricultural production is small 
scale and largely for subsistence purposes 
(Ghimire et al., 2013).
Agricultural production was also com-
promised by the widespread destruction of 
agricultural and non-agricultural infrastruc-
ture. Fighting damaged bridges and roads 
needed to bring agricultural products to mar-
kets, as well as limiting penetration of whole-
sale buyers and increasing the transport costs 
of seeds and inputs during the post-conflict 
period. Even in 2012, 94% of roads in Liberia 
remained unpaved, and many become im-
passable during the rainy season (Shor, 2012). 
Currently a major road project is underway 
connecting Liberia’s ‘breadbasket’ counties 
to the capital (Moore, 2014). However, in the 
meantime farmers struggle to take produce 
to market, which reduces their returns and acts 
as a disincentive to large-scale production.
Other infrastructure was also affected. 
Irrigation infrastructure was widely des-
troyed, especially in swamp-based rice sys-
tems in the rural north. In 2013, only 5% of 
farmers had access to irrigation infrastruc-
ture (Ghimire et al., 2013). Government build-
ings, including those of CARI and other 
agricultural extension facilities, were looted 
and burned. Liberia’s main energy source, the 
Mount Coffee hydroelectric plant in Mont-
serrado County, was damaged in the conflict 
and is still being rebuilt (IFC, 2013), which 
limits processing and storage capacities and 
accelerates post-harvest loss.
Agricultural tools and inputs were stolen, 
lost or destroyed during the war, as people 
fled rural areas. Farmers operating after the 
war lacked even the most basic tools to pre-
pare fields, weed and harvest. They also 
lacked the seeds, rootstock and plant mater-
ial needed to quickly resume production. 
Donor agencies distributed agricultural in-
puts and equipment to farmers in the early 
post-conflict period, but these conditions 
slowed the redevelopment of the agricultural 
sector (Ghimire et al., 2013).
Significance of Agriculture  
and Agricultural Extension
Despite the challenges, agricultural devel-
opment is fundamental to reconstruction, 
peace and stability, and to overall develop-
ment in post-conflict Liberia. The transitional 
government identified the importance 
of rebuilding agriculture in early policy 
documents. Liberia signed the 2003 Com-
prehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme (CAADP) agreement, which 
committed the country to allotting 10% or 
more of the national budget to agriculture 
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(MoA, 2007; IFPRI, 2013). These early policies 
were subsequently reinforced by President 
Johnson-Sirleaf following her 2005 election 
victory. The new administration placed 
agriculture ‘at the center of reconstruction 
and development efforts’ (MoA, 2007: 1) 
and identified rice as a commodity as im-
portant to national development as oil and 
concrete (Shor, 2012). Liberia’s Poverty 
Reduction Strategy also cited agriculture as 
crucial for economic revitalization (Zinnah 
and Perry, 2011). Furthermore, agriculture was 
viewed as the sector most able to reincor-
porate displaced people and former fighters, 
contributing towards long-term peace and 
stability (Blattman and Annan, 2012).
Specific strategies represent the two 
phases of post-conflict development. Early 
agricultural policies created and implemented 
during the emergency (or relief) phase focused 
mainly on food security. In addition to food 
aid, programs to rebuild large-scale produc-
tion systems, use modern technologies and 
develop value chains and markets for Liber-
ian produce dominated this period (MoA, 
2007). While the Government of Liberia 
lacked the capacity to adequately implement 
this strategy, international donors contrib-
uted funding and programming towards pro-
duction agriculture (USAID, 2008a). Many 
international agencies distributed seeds, tools 
and other inputs designed to help farmers 
restart food and cash crop production. Rice 
production was prioritized through several 
large-scale irrigation and swamp development 
schemes. Increasing production of Liberia’s 
second staple, cassava, has also become a 
deliberate focus of the Government of Liberia 
and international donors (MoA, 2007; MoA, 
2009; DAI, 2012; Moore, 2014).
Agriculture in the development (or 
rehabilitation) phase expanded to better align 
with changing conditions. Stakeholders 
sought to transform the sector to foster both 
large- and small-scale production models 
(MoA, 2008b). Policies began to include ‘pro- 
poor’ strategies designed to enhance the pro-
duction capacity and yields of smallholder 
farmers, thereby improving rural livelihoods 
and increasing incomes (MoA, 2007; MoA, 
2008a, 2009). This livelihood-centric focus 
was intended to address poverty, build local 
food security and promote stability in rural 
areas (MoA, 2007; MoA, 2008a; MoA, 2009). 
The Ebola epidemic led to a downturn in 
agricultural yields and an increase in food 
insecurity, leading to increased efforts that 
reinforced the focus on agricultural develop-
ment (World Bank, 2015b).
Post-Conflict Agricultural Extension
Swanson et al. (1997) described food secur-
ity and rural livelihood development as the 
two primary objectives of agricultural exten-
sion. Similarly, during the post-conflict period, 
Liberia prioritized both objectives and re-
lied heavily on agricultural extension to reach 
its development objectives (MoA, 2007).
Whereas pre-war extension services were 
provided largely by the MoA (Moore, 2014), 
in the current post-war phase the system is 
composed of a range of actors. At the center is 
the MoA’s Department of Rural Development, 
Extension, and Research (DRDER). A total of 
134 extensionists work in the DRDER (Moore, 
2014), including 72 field-based extension offi-
cers serving Liberia’s 15 counties (McNamara 
et al., 2011). Each county contains County 
Agricultural Coordinators (CACs) and District 
Agricultural Extension Officers (DAOs), sup-
ported by regional subject matter specialists 
responsible for multiple counties (MoA, 2007; 
USAID, 2008a; USAID, 2009).
The demographics of public extension 
personnel were substantially impacted by 
the conflict. The majority of extension ad-
ministrators, but also most field-level offi-
cers, are over 50 years old. Many had served 
since before the conflict and are expected to 
retire in the next few years (USAID, 2008b; 
McNamara et al., 2011). During the conflict 
itself, younger extension officers fled, due to 
security concerns and the inability to draw a 
salary as services were suspended (MoA, 
2007). As a result of this ‘brain drain’ there 
was a need to restock the extension system 
after peace was re-established (Eicher, 2006). 
However, the MoA struggles to attract and re-
tain young extension officers, despite wide 
agreement on the need to employ younger 
staff (Moore, 2014).
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In addition, 89.3% of MoA extension 
personnel are male (Moore, 2014). Represen-
tatives from the Farmers Union Network of 
Liberia (FUNL) described this imbalance as 
a major impediment to serving female farm-
ers and an indication of cultural bias and 
inadequate political will rather than a lack 
of qualified candidates (Moore, 2014). The 
MoA is currently undertaking actions to nar-
row the gender gap (Zinnah and Perry, 2011).
While the MoA occupies a central role, 
a large number of donors, international non- 
governmental organizations (INGOs), local 
civil society organizations (or domestic NGOs) 
and a small contingent of private sector actors 
also provide extension services to farmers. 
Liberia experienced a sizeable influx of 
donor-funded projects immediately follow-
ing the 2003 peace agreement, when the 
institutional and operational capacity of its 
government to provide essential services to 
farmers was at its lowest (USAID, 2008a). This 
phenomenon is common in post-conflict or 
post-disaster situations, where injections of 
donor funding are often needed to provide 
services in a vacuum of public capacity 
(Schuller, 2012). Many of these efforts in-
cluded short-term food aid, but also the 
dissemination of inputs and basic exten-
sion services to rapidly restart agricultural 
production.
As Liberia moved from the emergency 
phase into the development phase, many 
organizations ceased operations and were 
replaced by others with different mandates. 
Still others (e.g. the Adventist Development 
and Relief Agency) have shifted from pro-
viding aid to conducting more traditional 
extension activities (Moore, 2014). Approxi-
mately 60 donors and NGOs (both inter-
national and domestic) were operating in 
agricultural extension in 2011 (McNamara 
et al., 2011). Among these are ACDI/VOCA, 
BRAC, Care International, the Food and Agri-
culture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) and Winrock International.
Domestic NGOs and civil society organ-
izations have also proliferated in the early 
development phase, and especially since 
2010. During the conflict and early post-conflict 
period, church-based organizations were the 
predominant actors within civil society. More 
recently, organizations such as the Commu-
nity of Hope Agriculture Project (CHAP), the 
FUNL and the Sustainable Food and Seeds 
Project have emerged to address specific 
needs of the post-conflict period; serve unique 
segments of the population, regions and 
crops; and increasingly work in partnership 
with the MoA, donors and INGOs as they 
grow in number, capacity and relevance 
(Moore, 2014). Meanwhile, the private sec-
tor remains minimally involved in exten-
sion service delivery.
Donor- and NGO-employed extension 
officers are typically much younger and 
more likely to be female than their MoA 
counterparts. These organizations have been 
proactive about hiring and developing recent 
agriculture graduates of the University of 
Liberia and Cuttington University (Feed the 
Future, 2011). Donor projects in particular 
attract younger and more educated workers 
due to higher salaries and better working 
conditions (Swanson and Rajalahti, 2010). 
Often personnel are recruited away from the 
MoA or other agricultural employers because 
the supply of trained extensionists is low, 
having been diluted by conflict and the ‘brain 
drain’ (Eicher, 2006). Donors and NGOs have 
proven far more likely to employ female 
extensionists, although even these organiza-
tions have rarely exceeded a rate of 40% 
women (DAI, 2012; Moore, 2014).
Experiences, Impacts and Issues
Extension in post-conflict Liberia is compli-
cated and faces considerable challenges in 
serving farmers. A range of contextual factors, 
strategies and approaches have been used—
with varying levels of success—in the post- 
conflict period. The following sections 
assess some key issues affecting the extension 
system.
Policy and planning
Post-conflict Liberia has undergone several 
major extension policy shifts between the 
emergency and development phases. Initially 
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Liberia, like many post-conflict countries, 
did not have much formal agricultural policy 
in place. In the first few years following the 
conflict, the MoA largely promoted extension 
policies to rebuild food security through 
speeches, press releases and other informal 
channels. Liberia later signed the CAADP 
agreement, and President Johnson-Sirleaf 
emphasized agricultural production in her 
inaugural policies (MoA, 2007). This approach 
did not always provide a consistent message 
or strategy for agricultural development. 
Without established policy, donors and 
 INGOs implemented their own operational 
policies and many actors used disconnected 
or contradicting development approaches 
in the early post-conflict period.
However, from 2007 to 2009 the MoA 
created several key policies intended to clar-
ify development priorities and shift the 
extension system towards longer-term de-
velopment efforts. These policies discussed 
a pluralistic, participatory, value chain ap-
proach designed to be more appropriate to 
changing conditions than the largely top-
down, technology transfer model used in 
the pre-war period (MoA, 2007; MoA, 2008a; 
MoA, 2009). Policies also included an em-
phasis on livelihood development and 
farmer empowerment strategies.
This policy transition is significant for 
several reasons. It represents a semi-resolution 
of an ongoing revitalization versus modern-
ization debate between extension providers. 
The majority of MoA administrators and 
CACs were trained during the training- and-
visit era when Liberia’s agricultural sector 
was stronger. In several interviews, senior 
administrators cited nostalgia for Liberia’s 
pre-war agriculture and suggested that re-
turning the nation to that model of exten-
sion should be the MoA’s goal (Moore, 2014). 
This mindset was common among the ‘old 
guard’ within the MoA.
In contrast, younger members of the 
MoA were eager to modernize the extension 
system, with support from donors, the INGO 
sector and other domestic partners. The need 
to adapt to post-war conditions has slowly 
gained traction, despite ongoing resistance 
from senior officials. The Modernizing Exten-
sion and Advisory Services (MEAS) project 
was invited to conduct a scoping mission as 
a step towards this objective (MEAS, 2011). 
These transitions have slowly occurred, 
although considerable support from within 
the Liberian government and from outside 
stakeholders is required (MoA, 2007; MoA, 
2008a; MoA, 2009; McNamara et al., 2011).
However, implementation of transitions 
in extension policy has proven slow to match 
the rhetoric. One such policy transition is 
decentralization (USAID, 2009). While decen-
tralization of extension services to the county 
level was an objective of the 2008 and 2009 
policies, administrative procedures remain 
highly centralized and bureaucratic years 
later (Moore, 2014). Activities such as iden-
tifying program foci and priority-setting re-
sponsibilities are largely undertaken at the 
MoA office in Monrovia. Requests for mater-
ials, and especially funding, are also relayed 
by officers through their CACs to the national 
level, where funding and supplies are man-
aged and dispersed (Moore, 2014). Donor 
projects and INGOs are more decentralized. 
Many large programs—such as ACDI/ 
VOCA’s LIFE III program and Development 
Alternatives International (DAI)’s Food and 
Enterprise Development (FED) program—
have county-level offices with relative auton-
omy (MEAS, 2011; DAI, 2012). BRAC has 
community-level programs that operate in-
dependently, depending on the needs of its 
respective sites (BRAC, n.d.).
The MoA’s struggles to decentralize are 
likely to be a legacy of the Liberian conflict. 
Mutual distrust between the central govern-
ment and local authorities is certainly a factor. 
Whereas donor agencies and multinational 
partners (e.g. USAID, World Bank) stress lo-
calization and a decentralized democratic 
process as a means of promoting good gov-
ernance, the post-conflict Liberian govern-
ment may not be willing to expand the 
rights and power of peoples or regions that 
previously fought against the prior regime, 
destroyed government property and targeted 
public servants. This mindset, however 
obscure, is likely to contribute to slow decen-
tralization shifts in Liberia.
Another area of policy discord relates 
to participatory, capacity-building extension 
that promotes farmers’ empowerment. The 
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heavy influx of donor dollars and programs 
providing free seeds, tools and inputs to 
farmers in the emergency phase is thought 
to have created a ‘dependency syndrome’ 
among Liberian farmers that compromises 
current capacity-building programming 
(Chronic Poverty Research Center, 2011). 
Farmers have avoided programs that do not 
include material or financial compensation 
for participating and are reluctant to engage 
in training that might produce longer-term 
capacity building and more sustainable de-
velopment (Moore, 2014). Changing this 
mentality has been a challenge to organiza-
tions implementing participatory extension 
models and requires a unified effort among 
service providers. This shift is particularly 
complicated by a ‘victim mentality’ or sense 
of powerlessness to control one’s own well- 
being, which developed among many Liberians 
as a result of conflict (Bar-Tal et al., 2009).
In addition, while the MoA and many 
donors/INGOs have committed to capacity- 
building strategies, a number of other organ-
izations still actively distribute free inputs 
to farmers. These programs undercut long- 
term capacity building and sustainable de-
velopment of the sector. Progress was being 
made after several years of post-conflict de-
velopment and better coordination between 
extension actors (Moore, 2014), but emergency 
aid stemming from the Ebola epidemic has 
reversed this trend (World Bank, 2015b).
Extension policies lack formal review 
processes to allow for revision and updating 
as circumstances change (Moore, 2014). 
The MoA struggles to evaluate the impact of 
its policies and programs, as do many domes-
tic NGOs (McNamara et al., 2011). Larger 
donor projects and INGOs have effective 
monitoring and evaluation processes to guide 
their operations and strategic planning (DAI, 
2012), but no mechanism exists for these 
evaluations to affect overarching policy at 
the national level. As a result, the extension 
system lacks timely revisions to extension 
policies.
Evidence suggests that poor policy re-
view within public extension is directly 
tied to post-conflict socio-political dynamics 
(Moore, 2014). First, much like the policies 
themselves, revision procedures must be 
developed anew and policy review must be 
conducted by individuals with the requisite 
capacity or experience. Furthermore, policy 
review, and especially review practices that 
include feedback from diverse stakeholders, 
may also be viewed as a threat to stability. 
Inviting opposing parties (often headed by 
former warlords), leaders of different ethnic 
groups, rural farmers or other influential 
stakeholders to critique policy of the ruling 
government could be more contentious than 
beneficial in post-conflict Liberia. Given 
these conditions, reticence to actively pursue 
policy review is not unexpected.
Funding
Funding is a central issue affecting the quality 
and effectiveness of extension. The overall 
budget of Liberia in the post-conflict period 
is compromised by an economy that is in 
the rebuilding phase coupled with a poor 
tax base, while threats of instability deter 
foreign investment and poor institutional 
capacity and governance concerns limit 
donors’ willingness to provide direct lending 
(MoF, 2013). As a result, the Liberian govern-
ment faces considerable challenges related to 
funding its public advisory services. Des-
pite committing 10% of the national budget 
to agriculture through the CAADP agree-
ment, evidence suggests that the actual allo-
cation for agriculture is approximately 3%, 
or US$14 million dollars (IFPRI, 2013; MoF, 
2013). An even smaller amount is dedicated 
to agricultural extension, with rural infrastruc-
ture development (e.g. roads, irrigation sys-
tems) accounting for much of agricultural 
spending (Moore, 2014).
As a result, shortfalls in public agricul-
tural funding restrict services to farmers. 
The MoA is unable to hire sufficient officers 
to provide adequate coverage and to rebalance 
the gender and age of its officers. Retention 
of talented personnel is also a challenge due 
to low salaries and high job-related expenses. 
McNamara et al. (2011) reported that nine 
of 81 officers left the MoA between 2008 
and 2011, because of issues related to salary. 
Moore (2014) also cited multiple complaints 
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from MoA officers about low salaries and the 
desire to leave for more lucrative opportun-
ities elsewhere. Officers often seek other 
income-generating opportunities to supple-
ment their salaries, yet these are few in 
post- conflict Liberia compared with other 
countries with greater stability and a stronger 
private sector (Moore, 2014). Those officers 
who remain with the MoA lack resources to 
conduct training and have insufficient fuel 
allocations for travel to engage with farmers 
(McNamara et al., 2011).
Insufficient funding also impacts the 
MoA’s technical capacity. The ability to re-
construct CARI, and thereby to conduct 
research domestically, is compromised 
(USAID, 2008a), and lack of computers and 
other technologies limits officers’ access to 
web-based information (Swanson, 2011). As 
a result, many officers struggle to provide 
up-to-date information to their farmers. 
Also, funding limits the capacity to pro-
duce print materials or to effectively in-
corporate information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) into extension service 
delivery, despite the potential of these 
channels to address poor coverage and in-
form a wider audience (McNamara et al., 
2011; Zinnah and Perry, 2011; Asenso- Okyere 
and  Mekonnen, 2012).
In contrast, sizeable investments were 
made by donor agencies to provide exten-
sion services in the post-conflict period. 
Donor-led initiatives proliferated in Liberia, 
as in many post-conflict and post-disaster 
countries, due to the vacuum in public ser-
vices as the government rebuilt and the dire 
need for basic agricultural programming. 
A similar influx of donor funding and donor- 
led programming has followed the recent 
Ebola epidemic (World Bank, 2015b).
Several large donor projects and INGOs 
now operate in the country, with a combined 
annual budget of more than US$100 million 
(Moore, 2014). USAID’s funding to Liberia 
has been reported as the highest total within 
Africa, despite the country’s small size and 
population (DAI, 2012). The largest single 
initiative is the FED project managed by DAI. 
This project represented the Obama admin-
istration’s Feed the Future initiative for 
global hunger and food security (Ho and 
Hanrahan, 2011) and focuses on providing 
extension services and developing rice, 
cassava, vegetable and livestock value 
chains (DAI, 2012). The budget of FED 
alone (US$76 million over 5 years) exceeded 
that of the Liberian government (Moore, 
2014). Other donor agencies and organiza-
tions, such as ACDI/VOCA, FAO, Winrock 
International and the World Bank, have also 
operated highly funded projects to develop 
staple and cash crop production (World 
Bank, 2015a).
These funding levels allow donor pro-
jects and INGOs to hire and retain the most 
highly skilled extensionists available, and 
even to attract those displaced by conflict back 
to Liberia. These organizations can also pro-
vide pre- and in-service training to their 
workers, supply and maintain vehicles to 
allow operations in remote rural areas, and 
produce print and ICT-based training mater-
ials. All of these factors provide a significant 
advantage that is reflected in the quality of 
extension services and the corresponding 
preference by farmers for working with 
donor-led projects and INGOs, as opposed 
to with the Liberian government (Moore, 
2014). Funding is therefore the single largest 
factor influencing extension service delivery 
in post-conflict Liberia.
Pluralism and coordination
As discussed, the early post-conflict period 
saw a range of extension providers acting 
without coordinated policy and strategic 
plans. More recent policies have promoted 
pluralism, and the MoA has sought to foster 
an effective pluralistic extension system. 
The 2007 Comprehensive Assessment of 
the Agriculture Sector stated this goal: ‘The 
extension system needs to transform from 
the transfer of technology model to a pluralis-
tic extension system that involves multiple 
public and private sector service providers’ 
(MoA, 2007: xvii).
The Liberian MoA actively promotes 
itself as a central facilitator and monitor. 
The government holds Agricultural Coordin-
ation Committee (ACC) meetings that gather 
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service providers at the national and county 
levels to help coordinate extension activities, 
avoid duplication of programs, share chal-
lenges and lessons learned, and maximize 
resources (Zinnah and Perry, 2011; Moore, 
2014). Stakeholders from the MoA, donor-led 
projects, INGOs, domestic NGOs and the 
civil sector all cited the value of these forums 
in working towards an effective pluralistic 
system (Moore, 2014).
However, the practical realities of imple-
menting pluralistic extension in post-conflict 
Liberia remain challenging. Power dynamics 
developed after the conflict that significantly 
affect pluralism in extension provision. 
Specifically, the MoA and the donor/NGO 
sector are not equal partners. International 
agencies took the lead in providing emer-
gency food aid and extension services in the 
early post-conflict period (MoA, 2007). Even 
after a certain level of institutional capacity 
and governmental stability had developed, 
the MoA still relies heavily on international 
actors to serve Liberian farmers (Moore, 2014).
Funding differences in particular create 
this need. Simply put, the extremely well- 
funded donor-led and INGO programs have 
the capacity to hire and train talented officers, 
develop effective training curricula and ma-
terials, provide comprehensive services and 
inputs to farmers, and travel to serve farm-
ers in remote areas, while the MoA struggles 
in all these respects.
Although policy asserts the need to 
work together at the field level, collaboration 
and partnership dynamics are quite skewed 
and heavily reliant on the donor/INGO sector 
to buoy the MoA in conducting extension 
activities. Limited resources and capacities 
leave most MoA officers unable to offer 
much assistance to their counterparts work-
ing with donor-led and/or INGO projects. In 
many cases, these officers and MoA officers 
have conducted joint training, but more 
commonly the capacity gap has repositioned 
officers with donor/INGO projects as lead-
ers and MoA officers as learners at the level 
of client farmers (Moore, 2014).
Both the MoA and donor/INGO sectors 
are acutely aware of these power dynamics, 
and consequently have different levels of 
motivation to pursue pluralism. Because 
many donor-led or INGO extension providers 
began operating during a period in which 
national policy was absent and the govern-
ment lacked the capacity to operate, many 
international organizations became accus-
tomed to operating independently. At the 
same time, donors/INGOs recognize that the 
MoA is reliant on their involvement, that 
they are driving the extension system and 
that correspondingly the MoA does not have 
the authority to significantly affect their 
operations. Convincing these organizations 
to foster pluralism in a more active manner, 
share resources and information, coordinate 
with the national government and adhere to 
overarching policy or strategic plans is a 
major challenge. In fact, some donor-led pro-
jects and INGOs (e.g. ACDI/VOCA, FED) have 
questioned whether pluralism really bene-
fits their organizations or whether it instead 
represents an unnecessary use of their time 
and resources (Moore, 2014).
Nevertheless, most donor programs have 
increased their efforts to collaborate with the 
Liberian government in recent years. Donor 
programs and INGOs now provide consider-
able support to the MoA. ACDI/VOCA, the 
FED program, ZOA and other INGOs fre-
quently invite MoA personnel to participate 
in in-service trainings, provide technical in-
formation and offer transportation to project 
sites (Moore, 2014). Unfortunately, despite 
intentions of equal collaboration by admin-
istrators, unequal capacities and roles at the 
field level often create a top-down relation-
ship between MoA and donor project/INGO 
officers, which leads to tension and further 
complicates partnerships (Moore, 2014). 
Similar dynamics were found between donor 
projects/INGOs and their domestic NGO 
partners, where again disparities in skills and 
funding can lead to a top-down arrangement. 
As a result, pluralism is not functioning 
properly in post-conflict Liberia.
Coverage
An estimated 1 million smallholder farmers 
are active in post-conflict Liberia (CIA, n.d.), 
creating a huge audience for extension and 
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advisory services. However, poor coverage 
by extension providers remains a major 
weakness of the system. As discussed, the 
MoA employed only 72 field-level officers 
in 2014. All 15 counties employed a CAC 
but only half of Liberia’s 68 districts had a 
dedicated DAO (USAID, 2008a). This results 
in extremely high farmer-to-officer ratios 
(1000:1 to 5000:1).
Poor coverage, while certainly not unique 
to post-conflict countries, is tied to Liberia’s 
conflict. Vacant posts are often distributed 
along ethnopolitical lines, specifically with 
regard to the role of different groups in the 
conflict. The ‘breadbasket’ counties of Bong, 
Lofa and Nimba, the site of several rebel 
movements and home to a number of post- 
conflict parliamentarians, are generally well 
stocked with extension officers and receive 
considerable development attention. In 
contrast, southeastern counties, home to the 
Krahn ethnic group and the indigenous rebel 
leader Samuel Doe, who initiated the 1980 
coup, have many fewer officers and receive 
considerably less development attention 
(Moore, 2014). Safety and security concerns 
also affect officer placement (Moore, 2014), 
largely depending on different regions’ feel-
ings of ‘insiderness’ versus ‘outsiderness’ with 
respect to the Liberian government.
Even in areas where its personnel are 
present, other factors have left MoA officers 
simply unable to serve all potential clients. 
Vehicles issued to CACs are used heavily to 
attend central administrative meetings and 
sparingly for projects (McNamara et al., 2011). 
A handful of DAOs were issued motor-
cycles, although the low fuel allocations left 
many officers unable to use them. DAOs 
have reported spending their own salaries 
to hire transport to reach farmers or relying 
on INGOs for occasional transport to their 
client communities (Moore, 2014), which 
was not considered a sustainable operating 
model. As a result, Moore (2014) found that 
virtually all farmers interviewed never inter-
acted with government extension officers, 
and that rural, female and youth farmers 
were the least likely to receive services from 
the MoA.
Donor-led projects and international 
and domestic NGOs play an important role 
in addressing coverage challenges. As a 
component of partnership and pluralism 
policies, some projects, INGOs and local 
NGOs coordinate activities with the MoA to 
operate in areas where the government lacks 
the capacity to serve. For example, officers 
employed by the FED program help to serve 
in remote rural areas of Nimba and Lofa 
County that are otherwise understaffed by 
the MoA (DAI, 2012). However, these organ-
izations generally work intensively with 
small groups of farmers, meaning their over-
all contribution to coverage is small (MEAS, 
2011).
Many local NGOs and civil society 
organizations (e.g. CHAP, FUNL) also pro-
vide short-term services. This group of service 
providers is still growing and has limited 
capacity to contribute, but has been success-
ful in working with otherwise marginalized 
audiences, such as female farmers, youth 
and farmers in remote areas of the country 
(including the traditionally underserved 
southeastern counties) (Moore, 2014). Still, 
despite these efforts, there are not enough 
extension personnel to serve all Liberian 
farmers, a factor that severely compromises 
the development of the agricultural sector. 
The ongoing capacity to expand coverage 
may also change when donor funding tied 
to post-conflict reconstruction—and later to 
Ebola response, which is a primary source 
of operational funding for domestic NGOs—
is reduced in the future.
Extension Approaches/Models
Demand-driven extension (participatory 
extension models)
Making the transition to demand-driven and 
participatory models, based on farmer-led 
priority setting, hands-on and demonstration- 
based teaching and peer-to-peer learning, 
has proven difficult for the Liberian MoA 
(MEAS, 2011; Swanson, 2011). As previously 
described, an unwillingness to empower 
regions or ethnic groups with ties to the 
Liberian conflict to ‘demand’ services from 
the government is possibly a product of the 
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civil war, even though the Liberian government 
verbally promotes such bottom-up extension 
approaches.
Placing emphasis on participatory and 
learner-centric extension has also been a 
challenge. Consequently, many MoA per-
sonnel, especially older officers who served 
in extension before and through the conflict 
and were trained during the technology 
transfer era when workshops and lectures 
were emphasized, have struggled to adapt 
to this philosophical shift (USAID, 2008b).
Liberia’s agricultural institutions (e.g. 
Cuttington University, University of Liberia) 
similarly fail to prepare younger officers with 
participatory skills (McNamara et al., 2011; 
Moore, 2014). Agricultural institutions in 
countries emerging from conflict often lack 
quality instructors due to displacement and 
attrition, use outdated curricula and strug-
gle with issues of social cohesion—all factors 
that compromise the quality and relevance 
of the education received by graduates 
(Buckland, 2005). This phenomenon also 
affects the knowledge and skills of Liberian 
graduates, who learn production and tech-
nical skills but lack capacity in participatory 
extension (Moore, 2014).
Lack of professional development is 
also a factor. While recent policies and ad-
ministrative decisions have repositioned 
field-level MoA officers as facilitators, com-
munity mobilizers and communicators 
( Sulaiman and Davis, 2012; Ganpat, 2013), 
no corresponding pre- or in-service training 
has been provided to retool these officers 
for their new responsibilities, due to fund-
ing and logistical limitations. MoA officers 
therefore lack capacity in participatory 
extension (McNamara et al., 2011).
The legacy of conflict may also create 
reluctance on the part of field-level officers 
to empower farmers to demand services. 
Some officers indicated that this reposition-
ing of power dynamics affected perceptions 
of safety and security but also social standing 
(Moore, 2014). Combined with lack of train-
ing, this mindset severely compromises 
attempts to move towards demand- driven 
extension.
In contrast, donor-led projects and 
 INGOs have proven to be very successful at 
incorporating participatory extension methods 
into their work with farmers:
 1. These organizations do not face the same 
post-conflict concerns. Empowering farmers 
to better dictate extension programming is 
seen as a positive endeavor to promote dem-
ocracy, transparency and good governance, 
whereas the MoA has shown reluctance to 
fully engage in demand-driven models for 
the same reasons (Moore, 2014).
 2. These organizations benefit from an op-
erational strategy that is more conducive to 
participatory extension. Whereas the MoA 
is tasked with serving as many Liberian 
farmers as possible, donors and INGOs stra-
tegically focus on providing regular, com-
prehensive and longer-term services to fewer 
farmers. This level of interaction and respon-
siveness allows officers to develop trust 
with their farmers and to better understand 
their challenges and needs, which is essen-
tial for participatory extension to be effect-
ive (Swanson et al., 1997).
 3. Donor-led projects and INGOs also have 
the resources to better prepare their person-
nel in participatory extension methodolo-
gies. Field-level FED officers receive thorough 
pre- and in-service training that includes 
not only crop-specific technical information 
but also facilitation, agribusiness and coopera-
tive management skills (DAI, 2012). They 
do not rely on the aforementioned agricul-
tural universities and colleges to develop 
these skills and are therefore more capable 
and effective when working with farmers 
(Swanson, 2011; Moore, 2014).
In recognition of this gap, many donor pro-
jects and INGOs (e.g. ACDI/VOCA, FED) 
have made officer training available to 
members of the MoA. Unfortunately, with-
out funding for transportation, lodging and 
daily expenses, the participation levels re-
main low and the potential benefits of free, 
high-quality professional development train-
ing are not maximized by the Liberian gov-
ernment (Moore, 2014).
This capacity gap also impacts the use 
of demonstrations and hands-on teaching. 
The use of demonstrations is heavily advo-
cated by extension service providers (MoA, 
2007). MoA administrators and field-level 
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extensionists consistently acknowledge the 
benefits of ‘learning by doing’ in retaining 
information and adopting new practices. 
However, the MoA lacks the tools, seeds 
and other resources to perform effective 
demonstrations, making the model difficult 
to implement for most field-level officers 
(Moore, 2014).
Land for demonstration sites is limited. 
In 2011 the MoA intended to create demon-
stration farms to accompany each county 
office, for conducting farmer field days and 
trialing new crop varieties and farming 
methods (McNamara et al., 2011; Swanson, 
2011). However, by 2014 only one county 
had a functional demonstration farm (Moore, 
2014), suggesting the approach was more 
easily verbalized than operationalized.
The donor/INGO sector took a different 
approach that proved more successful. 
Rather than creating and operating their 
own sites, donors and INGOs identified ‘lead 
farmers’ from within their client base and 
obtained permission to use a portion of 
those individuals’ land to conduct demon-
strations and trials (Moore, 2014). This 
model placed the demonstration site central 
to where farmers worked, helped promote 
local buy-in by allowing the lead farmer to 
benefit from the innovations tested with-
out risk to his/her own production and 
 reduced maintenance costs to implement-
ing organizations.
The demonstration farm approach also 
tied in closely with the promotion of peer-to- 
peer learning and information sharing within 
farmers’ groups. The formation of strong and 
functional farmers’ groups has been compli-
cated in post-conflict Liberia. Social cohesion 
issues arising from the displacement and re-
integration of rural peoples present chal-
lenges (Fearon et al., 2009), as do concerns 
that farmers’ groups are more easily mobil-
ized (Unruh, 2009). Early aid programs that 
provided seeds, equipment and other inputs 
frequently resulted in the ad hoc creation of 
groups of farmers who were not traditionally 
affiliated, only to separate after input distri-
bution was complete (Moore, 2014). This ten-
dency made it difficult to conduct longer-term 
group projects that required cohesion and 
continued participation.
Certain regions also have cultural ten-
dencies to work together or work apart. For 
example, the counties of Bong, Lofa and 
Nimba practice a kuu system whereby farm-
ers arrange themselves into groups and ro-
tate between farms to complete otherwise 
time-consuming tasks. Kuus have leaders and 
share information among members more 
readily (Moore, 2014). On the other hand, 
there is a cultural reluctance in some regions, 
such as the Krahn-dominated Liberian south-
east, to be ‘grouped’ by the government or 
other extension providers. The perception 
is that farmers in this region view exten-
sion information as a competitive advan-
tage and do not readily share with neighbors 
(Moore, 2014). Inability to practice group-
based approaches has deterred some pro-
viders from working there. However, 
post-conflict ethnopolitical factors may 
also be involved, especially since the heav-
ily indigenous region produced Samuel 
Doe and was central to initiating the Liber-
ian conflict. Negotiating group dynamics 
and tailoring extension programming to cul-
tural differences has been a challenge and 
remains a point of focus in the post-conflict 
period.
Another prominent peer-to-peer learning 
strategy is the Farmer Field School model, 
which the MoA promotes heavily (MoA, 
2007; USAID, 2008a). Farmer Field Schools 
involve central training sites that enroll and 
train lead farmers in a range of production 
skills to share with their respective commu-
nities, thereby spreading information to 
new audiences (Davis et al., 2010).
Where social cohesion and group-based 
farming is effective, the Farmer Field School 
approach has been quite successful in Li-
beria. In an analysis of farmers’ perspec-
tives, Moore (2014) found that participant 
farmers described considerable knowledge 
and skill acquisition and routinely expressed 
their intention to train their neighbors. Efforts 
to tie Farmer Field Schools to existing kuus 
has particular promise, as recent efforts to 
identify kuu leaders as lead farmers and 
encourage their participation in Farmer 
Field Schools have been extremely effective 
in spreading new varieties and methods 
(Moore, 2014).
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However, the MoA has limited capacity 
to implement the approach. Lack of demon-
stration sites, poor technical capacity of 
trainers and insufficient resources to oper-
ate the schools remain problematic (USAID, 
2008a). Again, donors, INGOs and specific-
ally the FED program are the leaders in 
the  Farmer Field School model in Liberia 
(Moore, 2014).
Market-driven extension (value  
chain approach)
Efforts to modernize extension in post- 
conflict Liberia also include broadening the 
focus on production to include a full value 
chain approach (Zinnah and Perry, 2011). 
Following the absence of cohesive policy 
and development strategy in the early post- 
conflict period, this objective is now a near 
consensus among public, donor-led and NGO 
service providers. Market-driven extension 
was included as a priority of the MoA’s 
2008 policy (MoA, 2008b). Value chain de-
velopment is also a key component of the 
Feed the Future initiative and therefore the 
FED program (Ho and Hanrahan, 2011; 
DAI, 2012). With the two most influential 
service providers promoting ‘agriculture as 
a business’ (Moore, 2014: 148), other donor 
projects, INGOs and civil society organiza-
tions have refocused their strategies to fol-
low suit.
Agreement on this priority helps to 
avoid competing agendas in service delivery. 
Coordination at the national level, in policy 
decisions and through the ACC meetings 
has allowed extension providers to priori-
tize specific value chains to avoid duplica-
tion (Moore, 2014). The government is fo-
cusing on rice and cassava value chains, 
supported by the FED program, which focuses 
on the two main staples plus vegetables 
and goats (DAI, 2012; Moore, 2014). BRAC 
programs center on poultry, while ACDI/
VOCA, Winrock International and the 
World Bank emphasize cocoa, coffee, palm 
oil, rubber and other cash crops for inter-
national markets.
However, verbal consensus on value 
chain development leads to different out-
comes when the capacities of providers are 
considered. Despite administrative support, 
the MoA does not have a clear understand-
ing of how to implement the value chain 
approach at the field level. Similar to capaci-
ties in participatory extension, MoA officers 
do not receive adequate training on value 
chain development and are therefore unable 
to incorporate key components (e.g. market-
ing, post-harvest handling, record-keeping) 
needed by farmers (Swanson, 2011). Most 
commonly, MoA officers promote higher 
quantity and quality of production with the 
assertion that this product will be attractive 
to buyers. However, lack of pre-established 
markets is a major obstacle. Liberia, like many 
post-conflict countries, struggles to access 
export markets due to a poorly developed 
trade infrastructure, minimal private sector 
involvement, and post-conflict and now 
Ebola-related stigma facing Liberian produce 
(Agwu et al., 2012). Farmers who target do-
mestic markets often overproduce and over-
estimate demand, which leads to unsold 
and spoiled produce and causes financial 
loss (Moore, 2014). Ebola further comprom-
ised the viability of local markets as buyers 
and producers alike lacked the mobility to 
trade (World Bank, 2015b).
One District Agricultural Extension Offi-
cer pre-arranged a buying agreement with 
the World Food Programme (WFP) to distrib-
ute beans grown by his farmers’ groups to re-
gional refugee camps. This relationship 
closely mirrored the WFP’s Purchase for Pro-
gress (P4P) program, which exists in Liberia 
but on a small scale. Social cohesion con-
cerns, inability of farmers’ groups to meet 
production quotas and lack of rural infra-
structure were cited as reasons (WFP, 2014). 
As a result, this case is unfortunately the ex-
ception and not the rule among MoA value 
chain programs. This individual had partici-
pated in a unique MoA exchange program 
that sent him to India to study agribusiness, 
and the experience provided the motivation 
to pursue this buying arrangement.
Donor projects and the INGO sector 
were far more effective at promoting the 
value chain approach. Officers receive pre- 
and in-service training in the range of skills 
needed to teach different components of the 
value chain (Moore, 2014). Again, the MoA 
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is invited to send its officers to these train-
ings. ACDI/VOCA, FED and other projects/
INGOs also train specialists to emphasize 
different areas of the value chain. FED’s 
business extension officers teach record- 
keeping, marketing and other agribusiness 
skills on a rotational basis, while crop pro-
duction specialists guide farmers’ groups 
through growing specific crops (DAI, 2012).
Donors’/INGOs’ model of long-term in-
volvement with smaller groups of farmers 
also allows different trainings and interven-
tions held at different stages of the agribusi-
ness chain, from planning, predetermining 
markets and record-keeping to post-harvest 
processing, storage and sales (Moore, 2014). 
When possible, organizations collaborate to 
maximize different agencies’ relative strengths 
within the value chain. For example, while 
FED is effective in teaching agribusiness 
skills to farmers, the overall value chain is 
backstopped by equipment and processing 
training supplied by the FUNL, German 
Agro Action and the World Bank. The re-
sult is that farmers are linked to markets 
(Moore, 2014).
Institutional Capacity Building
In any post-conflict situation, strengthening 
the capacity of local institutions allows 
more effective and sustained development 
while also promoting governmental stabil-
ity (Arthur, 2011; Cunguara and Moder, 
2011). When the MoA was incapable of pro-
viding extension services during the early 
emergency phase, donors and INGOs oper-
ated in parallel with, or sometimes counter 
to, the MoA in addressing pressing needs 
(MEAS, 2011). These actors prioritized 
emergency aid and service provision and 
did not emphasize or devote much time or 
resources to building institutional capacity. 
Without direct support, Liberia’s public ex-
tension capacity increased slowly but still 
remains low. Following 2008 policies that 
called for collaboration and partnership, 
many large donor projects and INGOs (e.g. 
ACDI/VOCA, FED) have included a mandate 
to build MoA capacity in their programming 
(DAI, 2012; Moore, 2014). The impending 
end to many project and funding cycles 
may also have served as a call to action.
However, strategic planning towards 
this objective is largely informal, and con-
crete activities to build the administrative 
capacity of the MoA are lacking. In addition, 
disparities in skills and funding lead to a 
top-down arrangement. Many donor organ-
izations and INGOs attempt to include the 
MoA in their operations as a teaching strat-
egy. Other efforts include disseminating 
technical information to the MoA, inviting 
MoA personnel to participate in in-service 
trainings and joint planning sessions, and 
providing transport assistance when feas-
ible (McNamara et al., 2011; Moore, 2014). 
However, donors and INGOs still remain 
the drivers of planning and operations.
In many ways, these efforts echo earlier 
emergency-phase models of distributing 
inputs to farmers. Providing access to tech-
nical information does not increase the 
MoA’s capacity to conduct its own research, 
and distributing donor/INGO extension 
materials does not enable the MoA to create 
its own print or online resources. These 
strategies may pay short-term dividends, 
but their long-term impact is questionable.
Stronger efforts to incorporate MoA per-
sonnel into professional development train-
ings could have far greater long-term bene-
fits. This training could potentially build 
sustainable administrative and technical 
skills within the public sector. Indeed, ad-
ministrative training in Monrovia is effective 
and frequently attended, since transporta-
tion and lodging are not concerns for MoA 
participants. Unfortunately, MoA personnel 
are far less able to participate at the field level 
due to the aforementioned financial and logis-
tical barriers. Donors and INGOs have not 
shown adequate efforts to remove barriers and 
maximize capacity-building opportunities 
(Moore, 2014).
Donors and INGOs also have a loose 
mandate to develop the capacity of domes-
tic NGOs and civil society organizations. 
The Feed the Future initiative and major 
multilateral donors (e.g. Gates Foundation, 
World Bank) have advocated partnership 
between international and domestic NGOs 
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in serving farmers (Ho and Hanrahan, 2011). 
In Liberia, many donors and INGOs delegate 
field-level operations to local organizations 
but retain management over funds and ma-
terials. This model places domestic NGOs 
between clients and donor agencies, and 
sometimes makes aligning donor and client 
agendas difficult (Schuller, 2012; Moore, 2014). 
Furthermore, access to technical informa-
tion and inclusion in professional develop-
ment trainings was insufficient to build the 
capacity of domestic NGOs, which strug-
gled greatly with administration, financial 
management, fundraising and advocacy 
skills that were not adequately addressed by 
donor partners (Blagescu and Young, 2006).
Implications and Recommendations
Liberia provides several important lessons 
and implications for other post-conflict coun-
tries. While many of the specific details are 
relative to the Liberian context, the overall 
themes are likely to be common to other 
nations practicing agricultural extension 
following violence and warfare. Similarly, 
key elements can be identified to effectively 
rebuild agricultural extension systems and 
programs in post-conflict settings. These are:
• Flexibility to adjust to changing policy 
environments and willingness to engage 
in policy creation and review.
• Sufficient, consistent and creatively 
utilized funding to support effective ex-
tension strategies and programs.
• Genuine commitment to and action to-
wards pluralism in service delivery.
• Innovation in addressing coverage gaps 
and balancing personnel to meet farmers’ 
needs.
• Conflict-sensitive extension approaches.
• Appropriate pre- and in-service train-
ing to support transitions in extension 
philosophies.
• Balanced coverage of all value chain 
elements to promote livelihood devel-
opment.
• Commitment to and efforts towards 
institutional capacity building by inter-
national agencies.
Each component requires individual dis-
cussion, as follows:
 1. Extension providers in post-conflict 
settings must be capable of working in an 
environment without set policies, willing to 
engage in collaborative policy creation and 
review processes, and flexible enough to ad-
here to new national policies and strategic 
plans when these are put in place. Post- 
conflict countries should expect a certain 
lack of synchronicity in extension during 
the early period as policies are developed, 
especially when donors and INGOs act au-
tonomously and independently of govern-
ments to deliver emergency services. As 
government capacity allows, all stakeholders 
involved in extension service delivery 
should be prepared to engage in policy cre-
ation and planning efforts.
Inclusive policy making is critically 
important to post-conflict extension. It is es-
sential to synchronize philosophies, strat-
egies and objectives to avoid competing 
agendas that undercut one another. Govern-
ments that do not include other providers in 
policy making may face problems when 
policies are installed that do not align with 
existing donor/INGO strategies. For example, 
models of giving inputs versus building 
capacity affected outcomes in Liberia (Moore, 
2014), and similar instances should be 
avoided. Also, while post-conflict govern-
ments should be central to policy making, 
donors and INGOs can help to create policy 
that is mutually beneficial, while simul-
taneously building institutional capacity 
in policy creation processes. Likewise, in-
put from beneficiaries can allow policies 
to better represent the needs of farmers 
(Swanson, 2013).
In addition, donor organizations and 
INGOs must be receptive to policy shifts 
and support the implementation of policy, 
even if this means changing operational 
strategies. Failure to do so undercuts the 
efficacy of extension policy, leads to coun-
terproductive power dynamics, undermines 
burgeoning governments and affects stabil-
ity (Collier, 2006; Arthur, 2011).
Policy also needs to be flexible and 
allow for revisions as circumstances change. 
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Regular and systematic policy reviews must 
be planned and implemented in post-conflict 
extension systems. This requires governmen-
tal, non-governmental, private and civil soci-
ety providers to conduct regular evaluation 
and to use adaptive management strategies, 
so that policies and year-to-year operating plans 
best represent the rapidly changing context 
found in post-conflict settings (Swanson et al., 
1997; Rossi et al., 2004).
 2. Funding levels and trends are central 
to the effectiveness and sustainability of ex-
tension systems. In Liberia, and likely in 
other post-conflict settings, funding levels 
determined coverage, capacity of person-
nel, access to technical information and 
other aspects of the system (USAID, 2008a; 
MEAS, 2011). Funding trends are also tied 
to the ‘bubble’ phenomenon of emergency 
aid, which is extremely high immediately 
following conflict or a major disaster but 
then declines (Schuller, 2012). When gov-
ernments are underfunded, extension ser-
vices available to farmers wax and wane 
with donor funding levels. For example, an-
ticipated reductions in donor funding in Li-
beria called into question the sustainability 
of present service levels.
Large funding disparities between exten-
sion actors also create issues of power and 
accountability (Swanson and Rajalahti, 2010). 
These are particularly problematic when 
governments and domestic agencies are dis-
empowered within their own countries. 
Post- conflict governments face additional 
challenges soliciting direct funding due to 
minimal track records of responsible borrow-
ing, perceptions of poor governance and low 
institutional capacity. Multilateral donors are 
often hesitant to lend to post-conflict govern-
ments due to stability concerns and uncertain 
economic growth potential (Collier, 2006), 
even though these nations are likely the most 
in need of capital. To avoid directly funding 
government ministries, one option is to sup-
port the operations of field-level officers by 
addressing MoA funding shortfalls (e.g. trans-
portation, materials), thereby leveraging fund-
ing to provide better public services while 
also building local capacity.
 3. Commitments to pluralism must be 
 extended beyond the boardroom and into 
field-level operations. Providers must do a 
better job of identifying and utilizing the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of actors 
within the system. For example, the Liber-
ian MoA recognized donors’/INGOs’ tech-
nical advantage but did not adequately 
 leverage this resource to its own benefit 
( USAID, 2008a; MEAS, 2011). Partners must 
seek ways to address any detrimental weak-
nesses. This may involve donors/ INGOs 
and the MoA working together to remove 
barriers to participation in professional de-
velopment trainings.
Ministries of agriculture should also be 
wary of deferring too much of service deliv-
ery to donors, INGOs and the private sector. 
In Liberia this led to problems when the 
MoA attempted to implement policy and 
strategic planning in an environment where 
donors and INGOs had previously operated 
autonomously (Moore, 2014). Also, many 
international organizations operate on short- 
term funding cycles (Schuller, 2012), which 
affects the availability of services when agen-
cies’ funding decreases or contracts end.
Expecting that privatized extension 
will become available to fill this void is not 
a viable strategy. Private sector development 
is often slow in post-conflict countries, due 
to instability, inefficient governments, poor 
infrastructure and a suboptimal business cli-
mate. In Liberia, the current model is to quickly 
commercialize groups of farmers so that 
they can eventually pay for private services 
(MoA, 2007). Unfortunately, there is little 
evidence to suggest that the private sector 
will be ready to take over in the near future.
Instead, ministries of agriculture should 
be more involved in activities that foster a 
sustainable pluralistic system with multiple 
service providers. Facilitating effective 
coordination and removing barriers for out-
side actors to operate is a vital role for post- 
conflict governments faced with low capaci-
ties to provide direct services. Monitoring 
better-funded donor projects or INGOs can 
help to ensure that extension activities 
follow national policy and move towards 
development objectives (Swanson et al., 
1997). Profit-driven private extension ser-
vices should be encouraged through the 
 removal of barriers to their operation, but 
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must also be monitored to prevent them 
from disproportionately benefitting finan-
cially successful farmers with the capacity 
to pay, while underserving poor, female or 
other marginalized farmer populations 
(Feder et al., 1999). Without governmental 
oversight, this could potentially lead to the 
same levels of disparity that contributed to 
conflict in the first place.
 4. Considerable coverage limitations and 
high farmer-to-officer ratios are common to 
extension in the developing world and are 
particularly unlikely to be addressed in 
post- conflict countries (Birner et al., 2011). 
Even with donor and INGO funding and 
personnel numbers at peak levels, most 
Liberian farmers do not receive direct ser-
vices from providers. Alternative means are 
needed to minimize coverage gaps in Liberia 
and other post-conflict settings.
Although direct funding that allows 
ministries to employ more officers is unlikely, 
one potential avenue is to use community- 
based extension volunteers. The FED pro-
gram employs youth in this role (Moore, 2014), 
and a number of other countries advocate 
the coverage benefits of farmer-to-farmer 
extension approaches (Franzel, 2015). Of 
course, issues of social cohesion, safety and 
security, funding sustainability and indi-
vidual capacity must be considered before 
mobilizing community extensionists in 
post-conflict settings.
Similarly, informal youth officers, espe-
cially those who are lightly subsidized, can 
be a major boon. They are already present in 
the community and know the context, people 
and local language. They can also receive 
basic information from central extension per-
sonnel/institutions by phone, which they 
can then disseminate to farmers for a small 
fee. Also, employing rural youth as extension 
officers may attract these young people to 
remain in or return to agriculture. Providing 
them with nominal employment can also re-
duce their susceptibility to mobilization and 
willingness to engage in further conflict.
The use of ICT to spread information 
messages remains underutilized across the 
developing world but especially in post- 
conflict countries (Asenso-Okyere and 
Mekonnen, 2012). While mobile phones 
represent a way to reach huge numbers of 
farmers in Africa and across the developing 
world with important extension information, 
post-conflict countries still face challenges. 
Often this results from the destruction of 
infrastructure during conflict. In Liberia, 
destruction of the national hydropower 
plant has made the availability of electricity 
a limiting factor. A potential solution in 
contexts of extreme infrastructure limita-
tions is radio. Rural radio has been expanded 
in recent years and now provides extension 
messaging to multiple counties (Swanson, 
2011). Distribution of low-cost solar radios 
may be a feasible alternative and has been 
successful in other post-conflict settings 
(e.g. Timor Leste) where physical infrastruc-
ture was destroyed.
While not addressing overall coverage, 
post-conflict countries that rebalance per-
sonnel can better serve target demographics. 
Extension officers who work with youth, 
women and other marginalized farming 
populations are essential to promoting de-
velopment, peace and stability (Blattman 
and Annan, 2012). In Liberia, many MoA 
extension personnel are older and nearing 
retirement age. At the same time, a large 
pool of talented young extension officers 
may become available as donor programs 
withdraw, including many highly trained 
female officers who are effective in working 
with women farmers (Meinzen-Dick et al., 
2011). A short-term influx of money from 
the Liberian government could fund retire-
ment packages and signing bonuses, to 
entice younger officers to join the MoA. 
Younger officers can better relate to youth 
farmers.
 5. Public extension systems in the develop-
ing world often strive to be more modern, 
decentralized and participatory, and to pro-
vide demand-driven services to farmers 
(Swanson and Rajalahti, 2010). While these 
approaches may be beneficial in stable coun-
tries, decentralization and demand- driven 
extension in particular may not be appro-
priate in the short term for post-conflict 
countries. Empowering local leaders and 
farmers to form groups and have a greater 
capacity to make ‘demands’ of newly estab-
lished governments may be seen not as a 
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path towards more effective extension but 
instead as a threat to peace and stability. In 
Liberia, this may contribute to differences in 
the actions taken by the MoA and those taken 
by the international community. Therefore, 
hesitation by extension administrators in 
post-conflict Liberia to embrace decentral-
ization and demand-driven extension is not 
only understandable but expected. Policy 
makers and agenda setters must take these 
dynamics into account when selecting 
extension models and pursuing extension 
reform.
 6. Philosophical shifts in extension ap-
proaches cannot be effective at the field level 
without corresponding retraining of exten-
sion personnel. Training of extensionists 
often ends during conflicts, meaning that of-
ficers in post-conflict periods may possess 
skills and information that are years out of 
date (Birner et al., 2011). Additionally, ex-
tension officers undergo a process of skill de-
terioration termed ‘forgetting by not doing’ 
when extension services are suspended. 
This further exacerbates capacity decline 
(Collier and Duponchel, 2013: 67).
In Liberia, government extension officers 
need to be retrained in both participatory 
and market-driven extension to address 
these objectives, yet efforts towards this re-
main insufficient (MEAS, 2011; Swanson, 
2011). Some MoA administrators assume 
that trained officers would migrate to the 
MoA after donor projects in Liberia end, 
thereby closing the capacity gap without re-
quiring the MoA to provide its own training 
(Moore, 2014). However, this belief ignores 
the maintenance factors (e.g. low salary, 
lack of materials, poor upward mobility 
within the organization) that deter many of 
these individuals from working for the MoA 
in the first place. Instead, Liberia needs to 
take better advantage of donor or INGO 
training that is available, especially since 
this opportunity will not last forever. Other 
post-conflict countries should also capital-
ize on available avenues to contemporize 
the skills of their officers.
 7. Market-driven extension can only be a 
step towards improved rural livelihoods if 
no gaps remain in the value chain approach. 
In Liberia, extension programs emphasized 
production of a few crops (e.g. rice, cassava, 
cash crops) without considering demand 
and market conditions. Export markets may 
be a more feasible long-term objective, with 
a focus on local markets a more realistic ap-
proach. Greater efforts to engage producers 
in P4P programs that supply refugee camps 
and school feeding programs would be es-
pecially beneficial in post-conflict settings 
where the demand for food aid is high (WFP, 
2014). Coordinated local marketing can also 
avoid local markets being flooded with 
commodities, thereby driving down prices 
received by farmers while increasing the 
prices of other foods that those rural com-
munities consume (FAO, 2013).
Market-driven extension must also pro-
vide adequate training on processing and 
storage while simultaneously implementing 
programs or lending schemes that allow 
farmers to purchase necessary equipment or 
materials. Transportation issues related to 
post-conflict infrastructure conditions, se-
curity concerns, low post-conflict private 
sector involvement and distance to markets 
must also be considered when advocating 
production schemes for farmers. These gaps 
in the value chain approach lead to high 
post-harvest loss in Liberia (Moore, 2014) 
and should be better addressed to truly en-
hance livelihoods.
 8. Capacity-building agendas must focus 
on developing institutions and civil society 
organizations, rather than focusing exclu-
sively on developing the capacities of bene-
ficiaries. Donors must recognize that low 
governmental capacity is an inevitability of 
post-conflict settings, and that enhancing 
rather than circumventing local institutions 
can build institutional capacity to promote 
sustainable growth. Strong domestic actors 
can also provide a better and more sustain-
able level of service to farmers over the long 
term, rather than the peaks and valleys that 
accompany donor initiatives and funding 
cycles (Abi-Ghanem et al., 2013). Also, de-
veloping the ability of ministries of agricul-
ture and local NGOs to serve farmers effect-
ively can foster positive farmer–government 
interactions that promote peace and stability 
(Collier, 2006; Arthur, 2011). Strengthening 
the public and civil sectors could have 
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this  effect in Liberia as well as in other 
post-conflict countries.
Clearly many challenges exist in post- conflict 
extension systems. However, successes and 
opportunities remain abundant even in this 
difficult period. Liberia has made consider-
able progress and has taken many important 
steps towards modern, pluralistic and farm-
er-driven extension that should provide divi-
dends well beyond the agricultural sector. It 
is the responsibility and challenge of individ-
ual post-conflict countries to consider and 
adapt the Liberian case to local conditions. 
This will require innovation, flexibility, col-
laboration and political will, yet the benefits 
can be fundamental to promoting peace, sta-
bility and long-term development.
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Introduction
More than a decade after the 1991–2001 
civil war in Sierra Leone and with the country 
emerging from the Ebola crisis, agricultural 
extension in the country finds itself in a dif-
ficult condition. Despite the numerous agri-
cultural development projects implemented 
since the war’s ending, extension capacity 
remains low. Frontline extension workers 
receive low salaries and routinely lack the 
funds necessary to obtain transport to get to 
the field with farmers or to run programs. 
Along with extension workers from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food 
Security (MAFFS), most districts have a 
number of extension and agricultural devel-
opment programs run by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs).
The nature of the coordination among 
the programs varies dramatically across geo-
graphic areas. Other operational challenges 
facing extension include weak linkages with 
agricultural research and a pipeline of im-
proved agricultural technologies and prac-
tices; gender gaps in reaching women farmers 
and helping them to gain access to land, 
quality inputs and finance; enabling envir-
onment issues such as land access and tenure 
for smallholders; the lack of well-developed 
input markets; very poor road infrastructure 
in some rural areas; and a need to train 
frontline extension workers on agricultural 
technologies as well as on extension process 
skills and information and communication 
technologies (ICTs).
Since the ending of the war, Sierra 
Leone has worked to rebuild infrastructure, 
such as rural roads and agricultural process-
ing capacity in rice and other value chains. 
Furthermore, the Government of Sierra 
Leone (GoSL) has pursued efforts to com-
mercialize agriculture and help farmers 
move from the subsistence agriculture pur-
sued during the war years to more market- 
oriented agriculture. In spite of the extensive 
efforts to rebuild agricultural infrastructure 
and commercial agriculture for smallholder 
farmers, much more remains to be done.
Areas where stronger extension services 
could improve things readily appear. For ex-
ample, there are enormous numbers of in-
land valley swamps with the potential for 
producing multiple crops of rice per year if 
basic water management infrastructure were 
available. A better functioning extension 
system could help with simple village-level 
planning and the development of rice swamp 
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improvements, as well as  providing tech-
nical backstopping on appropriate seed var-
ieties and inputs to make the most from the 
investment. Another example would be re-
garding inputs: most smallholder farmers 
do not apply fertilizer because they lack fi-
nance, experience, understanding and trust 
in dealers and input marketers.
Effective extension services would in-
clude a basic soil fertility management pro-
gram for farmers’ groups and on-farm learn-
ing plots or community-based demonstration 
plots to show best practices and allow for 
comparisons of alternative applications. 
Many other examples exist where better ex-
tension services could increase agricultural 
productivity and reduce rural poverty. In 
sum, the economy realizes a substantial op-
portunity cost in terms of rural poverty and 
missed agricultural productivity growth be-
cause of the weak state of agricultural exten-
sion services.
This chapter presents the case of agri-
cultural extension in post-war Sierra Leone. 
The writing is based on a review of litera-
ture related to the Sierra Leonean civil war 
and the agricultural sector in the country. 
The chapter draws on field research consist-
ing of meetings with farmers, frontline agri-
cultural extension agents, staff from the 
 Sierra Leone Agricultural Research Institute 
(SLARI), farmers’ organization leaders and 
MAFFS staff, which occurred in September 
2013. The field research was a part of an 
agricultural extension policy review con-
ducted for the GoSL’s West Africa Agricul-
tural Productivity Project (funded by the 
World Bank) and was organized by Enter-
prise Development Consultants of Freetown, 
Sierra Leone.
Additional interviews and conversa-
tions concerning agricultural extension oc-
curred during visits to Sierra Leone, starting 
in January 2009. With colleagues at Njala 
University, the author spent many days 
leading and participating in training cours-
es on extension and extension skills, speak-
ing with MAFFS staff, travelling around the 
country to observe research and extension 
activities and working with NGOs involved 
in agricultural extension efforts. Addition-
ally, this chapter benefits from fieldwork 
conducted by Festus Amadu, a PhD student 
in natural resources and environmental 
sciences at the University of Illinois, and 
the author, who together conducted re-
search on the post-Ebola extension situation 
in Sierra Leone from December 2015 until 
March 2016 (Amadu and McNamara, 2016).
Agriculture and Extension Prior to  
the 1990s
In 1990, just prior to the beginning of the 
civil war, Sierra Leone’s economy was im-
ploding following years of disastrous eco-
nomic practices during the presidencies 
of Siaka Stevens (1968–1985) and Joseph 
 Momoh (1985–1992). In the late 1980s, the in-
come per capita in Sierra Leone was assessed 
by some analysts to be lower than the figure 
for the 1960s, even as incomes increased glo-
bally over the same period (Fashole Luke 
and Riley, 1989). This long period of de-
cline and economic stagnation resulted 
from a number of factors:
 1. Like other oil-importing developing 
countries, Sierra Leone had experienced a 
strong decline in its terms of trade over the 
post-independence period. While prices for 
primary commodities produced in Sierra 
Leone —such as iron ore, cocoa, palm oil and 
rice—were soft, oil prices increased sharply 
from the price levels in the 1960s.
 2. Macro-economic performance in terms 
of the budget deficit and money supply, sta-
bility of the exchange rate, availability of 
credit within the economy and inflation de-
clined precipitously during the 1980s so 
that by the end of the decade the country’s 
economy was shrinking in size.
 3. The rule of Siaka Stevens and Joseph 
Momoh weakened the state through their 
approaches to governing, which informal-
ized and personalized the state. While the 
diamond sector and the mining industry are 
perhaps the poster children for this issue, 
the fact remains that the apparatus of gov-
erning throughout the GoSL was used to 
provide benefits to senior figures and to pol-
itical clients of the leaders during this 
period. These factors of declining terms of 
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trade, macro-economic instability and weak-
ness, and fractured governance and public 
performance all led to a severely weakened 
public sector extension system by 1990.
At the level of terms of trade and inter-
national economic links, the pre-war period 
saw exports from Sierra Leone decline for 
the agricultural commodities. Asenso- Okyere 
and Workneh (2008) analyze statistics from 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO) and show how 
exports for cocoa beans, coffee and oil palm 
all dropped in the period from 1985 to 1992. 
Oil palm exports went from 600 metric tons 
in 1985 to zero tons in 1992. Cocoa bean ex-
ports were 10,220 metric tons in 1985 and 
4000 metric tons in 1992. Coffee exports 
dropped from 10,240 metric tons in 1985 to 
4320 metric tons in 1992.
The exchange rate for the national cur-
rency (the Leone) also weakened over that 
period and the GoSL used a system of ex-
change rate controls, import licenses and 
foreign exchange restrictions to allocate the 
limited foreign exchange. This led to further 
disincentives for agricultural production, 
particularly for export crops, since the ex-
change rate controls essentially amounted 
to a tax on sales of these crops through for-
mal and legitimate channels. A black mar-
ket for foreign exchange was established. 
The overall impact of these economic pol-
icies was to make commercial agriculture 
production less attractive and remunera-
tive, and thus the policies worked to weaken 
the investment in agriculture and the pro-
duction of export crops. These policies also 
served to push people towards subsistence 
agriculture simply as a way to feed them-
selves as the economy began to contract in 
size and the industrial and service sectors of 
the economy declined.
An example of how weak the state had 
become by 1990 can be seen in the total gov-
ernment revenue figures. In 1980 total gov-
ernment revenue amounted to 17.0% of gross 
domestic product (GDP), while in 1990 total 
government revenue amounted to only 3.9% 
of GDP. The experience of other countries in 
the region, such as the Gambia during its 
structural adjustment period in the mid- to 
late 1980s, shows that variations in revenue 
are often a function of corruption at the port 
and the performance of customs and revenue 
agents (McNamara and McPherson, 1995).
Kandeh (1999) emphasizes how the 
breakdown of the state directly affected citi-
zens across the country, and particularly 
young people. He writes: ‘Non-delivery of 
public services and collective goods had a 
devastating impact on the youth segment of 
the population’ (p. 357). Kandeh goes on to 
highlight how under Momoh and Stevens 
the government actually moved away from 
the understanding that government had an 
obligation to provide citizens with services, 
including education. Momoh stated that 
education was a privilege ‘rather than a 
right of the citizens’ (Kandeh, 1999: 357). 
This in turn led to an educational system 
that distributed educational opportunities 
on the basis of political connections and not 
on scores or merit. Young people became 
disenfranchised and discouraged, and even 
those who graduated from university and 
received a government job later experienced 
disappointment when salaries were low or 
withheld. This further devalued education 
as an instrument for development when 
young people saw teachers going unpaid 
and without classroom materials or facil-
ities in working order.
By the late 1980s, Sierra Leone was 
running a large budget deficit and address-
ing it by printing money. In 1989, because of 
the macro-economic and fiscal disarray, the 
GoSL turned to an International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) structural adjustment program 
to obtain funds in return for meeting a num-
ber of conditions. The conditions included 
reducing subsidies on basic commodities, 
rationalizing the exchange rate through de-
valuation, reducing the budget deficit and 
privatizing state-owned enterprises (Kandeh, 
1999). This further deepened the poverty as 
government employees were let go and para-
statal enterprises were closed and sold.
Extension was in no way immune to 
these fiscal and organizational pressures, 
which it experienced directly. Although the 
extension system was designed as a na-
tional system with control centralized in 
the MAFFS national headquarters, funding 
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scarcity reduced the extent of coordination 
and control. Extension suffered from the 
limited availability of government funding; 
many field staff were not paid on time and 
failed to receive the funds necessary to 
travel to the field or to conduct field demon-
strations and other activities with farmers. 
Salaries declined in real terms with each 
devaluation of the Leone. Over time, exten-
sion came to be more about distributing fer-
tilizer and inputs, which could sometimes 
be distributed in a manner that would bene-
fit the government politically, and less about 
a coherent program of community- based in-
formal agricultural education and services.
With resources scarce for operation and 
mobilization, extension workers became 
available for informal employment by NGOs 
and for other tasks if they became available. 
By 1990, setbacks in the funding for agricul-
tural extension programs led to the lack of a 
coherent and delivered extension program 
on the ground and declining skills because 
of a lack of in-service training of field-level 
extension staff. Increasingly, NGOs provided 
agricultural development programming as 
an alternative to government programs. Zack- 
Williams (1999) describes the increase in 
NGO operations as evidence of the fragility 
of the state. He notes that from the late 1970s 
until the civil war, NGOs increased their op-
erations in areas such as education, health, 
food and agriculture, and democracy and 
governance at the same time that govern-
ment’s capacity and strength declined.
The Roots of the Sierra Leone Civil War
Scholars and observers debate the causes of 
the civil war in Sierra Leone but several ex-
planations appear to have strong support. 
The war in Sierra Leone, while not entirely 
unique in the history of sub-Saharan Africa, 
had unique features that raise questions 
about the causes of the war. These features 
included:
• The use of terror through mutilation 
and the hacking of limbs.
• The widespread use of child soldiers 
(on both sides) in the fight.
• The fact that GoSL soldiers turned into 
robbers and rebels at night and became 
‘sobels’ with the result that people could 
not trust either side in the conflict.
• The central role of diamonds both for 
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
as a source of guns and funds, and for 
the GoSL to fund contracts with secur-
ity contractors or mercenaries like Ex-
ecutive Outcomes.
Additional features of the war included:
• The way that combatants moved 
through territory for the purposes of 
pillaging and looting, not necessarily to 
establish firm control over the territory 
with active presence.
• The massive displacement of people 
and the shifts of people from rural vil-
lages to larger cities such as Bo and es-
pecially Freetown.
• The rise of alternative institutions to fill 
the gap left by the broken and failed state, 
such as the Karamajors (a traditional 
Mende hunting society turned militia).
• The sheer loss of life (estimates of more 
than 50,000 people killed).
• The fact that the conflict affected nearly 
everyone in the entire country through 
deaths, rapes, looting and robberies, 
and displacements.
• The ambiguous role of the international 
community, the Nigerian and Guinean 
troops in the Economic Community of 
West African States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG), and the UN troops and 
British Army commandos, who effect-
ively shut down the war for good by 
breaking up the remaining criminal 
gangs of rebels operating around Free-
town, Lunsar and Port Loko.
The breakdown in the state, starting from 
the time of Siaka Stevens and continuing 
through the time of Joseph Momoh, con-
tributed significantly to the war and its 
unique nature. Without strong authority 
and governance in the GoSL army, fighting 
the insurgency became especially difficult 
as soldiers could be bribed and influenced 
by the rebels. Furthermore, the troops on 
the frontlines felt abandoned at times and 
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did not trust their commanders to have their 
best interests at heart, particularly in terms 
of providing them with adequate supplies 
of arms, munitions and transport, as well as 
good quality emergency medical services 
and pay. Furthermore, the breakdown in the 
state and the endemic levels of corruption 
promoted distrust of the government by 
rural residents as well as international don-
ors. This no doubt lengthened the war as 
governments abroad felt unsure about the 
wisdom of getting too close to Sierra Leone’s 
incumbent government. Kandeh (1999) 
points out that since the state under Siaka 
Stevens and Joseph Momoh increasingly 
used gangs of thugs and young people to en-
force aspects of its rule, it was a short jump 
from that violence to a broader violence that 
grabbed and looted in the name of a revolu-
tion instead of in the name of a contract with 
the government or the approval of a license.
Another explanation for the particular 
nature of the war in Sierra Leone has been 
advanced by Paul Richards (1996), who has 
written extensively about the war and 
post-war period in Sierra Leone. Richards 
(1996) emphasized that many young people 
joined and supported the RUF because of 
frustration and disappointment with trad-
itional institutions, particularly local courts 
of justice involving the Paramount Chiefs 
and other Chiefdom officials. He also notes 
that in a battle fought without heavy weap-
ons, terror becomes an important part of the 
‘performance’ of war (Richards, 1996). Rich-
ards’ (1996) first point poses a central ques-
tion to our understanding of the war. Was 
the war primarily about gaining control of 
the diamond trade—as has been posited— or 
was it rooted in broader injustices that ei-
ther mobilized young people or created a 
class or large group of young people who 
were disenfranchised and felt abandoned 
by or ostracized from their home communi-
ties? This question becomes important not 
only for understanding the war’s causes, but 
it also may have policy implications for ac-
tions in the post-war period. Do traditional 
authorities and means of implementing 
local rule need to be changed? Is the current 
policy emphasis on district- level councils 
and local government working, at least at 
the level of provision of services? How ef-
fective are traditional authorities in advo-
cating positively for their youth and other 
marginalized groups?
Extension in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone
When the war ended on 18 January 2002, 
agricultural extension found itself in a very 
different place than it had been in 1980. 
Hundreds of thousands of people were dis-
placed within the country and abroad in 
camps. Agricultural production for key com-
mercial crops had declined to a fraction of 
its pre-war levels. As an example, rice pro-
duction in Sierra Leone was at 503,000 
tonnes (t) in 1990; in 2001, it was at 360,000 t 
(Asenso-Okyere and Workneh, 2008). The 
war, which drove people into subsistence 
living patterns, served to increase the pro-
duction of some crops, such as cassava, 
 because it was found to be more conflict- 
resistant.
Along with declines in production 
and  changed cropping patterns, enormous 
amounts of physical and human capital 
were lost to the war. Agricultural processing 
centers such as rice mills and oil palm mills 
were destroyed. Rural roads went for years 
without proper upkeep and repair. Key con-
tributors to agricultural knowledge systems 
at Njala University and in the MAFFS were 
lost or had left the country. Major institu-
tions such as SLARI and Njala University 
suffered extensive damage to their facilities 
and programs. More broadly for the agricul-
tural economy of Sierra Leone, some im-
portant trading and marketing institutions 
and patterns were lost, such as the break-
down of agricultural marketing boards and 
the decline of cash crop businesses (e.g. 
palm oil mills) that had previously bought 
from local producers. Even rice swamps 
that had been in production before the war 
were lost owing to years of neglect and lack 
of maintenance. Each of these agricultural 
assets would take years and tremendous ef-
forts on the part of government officials, 
donors, NGOs and community leaders to 
repair and rebuild.
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Beyond the loss of obvious physical 
 assets were the intangible assets that the 
war damaged severely: trust and human 
capacity. Trust is an essential part of com-
munity development, is required for agri-
cultural development and is a key compo-
nent in extension programs. Yet trust was 
destroyed in many communities. The war 
had driven communities apart, and many 
people had betrayed or done terrible things 
to their neighbors. If you cannot trust your 
neighbors not to steal your crops, why 
would you be willing to invest much in that 
farm? If you cannot trust your community 
group to manage your money fairly and 
honestly, why would you continue to con-
tribute to the rotating savings group or vil-
lage savings and lending association? Ma-
conachie (2011: 1064) states: ‘in societies 
that have been seriously affected by violent 
conflict, such as Sierra Leone, there are 
often complex challenges in rebuilding 
 social capital, which remains vital in oper-
ationalizing collective action and mobiliz-
ing community-driven development’.
In the immediate period after the war 
ended, NGOs played a critical role in assist-
ing people who had been displaced and 
were in the process of resettlement, as well 
as working to help people rebuild their live-
lihoods. Many different international NGOs 
from all over the world participated in this 
effort. Additionally, a number of capable 
local NGOs and firms also contributed to this 
work, often in partnership with the inter-
national NGOs. Further, MAFFS staff lent 
their support to NGO projects and operations 
in addition to their efforts with the MAFFS.
In the first few years following the war, 
the priority was to help people rebuild their 
lives and livelihoods through basic agricul-
tural development programs. Important 
work was implemented by World Vision of 
Sierra Leone in the areas around Kenema, 
Kailahun and Kono, which were key centers 
for much of the fighting and whose commu-
nities were tremendously impoverished by 
the war. Under the Promoting Agriculture, 
Governance and Environment (PAGE) pro-
ject, led by Agricultural Cooperative Devel-
opment International and Volunteers in 
Overseas Cooperative Assistance (ACDI- VOCA) 
and funded by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), which 
ran from 2008 to 2012, World Vision worked 
with farmer groups to develop their swamps 
and build their rice farms. Many of the 
groups consisted of vulnerable people, in-
cluding the previously landless, who the 
project had provided with long-term access 
to land by brokering agreements with cus-
tomary authorities. The groups then worked 
with World Vision staff to rehabilitate and 
develop the swamps and to learn and test 
agronomic practices, including simple yield 
increasing techniques from the System of 
Rice Intensification approach, an evolving 
set of principles and practices for increasing 
the productivity of irrigated rice by chan-
ging the management of plants, soil, water 
and nutrients.
Village savings and lending associations 
(VSLAs) were established in some communi-
ties, allowing members to contribute a small 
amount of funds each week. The associations 
make loans and earn interest as well as offer-
ing a kind of social fund to provide insur-
ance to members in case of a medical crisis 
or other emergency. Building trust through a 
group process facilitated by World Vision 
helped the farmers (many of them women) to 
rebuild their agricultural activities and in-
crease their incomes. By 2011, some of the 
groups had moved into a commercial phase 
during which they were selling rice by the 
truckload to be milled and sold to the World 
Food Program’s local purchase program. 
Others were using their newfound incomes 
to develop new swamps, expand their farms 
or to invest in a marketing business.
The program did not eliminate poverty 
or the very real risks these farmers faced. 
However, the groups were in a more secure 
situation with regard to their livelihoods 
than when they began. This sort of work 
took place all over Sierra Leone to varying 
degrees and was implemented by NGO pro-
jects as well as by donor-funded government- 
implemented projects. The NGOs and de-
velopment implementers (e.g. ACDI/VOCA) 
were appreciated by donors for their ability 
to adhere closely to donor guidelines for 
program implementation and financial 
management.
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With regard to capacity and the skills 
aspects of human capital, the economy suf-
fered a breakdown in the education system 
lasting over 10 years. Indeed, the break-
down in education began long before the 
war with the hollowing out of government 
capacity to deliver quality education. At 
one time, Sierra Leone was recognized as 
having one of the strongest education sys-
tems in West Africa. However, all of this 
was lost during the pre-war and war period.
The economists Collier and Du-
ponchel (2012) studied the impact of the 
war on the economy of Sierra Leone by 
examining company-level data from before 
and after the war. They analyzed how vari-
ations in the intensity of the conflict af-
fected productivity and examined the fac-
tors associated with losses in productivity. 
The authors found that the size of a firm 
was negatively impacted by the intensity 
of the war in their operating area. Firms in 
areas where the war was more intense 
tended to contract to a larger degree than 
firms in areas where the conflict was not as 
intense. Collier and Duponchel (2012) also 
found a long-term skills gap, supporting 
their theory ‘that conflict results in a sig-
nificant loss in human capital stock as a 
result of a “forgetting by not doing” phe-
nomenon, broadly analogous to learning 
by doing’ (p. 83).
While Collier and Duponchel (2012) 
did not examine data from across the econ-
omy, this effect of ‘forgetting by not doing’ 
may well affect agriculture and activities 
like extension or other components of the 
agricultural knowledge system. There is no 
doubt that the war in Sierra Leone had a 
strong negative impact on the stock of 
human capital, and its impact on the agri-
cultural extension system can be seen in the 
current lack of in-service training opportun-
ities and the levels of process and technical 
skills held by extension field workers and 
management.
Extension Services in Sierra Leone Today
Extension in Sierra Leone at the present 
time consists of a pluralistic system of 
 extension providers ranging from the 
 MAFFS in the public sector, to research 
demonstrations from SLARI, to major donor- 
funded projects (e.g. the IFAD Smallholder 
Commercialization Project), to NGOs and 
bilateral donors (Action Aid, Catholic Relief 
Services [CRS], GIZ, USAID, World Vision 
and many others), to private input suppliers 
and international research programs and 
farmers’ associations. All of these actors 
play a role in the extension system and are 
involved to some degree in delivering ex-
tension services to farmers. The many act-
ors pose a coordination challenge at the 
local and national levels. In many districts, 
the District Agriculture Officer holds a co-
ordinating meeting on a monthly basis with 
projects in his or her district. Furthermore, 
many NGO projects coordinate with front-
line extension workers on events and train-
ings and other field-level work.
At the national level, the Agricultural 
Extension Division within the MAFFS con-
sists of the Director of Extension Services, 
Deputy Director of Extension Services 
and three Assistant Directors (Research and 
 Extension Liaison, Field Operations and 
Cross- Cutting Issues). At the district level, 
the District Agriculture Officer directs the 
district program, which includes six Sub-
ject Matter Specialists (Crops, Livestock, 
Agricultural Engineering, Forestry, Exten-
sion, and Program Evaluation and Monitor-
ing). There are Extension Supervisors for 
each block—or administrative sub-portions 
of a district—and up to 40 or so frontline 
extension workers per district, although in 
many districts some positions are unfilled. 
Along with these staff at the district level, 
the extension personnel also work with 
NGOs, farmer- based organizations, Agricul-
tural Business Centers and development 
projects (IFAD, etc.).
MAFFS extension staff and programs 
face a number of serious constraints despite 
the strengthening activities that have oc-
curred since the war. Good staff are ham-
pered in their ability to deliver programs 
due to low salaries. In 2013, frontline exten-
sion workers were being paid less than 
200,000 Leones, or roughly US$40 per 
month. Block Supervisors were being paid 
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around 300,000 Leones a month. No  ongoing 
in-service training program exists and no 
training occurs unless it comes through 
a  project (NGO or donor-funded). While 
donor- and project-funded training can be 
useful, it does not often strengthen basic 
and core extension process skills and tech-
nical competencies. Transportation for ex-
tension staff is severely lacking, making it 
difficult for frontline extension agents to get 
to the field. Staff prefer to get seconded to 
donor-funded projects for the ‘top-up pay’ 
they receive or other perks.
Extension also faces challenges related 
to the technologies and approaches avail-
able to teach and distribute to farmers. Most 
smallholder farmers have a low level of lit-
eracy and numeracy, as well as a low level 
of basic scientific knowledge. This makes 
promoting technical innovations challenging 
and requires a time-intensive demonstrate- 
and-coach approach. Simple training methods 
like fact sheets need to be replaced by group 
demonstrations of new seeds and techniques. 
Radio has proved useful for the distribution 
of agricultural messages, and videos are 
being tested and deployed in the country. 
Hopefully these will allow some economiz-
ing on staff time and the costs of extension 
work.
To boost productivity, more innova-
tive agricultural tools and equipment—
such as walk-behind tractors for rice culti-
vation, small irrigation pumps, etc.—are 
needed that are not prohibitively expen-
sive. The development of input markets 
and the means to finance inputs are needed 
to allow the adoption of better quality 
seeds, fertilizer and pest management 
chemicals.  Extension is needed in the 
areas of post- harvest processing, storage 
and marketing. Further emphasis on mar-
keting and farming as a business is needed 
to help farmers find profitable activities 
that boost  incomes.
While extension in Sierra Leone faces 
the challenges noted above, some of the dif-
ficulties facing extension previously appear 
to have been reduced or eliminated. The ex-
change rate, a key factor in the economy 
that affects the terms of trade for agriculture, 
is no longer distorted as it was during the 
1970s and 1980s. International price signals 
for commodities are able to influence 
 investment activities and the allocation of 
efforts. Furthermore, while some in Sierra 
Leone would like to see the re-establishment 
of the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing 
Board for agricultural crop marketing, the 
marketing board is not currently operating, 
even as markets for agricultural inputs and 
output operate freely.
One market of interest in African agri-
culture is the fertilizer market, where gov-
ernment activity or actions can crowd out 
private sector input supply businesses. In 
Sierra Leone, the MAFFS distributes fertil-
izer and seeds (when available) to farmers 
and farmer groups, although farmers have 
complained about the lack of transparency 
and fairness in the distribution of fertilizer 
in their area.
Overall, the enabling environment ap-
pears to have substantially improved for 
agriculture, although major concerns and 
weaknesses exist in terms of the security of 
access to land by smallholder farmers, as 
well as weaknesses in public finances and 
the lack of support for transport and other 
program expenses.
The most common method of provid-
ing extension services in Sierra Leone ap-
pears to be the Farmer Field School ap-
proach, which was introduced and promoted 
by the FAO. MAFFS frontline extension 
workers and senior staff are familiar with 
this approach, and most have experience in 
implementing it in the field. Often a modi-
fied approach to the traditional Farmer 
Field School method is applied. Other ap-
proaches to extension emphasize group 
capacity building and participatory ap-
proaches, which are particularly seen in the 
programs of NGOs working in agriculture. 
Extension approaches such as on-farm dem-
onstrations, on-farm farmer-led research, 
demonstrations, agricultural newsletters and 
newspapers, extension embodied in out- 
grower schemes, agriculture days and agri-
cultural fairs, radio shows (especially con-
ducted by District Agriculture Officers) and 
videos are all employed in Sierra Leone. 
Group approaches work well in a social set-
ting where agriculture is often conducted 
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within family groups and other strong 
 networks at the village where the ages and 
genders of cohorts are similar.
Some extension services in Sierra 
Leone are farmer-led at this time. Farmers 
report being consulted in the design and 
planning of projects to be implemented in 
or around their villages. They also report 
going to the MAFFS and other extension 
providers with specific requests. In some 
NGO agricultural development projects, the 
farmers have a strong say in the direction of 
the group process and in the topics and 
focus of the agricultural services they are to 
receive. However, in most cases, farmer in-
put into the topics covered by extension 
 services at the local level is limited or 
non-existent. An important step will be for 
Sierra Leone to develop functioning block- 
and district-level advisory committees that 
can help guide program priorities. New 
means are being developed to incorporate 
farmer feedback on the quality of extension 
services and these may offer an additional 
channel for farmer input.
Despite their importance in agricul-
tural development and their supporting 
role in providing and facilitating agricul-
tural extension services, farmer-based or-
ganizations in Sierra Leone are in their 
early stages. The experience of coopera-
tives prior to the war was largely negative 
from the farmers’ point of view as many co-
operatives were manipulated for political 
gain, overwhelming the benefits received 
by members. Furthermore, in the context of 
Sierra Leonean political life during the 
 Stevens and Momoh presidencies, an inde-
pendent cooperative with a large number 
of members would have been seen as a 
threat and would have invited political 
intervention. Rebuilding trust and capacity 
in farmer-based organizations (FBOs) is 
happening at this time, and a number of 
FBOs have been established in the post-war 
period. Some notable FBOs are located in 
the Kono, Kailahun and Kenema areas, 
and have been established as a part of the 
 USAID-funded PAGE project among others. 
These FBOs focus on cocoa marketing, rice 
production and marketing, and other com-
mercial crops.
Extension Strengthening Efforts
While Sierra Leone has had many do-
nor-funded agricultural development pro-
jects in the post-war period, only a few have 
focused on building the capacity of the ex-
tension system. The Research into Use ef-
fort aimed to strengthen research capacity 
and the translational capacity to deploy the 
results in programs for farmers. Other pro-
jects have had components that indirectly 
strengthened extension through the provi-
sion of some training opportunities and the 
use of novel methods, or by providing ac-
cess to district-level agricultural office im-
provements and transportation. Neverthe-
less, much more remains to be done to 
create an  effective extension system that 
benefits farmers.
To gauge the priorities of key extension 
system stakeholders on what reforms or 
measures should be taken to strengthen ex-
tension in Sierra Leone, researchers fielded 
a brief questionnaire on the topic to agri-
cultural extension workers, farmer associ-
ation leaders and other MAFFS staff in-
cluding SLARI researchers. This took place 
in September 2013 as part of the back-
ground work for a report to the MAFFS and 
the World Bank’s West African Agricultural 
Productivity Program. A total of 70 re-
sponses was received, representing a con-
venience sample of extension stakeholder 
opinions.
In terms of the largest obstacles to 
strengthening the extension system, the re-
spondents reported that funding levels and 
political will to strengthen extension were 
the major impediments. Approximately 
77% of the respondents indicated that fund-
ing levels were a significant barrier and an-
other 44% (not mutually exclusive) indi-
cated that political will was lacking for 
improved extension. On an open-ended 
question concerning suggestions for strength-
ening extension and extension policy in 
 Sierra Leone, responses ranged widely from 
advocating complete devolution of exten-
sion to the District Councils to greater 
farmer participation in the country’s exten-
sion and research program. One response 
noted that there ought to be a unified  national 
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extension system that would involve all 
 extension providers (including NGOs) in a 
single unified system with the same condi-
tions of service for employees. Other sug-
gestions proposed the timely provision of 
extension funding for transport and pro-
gram expenses; providing training manuals 
and program materials to field extension 
staff; supporting the ability of extension 
staff to get to the field; the necessity of the 
availability of good seed, fertilizer and other 
inputs; building the capacity of FBOs; in-
creasing the educational requirements for 
frontline extension workers; allowing field 
staff to have greater program autonomy; im-
proving salaries and terms of employment 
for extension workers; and moving to per-
formance contracts for extension services 
at the local level. One respondent included 
a caveat that ‘having worked with the 
( District) Council for over 5 years, the levels 
of corruption and power concentrated in 
the hands of a few, such as the finance offi-
cer and chairman, make it difficult for the 
Council to achieve results’. These state-
ments show that the stakeholders have no 
illusions with regard to the challenges and 
barriers to improving extension in Sierra 
Leone.
In terms of extension approaches, the 
work carried out by World Vision of Sierra 
Leone under the PAGE project shows how 
extension efforts can help address root 
causes and contributing factors to the con-
flict. Richards (1996) argues that an import-
ant impetus for the war was the disenfran-
chisement of youth and other groups in 
rural Sierra Leonean society. The difficul-
ties and challenges that young people in 
rural communities faced in accessing re-
sources contributed to that sense of disen-
franchisement. The World Vision work that 
brokered access to productive land for poor 
people provides an example of the type of 
extension program that directly addresses a 
root cause of the conflict. Many extension 
efforts that focus on agricultural technology 
dissemination or a pre-identified topic may 
fail to address a root cause of conflict in the 
community, such as access to productive re-
sources. In fact, if not designed carefully, 
some extension efforts could  actually 
 exacerbate income inequalities in  rural 
communities and lead to future conflicts.
Maconachie (2011) emphasizes how 
the civil war in Sierra Leone served to break 
down trust in rural communities. The 
World Vision work described above and the 
work of CRS (and CRS savings and internal 
lending communities [SILCs]) address this 
issue of trust through the development of 
 village-level internally financed savings and 
lending institutions. Working together with 
facilitation from NGO staff, the savings and 
lending associations build trust across mem-
bers in the group, and create pathways for 
job creation, income growth and access to 
capital. Additionally, social insurance funds 
create a risk management mechanism that 
helps families deal with health shocks, un-
expected bills and needs for finance. By ad-
dressing the social capital building aspect 
of VSLAs and SILCs, the projects are re-
building trust within rural communities in 
Sierra Leone.
Another project—conducted by IFAD 
in the Kenema area—has shown good im-
pacts in working with rice farmers (women, 
men and youth) in inland valley swamp 
ecologies (Amadu and McNamara, 2016). 
The project mobilizes communities for 
swamp development and improvement 
through village-level meetings. The training 
and workshops place a significant emphasis 
on gender, and women are encouraged to 
participate in the project. Women are 
trained to participate in extension roles and 
to take leadership roles in community pro-
jects. This represents a marked increase in 
targeting women farmers and focusing on 
inclusivity in agricultural extension  efforts.
Recommendations and Opportunities  
for Improvement
An observation of ‘best-fit’ approaches 
around the world yields suggestions for im-
proving extension in Sierra Leone:
• Focus on program quality and impact 
rather than on breadth, coverage and 
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scope. The quality of extension services 
in Sierra Leone is presently very low, 
and if good examples of well- functioning 
extension engagements were more com-
mon and observable, it would help the 
discussion around capacity strengthen-
ing and funding levels.
• Continue to work with NGO extension 
programs, but consider how they might 
be able to contribute to strengthening 
the public sector system to be more 
sustainable. Over time, the public sec-
tor system is most likely to have the 
scale and presence to have the long- 
term impacts that good extension pro-
grams can deliver. A weakness of the 
heavy reliance on NGOs to date has 
been the relatively short time frame of 
most of their agricultural development 
projects.
• Continue efforts to build up the staff 
quality of extension within the MAFFS 
and to boost the terms of service so that 
good staff do not leave so readily.
• Work to increase farmer input and 
 control of extension programs through 
committees at the block, district and 
national levels.
• Increase the rigor of extension monitor-
ing and evaluation so that impacts are 
readily communicated and measured, 
and justifications for public resources 
are provided.
• Work with ICTs to extend the  extension 
impact of the MAFFS and NGOs.
• Define a small number of critical na-
tional agricultural extension programs, 
and provide training and program ma-
terials—including manuals and field 
support—for their deployment. Sup-
port these programs so that impact can 
be perceived by local government offi-
cials and other community and polit-
ical leaders.
• Figure out how to remove staff who do 
not perform once they are provided 
transport and programming resources. 
Increase the performance accountabil-
ity of the programs. Extension in Sierra 
Leone has the possibility to be a driver 
of poverty reduction and agricultural 
productivity improvement, leading to 
strong food security in one of the 
world’s poorest countries. Increasing 
the prominence of extension in the 
hierarchy of development priorities is 
necessary to realize this potential 
 contribution.
Conclusions and Lessons  
Learned
Agricultural extension in Sierra Leone con-
tinues to be largely influenced by the enab-
ling environment in the country, including 
the weak capacity of state ministries and 
 organizations, the dynamic of NGOs and a 
set of international donor- funded projects 
leading to a highly pluralistic setting for ex-
tension services. Several key lessons can be 
derived from the  country’s post-civil war 
and post-Ebola  experiences:
 1. The length of time and the breadth of en-
gagement in agricultural extension services 
needed after a significant civil war are much 
longer and deeper than most immediate re-
covery programs plan on or are designed to 
handle.
 2. As seen in the World Vision programs, 
which included access to productive re-
sources and building social capital, as well 
as the IFAD inland valley swamp rice pro-
gram, which focused on social inclusion 
for women and youth, it is possible to dir-
ectly address the root causes of conflict in 
the design and implementation of an exten-
sion program. These programs may require 
more staff resources in terms of time and 
training, but they also may hold the poten-
tial for decreasing the chances of further 
conflict.
 3. Knowledge of effective extension ap-
proaches in post-conflict settings is not 
based on rigorous empirical research but 
on standards and norms of professional 
development and disaster recovery prac-
tice. Many of these standards deserve 
more rigorous testing and scrutiny where 
possible.
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Introduction
This chapter considers the implications of 
conflict for the provision of agricultural ex-
tension services, and challenges in design-
ing and implementing strategies to rebuild 
agricultural extension systems (AES) in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The 
DRC case offers a unique perspective and 
contribution to this theme on several fronts. 
First, the DRC has suffered the ‘deadliest’ 
war since World War II, creating an infra-
structural, technical and institutional vac-
uum, which makes rebuilding lost capacity 
through training, extension services and 
rural education extremely important. At the 
same time, the intensity of impact makes 
the rebuilding process extremely challenging. 
Second, the DRC represents a case where 
there is not much observed commitment in 
terms of the rebuilding processes as far as the 
extension service is concerned. While new 
policies and plans have been formulated and 
new approaches have been adopted (e.g. from 
more top-down to more participatory ap-
proaches to policy making processes), there 
is still a lack of commitment by the govern-
ment to fund and implement elements of the 
newly adopted policies and plans. While 
numerous donor projects have been, and are 
being, implemented, they die off and there 
is no follow-up and institutionalization of 
these strategies because of the lack of gov-
ernment commitment.
Information and data cited in this chapter 
are from literature reviews, interviews with 
key informants and surveys of 107 extension 
organizations and 162 field staff in western 
DRC (Bandundu, Bas-Cong and Kinshasa 
provinces), analyzed in Ragasa et al. (2013b).
Background of the Conflict
Beginning in 1996, and six years after the 
introduction of the multi-party system, the 
DRC experienced a succession of wars. 
The first Congolese war (1996–1997) started 
when Laurent Désiré Kabila, heading the 
Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la 
Libération du Congo (AFDL), contested 
Mobutu’s leadership. The second Congolese 
war (1998–2003) had a much more inter-
national dimension because rival countries 
and factions saw in the conflict-hit DRC a 
convenient ground for waging proxy wars 
(Maystadt et al., 2014). These wars, accord-
ing to a survey by the International Rescue 
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Committee, caused more than 5  million 
deaths from 1998 to 2008 (IRC, 2007) and an 
estimated 1.7  million internally displaced 
people (IDMC, 2011), which makes it the 
world’s deadliest war since World War II with 
approximately 45,000 deaths every month 
since 1998. During the mid-2000s, the DRC 
was often referred to as the world’s most 
neglected humanitarian crisis.
The causes of the DRC wars were mul-
tiple, complex and intermingled (Vlassen-
root and Raeymaekers, 2004; Prunier, 2009). 
The weakness and inefficiency of Mobutu’s 
regime over 32 years, ethnic polarization, 
spill-over effects from the Rwandan geno-
cide, regional control by foreign powers and 
natural wealth have all been listed among 
the key factors. Without doubt, the DRC’s 
natural wealth in mineral resources has 
consistently been blamed as the main driver 
of the violence, either as a way to finance 
warring parties or as a warfare objective in 
itself (Congdon Fors and Olsson, 2004; Turner, 
2007; International Alert, 2010; Gambino, 
2011; Stearns, 2011). Nest et al. (2006) argue 
that the conflict events that have taken place 
in the DRC are mainly due to the weakness 
of the state; military, financial and logistical 
interventions from neighboring countries; 
ethnic political violence; regime survival; 
and contests for control over natural and 
mineral resources.
Repeated conflicts have profoundly dis-
rupted local livelihoods (Peace Direct, 2014). 
This violence, and the turmoil it creates, has 
severely affected the agricultural livelihoods 
of the poor, reducing their capacity to pro-
duce and trade. Yet claims of a direct causal 
line from conflict to poverty should be treat-
ed with caution, as causality may be reversed 
or indirect (Ali et al., 2015). The outbreak of 
civil wars is commonly attributed to poverty 
(Bannon and Collier, 2003; Justino, 2006), 
and the correlation between low per capita 
incomes and higher propensities for internal 
war is one of the most robust empirical rela-
tionships in the literature.
In his review of the literature, Pellillo 
(2012) indicates some studies on the micro-
economic consequences of conflict which 
address the impact of conflict and political 
instability on human capital accumulation 
(Akresh and de Walque, 2010; Chamarbag-
wala and Morán, 2011; Shemyakina, 2011), 
local institutions (Bellows and Miguel, 
2006; Bellows and Miguel, 2009), political 
participation (Blattman, 2009; Kyle, 2010), 
labor market outcomes (Kondylis, 2010) and 
health outcomes (Bundervoet et al., 2009; 
Akresh et al., 2011; Akresh et al., 2012; 
 Minoiu and Shemyakina, 2012). In the case 
of the DRC, it is obvious that all the areas 
mentioned above must have been affected 
by the repeated conflicts. The evidence pre-
sented by Pellillo (2012) suggests that the 
conflict events that have taken place across 
the DRC have had a significant negative im-
pact on household-level durable ownership 
and living conditions.
In a recent study, Ali et al. (2015) found 
that conflict is highly detrimental to the 
wealth of households: a 10% increase in con-
flict fatalities in the past 5 years decreased 
wealth by 3.6%. Their findings confirm the 
high socio-economic cost of war in the DRC. 
Indeed, they find that conflict—measured as 
the number of fatalities from violent conflict 
around markets—has a statistically signifi-
cant positive effect on multi-dimensional 
poverty: a 10% increase in the number of 
 fatalities around markets increases the 
probability of being multi-dimensionally 
poor by about 6%. Agriculturally involved 
households, female-headed households and 
households in rural areas are more likely to 
be multi-dimensionally poor as result of pro-
longed conflicts. Larger households and those 
with more children in the age range 0–5 years 
are more likely to be multi-dimensionally 
poor; households with older heads are less 
likely to be multi-dimensionally poor.
Eastern Congo has been particularly af-
fected by warfare and continuous violence, 
even after the signing of the Global and In-
clusive Agreement in 2002 (Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue, 2002). Eastern Congo continues to 
suffer from direct violence resulting from 
fighting and insecurity, unlike the northern 
and western provinces, which have been able 
to return to a state of relative peace. Several 
factors contribute to the continuous unrest 
and perpetuation of conflicts in eastern Congo. 
Eastern regions hold by far the largest en-
dowment of the DRC’s abundant natural 
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 resources and also offer direct access to 
neighboring countries (Burundi, Rwanda 
and Uganda), which have been implicated in 
the quest for the various economic and pol-
itical gains resulting from the civil war. The 
northern and western regions of the country 
are experiencing relative peace and stability 
while dealing with the challenges of poverty, 
but eastern DRC continues to host a diver-
sity of armed groups and militias that con-
stantly perpetuate the cycle of violence and 
challenge peacekeeping and reconstruction 
efforts in the region. One example is the in-
surgency of the M23 militias, defeated in 
2012 due partly to efforts from a tougher 
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mandate.
The regional difference relating to con-
flicts and their impacts on agriculture high-
lights the need for special considerations in 
rebuilding the agricultural sector and exten-
sion system. In the eastern regions, additional 
challenges include: (i) the levels of insecurity 
and violence towards farmers attempting to 
work in their fields; (ii) the inability of exten-
sion agents to reach farmers, as both trainees 
and trainers face constant situations of un-
rest; (iii) risks of gender- based violence as 
women face the risk of rape while collecting 
firewood, fetching drinking water and work-
ing in their fields; and (iv) exacerbated land 
and water access challenges due to constant 
displacements in the Kivu provinces.
Indeed, different armed conflicts affect-
ing the country, in particular in the eastern 
regions, continue to take a heavy toll on the 
region. Conflict and the resulting displace-
ment of the population has caused an im-
portant reduction in agricultural produc-
tion and has weakened the livelihoods of 
households essentially based on agriculture 
and animal husbandry (WFP, 2011; UNOCHA, 
2012). Paving the way for economic devel-
opment and political stability is necessary 
not only for the DRC but also for the whole 
Great Lakes region, which in the 1990s ex-
perienced one of the bloodiest decades of its 
history.
There is an urgent need to improve 
food security, which has been at alarmingly 
low levels, particularly after the two Congo-
lese wars. More than 70% of the Congolese 
population are undernourished, while around 
two-thirds of the population live on less 
than US$1 per day (Ulimwengu et al., 2009). 
Such food insecurity contrasts starkly with 
the DRC’s huge agricultural potential. Des-
pite 80 million ha of arable land, climatic 
diversity and relative abundance of water, 
only 10% of the land is cultivated. The DRC 
is also known for its abundant mineral re-
sources including gold, copper, uranium, 
diamonds and coltan. This natural wealth 
has the potential to serve as a catalyst for 
economic development, but instead has 
been argued to constitute a factor for fuel-
ling conflict and further exacerbating food 
insecurity (Maystadt et al., 2014).
Food security represents an important 
goal in post-conflict DRC and should be the 
main target of any post-conflict rebuilding 
program as there is an interaction between 
food security and resilience to conflict in 
the DRC. The impact of conflict on food se-
curity depends on the magnitude of damage 
to physical, human, financial, social and 
political capital, all of which affect house-
holds’ access to the resources (including 
food) needed to ensure sustainable liveli-
hoods. We argue that extension services 
should play a major role in the process 
of restoring households’ livelihoods, espe-
cially in rural areas where 70% of the Con-
golese population live.
Characteristics of the Post-Conflict 
Agricultural Extension System (AES)  
in the DRC
The current AES in the DRC is character-
ized by drastic underfunding of the system 
without institutional reforms. The results 
are severe human resource management 
problems; unclear mandates and a lack of 
mission orientation; an elite capture problem 
(public extension agents serving primarily 
large-scale farmers); and largely underserved 
and illiterate rural producers. It is a largely 
defunct public extension system, with an ex-
tensive field staff still on the payroll, and nu-
merous non-government organizations (NGOs), 
church-based organizations (CBOs) and rural 
producer organizations (RPOs) trying to fill 
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the gaps mostly from ad hoc and project- 
based funding. Government extension agents 
and supervisors are often hired directly by 
these NGOs, CBOs and RPOs for their exten-
sion work, given the limited capacity of 
these organizations to staff projects. Nu-
merous NGOs and other service providers 
operating alone, without coordination, have 
 created a disorganized system with much 
inefficiency, redundancy and confusion due 
to conflicting messages given to farmers on 
specific issues or technologies. As described 
below, this has been a result of more than 
15 years of repeated conflicts with a persistent 
lack of commitment or sustained funding by 
the government for the agriculture sector in 
general and the extension service in particular.
Structure
The Congolese extension system is supported 
by outdated laws adopted in 1988 and 1993. 
These decrees define the extension system in 
the DRC to comprise the National Extension 
Service (Service National de Vulgarisation 
[SNV]), with national headquarters and a coord-
inating team in each province that support struc-
tures, including researchers and specialists 
for training and technical backstopping. These 
structures include the National Agronomic 
Research Institute (INERA), the National 
Mechanization Agency (SENAMA), the Na-
tional Seed Agency (SENASEM) and the Na-
tional Fertilizer Agency (SENAFIC). The ex-
tension system also includes the national 
agricultural inspection system within the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisher-
ies (MINAGRI), with a total 18,500 staff, of 
whom 11,245 are said to be qualified exten-
sion agents (FAO, 2005), complemented by 
agricultural workers from NGOs for the actual 
delivery of extension services to rural com-
munities (Fig. 3.1).
With these public sector field staff serv-
ing an estimated 6 million farmers, the ratio 
of farmers to public extension agents in the 
DRC is a comparatively low at 540:1 (Table 3.1). 
Anderson and Feder (2004) show that the 
farmer-to-agent ratio in most developing 
countries is over 1000:1. Thus, the number 
of agents may not be the major problem in 
the DRC’s defunct extension system. The 
challenge seems rather to be in effectively 
managing the large number of field staff to 
perform their extension work effectively 









(researchers, trainers, other providers of complementary
services (including SENAMA, SENASEM, SENAFIC)
Farmers’ groups
Other extension providers
(NGOs and rural organizations,
church-based, private sector)
Fig. 3.1. The agricultural extension system in the DRC. MINAGRI, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries; 
SENAMA, National Mechanization Agency; SENAFIC, National Fertilizer Agency; SENASEM, National Seed 
Agency; SNV, Service National de Vulgarisation (National Extension Service). From Journal Officiel (1988, 1993).
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To fill this huge gap in public extension 
service provision, international NGOs and 
donors have been actively involving local 
NGOs and producer organizations in exten-
sion service delivery. NGOs can offer greater 
incentives: the salary and benefits of an 
NGO extension agent are around US$500–
1000 a month, while that of a government 
extension agent is about US$50 a month. 
The salaries of public sector extension 
agents are extremely low, even within the 
agricultural sector. To put this into context, 
the daily farm labor wage is $0.5–3.5, which 
on average is higher than the salary of an 
extension agent in the public sector.
However, the involvement of NGOs in 
extension service delivery has major limita-
tions: (i) they lack technical capacity and 
often hire MINAGRI staff as extension 
agents and supervisors; (ii) similarly to gov-
ernment, they lack follow-up of targeted 
farmers, defined and feasible performance 
targets, mission orientation and account-
ability measures—there are also complaints 
of elite capture and leakages; (iii) the qual-
ity of services is rather questionable and 
many farmers are skeptical about whether 
extension agents have sufficient knowledge 
about new technologies that are of interest 
to them; and (iv) NGOs cover only a limited 
number of farmers, as confirmed by the 
available dataset on Bandundu, Bas-Congo 
and Kinshasa provinces (Ragasa et al., 
2013b).
Table 3.1. Farmer:extension agent ratio in the DRC 
and selected countries. From Davis et al., 2010; 
















Defunct National Extension Service (SNV)
The SNV was created in 1988 as an independ-
ent unit within the National Rural Develop-
ment Department, with its own budget, to 
 institutionalize the earlier National Exten-
sion Program. Its aim was to coordinate, 
harmonize and support rural extension ac-
tivities. In 1993 a decree was passed to grant 
administrative and financial autonomy to 
the SNV under the umbrella authority of the 
MINAGRI.
The headquarters of SNV is in the cap-
ital city of Kinshasa, but its area of activity 
is the entire country. During its early imple-
mentation (late 1980s), there were 121 staff 
at the national level and 82 coordinators 
and officers assigned to the different prov-
inces. Support was provided by researchers, 
subject matter specialists and trainers from 
the government agencies, NGOs, the private 
sector and other projects. SNV and its support-
ing structures worked with the MINAGRI 
extension chief, sector chiefs and techni-
cians to train supervisors, agronomists, vet-
erinarians and agricultural monitors, who 
are the frontline staff in direct contact with 
rural producers. SNV was tasked to develop 
extension materials and production guides 
and to update them regularly; to provide 
training and backstopping based on these 
extension materials; and to coordinate and 
monitor extension service provision.
From 1989 to the onset of the conflict, SNV 
had been supported financially by donor and 
international organizations including the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO), French Cooperation Agency 
(AFD), the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank, as 
well as by the DRC government. By the mid-
1990s donor support had ceased and gov-
ernment funds were substantially reduced. 
From 1997 to 2001, funding came solely from 
the government, and mostly to pay for salaries. 
Starting in 2002, there was no operational 
funding available from any source, and 
even staff salaries were not paid regularly. 
This makes it difficult for SNV to fulfil its 
function, as the staff of the agricultural inspec-
tion system are not under the supervision of 
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SNV, and without offering a budget SNV 
cannot train the staff of this system or pro-
vide other services to them. Nonetheless, 
the SNV continues to prepare and submit a 
budget every year. For example, in 2010 the 
SNV prepared a budget of US$100 million 
for extension activities, but did not receive 
any funds at all (SNV Director, pers. comm. 
to the head of IFPRI office in DRC, 2011). 
The budgetary resources needed for the sal-
aries of SNV staff alone are approximately 
US$2 million.
Although SNV staff were unpaid for 
years, many remained at their posts, look-
ing for any means of economic survival. 
Most remaining staff members are un-
trained in newer approaches to transmit-
ting improved technologies to farmers and 
have passed retirement age. A large pro-
portion of staff members in the provinces 
are uninformed about recent and pending 
policy changes, such as the Agricultural 
and Rural Management Councils (Conseil 
Agricole et Rural de Gestions, CARGs), the 
Agricultural Code (see below) and other 
measures related to decentralization and 
privatization. Those who are still able to 
work require new local leadership, 
catch-up training and resources to begin to 
work again.
A result of the defunct SNV is a ser-
ious issue of lack of coordination among 
the pluralistic extension service providers. 
Interviews conducted also suggest that 
many  agriculture-related projects and ac-
tivities do not work in coordination with 
local  MINAGRI offices, SNV, INERA and 
SENASEM (Ragasa et al., 2013b). This lack 
of coordination leads to serious inconsist-
encies, conflicting extension messages and 
duplication of efforts. There have been 
many cases of different service providers 
providing different and at times conflicting 
extension messages to producers. Not in-
volving agents and key staff of relevant 
government offices is also an unsustainable 
approach, as capacity is not built and there 
is no continuity of knowledge and activ-
ities when these international NGOs leave 
at the end of their projects. Similarly, most 
training activities are conducted in an ad hoc, 
small, uncoordinated and unsustainable way 
by NGOs and CBOs with links to their 
international counterparts. The cadre of 
government field staff and other organiza-
tions are often not included and rarely re-
ceive regular skill upgrading. This has im-
plications for a more regular, coordinated 
and sustainable provision of training and 
learning opportunities and for strengthen-
ing the whole agricultural education sys-
tem in the DRC.
Large field staff with no clear mandate
The lowest level of field staff in the MINAGRI 
are referred to as agricultural monitors, 
which is the same title they had in the colo-
nial period. They are the frontline profes-
sionals who are tasked to work directly with 
rural communities. At the sector level (the 
administrative level between territory and 
village), they are supervised by sector 
agronomists and sector veterinarians, who 
report to agricultural and veterinary inspec-
tors at the territory level, who in turn report 
to the provincial directors and inspectors. 
In provinces where the decentralization 
policy is not fully implemented, there are 
also agricultural and veterinary inspectors 
at the district level.
Interviews conducted by Ragasa et al. 
(2013b) suggest that the field staff (agricul-
tural monitors) in this system are not aware 
of their mandate to promote new technolo-
gies or to engage in other activities that 
would help farmers to increase their in-
come. Instead, they view their role as col-
lecting data and—as their title suggests—
monitoring farmers’ activities. One local 
expert with long-term field experience sug-
gested that their role remains influenced by 
the colonial past and pointed out that ‘they 
are still largely seen as policemen’ by the 
farmers (Ragasa et al., 2013b). Very few con-
sider the current system as a truly function-
ing extension service. However, there are 
other field staff who believe that extension 
is part of their mission, and even without 
operating funds from government they have 
been working with a number of international 
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organizations to provide extension services 
to farmers. This suggests a serious lack of a 
clear mission and mandate as perceived by 
those involved in the Congolese extension 
system.
To understand the current system of 
public agricultural extension service provi-
sion, it is useful to trace how the extension 
system worked in the past and to take ac-
count of its roots in the DRC’s colonial his-
tory. The Belgian colonial rulers did not 
practice a system of ‘indirect rule’, but ra-
ther engaged directly in the management of 
local affairs, including the management of 
agricultural production. As Mills (n.d.: 2) 
points out:
Agricultural officers (with their African 
assistants) kept a close eye on the local 
African population; with the development 
of large-scale mining and plantation 
activities, there was a large need for food 
for the laborers. There was a definite 
policy of using African peasant production 
to supply this local domestic market. The 
agricultural officers supervised and 
directed African farmers in what crops to 
produce.
It is also well known that the atrocities com-
mitted by the Belgian colonial rulers to ex-
ploit agricultural labor were far beyond 
those observed elsewhere in Africa (Mills, 
n.d.). To implement the policy of compul-
sory food crop production, the colonial 
rulers created an intensive, centrally guided 
and administered agricultural production 
system. The system that is in place today 
still features elements of the system set up 
by the colonial administration.
The lack of a clear vision and mandate 
for agricultural extension poses serious 
issues that impede the whole system. A re-
lated issue is the lack of operational targets 
and monitoring. There are no targets set for 
agents’ and organizations’ extension work, 
as reported by a large majority of agricul-
tural workers interviewed and more than 
half of extension organizations’ heads sur-
veyed by Ragasa et al. (2013b). As a result, 
there is no effective monitoring and evalu-
ation to assess the quality and performance 
of extension services. While there are more 
than 11,000 field staff at the MINAGRI, it is 
not clear to them whether they should be 
doing extension work in addition to their 
data collection and census activities.
Capacity of agricultural workers
The DRC’s AES is characterized by ageing 
personnel in extension and in the whole 
agricultural ministry in general. Of the 162 
field staff surveyed in western DRC 60% are 
over 50 years old. Low education levels and 
rare training opportunities are also limiting 
factors to effective agricultural extension. 
A quarter of field staff interviewed in west-
ern DRC have only a primary or secondary 
school agricultural degree. While 61% of 
agents had received other professional 
training in addition to formal education, the 
majority of agents with lower levels of formal 
education (primary or secondary school) 
had not received professional training. With-
out extensive training and retraining of 
agents and technicians, there could be a ser-
iously limited technical capacity to provide 
extension and advisory services to farmers.
A major concern with skill develop-
ment programs and capacity of field staff is 
the serious weakness in the country’s agri-
cultural training and education system. 
Within the Ministry of Education, the Agro 
or Agro-Veterinarian Studies Institute/Col-
lege (ISEA/ISEAV) and Rural Development 
Institute (ISDR) are the government institu-
tions that offer agricultural training and 
education and are responsible for training 
agricultural extension agents and rural de-
velopment workers. ISEA/ISEAV trains 
agricultural technicians (agronomists and 
veterinarians), while ISDR trains rural de-
velopment workers.  Almost all territories 
have at least one ISEA or ISDR. In some 
cases, farmers’ organizations also go to them 
directly to request training, often for a fee. 
Students carrying out their practicum (work 
placement) in the villages are also useful in 
disseminating technology packages and 
production techniques to farmers. In these 
cases, ISEA and ISDR are potentially useful 
pathways of technology  dissemination and 
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extension services delivery that can be ex-
plored further. However, visits to some of 
these institutes highlight several challenges 
in agricultural education and training in the 
DRC, including: a lack of sustained funding; 
no vision, strategic planning or forward- 
looking mentality (for ISDR/ISEA in par-
ticular and the education system in the DRC 
more generally); an outdated curriculum; 
problems of quality of education, starting at 
the primary school level; a lack of up-to-date 
training and skills development for staff; 
and a lack of links with the rest of the agri-
cultural support system including exten-
sion, research and universities.
Extension approaches and  
delivery methods
The main approach is still heavily based 
on the training-and-visit (T&V) system, a 
remnant of the World Bank-supported pro-
grams of the 1980s. A survey of 162 field 
staff in western DRC (Ragasa et al., 2013b) 
reveals that the most common method of de-
livering extension services is visits by field 
staff to farms or homes, followed by visits 
and information sharing at farmer- based or-
ganizations (FBOs), training sessions and 
demonstration farms. NGOs and RPOs more 
frequently use visits to and meetings with 
FBOs, training sessions and demonstration 
farms, while government, CBOs and the pri-
vate sector more frequently use visits to 
farmers’ fields or homes.
The survey results indicate that 74% of 
field staff hold special meetings, such as 
planning meetings, in which farmers can 
express which types of activities they ex-
pect to carry out. These meetings are 
usually held at the community, groupement 
(a group of villages belonging to the same 
clan) or sector levels. Field staff activities 
also include the formation, mobilization 
and support of RPOs.
Regarding the distribution of inputs 
together with the provision of extension 
services, a quarter of surveyed field staff 
from government extension in western 
DRC reported that they distribute inputs, 
while more than half of field staff from 
NGOs and all field staff from CBOs re-
ported distributing inputs. This indicates 
that NGO field staff often have a more inte-
grated approach to service delivery and 
tend to focus more on complementary in-
puts, technical knowledge and services for 
the farm management.
In eastern DRC, where numerous pro-
jects have been implemented, the use of 
radio and innovation platforms (IPs) are 
also common methods of disseminating in-
formation on agricultural management 
practices. The IPs assemble stakeholders to 
share information, identify opportunities, 
discuss problems and agree on joint activ-
ities related to a shared interest, often with 
a specific commodity focus.
Local participatory approaches have 
also been implemented, although at a 
small scale to date. The most common ap-
proach is Farmer Field Schools (FFSs; 
champ-écoles de paysans [CEP]). A FFS is 
a group of 20–25 farmers with associated 
land (usually 0.5–1 ha) who are trained in 
the field by following the various stages of 
development of a given crop, based on 
field observations and analyses. The ob-
jectives are to strengthen the capacities of 
farmers themselves to identify and solve 
problems encountered during crop pro-
duction and to reinforce their organiza-
tional capacities to further manage their 
own development.
These approaches rely on higher in-
volvement of farmers and producer organ-
izations to identify problems at a local level, 
define adaptive research and on-farm trial 
needs, implement trials and disseminate 
appropriate technologies. In western DRC, 
half of the government field staff inter-
viewed reported teaching or facilitating in 
FFSs, whereas 64% from NGOs and only 
17% from CBOs use FFSs.
Efforts to rebuild the AES
To understand the evolution of the AES and 
lessons learned from the past, this section 
summarizes the policies, programs and sta-
tus of AES in the DRC before the conflict, 
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and then compares these with the efforts to 
rebuild the system afterward.
Before conflict
There are three distinct periods of policy 
interventions in the DRC agricultural sector: 
the colonial period (1885–1960), the post- 
colonial period (1960–1990) and the democ-
ratization period (1990–present). As pointed 
out by Tollens (2004), the actions by differ-
ent governments to revive the agricultural 
sector and achieve rural development since 
independence have produced positive but 
insignificant results. Most of the policies 
failed to be comprehensive and lacked in-
ternal coherence and adequate articulation 
on the various interventions.
The colonial period was characterized 
by compulsory labor to produce cash crops 
for export and food crops for local con-
sumption. This policy had a provision that 
allowed the colonial administration to col-
lect tax against the sale of compulsory 
crops, which in turn was used for building 
rural infrastructure, debt repayment and 
paying for a system to monitor farmers. Dur-
ing the colonial times, agricultural workers 
were commonly referred to as agricultural 
monitors. They monitored farmers’ activ-
ities, whether they followed the prescribed 
practices and whether they reported their 
harvests and revenues correctly. While there 
was adequate production, compulsory labor 
led to human and social injustices, as those 
opposing the prescribed practices were 
sanctioned through either imprisonment or 
sequestration of their land. To address these 
injustices and to continue to promote agri-
cultural development, King Leopold III, dur-
ing his address to the Belgian Senate in 
1933, advocated for the inclusion of social 
considerations by providing the native 
population with ownership of their own 
land. This was the starting point of the peas-
antry period (1946–1960), which was char-
acterized by: (i) the abolition of compulsory 
cultivation; (ii) the creation of the National 
Institute for Agronomic Study in Congo 
(INEAC), later renamed INERA, which under-
took research on crucial agricultural issues 
including soil science and the selection and 
improvement of planting materials; and 
(iii) a strong focus on disseminating know-
ledge on agricultural management practices 
and mechanization for smallholder farmers. 
Groups and associations of farmers were also 
set up for easier organization of  services and 
dissemination of technology  messages.
In the 1960s, immediately following 
the colonial period, the agricultural sector 
went through a difficult transition. Agricul-
tural research and extension systems col-
lapsed, feeder roads deteriorated and water-
ways and railroads were disrupted. As a 
result, the share of agriculture in total ex-
ports dropped from 41% in 1958 to 16% in 
1966. This period was characterized by ex-
treme poverty, food insecurity and total dis-
couragement of farmers.
To revive the agricultural sector and 
make it the driving force of economic devel-
opment, in the early 1970s government au-
thorities decided to start regulating the sec-
tor through more realistic policies. In 1973, 
the first post-colonial agricultural policy 
was implemented as part of the Zairianiza-
tion movement (measures taken by Congo-
lese authorities to transfer productive assets 
from private foreigners to private Congo-
lese). It was followed later by many other 
policies, most of which were short-lived 
and ineffective. From 1973 to 1990, several 
agricultural policies were implemented but 
none achieved its objectives (Table 3.2).
The most notable was the Five-Year 
Plan (1986–1990), an ambitious long-term 
program implemented to induce economic 
and social development and to achieve food 
self-sufficiency. It targeted agricultural de-
velopment through the increase in size and 
productivity of peasant farms, promotion of 
entrepreneurship in the sector, intensifica-
tion of extension and applied agronomic re-
search, maintenance of feeder roads and job 
creation, and increased incomes in rural 
areas. It was characterized by the move to-
wards liberalism and the promotion of pri-
vate initiatives; promotion of partnerships 
including the private sector, NGOs, peas-
ants, small and medium-sized agricultural 
firms and donors; and the presence of a de-
tailed 5-year investment plan supporting 
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Table 3.2. Major policies affecting the agricultural extension system following the colonial period. From  
Le Plae, 1939; Béguin, 1965; Jewsiewicki, 1979, 1980; Mokili Danga Kassa, 1998; Northrup, 2003; AfDB, 
2004; Kakule, 2006; World Bank, 2010; Van Hoof, 2011; AfDB, 2012, 2013; World Bank, 2013, 2016.
Major policies 
and programs Year




Zairianization 1973–76 Agricultural development, 
improvement of social 




Difficult transition; enormous 
abandonment of fields; 
plummet in agricultural 
production; selection of new 
acquirers of agro-industrial 
units based on political criteria 
rather than management skills 
of new owners
Radicalization 1974–76 Transfer of strategic agro- 
industrial units and large 
fields mismanaged by 
unskilled acquirers either to 
the state or to more skilled 
new acquirers; new 
government agencies 
created to provide technical 
support to the sector and to 




Failed to revive agricultural 
sector as expected; agricultural 
research and extension almost 
non-existent; several agencies 
created to support the sector 
non-operational; most agro- 
 industrial units bankrupted; 
fall in production of all 
commercial crops except 
coffee
Retrocession 1976–78 Rehabilitation of bankrupt 
firms by providing 
financial and technical 
support
Limited success, many owners of 
nationalized agricultural firms 
declined the invitation; 






1978–82 Revival of the agricultural 
sector and others (e.g. 
mining, transportation, 
energy) to improve food 
security, increase production 
of exportable crops and 
crops used as inputs by 
local industrial firms, and 
fund projects contributing 
to rural development, with 
support from the IMF
Prominent Limited success even with 
26 projects during the first 
phase (1979–81) and 22 
during the second (1981–83), 




1979–80 Inducing large industrial and 
commercial firms to 
contribute to agricultural 
development through an 
increase in agricultural 
productivity and supply  
of basic inputs to local 
agro-industry, via several 
instruments including a 
special tax
Prominent Limited success: selective policy 
benefited a few rural areas 
where selected firms chose to 
operate; taxes led to increased 
prices of agricultural products, 
a disincentive for many firms  
to reinvest in agriculture
Agricultural 
Revival Plan
1982 Improving partnership 
between the government 
and the private sector for 
more rational management 
of the agricultural sector
Not 
 prominent
Some success, but small farmers 
and other stakeholders in the 
agricultural sector ignored
Continued
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Major policies 
and programs Year








1983–86 Preparatory stage to the 
Five-Year Plan (see below); 
first time donors were seen 
as stakeholders; supported 
by the World Bank and 
IMF; involvement of donors 
in management of the 
sector included diagnosis 
of previous agricultural 
policies and identification 
of causes of failure
Some success, public investment 
plans funded under this 
program included 68 
agricultural projects (forestry, 
livestock, fisheries);  





1986–90 Agricultural and rural 
development through 
increase in size and 
productivity of peasant 
farms, promotion of 
entrepreneurship, job 
re-creation in rural areas, 
intensification of extension 
and applied agronomic 
research, maintenance of 
feeder roads
Prominent Limited funds, government 
defaulted on its commitments
Master Plan 1990–2002 Achieving agricultural and 
rural development through 
participatory approaches; 
rehabilitation of rural 
infrastructure; improvement 
of supply of inputs and 
credit; funding of 
agronomic research and 
extension; improvement of 











2009– Reducing poverty and hunger 
by 50% by 2015 
( Millennium Development 
Goal); specific objectives: 
10% of government budget 
going to agriculture to 









Targets not achieved, funding for 
agriculture remains low, 
government commitment 
continues to be lacking
Table 3.2. Continued.
the general policy. Agricultural extension 
services were one of the major themes in 
this program. However, its implementation 
failed, as with the previous initiatives, due 
to a shortage of funds (the government de-
faulted on its financing commitments).
To support the government of the DRC, 
many externally funded programs operating 
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in the 1970s and 1980s supported agricul-
tural technology transfer and advice to 
small producers, among others. Most notable 
among these programs were the World Bank- 
funded projects based on the T&V method. 
In 1988 the National Extension Service 
(SNV) was created to harmonize approaches 
and methods previously developed for vari-
ous extension services and to integrate them 
in the MINAGRI’s day-to-day activities. How-
ever, starting with the unrest of 1991, which 
brought a nationwide crumbling of institu-
tions and withdrawal of most donor support, 
SNV’s institutional capacities were weakened 
and ceased to function almost immediately, 
giving way to an emergency model of exten-
sion services with NGOs stepping in to fill 
the gap, sometimes without the adequate 
experience and capacity previously brought 
by the SNV.
The political instability that character-
ized the country since 1990 has not al-
lowed full implementation of any agricul-
tural policy. In 1990 an agricultural strategy 
known as the ‘Master Plan’ was developed 
but has never been implemented. The Mas-
ter Plan was a comprehensive and coher-
ent agricultural and rural development 
policy involving participatory approaches 
with all stakeholders involved in the agri-
cultural sector, and was the first time that 
the DRC had aimed to decentralize services 
and restructure the functions and staffing 
in the MINAGRI. Improvement in agricul-
tural extension services provision, through 
the SNV, was a major component of this 
policy. Despite its coherence, the program 
was never implemented, as the country 
was entering a period of political and so-
cial unrest.
After conflict
In 2003, after the war, the DRC President an-
nounced his intention to revive and imple-
ment the Master Plan. However, the context 
was totally different at that point, politic-
ally and economically. New policies were 
implemented but at a rather slow pace. 
Moreover, as part of billions of dollars of inter-
national assistance for security, humanitarian, 
 stabilization, peace-building and economic 
recovery interventions, many donor-supported 
projects were already being implemented 
targeting agriculture and the rural sector. 
Table 3.3 lists the major programs with 
prominent extension services provision.
Drafting of the Agricultural Code
In 2009 a new policy document known as 
the ‘Agricultural Code’ was drafted, picking 
up on some past planned reforms and pay-
ing attention to new challenges and the en-
vironment that the agricultural sector now 
faced. It aimed at reducing poverty and 
hunger by half by 2015 (a Millennium De-
velopment Goal) and allocating 10% of the 
government budget to agriculture to meet 
the Maputo commitment. Among other things, 
the three major components of this code are: 
(i) decentralization of agricultural services; 
(ii) restructuring of the MINAGRI; and 
(iii)  implementation of the CARGs, which 
are platforms for consultation, dialogues, 
problem-solving, articulation of demand of 
rural services, monitoring of programs at 
the territory and local levels, and providing 
an avenue for engagement in policy making 
processes at the provincial and national 
levels. These three planned reforms have 
significant implications for the DRC’s AES. 
FAO supported the design and plan for re-
structuring the MINAGRI, while the Belgian 
Technical Cooperation and various donors 
and NGOs have supported the establish-
ment of more than 140 CARGs across the 
country. However, this policy document re-
mains a draft and has not been implemented.
Agricultural and Rural Management  
Councils (CARGs)
There are high expectations that CARGs can 
be the solution to the ineffective AES in the 
DRC. The evaluation conducted by Badibanga 
et al. (2013) reveals several problems and 
challenges in the implementation of the 
CARGs and overall weakness in their oper-
ations, confirming earlier studies emphasiz-
ing the limitations of local management 
councils and multi-stakeholder platforms in 










Table 3.3. Projects supporting agriculture and extension systems in the post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo. From Pamuk et al., 2012; Vanlauwe et al., 2012; 
Kilelu et al., 2013; Pamuk 2014; van Paassen et al., 2014.
Project Donor Period Target provinces
Objectives and major 
 components Extension approach
Lessons learned for 
extension services 
provision








2004–12 Bandundu and 
Bas-Congo
Strengthening food security 
and reducing rural poverty 
through stimulation of 
agricultural production
Work with village  
organizations; farm 
 demonstrations; focused  
on seed multiplication and 
 distribution
Not documented







2005–10 Katanga, eastern  
Kasai and  
western Kasai
Contributing to food security 
and poverty reduction in 
rural areas
Work with village 
 organizations; farm 
demonstrations
Not documented
Western Growth  
Poles
World Bank 2013–19 Bas-Congo Increasing productivity and 
employment in selected 
value chains among 
small-scale farmers
Value chain approach; 
institutional development  
of SNV
Ongoing project; no 






USAID 2010–15 Bas-Congo; Kinshasa 
and Bandundu
Increasing productivity,  
market efficiency and 
capacity of rural 
 communities to respond  
to market forces
Strong focus on seed 
 multiplication and 









World Bank 2016–20 Eastern provinces Improving access to 
 livelihoods and socio- 
economic infrastructure in 
vulnerable communities
Innovation platforms;  
value  chain approach;  







World Bank 2010–17 Equateur Increasing productivity and 
employment in selected 
value chains
Pluralistic service provision; 
use of groups and farmers’ 
organizations; rehabilitation 
of INERA stations and the 
SNV
Ongoing project; no 










Project Donor Period Target provinces
Objectives and major 
 components Extension approach









CIAT, IITA and 
Biodiversity 
International
2005–13 Eastern provinces Improving livelihoods of rural 
households in Central  
Africa through increased 
 productivity of banana-, 
maize-, cassava- and 
legume-based systems
Radio, FFSs, village meetings, 





approach in looking 







2005–13 Eastern provinces Introducing a new approach 
(IAR4D) to promote 
innovation and its diffusion 
in African agriculture
Innovation platforms Mixed outcomes in 
terms of technology 
adoption, food 
security and poverty 
reduction
Improvement of 





and Uganda in 






FAO 2007–13 Eastern provinces Improving access to income 
and standard of living of 
rural households in 
cross-border districts of the 
four countries through 




Value chain approach Holistic approach in 









2016–20 Nationwide  
(145 territories)
Promoting youth 
 entrepreneurship while 
addressing poverty, youth 
 unemployment and food 
insecurity by making land 
(which is state property) 
available to small and 
medium enterprises
Value chain approach; local 
hubs of socio-economic 
development; focus on 
youth entrepreneurship
Holistic approach in 
looking at and 
addressing farmers’ 
constraints
CAADP, Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Program; CIAT, International Center for Tropical Agriculture; FARA, Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa; FFS, Farmer Field 
School; IAR4D, Integrated Agricultural Research for Development; IITA, International Institute of Tropical Agriculture; INERA, National Agronomic Research Institute; SNV, Service National 
de Vulgarisation (National Extension Service).
Table 3.3. Continued.
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of the surveyed CARGs achieved results 
consistent with at least one of their main 
goals, which means the other half have been 
conducting activities that are not consistent 
with their objectives. While 60% of stake-
holders interviewed were aware of CARGs, 
only 33% had attended a CARG-related 
meeting and perceived CARGs to be useful, 
and only 11% reported having benefited or 
knowing someone who benefited from CARGs. 
These responses suggest limited scope, cover-
age and relevance of CARGs based on stake-
holders’ experience.
The expectation that CARGs can be the 
major actor in agricultural service provision 
has been the subject of much controversy, 
which is partly explained by the lack of a 
clear definition of the CARGs’ mission. 
While some stakeholders in the agricultural 
sector believe CARGs can handle any issue 
relating to agricultural strategies and policies, 
others do not see how a multi-stakeholder 
platform such as the CARG can deal efficiently 
with an issue that requires resource commit-
ment and regular management operations, 
such as the provision of agricultural exten-
sion services.
The survey of 55 CARGs in western 
DRC (Badibanga et al., 2013) shows that 
33% (18 CARGs) indicated agricultural ex-
tension provision or monitoring as one 
of their main objectives. Of these CARGs 
60% have activities consistent with these 
objectives. However, 33% (six) of the remain-
ing CARGs did not achieve any extension- 
related goal. Further, 20% (11) of the CARGs 
surveyed did not have extension among 
their goals but achieved the extension out-
puts incidentally. Thus, the total of the sur-
veyed CARGs achieving extension outputs 
with or without an extension objective was 
42% (23).
The evaluation of the role of the CARGs 
undertaken by Badibanga et al. (2013) dem-
onstrates that this platform can play a role 
as a facilitator of access to agricultural exten-
sion services. CARGs can also act as a plat-
form for demand articulation and aggrega-
tion. It appears that CARGs are showing 
potential as an effective demand-side strat-
egy and a bridging institution for demand 
and supply. However, they cannot play the 
role of service provider and therefore can-
not function as a supply-side strategy. To 
operate effectively as a service provider, an 
extension organization needs: (i) to design 
and implement a coherent agricultural ex-
tension program with clearly defined tar-
gets; (ii) to use different means and methods 
for providing agricultural extension services; 
(iii) to use well-trained and experienced ex-
tension personnel; and (iv) to have substan-
tial financial and material resources to com-
plete its goals. The CARGs do not meet 
these conditions. In fact, a CARG is a multi- 
stakeholder platform for consultation and 
thus differs from any permanent structure 
or organization that can design a program 
and commit the resources needed to imple-
ment it. Supply-side strategies, including 
capacity building and training of pluralistic 
extension service providers, will be crucial 
to complement investments and support to 
demand-side strategies such as CARGs.
National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP)
In 2013 the DRC government and its part-
ners adopted the NAIP as part of the Com-
prehensive Africa Agricultural Development 
Program (CAADP) process. Research, exten-
sion and agricultural training is the NAIP’s 
main component. Overall, this program 
aims to boost research activities to generate 
and disseminate information on improved 
technologies for sustainable agricultural de-
velopment and to improve agricultural 
productivity in the country. Specifically, it 
aims to strengthen public institutions and 
civil society organizations for advisory sup-
port through:
• Identification and labelling of NGOs 
and various actors working in rural de-
velopment.
• Establishment of provincial and national 
directories of government agencies and 
private extension organizations offering 
extension services.
• Development of manuals on technical 
standards, procedures and management 
tools to inform extension officers at the 
provincial level.
• Training of extension services trainers.
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• Construction and rehabilitation of ex-
tension services buildings and infra-
structures at national and provincial 
levels.
• Equipping of extension services struc-
tures with means for transportation and 
logistical support to ensure an improved 
level of service delivery to farmers.
• Establishment of a monitoring and co-
ordination hub to harmonize activities 
among NGOs and partners.
• Installation of an action-tracking data-
base and advisory support at provincial 
level.
Dissemination and popularization of techno-
logical innovations include actions such as:
• Development of a national strategy for 
agricultural extension services and dis-
semination of research results.
• Dissemination of simplified and user- 
friendly versions of research results.
• Organizing open days for technological 
innovations.
• Training program leaders in strategic 
communication.
• Capacity strengthening of research and 
development journalists.
• A framework for consultation and in-
formation sharing linking researchers, 
extension workers and agricultural or-
ganizations at territorial, provincial 
and national levels.
• Publication and dissemination of re-
search results through appropriate channels 
(radio, print, television, professional 
organizations).
These activities will substantially revitalize 
the AES in the DRC.
Of the US$857 million available for the 
NAIP, 93% (US$797.3  million) represents 
the contribution of development partners 
and 7% (US$60 million) is from the Congo-
lese government. The breakdown of this 
amount, according to the projects already 
planned, indicates that US$504  million 
(59%) was mobilized during the 2013–2015 
period and US$351  million (41%) will be 
released in 2016–2020. The distribution of 
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Fig. 3.2. Funds available for National Agricultural Investment Plan, by sub-program. From MINAGRI  
(2013).
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Integrated Agricultural Research  
for Development (IAR4D) and IPs
The Lake Kivu region, capturing parts of 
eastern DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, is one of 
three project sites of the sub-Saharan Africa 
Challenge Program (SSA-CP), coordinated 
by the Forum for Agricultural Research in 
Africa (FARA). SSA-CP aims to develop 
technologies for sustainably intensifying 
subsistence-oriented farming systems; de-
velop smallholder production systems that 
are compatible with sound natural resource 
management; improve the accessibility and 
efficiency of markets for smallholder and 
pastoral products; and catalyze the formula-
tion and adoption of policies that would en-
courage innovation to improve the liveli-
hoods of smallholders and pastoralists. It 
started in 2004 with the aim of introducing 
a new approach to promoting innovation 
and diffusion of innovations in African agri-
culture. IAR4D is based on the innovation 
systems perspective and creates coalitions 
of stakeholders to identify and address local 
bottlenecks to agricultural development. 
Through this approach, the program aims to 
promote agricultural innovations by utiliz-
ing farmers’ indigenous knowledge through 
a participatory framework and interactions 
between different stakeholders. The innov-
ation systems perspective focuses on recog-
nition of a wider, differentiated set of innov-
ation suppliers; demand responsiveness 
and better connectivity of agricultural re-
search with a wider range of innovation act-
ors beyond extension agents and farmers; 
and an expanded definition of the innov-
ations being developed to include both eco-
nomic and social applications (World Bank, 
2007, 2011).
A central concept of this approach is IPs, 
which are decentralized local innovation 
systems. IPs are vehicles to bring stake-
holders together. Each IP serves a group of 
villages and theoretically chooses represen-
tatives from different stakeholders via a par-
ticipatory process. These representatives of 
farmers’ associations, traders, researchers, 
extension workers, NGOs and government 
policy makers regularly meet at the plat-
forms, articulate their views and negotiate 
joint strategies for action. To provide ‘proof 
of concept’, the IAR4D program and its IPs 
were rolled out as a large experiment 
whereby some communities received IPs 
and others did not. In addition, baseline 
and midline surveys were conducted. These 
processes ensure rigorous monitoring and 
evaluation of the concept. Available studies 
show mixed outcomes of these IPs (Pamuk 
et al., 2012, 2014). Even within eastern DRC, 
results are mixed. The IPs in Kituva re-
sulted in higher food security and reduced 
poverty, while those in Rubare led to lower 
food security and a higher poverty count. 
There were no significant impacts of IPs on 
poverty in Bweremana and Rumangabo 
(Pamuk et al., 2012). The mixed outcomes 
of IPs in the context of the IAR4D program 
and SSA-CP are consistent with results ob-
tained by other authors in other contexts 
(Kilelu et al., 2013; van Paassen et al., 2014).
Integrated multipronged communication 
approaches
Eastern DRC is one of the project areas for 
the Consortium for Improving Agriculture- 
Based Livelihoods in Central Africa (CIALCA), 
a research-for-development consortium led 
by the Tropical Soil Biology and Fertility 
Research Area of the International Center 
for Tropical Agriculture (TSBF-CIAT), the 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture 
(IITA) and Bioversity International. It aims to 
improve the livelihoods of rural households 
in Central Africa through the identification, 
evaluation and promotion of technological 
options to enhance the productivity of banana-, 
maize-, cassava- and legume-based systems, 
and to create an enabling environment for 
their adoption. CIALCA promoted com-
plete integrated soil fertility management 
(ISFM) comprising the use of improved 
germplasm, mineral fertilizer, appropriate 
organic resource management and local 
adaptation.
CIALCA follows an integrated, multi-
pronged communication approach using a 
mix of tools to disseminate and promote 
ISFM at a large scale. The first steps towards 
ISFM were fertilizer and improved varieties. 
An essential condition for their adoption is 
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access to farm inputs, markets and financial 
resources. CIALCA has worked on dissem-
ination strategies, including ways to facili-
tate access to the required inputs, simple 
information fliers spread through extension 
networks and knowledge on how to avoid 
less responsive soils. CIALCA implemented 
campaigns that addressed farmers’ con-
straints by offering them information, tech-
nology demonstrations, product exhibits, 
financial incentives and opportunities to 
develop their skills within their own farms. 
As efforts to promote the seed and fertilizer 
strategy were underway, activities such as 
FFSs were initiated to guide farming com-
munities towards complete ISFM.
The CIALCA Knowledge Resource 
Centre was established in the African Great 
Lakes region to identify and leverage new 
impact pathways for ISFM technologies. By 
working closely with extension agents and 
outreach partners, targeted information 
tools can be developed to support adoption 
of practices by farmers in specific settings. 
A particular challenge was to develop in-
novative knowledge products that take into 
account the low rates of adult literacy and 
formal education prevalent in the region. 
Rural radio, one tool that was used, offered 
a wide reach and was very useful for raising 
awareness around a particular issue. How-
ever, it is less suitable as a training tool, par-
ticularly as knowledge complexity increases. 
With increasing complexity of knowledge, 
CIALCA focuses on rigorous and in-depth 
farmer facilitation and training.
CIALCA has intervened in markets by 
working with farmers’ organizations to 
achieve a marketable production scale. Cap-
acity building on collaborative action, mar-
keting and business planning skills and 
management of credit and finances have en-
sured that farmers are now able to bulk their 
produce, wait for better prices and earn 
higher incomes from their produce. In add-
ition to farmers, training also targets the in-
stitutions and organizations that support 
farmers’ organizations, such as NGOs and 
national research staff, to ensure post-pro-
ject sustainability. Farmers in South Kivu 
were able to raise their sales revenues by 
50% through strategic storage facilitated by 
inventory credit schemes (warrantage): farm-
ers did not have to sell immediately after 
harvest but were able to store their produce 
collectively, awaiting better prices for their 
products. Through group efforts, farmers 
were also able to acquire credit for their 
ISFM-based farming activities and, because 
they had targeted production to key mar-
kets, were able for the first time to borrow 
funds without collateral. In addition, farm-
ers working in groups have been able to ini-
tiate mutual savings schemes that supple-
ment other sources of finance, particularly 
for investment in new technologies.
Other approaches promoted by external 
partners
Various approaches to agricultural extension 
are being implemented by donor projects, in-
cluding FFSs, rural radio and value chain 
approaches. The World Food Programme 
promotes rural radio as a powerful tool for 
broader dissemination of information on 
agricultural extension in rural areas. Since 
2002 new approaches are being tested 
through various projects implemented with 
FAO technical assistance. These approaches 
include EU-, Technical Cooperation Pro-
gram- and UNDP-funded projects, and use 
the FFS methodology developed by FAO. At 
present, 83 FFSs are operating and results 
are promising (MINAGRI, 2009). The aim is 
to extend the methodology to other crops 
and sites in other provinces.
The value chain approach has been 
used by major programs supporting the 
agricultural sector and technology dissem-
ination in the DRC (e.g. ongoing projects of 
FAO, USAID and the World Bank), demon-
strating that a range of services is needed to 
build sustainable value chains that effect-
ively link farmers to markets. These ser-
vices include:
• Organizing farmers into business- 
oriented entities.
• Offering training and advice for indi-
vidual farmers, groups of farmers, 
farmer organizations, cooperatives and 
other agribusinesses along the value 
chain.
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• Disseminating information about tech-
nologies, new research, markets, inputs 
and financial services.
• Providing participatory demonstrations 
and practical adaptation of new tech-
nologies and practices on-farm.
• Developing business management and 
negotiation skills among smallholder 
farmers and other local entrepreneurs.
• Facilitating linkages among market 
 actors (including financial and non- 
financial inputs, processing, trading).
• Facilitating compliance with quality 
standards and traceability require-
ments of markets.
More projects and programs have been im-
plemented in eastern regions due to the 
greater challenges they face resulting from 
past and current conflict. For example, 
FAO projects in the eastern regions particu-
larly included water resources manage-
ment among their main components, spe-
cifically to address post-conflict issues 
pertaining to water access and use policies 
among communities affected by civil un-
rest and local conflicts within the respect-
ive countries. The project also embedded 
gender and social inclusion safeguards dur-
ing project implementation to ensure that 
reconstruction efforts and value chain de-
velopment are able to reflect diverse voices 
and contributions.
For several regions in the country, in 
consideration of non-functional markets 
and lost planting materials due to past con-
flict, efforts to rebuild extension services 
have often been accompanied by provision 
of planting materials and other inputs in the 
short term, and rebuilding the markets and 
developing value chains in the longer term. 
Infrastructure development and basic ser-
vices are also provided alongside agricul-
tural information provision.
Key Lessons from Efforts to Rebuild  
the AES
The following seven points can be high-
lighted as major challenges and lessons for 
rebuilding the AES in the DRC.
Sustained government funding
It is critical to rebuild the lost capacity and 
livelihoods of rural communities. There-
fore, it is crucial to mobilize substantive 
funds and commitment from the govern-
ment. As discussed above, the Congolese 
government has often defaulted on its com-
mitments in the implementation of key pol-
icies and programs. The process of decen-
tralizing agricultural service provision in 
the DRC has been slow. Funds are not de-
centralized, leaving the local levels with 
fragile situations regarding financial, insti-
tutional and technical capacities.
No amount or degree of institutional re-
forms or approaches will work without sus-
tained funding and commitment from gov-
ernment. In countries with major reforms in 
their AES, such as Brazil, Senegal and 
Uganda, state governments provide a pool 
of resources and advertise a call for pro-
viders (from any source: public, private, 
NGO or RPO) through a competitive process 
(Suresh Babu [April 2016] and Jean Charles 
Faye [November 2014], International Food 
Policy Research Institute, pers. comm.). 
Funding should be stable rather than rely-
ing on ad hoc projects. Governments must 
invest in the extension system in order to 
transform the agricultural sector.
In the absence of government funding, 
external funding has been crucial for the 
functioning of the extension system. External 
funders such as donor agencies and inter-
national NGOs also tend to place condition-
ality and emphasis on monitoring of adop-
tion and impact, and this has implications for 
their support for a transitioning economy 
such as the DRC. However, as proved during 
the past decades of neglect of extension in the 
DRC, short-term support from external actors 
is extremely important but will need to be 
supported and continued by the government 
if sustainability is to be achieved.
Clearly defined objectives
Clear direction and vision, coupled with 
measurable targets, are extremely import-
ant. The huge number of extension agents 
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and technicians in the agricultural inspec-
tion system within the MINAGRI (estimated 
at 11,245) offers an opportunity and asset to 
be utilized for extension delivery. To date, 
their mandate covers mainly data collection 
and ‘monitoring’ of farmers’ activities. With 
a clear mandate, clear definition and com-
munication of roles and responsibilities, 
and a corresponding performance assess-
ment and incentive system, this inactive 
and defunct inspection system could be 
transformed to successfully support know-
ledge dissemination and technology trans-
fer in rural areas.
The rationale for maintaining such an 
extensive field staff without a mandate to 
fulfil the ‘public good’ functions of agricul-
tural extension remains unclear. Obviously, 
data on agricultural production could be 
collected more effectively by conducting 
sample surveys rather than maintaining an 
extensive network of field staff aiming to 
monitor every farmer.
Another function for the system of in-
spectors, agronomists, veterinarians and 
monitors, apart from data collection, is the 
prevention of crop and livestock diseases 
(Ragasa et al., 2013b). While this is a public 
sector function, it appears more efficient to 
pursue this function together with, rather 
than separately from, the promotion of new 
technologies and farming practices.
Work with public institutions
Public sector extension remains crucial even 
in nations such as the DRC with very weak 
government institutions. As widely observed 
in the DRC and other fragile countries, many 
donor- and NGO-led projects tend to bypass 
government institutions, not involving them 
in their project design, implementation and 
capacity-strengthening activities. An import-
ant strategy therefore is to include public sec-
tor extension agents and subject matter spe-
cialists in capacity- strengthening and learning 
programs, instead of bypassing them and fo-
cusing only on NGOs, as is the practice for 
many development organizations. It will be 
crucial to work with government counterparts 
(agriculture ministries, extension systems, 
 research institutes, seed inspection systems) 
in agricultural and rural projects. These ef-
forts should occur even where there is some 
distrust of and perceived inefficiency in the 
government institutions, which continue to 
have human resources scattered throughout 
the country. These institutions should there-
fore form part of any capacity-strengthening 
efforts related to extension activities.
In the case of this pluralistic system, fo-
cusing on coordination, quality control and 
regulation to avoid conflicting extension 
messages and duplication of efforts will be a 
priority for the government, equal to or even 
more important than providing extension 
services themselves. While there remains 
pressure to continue service provision by 
the public sector, there have to be major de-
cisions on how to invest limited resources 
more effectively. The public sector could 
focus more on coordination and regulation 
of extension services, thereby freeing more 
resources from actual service provision, 
which could be done mainly by, or con-
tracted out to, the private sector and NGOs.
Demand- and supply-side strategies
Many government officials and stakeholders 
have high expectations that CARGs can 
offer the solution to the ineffective AES in 
the DRC. However, these expectations are 
unrealistic and stem from a lack of under-
standing and consideration of both the de-
mand and supply sides of extension ser-
vices. CARGs are starting to be used as a 
demand-side strategy, particularly as a plat-
form for demand articulation and as a bridg-
ing institution between demand and supply 
of extension services. However, they are un-
likely to perform the role of service pro-
viders. Supply-side strategies, including 
capacity building and coordination of plur-
alistic extension service providers, will need 
to be implemented in addition to strengthen-
ing CARGs. Especially in the case of the 
DRC, where almost a quarter of agents have 
only a primary school education and the ma-
jority of government agents have no univer-
sity degree, regular training is extremely 
 important and needs to be institutionalized 
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rather than being provided as an ad hoc ac-
tivity. Part of the supply-side strategies is to 
rebuild the agricultural education and train-
ing institutes so that they can be effective in 
training future field staff and service pro-
viders to work with rural communities. The 
AES relies on the strength of the agricul-
tural education and training system, so any 
efforts to revitalize the former will need 
complementary investments in the latter.
CARGs would need to focus on facili-
tating consultation among stakeholders on 
agricultural extension policies and strat-
egies, and on monitoring and evaluating the 
implementation of decisions that result 
from such consultation. To play such a com-
plex role, CARGs need capacity building 
for their members and leadership on multi- 
stakeholder processes; management of multi- 
stakeholder platforms; social interaction 
and strategies for reaching a consensus; 
monitoring and evaluation of agricultural 
extension and agricultural production; and 
post-harvest methods. CARGS also need to 
implement appropriate self- financing pol-
icies which will allow them to collect sub-
stantial contributions from their organiza-
tion members who have the financial 
capacity to support them, while setting fi-
nancial targets for their other organization 
members with limited financial means.
Multipronged, targeted communication 
approaches
The experience with the T&V approach 
yielded limited results. Top-down ap-
proaches were used without taking suffi-
cient account of farmers’ needs and the vari-
ability of ecosystems. At the same time, the 
system was extremely costly and was un-
sustainable once donor financing ended. 
The experience with CIALCA highlights the 
need for integrated and multipronged com-
munication approaches, and shows that the 
need for intensive farmer facilitation and 
training increases rapidly with increasing 
complexity of knowledge. By working 
closely with extension agents and outreach 
partners, targeted information and dissem-
ination tools can be developed to support 
adoption of practices by farmers in specific 
settings. For example, a mix of input access 
facilitation, simple information fliers spread 
through extension networks, technology 
demonstrations, product exhibits and know-
ledge resource centers can be used based on 
the specific local setting. A particular chal-
lenge is to develop innovative knowledge 
products that take into account the low 
rates of adult literacy and formal education 
prevalent in the region. Rural radio is one 
tool that offers a wide reach and is very use-
ful for raising awareness around a particular 
issue. However, it is less suitable as a train-
ing tool, particularly as knowledge com-
plexity increases. Experiences with IPs are 
also mixed, so implementing them will re-
quire special consideration of the set-up 
process, focus on tangible outcomes, need 
for complementary skills and operational 
capacity needed to manage the IP process.
Holistic approaches to addressing farmers’ 
constraints
The experience with CIALCA shows the 
need to look at other inputs, services, mar-
kets and policies. This is also the central 
theme of the African Development Bank’s 
program of ‘Centers for Integrated Develop-
ment’, designed as hubs of socio-economic 
development at the local level. This is also 
related to the value chain approach begin-
ning to be adopted by various partners in-
cluding FAO, USAID and the World Bank.
Weak policy and low investments in 
complementary inputs and services also 
limit the effectiveness of extension. Access 
to credit, inputs, markets, land, equipment 
and tools are the most common and most 
consistently mentioned constraints among 
farmers, based on the perspectives of agents, 
organization heads and farmers themselves. 
Training and extension services are men-
tioned as only a part of the problem, and 
therefore are only a part of the solution. In-
creasing the productivity and incomes of 
rural communities will not require changes 
in the extension system alone, but rather a 
holistic approach to address constraints in the 
input distribution system and technology 
56 C. Ragasa and J. Ulimwengu
adoption. The results warrant complemen-
tary review and reform in the policies and 
investments governing these inputs and 
 services.
Recruiting female field staff
Only 5% of the field staff surveyed are 
women. Of all the extension organization 
heads interviewed, only 7% are women. 
There was no female supervisor or head in 
the public sector agencies.
In the DRC there is a limited dataset on 
female and male farmers’ differentiated ac-
cess to extension services, but evidence from 
the literature in many different countries 
suggests a strong correlation between the sex 
of the agent and the gender differential in ac-
cess to extension services. For example, a 
1993 FAO study of 24 extension programs in 
 Africa, Asia and Latin America suggests that 
the presence of female extension agents was 
an important factor in female farmers’ par-
ticipation in extension activities. Female ex-
tension workers serve a higher proportion of 
female farmers than do male agents. The 
average ratio of women to men farmers is 1.3 
for female agents and 0.53 for male agents 
(World Bank and IFPRI, 2009). This may sug-
gest that extension services from female ex-
tension agents are better targeted to female 
farmers. In Tanzania, 40% of women farmers 
preferred to work with female extension 
agents, 26% preferred male extension agents 
and the remaining 34% had no preference 
(Due et al., 1997). Female farmers stated that 
they preferred female extension agents be-
cause they were freer to discuss problems 
with them, and female agents were better 
able to accommodate their time preferences 
for meetings than were male agents. Gender- 
based constraints, such as social norms that 
limit women’s school attendance or mobil-
ity, also limit their opportunities and will-
ingness to work as agricultural extension 
agents (Ragasa et al., 2012). It may be diffi-
cult at a practical level for a married woman 
to work in a rural area away from her hus-
band and family or to find housing and 
schooling appropriate for her children.
The analysis by Ragasa et al. (2015b) 
suggests a strong correlation between the 
presence of female agents in extension or-
ganizations and performance in service pro-
vision, which confirms results of past stud-
ies (Ragasa et al., 2013a). In places where 
female heads and agents are few, as in the 
case of the DRC, focusing on girls’ educa-
tion and encouraging more women students 
and graduates to work on agriculture and on 
AES will be an important strategy.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Although the post-conflict or emergency 
period is rife with difficulties, it is also a 
time of great opportunity. Particularly in 
post-conflict settings, long-standing struc-
tural issues can be addressed. Opportun-
ities also are present for promoting eco-
nomic and agricultural diversification and 
attaining sustainable livelihoods.
The ambitious strategy adopted by the 
Congolese government as part of the NAIP 
consists of concentrating its interventions in 
growth poles or corridors in which the ne-
cessary infrastructure (energy, water, roads) 
could be established to enable privately 
managed agricultural enterprises and farm-
ers’ cooperatives to focus on food crop and 
livestock production, processing and mar-
keting in a coordinated manner in the con-
text of an agro-industrial park (Ulimwengu 
et al., 2015). In addition to providing infra-
structure, the park could also host services. 
This is a good starting point towards more 
concerted efforts to rebuild the agricultural 
sector and provide the needed productive 
and social services to the rural population.
Rebuilding the agricultural sector is cru-
cial for food security, restoring livelihoods 
and the economic recovery of the DRC. Revi-
talizing the AES will be extremely important 
in this regard. There is a clear need and op-
portunity to reach out and draw on the re-
sources and expertise of both the public and 
private sectors. Community-based resources 
must also be harnessed. The extent of dam-
age requires a full complement of labor, and 
the different skills and capacities of various 
actors.
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Strategies to rebuild the AES in the 
DRC must look at both demand-side and 
supply-side constraints and should follow 
a defined sequence. In the short term, a 
first priority would be a unified policy and 
clearer strategy for agricultural extension. 
This will require designing and communi-
cating a clear mission and mandate of 
the  11,000+ extension agents scattered 
throughout the country. If they could be 
utilized to focus on advisory services and 
technology transfer, rather than focusing 
on conducting censuses and monitoring 
farmers’ activities, this could go a long way 
towards reaching out to the rural popula-
tion with knowledge and technologies. 
Clear mandates, functions and perform-
ance targets for extension staff may trigger 
a change in perception and trust among 
farmers that extension agents are no longer 
‘monitors’ but rather knowledge brokers 
and technical advisors.
The national workshop on agricultural 
extension and productivity held in June 
2012 offered a good start, and the govern-
ment can continue to bring the workshop’s 
recommendations into its agricultural strat-
egy planning and policy formulation.
A second priority in the short term is 
institutional coordination of extension ser-
vices, especially in a pluralistic extension 
system. Greater coordination, quality con-
trol and regulation are critical to communi-
cate consistent extension messages across 
many different extension service pro-
viders. This will also involve encouraging 
development organizations to work with 
local MINAGRI offices, INERA, SENASEM 
and SNV to avoid inconsistencies and du-
plication of efforts, as well as to ensure cap-
acity building and continuity of activities. 
The capacity of SNV to play its role of coord-
ination and technical backstopping should 
be strengthened.
A third priority in the short term con-
sists of streamlining the number of extension 
staff by retiring the older and least efficient 
staff and hiring and retraining younger and 
more dynamic individuals. This can stream-
line the salary structure and free up valuable 
resources that can be shifted to much- needed 
operating funds (for actual extension service 
provision) and capital funds (e.g. buildings, 
vehicles and equipment). Implementation 
has already begun and the government 
should facilitate this for more immediate 
 impacts.
A fourth priority addressing the de-
mand side is to strengthen the role of farm-
ers’ organizations at the village level, and 
the role of CARGs at the sector and territory 
levels, in demand articulation and the cap-
acity for planning and monitoring service 
provision. The role of CARGs in the policy 
making process should be strengthened so 
that they can advocate effectively for greater 
investment and commitment to agricultural 
extension.
In the medium term, complementary 
investment in reforming the agricultural 
education and training institutes will be a 
priority as they are the critical institutions 
that train and nurture the new wave of agri-
cultural extension agents and officers. This 
will also include a review and reform of ex-
tension curriculum. And, given the serious 
food and nutrition insecurity in the DRC, 
inclusion of nutrition messages in agricul-
tural extension services will be an import-
ant strategy. The scarcity of female exten-
sion workers requires investing in and 
supporting girls’ education and mobilizing 
more female agents in the medium term. 
Given that extension services are just one of 
the factors determining productivity growth, 
complementary investments and policy re-
forms to facilitate access to markets, and af-
fordability of inputs in order to complement 
the knowledge and extension provision, 
will also be important strategies in the me-
dium term.
In the long term, there will be a need 
for better advocacy and communication 
for more stable funding (especially for 
operating and capital components) from 
the government, rather than persistent 
dependence on ad hoc and short-term 
projects. Institutional reform cannot suc-
ceed without sustained funding and com-
mitment from government. The NAIP im-
plemented in 2013, with detailed reforms 
of the AES, is encouraging and is in need 
of bold and firm commitment from the 
government.
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Background
History of conflict in South Sudan
Formed from the ten southernmost states of 
Sudan, South Sudan is a land of expansive 
grassland, swamps and tropical rainforest 
straddling both banks of the White Nile 
(Natsios, 2012). It is highly diverse ethnically 
and linguistically. Among the largest ethnic 
groups are the Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk. Un-
like the predominantly Muslim population 
of Sudan, the South Sudanese follow trad-
itional religions, while a minority is Christian 
(Jok, 2011).
As Sudan prepared to gain independ-
ence from joint British and Egyptian rule 
in 1956, southern leaders accused the new 
authorities in Khartoum of backing out of 
promises to create a federal system and try-
ing to impose an Islamic and Arabic identity 
on the south (Schomerus and Allen, 2010). 
This tension led to a series of armed con-
flicts. Collins (2007) indicated that the long-
est, most destructive and violent of  Sudan’s 
five civil wars were the two between the north 
and south. The first occurred in 1955 when 
southern army officers mutinied, igniting a 
civil war between the south—led by the 
Anya Nya guerrilla movement—and the 
 Sudanese government. A second conflict—
termed the Anya Nya civil war—occurred 
from 1963 to 1972 and only ended when 
the Addis Ababa peace agreement of 1972 
accorded the south a measure of autonomy.
In 1983 the south again rose in rebellion—
led by the Sudan People’s Liberation Move-
ment (SPLM) and its armed wing, the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)—when the 
Sudanese government cancelled the auton-
omy arrangements (Belloni, 2011). This was 
the start of the second southern civil war, 
which took place between 1983 and 2006. 
During the second southern civil war, and 
specifically from 1991 to 1996, an internal 
‘civil war within a civil war’ took place be-
tween the Dinka and Nuer tribes and caused 
massive casualties and human suffering be-
fore the SPLA could establish its authority 
(Collins, 2007: 1783).
The conflict officially came to an end 
with the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement. The south was granted re-
gional autonomy and guaranteed represen-
tation in a power-sharing government (Dagne, 
2011). The agreement included a referendum 
in the south on independence, to be held in 
2011. The people of the south voted 99% to 
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1% in favor of splitting from Sudan. The 
prospect of independence excited the South 
Sudanese, who were looking for a fresh start, 
a new country and lasting peace (Christopher, 
2011). Consequently, South Sudan broke away 
from Sudan and became an independent na-
tion in 2011. SPLA officers remained in 
military leadership positions as governmen-
tal reorganization proceeded.
This process was not without its costs. 
Hanzich (2011) reported that at least 1.5 million 
people are thought to have lost their lives 
and more than 4 million were displaced in 
the 22 years of guerrilla warfare. Food inse-
curity became a pressing issue as the war 
 escalated (Keen and Lee, 2007). Massive 
numbers of people fled the conflict either 
north wards or to adjoining nations and have 
not returned. Thousands who fled took what 
livestock they could with them.
In December 2013, the young state 
again plunged into crisis amid a power 
struggle between the president and his 
deputy, whom he had dismissed. South 
Sudan’s president is a member of the Dinka 
tribe and the former deputy is a Nuer tribe 
member (Jok, 2011). Fighting between gov-
ernment troops and rebel factions erupted, 
largely through tribal conflict between the 
Southern Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) 
and the SPLA, which is controlled by the 
president.
Within weeks the conflict had killed 
thousands and prompted more than 800,000 
to flee their homes (Arnold and LeRiche, 
2013). Aljazeera America (2014) reported 
that nearly 100,000 South Sudanese civil-
ians had been given refuge in UN camps in 
South Sudan. These civilians fled to escape 
killings and massacres, and continue to fear 
returning home. The large populations in 
the UN camps have given rise to specific 
challenges related to food security due to 
problems of access to food, distribution of 
food aid and the dietary needs of refugees 
with diverse age ranges.
A series of cattle raids between the 
Nuer and Dinka tribes in December 2013 
and January 2014 caused conflict to spread 
once again. Hundreds of people were killed 
and thousands were displaced from their 
homes in retaliation (British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2014). These raids are a long- 
running cultural practice that exists outside 
of national issues. Several cease-fire agree-
ments have been proposed recently, but 
these have broken down since the summer 
of 2015.
The post-conflict context
South Sudan, like many fragile states, has 
not yet fully emerged from conflict. There-
fore, terming it a post-conflict state is some-
what misleading. Nonetheless, South Sudan 
has many characteristics that are consistent 
with other countries facing sporadic and re-
curring violence following larger conflicts. 
These characteristics have important im-
pacts on the roles of agriculture and agricul-
tural extension.
South Sudan remains a resource-rich 
nation with poor infrastructure and con-
tinuing tribal conflicts that hinder agricul-
ture and the conservation and responsible 
use of natural resources. Efforts to develop 
agriculture have been negatively impacted 
by the conditions surrounding the conflict. 
For example, much of the direction of eco-
nomic activity in South Sudan is managed 
by generals and other leaders of the former 
SPLA. Given their backgrounds and the 
importance placed on security, approxi-
mately 40% of the budget of South Sudan 
is allocated to maintaining military infra-
structure. This reduces the budget avail-
able for agriculture and other activities. In 
addition, military leaders have a de facto 
role in identifying and encouraging vari-
ous endeavors and enterprises important 
to South Sudan, in terms of both economic 
viability for the nation and logistical con-
siderations (e.g. food supply) for the mili-
tary. Agriculture therefore has a unique 
role in this context of militarization and 
priority-setting.
Funding for agriculture is additionally 
compromised by the composition of the 
South Sudanese economy and reliance on oil 
revenues. Years of civil war have prevented 
the development of any effective infrastruc-
ture, and crude oil represents the only reli-
able revenue stream for the government. 
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 Personal property taxes or income taxes are 
not a possible source of governmental fund-
ing, and the nation is not yet stable enough to 
allow for any significant income from tour-
ism. However, the sporadic and ongoing con-
flicts, together with the current low price of 
oil, have led to a dramatic fall in oil produc-
tion in South Sudan. The budget assigned to 
agriculture has decreased considerably as a 
result of the lowered oil revenues. This re-
duction has had a ripple effect, influencing 
the resources—human and other—that would 
typically have been devoted to food security.
Access to and the use of natural re-
sources are also factors that affect agricul-
ture in South Sudan. As Sudan—and later 
South Sudan—endured multiple civil wars 
between 1956 and the present, these con-
flicts reduced the country’s access to natural 
resources and consequently its production 
of agricultural commodities (Collins, 2007). 
For example, restricted access to and the 
strain on water supplies during the civil 
wars led to decline in agricultural product-
ivity (Fegley, 2009). In addition, managing 
South Sudan’s water supply in the current 
period remains important in the fight 
against food insecurity (Rai et al., 2012). 
Water conservation programs in South 
Sudan are paramount for agricultural pro-
duction, due to domestic pressures on the 
Nile River and the needs of other countries 
that rely on the Nile. Meanwhile, the 
swamps in the southern part of the nation 
are in danger of being drained for cultiva-
tion, leading to a loss of biodiversity and 
soil fertility (Salman, 2011). Gorsevski et al. 
(2012) have also indicated that the conflicts 
have had a negative effect on forests and 
other natural resources.
Agricultural Extension Providers  
and Actors
The system of agricultural extension in 
South Sudan is largely disorganized and in-
cludes a range of actors with varied roles and 
operational statuses. Public sector programs 
and institutions from both the South Sudan-
ese government and its military provide 
 extension services. In addition, due to the 
youth of the nation and the corresponding 
lack of institutional capacity to serve farm-
ers, a wide variety of non-state entities work 
to assist South Sudan with agricultural de-
velopment. All provide crucial services and 
fill unique roles.
SPLA Agricultural Extension Battalion
Following independence in 2011, the SPLA 
was faced with the question of how to en-
gage its fighters in productive activities that 
would provide food for the military but also 
serve the development goals of the country, 
while providing employment to a group of 
military officers lacking many marketable 
skills. At the same time, South Sudan’s 
population was heavily reliant on agricul-
ture as a livelihood and food production 
strategy. Given that many SPLA fighters 
came from agrarian backgrounds, an early 
concept of a post-conflict extension system 
for South Sudan was that a battalion from 
the SPLA would serve as extension officers. 
Efforts were made to create this agricultural 
battalion, which does provide limited ser-
vices to farmers. However, the system was 
not fully developed due to the further upris-
ing in December 2013. Nonetheless, the 
SPLA agricultural battalion is still a pro-
posed model for agricultural extension ser-
vices in South Sudan.
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Tourism, 
Animal Resources and Fisheries
The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, 
 Tourism, Animal Resources and Fisheries 
(MoAFTARF) also plays a major and central 
role in South Sudan’s extension system, 
particularly as related to the development 
of the agricultural sector. The MoAFTARF 
has a broad mandate that includes efforts to:
• Establish and manage an effective agri-
cultural extension service.
• Formulate legislation, policies, stand-
ards and plans for the development of 
agriculture and forestry in South Sudan 
and ensure adequate food availability.
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• Promote and, where necessary, regulate 
the efficient production and marketing 
of agricultural and forest products.
• Conduct demand-driven research and 
collect data on production and its 
socio-economic impacts on incomes 
and well-being.
• Rehabilitate and expand training and 
research institutions.
• Develop the capacities of farmers and 
other stakeholders in the fields of agri-
culture and forestry, especially related 
to the development and adaptation of 
appropriate technologies.
• Provide technical assistance and train-
ing to state and local governments to 
build their capacity to assume respon-
sibilities for agriculture and forestry.
Within the context of this mandate, the pri-
ority objectives of the Ministry are: (i) to es-
tablish and maintain an effective agricul-
tural extension service; (ii) to develop the 
human resources of stakeholders working 
in agriculture and forestry; and (iii) to re-
habilitate and expand training and research 
institutions. To accomplish these object-
ives, the Ministry is supported by the USA, 
the EU and the Ministry of Agriculture of 
the People’s Republic of China. However, to 
date the MoAFTARF does not support or 
provide training for any type of extension 
system in South Sudan. Only the SPLA’s 
agricultural battalion performs this role.
These three Ministry objectives align 
with US Department of State and SPLA agri-
cultural battalion goals for agricultural de-
velopment and extension in South Sudan. 
However, historical and political barriers—
such as perpetual tribal and political con-
flicts—keep the leaders of the SPLA’s agri-
cultural battalion and the Ministry from 
working together. At the time of this case 
study, the Ministry had no working rela-
tionship with the extension efforts pro-
vided by the SPLA. Over time, inter-
national organizations may be able to help 
improve working relationships between 
the Ministry and the SPLA for the benefit 
of the rural poor, but more effective collab-
oration is not expected in the short term 
due to internal socio-political conflict and 
reduced involvement from foreign govern-
ments. Instead, other organizations are an-
ticipated to provide agricultural extension 
services in South Sudan to address institu-
tional weaknesses and gaps due to poor co-
ordination between the MoAFTARF and the 
SPLA.
Agricultural non-governmental  
organizations (NGOs)
Several NGOs provide extension services in 
South Sudan. The specific objectives and 
approaches of different non-state actors are 
both similar and dissimilar to governmental 
efforts, although they share the common 
mission to increase food security in South 
Sudan.
Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
CRS has been working in the southern part 
of Sudan—and later South Sudan—since 
1983. After independence in 2011, CRS 
supported development and recovery in 
parts of the country where post-conflict 
 remedial services were otherwise entirely 
lacking. Against a background of political and 
economic turmoil resulting from the conflict 
that flared up in December 2013, the CRS 
website for South Sudan announced: ‘The 
presence of Catholic Relief Services in South 
Sudan is needed now more than ever to 
strengthen these relationships and promote 
healing, while continuing to deliver lifesav-
ing emergency and development assistance’ 
(Pozniak, 2015).
CRS South Sudan offers programs in 
agriculture, civil society and governance, 
disaster response, microfinance, peace build-
ing, and water and sanitation. The immedi-
ate goal of the CRS South Sudan agriculture 
program is to improve family well-being 
through agro-economic development and 
environmental stewardship. The agency’s 
long-term goal is to strengthen the capacity 
of local agencies and farming communities 
to take control of their own development. 
The formal objectives of the agriculture pro-
gram are: (i) to engage with vulnerable com-
munities to meet their long-term food and 
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livelihood needs; (ii) to foster sustainable 
socio-economic development; and (iii) to 
promote agricultural practices that link pro-
duction to conservation, using local sources 
where available.
World Vision International (WVI)
WVI has been involved in South Sudan for 
over 25 years. It has provided numerous 
agricultural extension programs during this 
time and in 2014 worked with approxi-
mately 128,000 people. World Vision’s South 
Sudan country program reported in 2015 
that their organization was the only entity 
combating food insecurity in the northern-
most state, the Upper Nile.
World Vision South Sudan provides 
training on improved agricultural practices 
such as soil conservation techniques, no-till 
farming techniques, native tree regeneration 
and the development of small seed-saving 
banks (Africa CSA Alliance, 2014); post- 
harvest handling and packaging; agricul-
tural marketing; and financial management. 
Extension programs focus on commodities 
that include sesame, pineapple, fish, tomato 
and maize, among many others.
Besides teaching farmers, the organiza-
tion also provides inputs such as hoes, seeds 
and fishing equipment. The organization do-
nated approximately 174 oxen to farmers in 
Warrap State to increase food production 
(World Vision–South Sudan, 2013). In South 
Sudan, World Vision has had an impact on 
farmers’ yields, income and well-being as a 
result of these efforts (Oxfam, 2014).
African Centre for the Constructive  
Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
ACCORD is one of several agricultural 
NGOs that are still operational despite past 
and current conflicts in South Sudan. It has 
been involved in South Sudanese agricul-
tural extension work for approximately 
30 years. ACCORD operates in the Central 
and Eastern Equatoria States.
ACCORD offers extension programs re-
lated to conflict resolution, leadership devel-
opment, fishery production, animal manage-
ment and water conservation. The organization 
maintains  collaborative relationships with 
evangelical Christian groups, the United 
States Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID), the Konrad Adenauer Foun-
dation and the Norwegian Institute for 
International Affairs.
United Methodist Committee on Relief 
(UMCOR)
UMCOR currently conducts up to 69 pro-
jects in South Sudan (2015–2016) and has 
collaborative relationships with USAID, the 
EU, the US State Department and various 
UN agencies. Sustainable agriculture and 
food security are a programmatic focus of 
UMCOR (2015). Under its food security pro-
ject, 16 fish farms have been established and 
over 200 farmers in the Central Equatoria 
state of South Sudan have been trained in 
aquaculture and received fish management 
inputs. An additional 2400 farmers have been 
trained in cassava intercropping.  UMCOR also 
provides training and advice on water quality 
for rural people living in the Upper Nile State 
and Bahr el Gazal/Darfur region (UMCOR, 
2015), and estimated that over 40,000 indi-
viduals will be impacted by this project.
Agricultural colleges
john garang memorial university of science 
( jgmust). John Garang Memorial University 
of Science in Bor, the capital of Jonglei State, 
provides agricultural services and education 
in the agricultural sciences. The university, 
in collaboration with the US State Depart-
ment and the Norman Borlaug Institute for 
International Agriculture of Texas A&M Uni-
versity, designed the Consortium for Develop-
ment project to improve agricultural education; 
create institutional linkages to improve pro-
ductivity; encourage agricultural develop-
ment and resource conservation; and develop 
programs to address youth entrepreneurship, 
conflict resolution and gender- based educa-
tion issues. Based on JG-MUST faculty input, 
a livestock production course was developed 
and is currently being offered. Curriculum for 
the course was delivered by three methods: 
(i) traditional pencil and paper; (ii) separate stu-
dent and instructor course CDs; and (iii) a basic 
 Enhancing Food Security in South Sudan 67
web-based format. Challenges relative to 
maintaining the infrastructure at JG-MUST 
make it difficult to  determine the effective-
ness of any of these delivery methods.
Agricultural Extension Projects  
and Activities
Various efforts have been made by state and 
non-state actors to provide and strengthen 
agricultural extension in South Sudan. 
However, given the influential role of the 
military, many efforts have sought to engage 
the SPLA directly. USAID, in particular, has 
created a number of projects to assist the 
SPLA in improving food security, working 
closely with the US State Department and 
Texas A&M University’s Norman Borlaug 
Institute for International Agriculture to de-
sign and deliver these projects.
Enhancing Agricultural Infrastructure for  
the Military of South Sudan Project
A major collaborative project—funded by 
the US Department of State—was the En-
hancing Agricultural Infrastructure for the 
Military of South Sudan Project. The pro-
ject aimed to support the Republic of South 
Sudan in its efforts to transform its military 
from a largely guerrilla force to a national 
army under the newly formed government. 
Part of the project involved the develop-
ment of agricultural infrastructure, specific-
ally the building of roads linking farmers 
to markets, and the development of water 
points for people and livestock.
Food security, and particularly a sus-
tainable food supply for the SPLA, was an-
other key objective. The SPLA was spend-
ing upwards of US$100 million a year to 
import food for its troops. Through a grant, 
the US Department of State worked with 
the South Sudan Ministry of Defense to es-
tablish an agricultural support and training 
program, which was implemented through 
the Borlaug Institute for International Agri-
culture and Texas A&M AgriLife Research. 
The objective was to allow the SPLA to 
 develop sustainable food sources for sol-
diers and their families while stationed 
at  bases or training camps and while de-
ployed on mission. The project designed 
an approach that engaged military per-
sonal, employed local people in food pro-
duction activities that contributed to rural 
livelihoods and utilized available resources 
to generate food locally for consumption 
by the SPLA.
In addition, the project focused heavily 
on designing and delivering basic and ex-
panded agricultural training curricula, with 
the understanding that the curricula would 
function as infrastructure by creating a sys-
tem for knowledge to be transferred from 
trainer to learner (Knowles et al., 2005). In 
curricula design, the project team from 
Texas A&M and the US State Department 
assessed the needs of participants, devel-
oped and provided curricula to meet those 
needs and evaluated the change in know-
ledge gained due to the curricula and in-
struction. Ultimately, the project contrib-
uted to improved food supplies for both the 
SPLA and rural people.
Extended Agricultural Training (EAT) project
The EAT project—conducted with SPLA—
was derived from the Enhancing Agriculture 
Infrastructure for the Military of South Sudan 
Project. The project was originally a class de-
signed to train members of the SPLA to serve 
as extension officers and to operate as farmers 
themselves. Upon graduating from EAT, army 
officers were provided with a farm and were 
expected to teach modern farming practices 
to local farmers through demonstrations and 
individual consultations, effectively employ-
ing army personnel as extension officers 
through the SPLA’s agricultural battalion. 
Trainees learned the skills needed to teach 
local farmers the sustainable management 
and production strategies to improve their 
food security but also developed the compe-
tencies to themselves manage the army’s 
farms, to increase the SPLA’s food production 
and reduce food costs for the army.
The implementation of the EAT project 
occurred in stages. First, the project’s  Training 
68 R. Strong et al.
Impact Specialist—under the direction of the 
Project Training Coordinator— conducted an 
observational needs assessment of future 
participants’ training needs and determined 
whether curricula needed to be developed 
from scratch, sourced from instructional 
resources or transformed from existing 
 materials.
The assessment showed that the major-
ity of future participants needed more 
training on how to teach adults. In technical 
areas, 67% needed more training in small 
animal production; 80% wanted to be more 
knowledgeable in identifying crop pests 
and diseases; 73% of the participants be-
lieved they needed more farm management 
knowledge to help farmers become more 
successful; and 93% wanted to better under-
stand evaluation techniques to be able to 
measure the impact of their teaching. Fu-
ture participants also requested more visual 
materials due to their target audience being 
illiterate (67%); materials that would help 
them teach soil testing procedures and pest 
and disease identification (73%); and dic-
tionaries to help them better understand 
English and thus work more effectively 
with US and European agricultural devel-
opment organizations (47%).
Following the assessment, the EAT 
Training Content Specialist developed 
new training materials—largely in pictorial 
formats— to fill gaps in existing curricula 
and allow better access to information for 
trainees with varying levels of literacy. 
A complete training manual was produced 
for use with farmers to help them under-
stand budgets, markets, options for improv-
ing soil fertility and other relevant topics. 
The first manual influenced subsequent at-
tempts to develop materials for SPLA exten-
sion officers and farmers, many of whom 
were illiterate in Arabic as well as English.
The EAT project then reviewed its cur-
rent training methodologies as compared to 
principles of adult education (Knowles 
et al., 2005). Recommendations for additional 
adult training methodologies were devel-
oped for use in conjunction with the im-
proved training materials, and resources 
were sourced from program partners to sup-
port their use.
Finally, the EAT project sought to iden-
tify environmental factors that could poten-
tially influence the adoption and diffusion 
of program objectives and educational re-
sources using a political, economic, social, 
technological, environmental and legal 
(PESTEL) analysis (Table 4.1). The PESTEL 
analysis was selected because of its suit-
ability in changing environments and was 
therefore a more valuable assessment of ex-
ternal factors of influence than a strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) 
analysis. The analysis was completed 
through interviews and qualitative meas-
urement of extension officers involved in 
the EAT project.
Ultimately, these themes were exempli-
fied in the actual outcomes of the EAT 
Table 4.1. Barriers identified through the PESTEL analysis.
Political (P) Land ownership disputes; lack of trust in the government and governmental programs; 
limited education of farmers and officers; difficulties for outsiders in understanding the 
issues faced by farmers
Economic (E) Limited incomes of farmers; high food prices; inadequate housing; lack of sustained 
funding and support from the government for basic needs
Social (S) Separation from families to attend the training conducted at SPLA headquarters outside 
of Juba; lack of English skills; health problems; inadequate training facilities; short 
 duration of the training program
Technological (T) Lack of electricity; insufficient equipment and computers; poor quality of equipment; 
lack of textbooks/manuals; shortage of livestock inputs
Environmental (E) Climate; poor living conditions at the school; high transportation costs; lack of medical care
Legal (L) Inadequate follow-through on commitments from the local government, outside 
governments and non-governmental organizations
SPLA, Sudan People’s Liberation Army.
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 project, which were affected by political in-
fluences and sustainability issues related to 
ongoing conflict in regions affected by the 
civil war. However, PESTEL factors are use-
ful not only for assessing the EAT project 
but also for providing insight into the larger 
context of agricultural extension services in 
South Sudan.
Conclusions and Lessons Learned
The examples described above provide a 
range of themes and lessons learned from 
South Sudan that may have larger import-
ance for other post-conflict countries.
Safety and security
The ongoing conflict between the Dinka and 
Nuer tribes makes the rebuilding of agricul-
tural extension in South Sudan challenging, 
to say the least. The safety of trainers, evaluators, 
curriculum designers, farmers and local gov-
ernment officials involved in agricultural ex-
tension projects is a serious worry, both for 
the individuals concerned and for the or-
ganizations that employ them.
Extension actors struggle with the ques-
tion of whether or not to approve activities in 
environments where safety cannot be evalu-
ated because the situation changes from one 
day to the next. Ruiz-Postigo et al. (2012) re-
ported that safety concerns prevented NGO 
healthcare workers from screening South 
Sudanese citizens for human African tryp-
anosomiasis. Likewise, Spencer et al. (2013) 
found that security issues prevented a 
health screening team from testing children 
for the debilitating and potentially fatal 
nodding syndrome. Similar limitations are 
found in agriculture. Agricultural develop-
ment workers with good intentions towards 
development and farmers’ empowerment 
are often deterred by safety concerns, result-
ing in needs going unaddressed and depriv-
ing people of the hope that conditions can 
improve.
Security concerns also hinder the 
growth and development of South Sudan at 
the level of farmers. Branch and Mampilly 
(2005) suggested that until national conflicts 
are reduced or eliminated, farmers are un-
likely to return home to plant and harvest 
their crops, causing food insecurity to per-
sist. Farmers are also reluctant to participate 
in group-based programs or meetings com-
monly employed by extension providers. 
Only by reducing the number and scale of 
conflicts in South Sudan will local people 
feel safer in attending public educational 
events (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2012).
The safety of both extension workers 
and farmers must be improved. Unless this 
need can be met, the challenges of rebuild-
ing agricultural extension in South Sudan 
will be hard to overcome. However, effective 
agricultural development can actually miti-
gate some of these same safety and security 
concerns. Agricultural extension programs 
that provide the rural population with the 
means to improve their own production can 
help the nation achieve food security and re-
duce poverty, ultimately lessening conflict 
and promoting social cohesion. This should, 
in turn, raise the chances of sustaining peace.
Agricultural training for extension providers
Pre- and in-service training
The lack of a formal extension system in 
South Sudan underscores the need for con-
sistent and ongoing training for extension 
officers. Individuals acting as extension offi-
cers are often unprepared for the demands 
of the job. Graduates of JG-MUST, for ex-
ample, lack the technical and process skills 
needed to work with farmers. Data from the 
EAT project also pointed to a number of un-
met or inadequately met training needs of 
army officers preparing to serve as exten-
sion officers. The training competencies 
most needed were in developing and evalu-
ating educational programs for adults. 
Strengthening these training programs and 
the institutions that prepare extension offi-
cers is therefore crucial.
Ongoing training in teaching, learning 
and disseminating information to farmers is 
also needed. EAT graduates will continue to 
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require professional development and re-
sources to be successful in their roles as ex-
tension officers. In-service training is par-
ticularly needed on topics related to crop 
and small animal production; pest and dis-
ease control; farm management and agri-
business; and agricultural marketing. Like 
other post-conflict nations, South Sudan 
needs the support of international organiza-
tions to address its extension training gaps 
and create competent and excellent agricul-
tural extension programs.
Needs assessment and evaluation  
for  development organizations  
and extension actors
Experiences in South Sudan—and specific-
ally with the EAT project—illustrate the im-
portance of proper needs assessment and 
evaluation when training extension profes-
sionals. Evaluating existing materials and 
approaches against learner needs is essen-
tial for creating training programs that ad-
dress knowledge and skill gaps and better 
prepare graduates for work with farmers.
Using a PESTEL analysis at the onset of 
developing training programs to determine 
barriers to learning and the adoption of new 
techniques can contribute to greater suc-
cesses and sustainable outcomes. The re-
sults of a PESTEL analysis can offer insight 
into needs likely to continue as issues for 
extension workers, such as land ownership, 
living conditions, family needs and insuffi-
cient infrastructure. Understanding these 
factors can help extension programs make 
strategic decisions and improve services. 
Consideration of experiences in other con-
flict regions suggests that identifying these 
results or external factors may offer insight 
into issues that may lead to program failure 
if not properly managed.
Agricultural extension curricula
Effective and appropriate curricula are also 
crucial to training future extension officers. 
For example, program leaders and SPLA 
generals described their training needs in a 
meeting held at the outset of the EAT project. 
At the same time, existing curricula and 
training materials were predominately writ-
ten in English and at a ninth-grade (age 14) 
reading level. However, effective training 
was confounded by two major factors: (i) lit-
eracy levels in the workforce are low due to 
50 years of conflict; and (ii) those who were 
literate mostly read Arabic (over 60% of the 
population are Arabic speakers) rather than 
the official language of English.
It was concluded that training materials 
needed to be bilingual (English/Arabic) to 
encourage learning in both languages, more 
pictorial than text-based and with content 
delivered at an appropriate level of under-
standing. Materials were supported by 
teaching through demonstrations as much 
as possible. Texas A&M University’s In-
structional Materials Service provided a 
variety of reference materials and resources 
to the EAT project, either as PDFs or CDs for 
instructors and students. The materials 
were better suited to the audience and 
helped trainees learn to make decisions in 
many areas of farm management, including: 
(i) site location for crop production; (ii) crop 
production designs, including patterns and 
rotations; (iii) water management; (iv) till-
age and land preparation; (v) the use of in-
puts such as fertilizer and lime to control 
soil acidity; and (vi) harvest and post- harvest 
operations. Extension programs operating 
in post-conflict settings are most effective 
when using a similar participatory and needs- 
driven process for curriculum design.
Agricultural training to farmers
Programmatic targeting
Agricultural extension programs that iden-
tify and understand the characteristics and 
desired outcomes of their target audience 
are more likely to be successful. There are 
several examples of extension efforts that 
have had a positive impact on agriculture in 
South Sudan. Successful NGO projects 
working on food security are particularly 
evident. The common denominator for these 
successful projects is that they targeted a 
specific audience or commodity and the 
 organization has a long, positive history in 
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South Sudan and a strong understanding of 
the local context.
In contrast, some projects observed a lack 
of these characteristics. For example, the 
methodology espoused by EAT extension 
personnel was not congruent with the con-
text of resource-poor and risk-averse small 
farmers. The project focused on national- 
level issues and did not adequately consider 
the needs of local farmers. The EAT project 
was further compromised because it was in-
stituted by an internal organization and by 
the military, which was not ‘well- perceived’ 
by a large percentage of the South Sudanese.
Alternative approaches to reaching farmers
Given the safety and security conditions 
that often limit the ability of extension offi-
cers to interact directly with farmers, there 
are useful alternative means of reaching 
farmers in South Sudan. Many South 
 Sudanese—including EAT officers and 
farmers—have cell phones, which can be 
charged using solar power. This indicates 
that information and communications tech-
nologies (ICTs) could be an avenue for de-
livering educational content to farmers 
throughout the conflict-torn nation. Cell 
phones could be used to get information to 
farmers in remote locations, as well as offer-
ing professional development to extension 
officers, thereby saving on travel time and 
expenses. The benefit of ICT use for agricul-
tural development efforts in Africa, Latin 
America and the Caribbean is well docu-
mented. This opportunity needs further in-
vestigation in the context of South Sudan, 
but it appears that ICTs could help exten-
sion personnel deliver agricultural content 
to farmers more effectively than current 
face-to-face meetings, especially when con-
flict and safety are also factors.
Service provision to women farmers
There is great need and potential to better 
serve women farmers in South Sudan. Glo-
bally, the diversity and number of females 
in food production is increasing as women 
become more involved in agriculture (Charlton, 
1984), yet extension programs regularly 
struggle to reach and benefit women farmers 
(Meinzen-Dick et al., 2011). Due to the lack 
of training and educational opportunities 
for women in production agriculture, women 
farmers are largely excluded from some 
business aspects of farming (Kabeer, 2012). 
However, when women are equally engaged 
in extension and have equal access to re-
sources they see greater improvements in 
agricultural production than men (Davis et al., 
2012), suggesting greater emphasis on serv-
ing women through extension could be 
beneficial to South Sudan’s agricultural sec-
tor. Benefits are greater when women farm-
ers are taught by female extension officers, 
especially in contexts and communities 
with strict social and gender norms.
However, the EAT project consisted 
only of male participants, since women 
were not involved in the agricultural battal-
ion. This raises the question of how women 
farmers will react to male instructors, 
whether women will participate in exten-
sion programs and if EAT graduates will be 
able to serve women farmers to the same de-
gree they serve males. This suggests that the 
benefits of the EAT project to women will be 
minimal.
In contrast, WVI has effective and well- 
documented experience serving women 
farmers in South Sudan. Unlike the SPLA, 
WVI specifically targets women farmers with 
their programs and develops programs strictly 
for women. The primary lessons learned by 
WVI were the critical importance of identi-
fying the target audience, conducting a 
needs assessment with that audience and 
developing educational programs based on 
those identified needs. These needs assess-
ments can highlight the aspects of agricul-
tural education training most needed by 
women. In the case of WVI, evaluations were 
conducted during and after program imple-
mentation to help coordinators monitor and 
improve programs for women farmers.
Agricultural extension organizations—
whether governmental or non-governmental—
should examine the experiences of WVI 
in serving women farmers in South Sudan. 
The organization’s approach has proved 
 effective and replication of certain elements 
may be possible. This would benefit all 
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 extension providers, but more importantly 
it would benefit women farmers. Increasing 
their inclusion in extension programming 
will help improve the food security of South 
Sudan, assist a new democracy and provide 
citizens of both genders with a sense of 
ownership in the nation’s future.
Coordination and collaboration
Coordination between providers is an area 
of concern for agricultural extension in 
South Sudan, as in many post-conflict coun-
tries. As discussed above, MoAFTARF did 
not collaborate with the SPLA on extension. 
There could be numerous reasons why these 
breakdowns in collaboration exist (e.g. tri-
bal differences, socio-political power strug-
gles), although in this case there is no clear 
single reason.
Regardless of the cause, a lack of coordin-
ation between state actors certainly comprom-
ises the quality of the services provided to 
farmers. Building better collaboration within 
the public sector would enable better solutions 
and more focused efforts in  addressing food 
security across the young nation. Collabor-
ation could also foster more national unity 
and promote peace, improving the lives of all 
South Sudanese and their descendants.
In addition, despite actively providing 
agricultural and extension services, many 
NGOs operate in isolation from state actors. 
At the time of this case study, collaboration 
between the SPLA and agencies such as 
 ACCORD, CRS, UMCOR and WVI seems to 
be minimal. Nevertheless, collaboration be-
tween NGOs, the SPLA and MoAFTARF is 
needed to more effectively train extension 
staff to train farmers across South Sudan. All 
extension actors could strengthen each other, 
creating synergistic relationships in which 
the impact of the whole system is greater 
than the sum of its parts. Opportunities for 
collaboration readily exist, and external and 
internal NGOs should seek positive collabor-
ation with the government to implement 
projects that align with respective organiza-
tional objectives to help South Sudan be-
come a food secure and peaceful nation.
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Introduction
The economies of most sub-Saharan African 
countries are agriculture based with the ma-
jority of the population living in rural areas 
and depending on farming for their liveli-
hood (World Bank, 2008). Under these cir-
cumstances, the outbreak of protracted armed 
conflicts, which often particularly affect 
rural areas, can result in the decline and 
stagnation of agriculture, including the pro-
vision of key agricultural services such as 
extension.
Mozambique celebrated its national 
independence in June 1975, following a 
10-year war of liberation against the former 
colonial power, Portugal. However, in 1977 
the country was back at war, this time with 
two rival factions—the government and 
the ‘ rebels’—pitted against each other in a 
struggle that lasted approximately 16 years 
and resulted in the loss of many lives and 
the widespread destruction of social and 
economic infrastructure. A combination 
of  external and internal factors, related to 
regional politics as well as government 
policies, is thought to have fuelled the con-
flict (Baden, 1997). Governments in former 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and in former 
apartheid South Africa  opposed the social-
ist policies embraced by  Mozambique’s post- 
 independence government (Unruh et  al., 
2003).
The war was fought mainly in rural 
areas, affected different areas to different 
degrees and reached its peak in the late 
1980s (Baden, 1997). Foremost among its 
negative legacies was poverty. By the early 
1990s, an estimated 74% of the population 
lived below the World Bank’s poverty 
threshold (less than US$1 per day), and Mo-
zambique was considered one of the world’s 
poorest countries (Fauvet, 2000; Brück and 
van den Broeck, 2006).
The Peace Agreement was signed in 
October 1992. By that time most of the vital 
rural infrastructure (roads, bridges, energy 
and water supply) was either badly dam-
aged or completely destroyed. The agricul-
tural sector was virtually stagnant in the 
wake of the displacement of millions of 
people from the rural areas due to wide-
spread insecurity. There was little provision 
of key public agricultural services and very 
limited investment by either the public or 
the private sector.
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Farming can play a major role in coun-
tries recovering from armed conflict through 
the provision of food for the rest of the 
country and the pursuit of export opportun-
ities (Unruh, 1995; Unruh et al., 2003). Dur-
ing the post-war period, reviving agricul-
ture was a top priority for the Government 
of Mozambique and high on the agenda of 
key stakeholders (MAP, 1995; Lindau, 1998; 
Hester and Harrison, 2005). Rebuilding ex-
tension was seen as one of the most critical 
tasks to revive agriculture. Extension was 
an immediate need for thousands of small-
holders returning to their place of origin to 
resume farming activities (Gêmo et al., 2005).
This chapter looks at how the govern-
ment and key stakeholders performed in re-
building extension. It outlines the main chal-
lenges faced, the strategies adopted and the 
key factors that contributed to the establish-
ment of a pluralistic extension system, from 
the early post-conflict period (1993–1998) to 
the present (2016). The chapter also identi-
fies some continuing challenges and high-
lights the issues that need to be addressed 
to further enhance agricultural extension.
Very few studies (e.g. Gêmo and Rivera, 
2001; Gêmo et al., 2005; Gêmo et al., 2013) have 
discussed the rebuilding of Mozambique’s 
pluralistic post-conflict extension system. 
This study provides information on what 
was, and was not, achieved; why; and how.
Mozambique’s Agriculture  
and Extension System
Mozambique’s total population in 2016 is 
estimated at 26.4  million, about 68% of 
whom live in the rural areas and rely dir-
ectly or indirectly on agriculture (INE [Na-
tional Institute of Statistics], 2012). Mozam-
bique’s agriculture can be disaggregated 
into the smallholder subsector, dominated 
by households cultivating relatively small 
plots of land principally for home con-
sumption, and the large-scale commercial 
subsector (Benson et al., 2014). Small and 
medium-sized farms are the most common, 
numbering 3.9  million, 99.3% of the total 
number of farms (INE, 2010).
The country consists of ten agro- 
ecological regions, each having several pro-
duction systems. These regions indicate 
agricultural potential, which is determined 
mainly by the predominant soil types and 
the length of the growing period for rain-fed 
and irrigated agriculture.
The different agro-ecological regions, 
particularly the high- and moderate-poten-
tial regions, are suitable for a wide range 
of annual and perennial crops and also for 
livestock. The main food crops are cassava, 
sweet potato, maize, rice, sorghum, pearl 
millet and pulses. Maize and cassava are the 
two most commonly produced food crops. 
The main cash crops include cotton, to-
bacco and banana, and perennial crops such 
as cashew, coconut, citrus and mango. Live-
stock are another important component 
across the different agro-ecological regions, 
comprising mainly cattle, goats, pigs and 
poultry (MADER, 2002; MADER, 2003; 
 MINAG, 2005; MINAG, 2007a; MINAG, 2008).
Public extension
Mozambique’s extension system has been 
pluralistic since the 1990s, with government, 
private sector and mainly international non- 
governmental organization (NGO) extension 
providers. The public extension service was 
the first to be established, in 1987. This was 
followed by growing involvement of the pri-
vate sector in the early 1990s, and of NGOs, 
particularly beginning in the 1993–1994 
growing season.
Hosted at the then Ministry of Agricul-
ture and implemented through the former 
National Directorate of Rural Extension 
(DNDR) from 1987 to 1992, the public ex-
tension service limited its activities to 
fewer than 30 districts out of the then 128 
rural districts due to insecurity in many 
rural areas coupled with limited financial, 
human and other resources. The 30 districts 
covered were mainly those close to provin-
cial capitals, which were considered to be 
relatively safe. The service went through 
two main expansion periods: from 1993 to 
1998, when at least 21 new rural districts 
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were included; and from 2005 to 2008, 
when a further 59 districts were added. In 
2015 the public extension system, renamed 
the National Directorate of Agrarian Exten-
sion (DNEA) in 2006, covered geographic 
parts of 141 districts and 26 peri-urban 
areas (MASA, 2015). MASA (Ministério da 
Agricultura e Segurança Alimenta, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security) 
was established in January 2015 as a trans-
formation of the previous Ministry of Agri-
culture (MINAG).
Since its establishment, public exten-
sion has used various extension models, in-
cluding the Training and Visit (T&V) system, 
the farmer-to-farmer approach and Farmer 
Field Schools (FFSs). Funding since 1987 
has been provided by bilateral and mul-
tilateral development partners and by the 
government. Since 2007 four areas have 
been recognized as critical—for institutional 
development of the public extension, in 
particular—within the scope of implemen-
tation of the National Extension Program 
(PRONEA): human capital development; 
planning, monitoring and evaluation (PM&E); 
adequate logistic support; and research 
and  extension linkages (MINAG, 2007b; 
IFAD, 2012).
Private extension
Private sector extension activities started in 
the early 1990s following the privatization 
of former large state farms, particularly 
those engaged in cotton production. Privat-
ization marked the shift from large-scale 
public investment in large farms based on 
capital-intensive mechanization to private 
investment through labor-intensive out- 
grower schemes involving thousands of 
smallholders. Private extension was based 
on ‘cotton concessions’, whereby the gov-
ernment authorized local and foreign in-
vestors to promote cotton production and 
marketing in agro-ecologically suitable 
areas, mainly in districts in the northern and 
central regions of the country (Gêmo et al., 
2005). Particularly since 1996, private ex-
tension has been extended through private 
sector investments in tobacco production 
and marketing, and also through out-grower 
schemes.
NGO-based extension
The role of NGOs in extension was limited 
until the Peace Agreement of 1992, when 
most of the international NGOs present in 
the country were involved in emergency ac-
tivities. These activities included the free 
distribution of food, second-hand clothes, 
blankets and agricultural inputs (seeds and 
hand tools), targeted at the rural poor. Start-
ing in the 1993–1994 growing season—the 
first following the Peace Agreement—many 
international NGOs decided to engage in de-
velopment activities alongside their emer-
gency activities, including the provision of 
extension. These NGOs assisted thousands 
of economically and socially debilitated 
smallholder households with agricultural 
advice and inputs, particularly from 1993 to 
1998. From 2000 to 2010, most international 
NGOs remained widely present in rural 
areas throughout the country, although some 
restructured their interventions to focus on 
one or two provinces rather than having geo-
graphically scattered interventions (Gêmo 
et al., 2005; Gêmo and Chilonda, 2013). In 
the past 5 years some international NGOs 
have downsized their interventions in ex-
tension in provinces such as Zambezia and 
Nampula, probably due to the limited fund-
ing received from bilateral development 
programs. However, international NGOs, to-
gether with the few national NGOs working 
in extension, are still important providers 
contributing to enhanced access to exten-
sion by smallholder farmers.
Extension coverage at the national level  
and some issues with the pluralistic system
Despite being remarkably pluralistic, exten-
sion coverage at the national level has de-
creased since the early 2000s according to 
surveys conducted by MASA in collabor-
ation with the National Institute of Statis-
tics, as shown in Fig. 5.1.
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The decline in extension coverage ap-
pears to be related to population growth, 
which stands at 2.8% per annum, as esti-
mated in 2014 (World Bank, 2016). This has 
driven an increase in the number of new 
farmers and farms, while there has been lit-
tle or no corresponding increase in exten-
sion coverage by all extension providers. 
The reasons behind the brief upward blip in 
2012–2013 were not clearly identified dur-
ing the writing of this chapter.
Extension as a whole (public, private 
and NGO) has been targeted mainly at 
smallholders. Private extension is commod-
ity oriented, focusing mainly on non-food 
export crops (cotton and tobacco) and oper-
ating in areas of high or moderate agro- 
ecological potential. Public and NGO-based 
extension focuses primarily on food crops 
(cereals, roots and tubers, legumes and veget-
ables), selected livestock species (mainly 
chicken and goats, but also cattle) and 
agro-forestry activities (beekeeping). These 
activities span the full range of agro-ecological 
zones from high-potential areas to those with 
marginal agro-ecological potential.
Other important providers in Mozam-
bique’s national extension effort include 
farmers’ organizations; the National Union 
of Peasant Farmers (União Nacional de 
Camponeses, UNAC); donor and development 
agencies which fund extension; agricultural 
colleges and university faculties; and input 
suppliers, although the latter are still very 
limited in terms of number, penetration into 
rural areas and volumes of inputs traded. 
Despite the considerable diversity of exten-
sion providers, there has been little in-
formed public debate intended to enhance 
the role of extension and create a more en-
abling policy environment for agriculture.
The legacy of war and the rebuilding  
of extension
The war created an exceptionally challen-
ging environment in which to rebuild ex-
tension, particularly during the immediate 
post-war years (1992–1998), for the follow-
ing reasons:
• The rural population had suffered wide- 
scale displacement, the loss of family 
members and the near total disappear-
ance of rural social networks. Mozam-
bique’s civil war created 1.5–1.7 million 
external refugees and 3.0–4.3 million in-
ternally displaced people out of a total 
population of 13.2  million (Schwartz, 
2010, citing Aird et al., 1997).
• The country’s rural areas were split be-
tween ‘rebel’-held areas and those held 











































Fig. 5.1. Proportion of small and medium-sized farms with access to extension. From MASA (2002–2014).
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government interventions, including 
public extension, were restricted to the 
areas they could reach. Attempts to deliver 
services in ‘rebel’-held areas were likely 
to meet with mistrust at the very least 
and often with some outright hostility.
• Markets for agricultural inputs and out-
puts had virtually collapsed in rural 
areas. Key rural infrastructure (roads, 
bridges, warehouses, water supplies 
and energy) was either seriously dam-
aged or completely destroyed (Hoeffler, 
1999; IFAD, 2014). The poor condition 
of most rural roads was a special chal-
lenge to rebuilding extension because 
of the difficulties in accessing small-
holders in many rural areas.
• Thousands of landmines in rural areas 
posed a threat to reviving agriculture 
and rebuilding extension at a time 
when many smallholders were return-
ing and opening new farming plots in 
areas that had been the theater of war 
for many years.
• Only two colleges provided training 
at diploma level in agriculture and live-
stock production: the Agrarian Insti-
tute of Chimoio (IAC) and the Agrarian 
Institute of Boane (IAB). These schools 
trained only a few dozen diploma-level 
technicians per year during the war 
(Gêmo, 2004). The lack of qualified ex-
tension workers was a  severe challenge 
at a time when more field staff were 
needed.
Strategies adopted in rebuilding extension
A number of strategies were used by the gov-
ernment to rebuild agricultural extension in 
the post-conflict years. While some strategies 
were implemented mainly by the govern-
ment, most involved collaboration with 
other stakeholders in the agriculture sector. 
Box 5.1 summarizes these strategies, together 
with the period of their implementation.
More detailed discussion of these strat-
egies follows.
1993–1998
emergency food distribution following the peace 
agreement. Free or highly subsidized food 
distribution was critical during the second 
half of the 1980s and until 1992, when agri-
culture was virtually stagnant. During this 
period almost 80% of the country’s food re-
quirements were supplied from abroad, 
mainly as international food aid (Barnes, 
1998; Selvester and Castro, 2003). The main 
organizations involved in distribution were, 
on the government side, the former Depart-
ment for the Prevention and Combat of 
 Natural Disasters (DPCCN), which worked 
closely with the World Food Program (WFP) 
and the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), together with a number of inter-
national NGOs and some religious organiza-
tions. The continuation of food distribution 
after the Peace Agreement, particularly until 
1996, allowed a smooth transition from 
Box 5.1. Strategies adopted to rebuild extension in the post-conflict period.
1993–1998 (the first six years after the 1992 Peace Agreement)
Continuation of substantial emergency food distribution, particularly during the first three years following 
the Peace Agreement
Enhancement of the emergency agricultural input distribution program among smallholder farmers across 
the country
Use of field extension workers with low levels of education
1993–1998 to present
Rehabilitation, maintenance and construction/expansion of rural infrastructure and basic social services
Mobilization of resources from donor and development agencies to support agriculture in general, and 
extension in particular
Pilot dissemination of new technologies
Design and implementation of medium-term investment programs for public extension
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widespread hunger and complete depend-
ency on aid in 1992 to a productive and 
largely self-reliant smallholder sector by 
1998 (MAP, 1999). Millions of smallholders 
benefited from this transition.
enhancing the emergency agriculture input 
 distribution program. As noted by Brück (2001), 
considerable household assets, including 
agricultural inputs and tools, were lost dur-
ing Mozambique’s conflict. Restoring house-
holds’ assets and tools was critical to in-
creasing agricultural production and also in 
buffering households against shortfalls in 
income during the early post-conflict years. 
Against this background, the government, 
bilateral development partners and various 
international NGOs made a tremendous ef-
fort to distribute improved seeds and tools, 
including hoes, machetes, axes and sickles. 
Thousands of smallholders negatively af-
fected by war and drought benefited, par-
ticularly from 1992–1993 until 1995–1996 
(MAP, 1996). This intervention was made 
under the Emergency Program for Seeds 
and Hand Tools (PESU), a program imple-
mented from the late 1980s onwards. The 
Swedish International Development Agency 
(SIDA) and later the Japanese International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) were the main 
organizations involved in the distribution 
of hand tools, while the African Develop-
ment Bank (AfDB) worked directly with the 
government/MINAG to boost the dissemin-
ation of inputs, particularly seeds. Improved 
seeds were provided free of charge for poorer 
people and highly subsidized (50–75%) for 
those who were somewhat better off. During 
the 1993–1994 growing season about 33,000 
tonnes (t) of improved seed, mainly maize, 
rice, sorghum, groundnut and cowpea, were 
distributed to smallholders (MINAG, 1994). 
While substantial quantities of maize and 
rice seed were produced locally (100% of 
rice) by the national Seed Company (SEMOC, 
Sementes de Moçambique), some maize 
 hybrids, sorghum, groundnuts and cowpea 
seeds were imported from the southern African 
region, mainly Zimbabwe (Seed CO) and South 
Africa (Pannar Seed) (MINAG, 1994).
By providing basic inputs to thousands 
of smallholders who were starting to interact 
with extension (public sector and NGO-
based) at the time when input markets sim-
ply did not exist in most rural areas, PESU 
provided an opportunity to demonstrate to 
farmers how good agronomic practices 
(planting in rows, two seeds per hole, timely 
weeding, water harvesting, etc.), combined 
with improved varieties, could increase 
crop yields. The large-scale distribution of 
inputs through PESU ended in 1996, when 
the government decided that sufficient pro-
gress had been made to allow a transition to 
normal market mechanisms for the supply 
of inputs.
use of field extension workers with low levels of 
education. Given the limited number of 
qualified field extension workers (FEWs) in 
the early 1990s, the government allowed 
field staff with low educational levels to do 
extension work. In the Mozambique context, 
qualified FEWs are mainly diploma holders 
with 3 years of training in agriculture, live-
stock or forestry following 10 years of pri-
mary and secondary education. A limited 
number of BSc holders, with 4 years of post- 
secondary education, are also employed in 
extension. FEWs possessing lower educa-
tional levels were also common, including 
a mix of those with a basic education level 
(7 years primary and pre-secondary school-
ing plus 3 years in agricultural training) and 
some FEWs with only elementary level edu-
cation (5 years primary schooling plus 2 years 
in agricultural training).
The government’s strategy of suspending 
the required qualification levels for hiring 
extension staff during the early post-conflict 
period (1993–1998) allowed extension pro-
viders to hire many technicians despite 
low educational levels. The need to im-
prove the educational level of FEWs began 
to receive increasing emphasis from 1999 
onwards, as the first Extension Master Plan 
(EMP) was implemented (Gêmo, 2004; Gêmo 
et al., 2005).
1993–present
prioritizing rehabilitation and maintenance of the 
rural infrastructure. As noted by Brück 
(2006), post-war reconstruction policies 
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should support the re-establishment of mar-
kets and the expansion of household pro-
duction to meet demand, as these are un-
likely to occur spontaneously or with any 
rapidity when households are weak and 
their resources depleted by war. In Mozam-
bique, road rehabilitation, vital for linking 
smallholders to markets, was a major post- 
conflict priority. The country benefited from 
a multi-donor Roads and Coastal Shipping 
(ROCS) project, which rehabilitated 3800 km 
of roads and improved road maintenance 
(OECD and AfDB, 2002). In rural areas the 
government and key stakeholders made ef-
forts to ensure annual rehabilitation of se-
lected unpaved rural roads at district level, 
some of them linking different districts. The 
ROCS project was instrumental in enabling 
the expansion of extension as well as the 
restoration of market linkages. However, 
rural road rehabilitation and maintenance 
were limited in technical scope and re-
stricted in geographic focus compared with 
the overall needs across the country. Even 
rural roads that are annually maintained are 
still often impassable during the rainy sea-
son from October to April.
government support in mobilizing resources to 
 rebuild extension. The government was able 
to mobilize resources to rebuild extension, 
particularly from international NGOs and 
development partners who provided fund-
ing and political support to the reconstruc-
tion effort. This was particularly critical 
from 1993 to 1998, when there were huge 
tasks and resource requirements for rebuild-
ing extension as part of the national recon-
struction effort. Various funding mechan-
isms were used by the government and 
development partners to channel resources, 
as shown in Box 5.2.
As noted above, the private sector has 
been an important extension player since 
the early 1990s, when commodity-oriented 
extension began to expand through out- 
grower schemes focusing at first on cotton 
and later (1996) on tobacco. These schemes 
involved thousands of smallholders. Local 
private investment (mainly for cotton sub-
contracted production) and direct foreign 
investment (mainly for tobacco, such as 
 Mozambique Leaf Tobacco Co. Lda) are the 
two sources of funding for private sector 
 extension.
In summary, while the government was 
able to secure the resources needed from de-
velopment partners to rebuild and restart 
public extension services, political support 
and external funding from international 
NGOs and private sector companies were 
also needed to accelerate the expansion of 
extension services. In turn, the government 
provided political support to private exten-
sion to build the early relationships between 
private extension providers and smallholder 
farmers involved in the out- grower schemes. 
For instance, the government played a sig-
nificant role in negotiations and in reaching 
agreement on the annual market prices of 
different grades of cotton. The government 
also joined forces with a few large private 
extension providers in joint venture com-
panies for cotton production and marketing 
(Gêmo et al., 2005).
Piloting and Disseminating Improved 
Technologies
In the second half of the 1990s, MINAG 
made notable efforts to pilot the use of vac-
cines against Newcastle disease in chickens 
kept by smallholders in rural areas. Most 
rural households rear chickens (MADER, 
2002; MADER, 2003; MINAG, 2005; MINAG, 
2007a; MINAG, 2008), mainly with low use 
of improved inputs. However, Newcastle 
disease has seriously constrained produc-
tion and its control is seen as crucial for 
poverty alleviation at the household level 
(Perttula, 2009; Tomo, 2009). Analysis and 
modeling have indicated that control of 
Newcastle disease alone has the potential to 
increase household income from chickens 
by 42% (Woolcock et al., 2004).
The piloting of vaccinations against the 
disease in selected areas of Mozambique was 
important because it added ‘hard content’—
or a physical technology—to extension, 
rather than just advice. In general, this has 
been well accepted and has contributed to 
the relevance of extension in the eyes of 
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Box 5.2. Funding mechanisms used by the government and development programs to rebuild extension.
1993–1998
Public extension funding through large projects
The World Bank provided resources for public extension through two large projects: the Agricultural Ser-
vices Rehabilitation and Development Project (ASRDP) for Nampula and Cabo-Delgado provinces in the 
north of the country (1992) and the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Project (ARDP) (1990) 
for Inhambane and Gaza provinces in the south (see Lindau, 1998).
The two projects were vital in contributing to the expansion of public extension to at least 21 new 
districts between 1993 and 1998, with adequate logistical support (Gêmo et al., 2005). This included 
human capital development (contracting new qualified extension workers and providing in-service staff 
training) and purchasing means of transport (cars, motorcycles and bicycles) and equipment for fieldwork. 
Such logistical support is crucial in the retention of qualified field staff when salaries are low, as they trad-
itionally have been in most extension systems in the developing world.
Funding from bilateral development partners for NGOs
The European Union (EU), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and, to a 
lesser extent, the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) were the main donor agencies 
involved in  funding the activities of international NGOs. ACDI/VOCA, ActionAid, Care International, the 
 Cooperative League of the USA (CLUSA) and World Vision were the main NGOs involved. They contrib-
uted to strengthening extension by employing hundreds of agriculture/livestock technicians holding dip-
lomas and even some holding a BSc in agriculture.
1999–2016
Public extension funding through the National Agricultural Development Program  
(PROAGRI) (1999–2011)
This joint initiative by the government and development partners aimed to support the annual budget of 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, implemented from 1999 to 2006 (Phase I) and from 2007 to 
2011 (Phase II). Extension was one of eight PROAGRI components, together with crop production, irriga-
tion, livestock, forestry, research, land management and capacity development.
Under PROAGRI, public extension became underfunded (MINAG, 2007c; Gêmo and Chilonda, 
2013), resulting in limited logistical support for field operations, in-service training and monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) at central, provincial and district levels. The effectiveness of public extension was com-
promised (MINAG and IFAD, 2010; Gêmo and Chilonda, 2013). The funding shortfall is thought to have 
occurred because extension was simply not seen as a priority by PROAGRI  decision makers.
Public extension funding through the government and the International Fund for Agricultural Develop-
ment (IFAD) and the EU (2012 to the present)
Since 2012 the government, IFAD and the EU have been funding public extension in 42 districts through 
the Pronea Support Project (PSP), which aims to strengthen implementation of the National Agrarian Ex-
tension Program (PRONEA), launched in 2007 and due to run until 2016. However, the timely availability 
of the government’s contribution (17% in most of the costs incurred by IFAD), as well as delays in the 
disbursements of the approved PSP annual budget, have constrained project implementation across the 
42 districts (DNEA, 2014). In order to identify feasible solutions, these issues were recently addressed by 
the government and IFAD during the mid-term review (MTR) of the DNEA/PSP held in the second half of 
2015.
Public extension funding through the government and several bilateral development partners 
(2012 to the present)
In parts of the other 99 rural districts and the 26 peri-urban areas where public extension was operating 
in 2015 (MASA, 2015), the government and a few bilateral donors have been the main sources of funding 
from 2012 to the present. However, delays in releasing funds and erratic disbursements (of amounts below 
the approved budget) have negatively affected implementation in these areas (MINAG, 2014).
Continued
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smallholders. Vaccination against Newcas-
tle disease is currently the major livestock 
extension activity under the public Unified 
Extension System (SUE) adopted in 1998–
1999. However, limited quantities and de-
layed distribution of vaccines at the district 
level by the veterinary/livestock services of 
MASA, together with other logistical issues, 
have prevented a major success for exten-
sion in this area (MINAG, 2014).
Another initiative was the piloting of 
technology packages aimed at intensifying 
the production of food crops, mainly maize 
and rice, by smallholders. This initiative 
was implemented by public extension in 
collaboration with Sasakawa Global 2000 
(SG 2000), an international NGO active in 
Mozambique from 1995 to 2004. SG  2000 
promotes intensification of smallholder pro-
duction in a number of African countries, 
often through partnerships with  public exten-
sion (Fertilizer Toolkit, n.d.). Launched dur-
ing the 1995–1996 growing season, the pilot-
ing of technology packages was particularly 
strong from the 1998–1999 to the 2002–2003 
growing season. The packages consisted of 
free on-farm demonstrations of herbicides, 
mainly to support the introduction of no-till 
practices; inorganic fertilizers (mainly NPK: 
12-24-12 and urea 46%), applied using 
blanket/uniform application levels for differ-
ent locations; and improved seeds (mainly 
open-pollinated varieties of rice and some 
medium- and long-season maize hybrids). 
By 2002–2003, selected areas in 51 districts 
had been covered by this initiative. About 
1110–1200 on-farm demonstrations (with sizes 
varying from 100 m2 to 5000 m2) were con-
ducted per year, particularly from 1998 to 
2003. Participating farmers were able to ob-
tain yields varying from 2.5 to 6.0  t/ha of 
maize and 2.5 to 5.0 t/ha of rice, depending 
on how accurately the packages were ap-
plied. Average rain-fed maize and rice yields 
without the use of inorganic fertilizer in high- 
to moderate- potential agro-ecological zones in 
Mozambique are estimated at approximately 
1.0 t/ha for maize (MacauHub, 2013) and for 
rice (FAO, 2014). The majority of extension 
workers involved in the initiative also re-
ceived free inputs during two successive 
cropping seasons in order to farm 0.5  ha 
‘model demonstrations’ on their own plots 
and for home consumption. The main ob-
jectives of extending access to inputs by the 
field staff was to expand demo plots and also 
to promote major technical ability among ex-
tension workers in using the technological 
packages then under dissemination.
The technology packages initiative was 
important not just in raising yields, but also 
as a means of boosting smallholders’ access 
to, and appetite for, public extension. The 
initiative was discontinued after 2004, when 
SG 2000 funding ended, and the public ex-
tension service was not financially prepared 
to continue with the field demonstrations 
and the related training needed for both 
FEWs and farmers in the newly covered 
 districts.
Designing and Implementing Public 
Extension Investment Programs
The then National Directorate of Rural Exten-
sion (Direcção Nacional de Extensão Rural, 
DNER) implemented the first EMP from 
1999 to 2006. It identified key institutional 
milestones, main activities, the stakeholders 
that should be involved within and outside 
the then MINAG and the estimated total 
budget to be spent within the 5-year time 
frame (1999–2004, subsequently extended to 
Funding from several bilateral development partners for NGOs (1999 to the present)
Some bilateral donors continue to provide funds to international NGOs and to some national NGOs. This 
funding mechanism has been crucial in keeping the pluralistic extension system alive. Funding for NGO-
based extension efforts has declined over the past 5–10 years. International NGOs that had large-scale 
programs in the 1990s, such as Care International and World Vision (Gêmo et al., 2005), have to some 
extent downsized their extension activities in the most densely populated provinces of the country, in-
cluding Nampula and Zambezia provinces.
Box 5.2. Continued.
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2006). In 2007, a second EMP was approved 
and began to be implemented, with a time 
frame of 10 years (2007–2016). In summary, 
the two EMPs can be characterized as shown 
in Table 5.1.
The two EMPs were important in re-
building extension because they: (i) pro-
vided a more strategic means of pursuing 
the development of public extension by spe-
cifying the target beneficiaries (smallholders), 
the implementation pillars, the intended 
geographic coverage and, since 2005, projec-
tions of the total number of farmers to be 
covered in each of the 5-year periods; and 
(ii) were a means of mobilizing medium- 
term funding from the government and de-
velopment partners. For instance, the first 
EMP was budgeted at US$24  million over 
5 years and by 2006 it had been funded at 
about US$20 million in total under PROAG-
RI (MINAG, 2007c). The second EMP was 
implemented through PRONEA, whose ini-
tial budget was estimated at US$50 million 
over 10  years (2007–2016). IFAD allocated 
US$20 million to DNEA, while other devel-
opment partners and the government were 
expected to contribute the balance of 
US$30 million.
Put on hold in 2010, pending redesign 
due to poor performance (MINAG and 
IFAD, 2010; Gêmo and Chilonda, 2013), 
IFAD financial support to PRONEA re-
sumed in late 2012, with a budget of 
US$20 million and at least US$1.08 million 
from the EU, in addition to the governmen-
tal contribution consisting of 17% of PRO-
NEA expenses (a few category costs such as 
daily allowances and staff travel do not 
 require a government contribution). These 
funding developments show how the design 
and implementation of the medium-term 
EMPs have been important in mobilizing 
 resources.
However, a weakness in implementing 
the EMPs has been the poor definition of 
medium-term indicators or intermediate 
outcomes. In livestock, for instance, the an-
nual targets for vaccination against Newcas-
tle disease have only recently (in the past 
2–3 years) begun to be defined by the National 
Directorate of Veterinary Services (DNSV) at 
MASA. This is a critical intervention area 
for DNEA that deserves proper planning in 
terms of setting medium-term targets and 
identifying the required logistics—planning 
that should have been conducted jointly by 
DNSV, DNEA and MASA research services. 
The latter are responsible for producing one 
of the most widely used vaccines (I-2). I-2 
was produced by Mozambique’s Agrarian 
Research Institute (IIAM, from Instituto de 
Investigação Agrária de Moçambique), Ani-
mal Science Directorate (DSA, Direcção de 
Ciências Animais). The ACIAR project 
AS1/1995/040 developed seed cultures of 
the I-2 vaccine suitable for vaccine produc-
tion in developing countries. The I-2 master 
seed culture is kept at the University of 
Queensland and is provided to developing 
countries free of charge (Australian Center 
for International Agricultural Research (see 
ACIAR, 2014).
Learning from the Rebuilding Process
This section highlights the key issues en-
countered in rebuilding extension since the 
1992 Peace Agreement. Four issues are out-
lined:
 1. Key supporting factors that contributed 
to rebuilding extension.
 2. Challenges in rebuilding a properly co-
ordinated national extension system (Siste-
ma Nacional de Extensão, SISNE).
 3. Challenges in linking research and ex-
tension.
 4. Institutional concerns related to public 
extension.
Key factors that contributed  
to the post-conflict rebuild
Various political, social and economic fac-
tors were instrumental in contributing to the 
post-conflict rebuilding of extension. The 
political stability achieved by creating demo-
cratic institutions has been critical. This 
is epitomized by the multi-party National 
 Parliament, which sat for the first time in 







Table 5.1. Summary characteristics of the first and second Mozambique Extension Master Plans (EMPs).
The two EMPs Implementation pillars
Decentralization Human capital  
development
PM&E Implementing approaches Contribution to pluralistic 
extension
First EMP




 management to 
provinces
Stated targets in 
improving 
 qualifications  
of FEWs
Need to strengthen PM&E within 
scope of SUE under  
decentralized management  
of public extension
• Adoption of SUE
• Openness to piloting/adopting  
new extension models
• Predominantly supply-driven 
extension
• Outsourcing of pilot initiatives
Need to be a leading 
institution (DNEA) in 







Stated emphasis on 
continuing human 
capital development 
but without  
quantified targets
Need to strengthen PM&E  
under SUE, decentralized 
management of public  
extension and expected  
scaling up of extension  
outsourcing at provincial  
and district levels
• Strengthening SUE
• Openness to piloting/adopting  
new extension models and 
intended scaling up of FFS model
• Emphasis on need to develop 
demand-driven extension
• Need to expand outsourcing 
initiatives





empowerment of farmer 
organizations and other 
community-based 
organizations
FEW, field extension worker; FFS, farmer field school; DNEA, National Directorate of Agrarian Extension; PM&E, Planning, monitoring and evaluation; SUE, Unified Extension System.
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main parties, which recently spilled over into 
localized armed confrontations in 2013–2014, 
the country has enjoyed a largely peaceful 
 coexistence among its political parties since 
the 1992 Peace Agreement.
The government’s support for reviving 
agriculture and rebuilding a pluralistic ex-
tension system immediately after the 1992 
Peace Agreement was of paramount import-
ance in keeping the peace and restoring 
prosperity. The financial support provided 
by development partners to agriculture, and 
particularly to the rebuilding of extension, 
was and still is crucial. Finally, after 16 years 
of devastating war, thousands of vulnerable 
smallholders were brave enough to return 
to their destroyed villages and farms, risk-
ing their own safety to clear land riddled 
with landmines and to resume agriculture, 
especially between 1993 and 1996. Since 
then the smallholders have interacted well 
with extension wherever it operates across 
the country, and they increasingly demand 
the inputs and services they need to im-
prove yields and raise family farm incomes. 
These factors contribute to the country’s eco-
nomic and social recovery. Figure 5.2 sum-
marizes the supporting factors that were 
critical to the post-conflict rebuilding of 
agricultural extension.
Even in the tragic aftermath of the war, 
Mozambique found ways to facilitate peace-
ful recovery by making intelligent use of the 
contributions of both local and foreign part-
ners. The country was able to rebuild its ex-
tension system, creating a pluralistic model 
that became a reality in less than 10 years 
(Gêmo and Rivera, 2001; Gêmo et al., 2005).
Challenges in rebuilding the national 
extension system
The first and second EMPs both refer to the 
need to develop a truly national extension 
system with coordination among all service 
providers (a public, private and NGO-based 
SISNE) (MAP, 1998; MINAG, 2007b). This 
includes the exchange of information on 















crucial for restoring rural
prosperity, and extension as













general election, which led to 




keen to return to
their rural origins to
rebuild their lives
after living as internally
displaced persons or
refugees for years
Fig. 5.2. Five supporting factors in rebuilding extension in the post-conflict period.
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avoid conflicting or overlapping activities; 
collaboration in the field and in other core 
activities, such as in-service training for 
staff and field days for demonstrating tech-
nologies; and the sharing of experiences 
and lessons in delivering extension, such as 
environmental concerns, social and gender 
equity issues, difficulties in achieving qual-
ity standards and the effectiveness of differ-
ent extension models, among other matters.
However, ensuring an effective SISNE 
has been challenging (MAP, 1998; Gêmo 
et  al., 2005; Gêmo and Chilonda, 2013). 
SISNE has been inadequately achieved be-
cause many NGOs are mainly accountable 
to their donors rather than to local author-
ities, partners and beneficiaries; private ex-
tension interacts more with related MASA 
institutions (e.g. Mozambique’s Cotton Insti-
tute rather than the DNEA); and the DNEA 
itself has made little effort to act as the lead 
institution in generating and sharing evidence- 
based knowledge that can make extension 
more effective and efficient. The DNEA has 
also been weak in promoting policy debate 
on extension. For instance, the DNEA has 
only occasionally discussed how to involve 
private extension in SISNE to increase food 
production, particularly with smallholders 
participating in cotton and tobacco out- 
grower schemes. Very little progress, if any, 
has been made on this issue at MASA.
In conclusion, developing SISNE re-
quires holistic vision and dynamic imple-
mentation, led by the DNEA and MASA but 
involving all the different extension actors 
and other relevant stakeholders in the pur-
suit of shared objectives.
Challenges in linking research and extension
Research and extension linkages have been 
emphasized as crucial in Mozambique, as in 
nearly all developing countries (MAP, 1998; 
MINAG, 2007b; MINAG, 2010). In Mozambique, 
research and extension linkages refer to col-
laboration between the institutions (agricul-
tural universities and research institutes) 
and private sector companies that generate 
knowledge, and the public and NGO-based 
extension service providers. Agricultural 
research is almost all public with the excep-
tion of a few cases of adaptive research for 
cash crops (sugar cane and tobacco), carried 
out by large commercial companies.
Effective research and extension link-
ages in Mozambique means three things: 
(i) a substantial number of functioning link-
age mechanisms and activities at the dis-
trict, provincial and central/national levels 
and across different agricultural subsectors; 
(ii) linkages that generate expected outputs 
and outcomes among target farmers and 
farming systems; and (iii) successful cases 
of linkages that can be replicated across the 
country, where applicable.
Since the 1990s, various mechanisms 
and activities have been implemented at dis-
trict, provincial and central levels aimed at 
improving research and extension linkages. 
But despite progress in a few areas, effective 
linkages are still far from being accomplished 
(Gêmo, 2007; Gêmo, 2013). Evidence of strong 
research and extension linkages is scanty. 
This suggests that, with a few exceptions (Low 
et al., 2000; HarvestPlus, 2012; Low et al., 
2013), linkages between research services and 
extension have been weak.
Achieving effective public sector link-
ages has been challenging for various reasons:
 1. There has been weak demand for them 
from the government/MASA and from key 
stakeholders (farmers’ organizations, the 
private sector and development partners). 
Consequently, demand for information on 
the status and performance of linkages has 
also been weak to non-existent. Debate on 
research and extension linkages has been spor-
adic and has very seldom led to action.
 2. Resources allocated to public sector re-
search and extension, specifically to the Agri-
cultural Research Institute of Mozambique 
(Instituto de Investigação Agrária de Moçam-
bique, IIAM) and the DNEA have been very 
limited, even for their respective core 
business activities and critical investments 
( Flaherty et al., 2010; Gêmo and Chilonda, 
2013), let alone for outreach or linkage ac-
tivities such as joint field activities with ex-
tension workers or farmers.
 3. As most linkage mechanisms and activ-
ities have been funded by development 
partners, their duration is often limited to 
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2  or 3 years while project funding lasts, 
with limited likelihood of bringing about 
permanent change.
 4. Little has been done by either research or 
extension to analyze and document the few 
linkage mechanisms and activities that have 
been implemented, as a source of learning 
on how to create more effective linkages.
In summary, despite their role in contribut-
ing to research and extension effectiveness, 
linkage problems have not been properly 
addressed, and this is an issue on which 
MASA will need to perform better in future.
Institutional concerns related  
to public extension
Three issues are discussed below, specific-
ally geographic expansion and its implica-
tions; PM&E; and the implementation of dif-
ferent extension models.
Geographic expansion and institutional 
preparedness
Public sector extension went through two 
important phases of expansion, the first 
from 1993 to 1998 (with at least 21 new dis-
tricts covered) and the second from 2005 to 
2008 (from 69 districts covered in 2005 to 
128 in 2008). Comparing the first and se-
cond phases reveals a number of issues, as 
summarized in Table 5.2.
In summary, during and after the 2005–
2008 accelerated expansion, public exten-
sion was substantially understaffed, under-
equipped and undertrained. For instance, 
eight extension workers per district was the 
minimum number targeted by public exten-
sion since its establishment in 1987 (Gêmo 
et al., 2005; Gêmo and Chilonda, 2013). How-
ever, until 2012 two to four extension work-
ers was the norm in at least 40 districts, well 
below the critical number needed per district. 
Under these circumstances it is  unlikely 
that public extension could be effective in 
providing services to farmers. However, 
since 2010, when there were 770 extension 
workers, the number of DNEA extension 
workers has risen to 1361 (in June 2015). 
Despite this increase, more effort is needed 
in hiring new staff.
In conclusion, failure to address the 
main factors critical to institutional pre-
paredness seriously constrained the DNEA’s 
capacity to achieve the second geographic 
expansion with the desired level of effect-
iveness.
Planning, monitoring and evaluation (PM&E)
PM&E in public extension has been decen-
tralized since the late 1990s in line with the 
requirements of the first EMP, which had 
decentralization as a key milestone (MAP, 
1998). Since that time the districts and 
provinces have been primarily responsible 
for ensuring a sound bottom-up approach to 
PM&E. The organizations responsible have 
been the District Services of Economic Ac-
tivities (SDAEs), in which agriculture/ex-
tension services have been hosted since 
2006, and the Provincial Services of Rural 
Extension (SPERs), which are hosted at the 
Provincial Directorates of Agriculture and 
Food Security (DPASAs). However, devel-
oping effective PM&E in public extension is 
still a challenge for the reasons outlined in 
Table 5.3.
Despite the weaknesses described in 
Table 5.3, PM&E staff have been able to pre-
pare the annual plans that have been the 
basis for budget allocations for all agricul-
ture services within MASA, including ex-
tension. They have also ensured regular re-
porting consisting of quarterly, half-yearly 
and annual progress reports at district, pro-
vincial and national levels. Reports mainly 
focus on output indicators and less on input 
and outcome indicators, a tendency that 
masks the persistent underinvestment in 
PM&E. Major institutional efforts will be 
needed to develop the DNEA’s PM&E cap-
acity in the future.
Assessing the implementation  
of extension models
When public extension began in 1987, the 
T&V model developed and widely pro-
moted by the World Bank was adopted. 
Until 1992, the model consisted of eight 
 extension workers per district involved in 
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the dissemination of improved technology 
and practices through contact farmers se-
lected from among the more innovative 
farmers in different rural communities. In 
1992 the T&V model was modified to focus 
on farmers’ groups rather than on individ-
ual contact farmers, and to allow a more 
flexible agenda determined according to 
local conditions rather than the uniform ex-
tension agenda prescribed across the country. 
Over the 2000–2010 period a few provinces 
such as Manica and Sofala in the central re-
gion of the country also introduced the 
farmer-to-farmer model alongside T&V.
From 1998 to 2003, public extension and 
the international NGO Sasakawa Global also 
implemented a widespread technology-transfer 
model in at least 51 districts, seeking to pro-
mote the intensification of maize and rice 
production among smallholder farmers. 
Table 5.2. Comparing variables between the two expansion phases of public extension. From Gêmo et al. 
(2005); MINAG and IFAD (2010); Gêmo and Chilonda (2013).
Variable First expansion (1993–1998) Second (accelerated) expansion (2005–2008)
Main 
objectives
To expand extension assistance to reach 
thousands of people returning to their 
rural areas after years of internal 
displacement or living as refugees in 
neighboring countries
To ensure ‘extension for all’ by expanding 
services to all rural districts, in response to 




Emphasis on hiring new staff members  
to be allocated mainly to the new 
districts covered. The World Bank 
provided funding for new staff until 
they could be placed on the 
 government payroll
Little emphasis on hiring a critical mass of new 
extension workers to be allocated to new 
districts, causing a huge deficit of FEWs until 
2012. The need to hire more staff was not 
addressed before MINAG’s political directive 




Availability of financial resources for 
in-service training of field extension 
staff but also supervisors, who were in 
turn regularly supervised at field level 
by provincial- and national-level M&E 
officers
Frequent lack of resources for in-service 
training at the provincial level. Most districts 
did not have extension supervisors as many 
were reassigned to new districts and some 
appointed to new activities within and outside 
the agriculture sector at the district level
Operational 
logistics
Availability of adequate logistical support 
for transport, field equipment and 
inputs for demonstrations, and housing 
in some cases
Serious limitations in logistical support, 
particularly means of transport and inputs  
for field demonstrations, with negative 




No studies were conducted on this issue. 
Despite the low educational levels of 
extension workers at that time, there 
was adequate logistical, technical and 
methodological support from district 
supervisors and extension officers at 
provincial and central levels. Public 
extension was effective in disseminating 
agronomic practices such as row 
planting, timely weeding, improved 
granaries and seed germination testing, 
and in introducing new varieties of 
food crops
The first phase of PRONEA was implemented 
from 2007 to 2010. The program was put on 
hold following a joint decision by MINAG 
and IFAD (the main development partner 
funding PRONEA). PRONEA’s temporary 
suspension was caused by poor performance, 
indicating how weak service provision was 
during the 2005–2008 period and even in 
subsequent years.
In 2015 the DNEA was involved in a 
 comprehensive mid-term review of the 
PRONEA Support Project (PSP), which was 
implemented in 42 districts from June 2012 
(IFAD, 2012). With a budget of at least US$21 
million (2012 to 2017–2018), PSP aims to 
strengthen the implementation of PRONEA
DNEA, National Directorate of Agrarian Extension; FEW, field extension worker; M&E, monitoring and evaluation; MINAG, 
Ministry of Agriculture; PRONEA, National Extension Program.
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Additionally, between 2000 and 2010, public 
extension introduced the FFS model in 
 collaboration with FAO. Since 2013 there 
have been efforts to scale up the FFS model 
as part of PRONEA implementation.
Little effort has been made by the 
DNEA to analyze and compare the per-
formance of the different models as a 
source of learning. For instance, although 
FFS were piloted as long ago as 2000 (with 
modest expansion since then), little is 
known about their effectiveness and out-
comes, the challenges faced in implementing 
this model and the lessons that can be 
drawn for the model’s future adaptation, 
with the exception of a handful of studies 
(Djeddah et al., 2006; Braun and Duveskog, 
2008; Dzeco et al., 2010). There is nothing 
wrong with importing different extension 
models, especially those successfully im-
plemented in other African countries. 
However, a major effort is needed to assess 
their effectiveness and learn from experi-
ences with them to improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of public extension in 
Mozambique.
Table 5.3. Main weaknesses and challenges in improving planning, monitoring and evaluation (PM&E) in 
public extension.
Planning Monitoring and evaluation
External
Weak farmers’ organizations at the national level  
that could demand and lobby for greater farmer 
 participation in PM&E
Limited critical mass of smallholder farmers’ 
 organizations across the rural areas, which could 
lead to an increasing lack of pressure in public  
extension for more demand-driven planning
Annual plans made and approved 6 months before 
implementation, often under unknown financial 
ceilings and often subject to subsequent budget 
reduction and delayed allocation, depending on the 
speed of budget disbursements by relevant 
government bodies. This is a key issue as financial 
resources for field activities are often unavailable 
during the critical period of the agricultural season
Limited, weak and inconsistent debate on 
extension performance in general and M&E in 
particular by government and key stakeholders 
(farmers’ organizations, input suppliers, donor 
agencies)
Lack of evidence-based decision making in 
public agriculture services, especially with 
regard to strategic prioritization and 
 investment
Internal
Limited qualified and experienced staff working in 
planning at district, provincial and central levels.  
In mid-2014 newly recruited staff (two agronomists 
with BSc degrees) strengthened central DNEA 
planning and M&E. Before that the unit relied on just 
one experienced agronomist with a BSc and two 
other professionals trained in social sciences at the 
BSc level. This very small team has been responsible 
for overseeing all PM&E at the national level
Limited in-service training on planning over time
Limited efforts to review and assess the planning 
process and difficulty in securing evidence-based 
action at  district, provincial and central levels. 
DNEA promotes annual planning meetings for 
information sharing among provinces and with 
central government, but documented outcomes 
from these meetings are not available at MASA/
DNEA
Limited qualified staff allocated to M&E, 
particularly at the provincial level. Over time, 
only one and occasionally two M&E officers 
have been available at the provincial level, 
whereas at the central level there have been 
three or four people (also involved in planning)
Limited investment in M&E in-service training at 
district, provincial and central levels. In 2014 
the DNEA engaged some technical staff to help 
modernize the M&E system. The aim was to 
improve data recording and digital inputing at 
district level and to build a comprehensive 
database at the central DNEA. This was the only 
major investment in M&E over the past 10 years
Limited review of M&E procedures and tools used 
for data recording, compilation and verification 
at district, provincial and central levels
DNEA, National Directorate of Agrarian Extension; MASA, Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security.
90 H.R. Gêmo
Conclusions and Recommendations
The rebuilding of extension in post- conflict 
Mozambique has been a multi- stakeholder 
process involving both domestic and inter-
national organizations. Domestic stake-
holders include government institutions, 
in particular MASA, which now hosts the 
public extension program; farmers’ organ-
izations and a few farmers’ unions; and in-
put suppliers and output buyers. Inter-
national organizations include donors and 
development partners, which have funded 
extension; international NGOs; and private 
sector companies involved in commodity 
production through out-grower schemes.
The first 6 years (1993–1998) after the 
1992 Peace Agreement were of paramount 
importance in rebuilding extension and saw 
steady progress towards the current, rela-
tively stable, pluralistic extension system. 
However, while public extension has been 
substantially funded by development part-
ners and by the government, NGOs are 
funded solely by development partners. The 
extent to which these international NGOs 
will continue to access financial resources 
from development partners is an important 
issue for the future of the pluralistic system. 
Promoting the emergence of competent 
national NGOs is thus a challenge that should 
be considered by the country’s bilateral de-
velopment partners. This challenge seems 
not to have been addressed, in part because 
international NGOs are better at accessing 
foreign resources for extension than are the 
less well-resourced national NGOs.
Finally, more efforts are needed from 
different extension providers and other key 
stakeholders to create a better coordinated 
and more collaborative national extension 
system to replace the current rather frag-
mented model. This will include relevant 
information sharing, collaborative fieldwork 
(particularly in technology transfer), cap-
acity building, farmer training and innova-
tive partnerships to expand access to exten-
sion by farmers, particularly smallholders 
in many rural areas. Extension coverage at 
the national level in 2012 was estimated 
at 6.6% of the total number of small and 
medium-sized farms, which were estimated 
at 3.9 million in 2010. Expanding extension 
coverage while retaining its effectiveness is 
still a critical challenge for Mozambique’s 
agricultural sector.
The DNEA has been a major provider 
of public extension services. Its presence in 
129 rural districts and 23 peri-urban areas 
in 2014 illustrates the importance of its 
contribution to the pluralistic extension 
system. However, there are some critical 
issues that must be better addressed if 
the DNEA’s operations and performance 
are to be enhanced. The second geographic 
 expansion of DNEA’s operations, from 2005 
to 2008, when a total of 59 new districts 
were covered, was poorly executed as the 
DNEA’s institutional preparedness was 
weak. As a result, the expanded service was 
underfunded and understaffed, and person-
nel were undertrained. Although the DNEA 
has since hired more extension workers 
(who nearly doubled in number from 770 in 
2010 to 1360 in June 2015), there is a need 
for the DNEA to assess its current institu-
tional capacity and increase its staffing 
levels still further, particularly in areas 
where extension coverage is currently poor.
Human capital development, PM&E, 
analysis and comparison of different exten-
sion models, research and extension link-
ages are areas of intervention considered to 
be vital for the future effectiveness of pub-
lic extension. They should  feature in the 
priorities for periodic performance assess-
ments and studies at MASA/DNEA. This is 
particularly important because the DNEA 
has operated in selected areas of almost 
every Mozambican rural district, across dif-
ferent agro- ecological zones and in varying 
farming systems since 2010. Extension 
therefore serves smallholders who are so-
cially, economically and culturally hetero-
geneous and face different production and 
marketing challenges and opportunities.
The DNEA should also think about 
preparing an evidence-based medium- 
term (5–10-year) institutional development 
plan. As the second EMP is due to end in 
2016, now is the opportunity to think 
about a comprehensive institutional de-
velopment plan as part of the design of the 
third EMP.
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Introduction
This chapter focuses on Sri Lanka’s recent 
ethnopolitical conflict, its effects on agricul-
tural extension and attempts made to ad-
dress farmers’ needs in a post-war context. 
The evidence summarized in this chapter 
is drawn primarily from published sources 
and also from unpublished government 
 reports, interviews with key figures and 
focus group discussions in five villages: 
 Maharambeikulam and Samalankulam in 
Vavuniya district and Arasady, Manipay 
and Navaly in Jaffna district.
Background on Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka is a small island nation south of 
India. The island has been inhabited by trav-
ellers, traders and settlers from Arabia, Africa, 
the Far East and the West, although the 
 island nation’s 21 million inhabitants (as of 
2012) descend predominantly from settlers 
from the Indian subcontinent. The island 
came under Western colonial rule, initially 
of the Portuguese in 1597 and then of the 
British in 1815, more than two centuries be-
fore gaining independence from the British 
colonial empire in 1947. Modern Sri Lanka 
has a land mass of 65,610 km², with 29.4% 
covered in forest (Table 6.1). The country has 
a gross domestic product (GDP) of US$59,421 
million, a per capita gross national income of 
US$2761.30, an unemployment rate of 4%, a 
population growth rate of 8% and a rural an-
nual population growth rate of 0.7% (World 
Bank Data—http://data.worldbank.org/country/
sri-lanka). After independence from the British 
Empire, the country enjoyed a high quality of 
life, with a welfare economy drawing predom-
inantly on plantation exports of tea, rubber 
and coconuts (Sandaratne, 2004). The state 
heavily subsidized key services including 
education, healthcare, transport and food. 
Sri Lanka has had a high Physical Quality of 
Life Index for many years, and on the basis of 
many social indicators the country is ranked 
high among developing countries (UN, 2014).
Sri Lanka is a diverse country (Table 6.2) 
where ethnic groups have unique cultures, 
histories and values; communities that are 
close knit; and memories going back over 
several generations. The majority of Sri Lanka’s 
population (75%) speak the Sinhalese lan-
guage and are of the Buddhist faith. The 
Tamil group is the single largest minority, 
and is split between Sri Lankan Tamils, 
who are predominantly Hindu, and Indian 
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Tamils, who are predominantly Muslim. 
There are more than 20 lesser-known ethnic 
minorities in Sri Lanka (Galkanda, 2007), 
and many struggle to maintain their identity.
Background of the Conflict
Post-independence Sri Lanka suffered from 
ethnic divisions, and successive elected 
governments have failed to manage the na-
tion’s culturally diverse peoples in such a 
way as to ensure peace. Tension between 
the predominantly Sinhala state and the 
Tamil minorities started when the govern-
ment disenfranchised Tamil plantation 
workers in 1949, depriving them of the right 
to vote. These workers had been brought to 
the country from India by the British colo-
nial rulers to work in the tea plantations as 
laborers. In 1956, Solomon Bandaranaike 
was elected on a wave of Sinhalese nation-
alism as leader of a new Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party, which empowered the large Sinhalese 
rural population. The populist government 
addressed the strong feeling of deprivation 
and loss of opportunities felt by the Sin-
hala ethnic majority during British rule 
and made Sinhala the sole official language 
and Buddhism the state religion. These 
measures bolstered the popularity of suc-
cessive governments but drove a deep div-
ision between the two main linguistic 
groups—Sinhalese and Tamil. Since these 
early policy interventions, there has been a 
sharp ethnic divide in the strategies of elect-
oral politics in the country (de Silva, 2005; 
Bandarage, 2009).
These divides have led to several cycles 
of violent uprisings, which occurred at al-
most regular intervals in the 1970s, 1980s 
and 1990s (Uyangoda and Bastian, 2008). 
Feelings of disenfranchisement among edu-
cated rural youth in the predominantly Sin-
hala regions resulted in two major youth up-
risings in the 1970s and 1980s, led by the 
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, or People’s 
Liberation Front), a Marxist revolutionary 
political party (Alles, 1990; Gunaratne, 1990).
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) movement was formally established 
in 1976 (de Silva, 2012) with the purpose of 
founding a separate country for the Ta-
mil-speaking ethnic group, carving out more 
than two-thirds of the island’s land mass in 
the north and east. The first Eelam war broke 
out in 1983 (see Table 6.3). The uprising in 
the north, led by LTTE, escalated its violent 
campaign in the late 1980s and a full-scale 
Table 6.1. Land mass, population, percentage urban and average household size (2011). From Department 












Northern province 8,884 997,754 16.7 3.98 71,201 388,517
Jaffna district 1,025 567,229 19.8 4.13 42,410 158,747
Mannar district 1,996 95,430 23.2 4.01 4,912 34,229
Vavuniya district 1,967 164,852 19.2 3.84 7,925 40,722
Mullaithivu district 2,617 66,526 – 3.75 6,346 58,114
Kilinochchi district 1,279 103,717 – 3.56 9,608 96,705
Table 6.2. Sri Lanka’s diversity.
Ethnic breakdown Percentage Religious composition Percentage
Sinhalese 74.9 Buddhist 70.2
Sri Lankan Tamils 11.2 Hindu 12.6
Indian Tamils 4.2 Islam 9.7
Moors 9.2 Christian 7.4
Others 0.5 Other 0.1
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war broke out, with both sides using heavy 
arms from foreign suppliers. Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi of India (in 1991) and Prime 
Minister R. Premadasa of Sri Lanka (in 1993) 
and large numbers of leading politicians in 
Sri Lanka were assassinated. Among the lat-
ter were nine cabinet ministers: Ranjan 
Wijeratne (in 1991); Lalith Athulathmudali 
(in 1993); and Gamini Dissanayake, Weerasin-
ghe Mallimarachchi and G.M. Premachandra 
(in 1994); C.V. Gunaratne (in 2000); Lakshman 
Kadirgama (in 2005); D.M. Dasanayake and 
Jeyaraj Fernandopulle (in 2008); and 27 
members of parliament from 1975 to 2008. 
Police officers and civilians, including women 
and children, were also killed. Fear was per-
vasive across the country. Sporadic attacks 
on civilians and public property, coupled 
with disruption of civil life, displacement of 
families, an outflow of refugees, the presence 
of land mines and coerced recruitment of 
fighters by LTTE, combined to make life ex-
tremely difficult for villagers caught between 
the warring sides.
The effects on agriculture and liveli-
hoods during the conflict were severe and 
inflicted deep damage. Movement and ac-
cess to farmland became difficult. The mili-
tary set up numerous checkpoints and bun-
kers, large areas of land were taken over and 
declared high-security zones, and the mili-
tary eventually occupied and controlled the 
northern and eastern regions (Fig. 6.1). For-
merly these were mostly residential and 
farming areas, thus the residents were de-
prived of their livelihoods and homes. Mar-
kets for selling produce and purchasing in-
puts ceased functioning, severely affecting 
production and disrupting cash flows and 
livelihoods. Any material transported to the 
north, and any produce moved out of the 
north, was subjected to detailed and lengthy 
security checks by both the Sri Lanka mili-
tary and LTTE, at the border between the re-
gions controlled by each of the two warring 
factions (UN, 2010). These involved time 
and clearance certifications from designated 
authorities, and LTTE imposed a tax system 
Table 6.3. Timeline of the conflict and related events.
Date Event
1948 Ceylon gains independence from British colonial rulers
1956 Wave of Sinhalese nationalism, with Sinhala made the official language of Sri Lanka
1958 Anti-Tamil violence erupts
1971 First JVP uprising—a Sinhalese Marxist youth group launches a rebellion
1972 Ceylon becomes Sri Lanka; Buddhism and Sinhala language given prominence in new constitution
1976 Launch of LTTE
1977 Post-electoral violence leaves 100 Tamils dead
1983 In Black July riots, hundreds of Tamils are killed and more than 100,000 flee to India  
Outbreak of first Eelam war
1985 Peace talks fail; Tamil militants attack the city of Anuradhapura
1989 Operation Liberation and the Indo-Lankan Peace Accord
1990 Second Eelam war
1994 Peace talks
1995 Third Eelam war; conflict intensifies, thousands killed
2002 Norwegian-mediated permanent ceasefire; road link to the north reopens, flights resume to Jaffna; 
relief, resettlement and reconciliation efforts launched by the government
2003 LTTE withdrawal from peace talks; war escalates in the north and east
2004 Tsunami: about 35,000 people, both Sinhalese and Tamil, die and many thousands are displaced
2008 Conflict escalates; government withdraws from ceasefire agreement
2009 End of war with LTTE; people begin to return to war-affected areas
2010 Mahinda Rajapaksa re-elected; parliament approves a constitutional change allowing the 
president to seek an unlimited number of terms
2012 UN report on civil war crimes released
2013 Amnesty International and UN Human Rights Commissioner accuse government of eroding 
democracy and the rule of law
2015 Maithripala Sirisena, a liberal elected president at early elections, brings in sweeping changes
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at the border crossings. This situation pre-
vailed for nearly three decades and was 
highly visible, extremely intimidating and 
very disruptive.
Movement of people was also problem-
atic. Irrigation systems no longer operated, 
since the officials controlling them were un-
able to work. Farmers’ organizations, village 
development societies, women’s village 
 development societies and other forms of 
community-based organizations (CBOs) 
foundered as their members could not meet, 
a problem compounded by a general break-
down in social relationships. Many people 
migrated to safer areas and became refugees 
for decades (focus group discussions, 2014).
Agricultural extension, credit and in-
surance providers were unable to work in 
the conflict areas. Travel restrictions, secur-
ity checks, disruptions of public transport 
and fear on the part of extension workers 
visiting clients outside of main towns all 
took their toll. Interactions between farming 
families and service personnel gradually 
disintegrated as the violence escalated. 
Regular systematic agricultural extension 
became impossible in the context of spor-
adic intense violence, security concerns, 
tensions and fear (focus group discussions 
in four villages in 2014).
Ultimately the civil war ended with 
the military defeat of LTTE in 2009, and 
 Sri  Lanka recently emerged from several 
decades of intense ethnopolitical violent 
conflict. The conflict-related damage was 
severe. The northern region was previously 
a major supplier of vital food crops and sea-
food, as well as human resources important 
to public administration and professional 
groups. Key agricultural, educational, in-
dustrial and cultural centers were located in 
this region. The war in the north disrupted 
the functioning of these institutions, des-

















Fig. 6.1. Map showing the areas under Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and government control during the 
height of the conflict. Source: Stratfor.
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families and communities and resulted in 
enormous economic losses (NPC, 2001). 
Thousands of lives were lost, large numbers 
of women were widowed and children or-
phaned and many civilians were left phys-
ically disabled (de Silva et al., 2011).
Over a million people were internally 
displaced and about 200,000 migrated over-
seas as refugees from the affected regions 
(NPC, 2001; Gomez, 2002; World Bank, 
2003; UN, 2010; UNICEF, n.d.). Although 
thousands of people migrated out of these 
regions, many more remained and were dis-
placed several times. Nearly 40% of the 
population in this part of the country were 
displaced once or several times (Department 
of Census and Statistics, 2011). Life in these 
regions has gradually returned to normal 
since the end of the war in May 2009, with 
over 400,000 persons moving back to the 
north of the country (see Table 6.1), assisted 
by the International Organization for Migra-
tion (IOM) and other international agencies 
and supported by family and friends.
Schools, places of worship, public 
transport and telecommunications systems 
are being restored. More importantly, the 
social fabric torn apart by 26 years of war 
and distrust is gradually being rebuilt. Large 
numbers of war widows, single-parent fam-
ilies and disabled persons are starting to re-
turn to a semblance of normal life, with sup-
port from the state, faith-based organizations, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and numerous international agencies.
It has also been challenging to rebuild 
agricultural production. Much of the agri-
cultural infrastructure in towns was des-
troyed by years of heavy shelling, as were 
roads and irrigation systems in rural areas. 
However, a large number of tanks previously 
used for irrigating rice cultivation and later 
either abandoned or destroyed by the war 
have since been reconstructed, and the irriga-
tion canals have been renovated for re-use. 
Agricultural service infrastructure that was 
destroyed or abandoned is being rebuilt. 
Agricultural extension personnel, who had 
left their workstations due to the war, are re-
turning, or new recruits are taking up duties.
Ethnic tensions contributed to the con-
flict; thus, any attempts to rebuild after a long 
and violent conflict must recognize the root 
causes of the conflict (Perera, 1999) and also 
the complex yet fragile social relationships 
that make communities function and meet 
the needs of individuals and families. Trans-
forming fractured communities into cohe-
sive and wholesome units will have a sig-
nificant bearing on the outcome of efforts to 
rebuild the country, develop agriculture and 
make agricultural extension effective.
Agriculture and Extension in Sri Lanka
This section examines continuity and 
changes in the agricultural sector in the 
north, focusing mainly on agricultural ex-
tension. Following a brief history of agricul-
ture in Sri Lanka, it describes how agrarian 
livelihoods continued during the war and 
what adjustments had to be made due to the 
disruption of institutions in the region; how 
the agricultural extension system func-
tioned before, during and after the period of 
conflict; how agricultural extension is 
re-establishing operations in the post-war 
context; what key challenges and opportun-
ities the state faces; and what should be the 
roles of key stakeholders in ensuring an ef-
fective and accountable agricultural exten-
sion service in the region.
Agriculture in Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka has always been, and remains, a 
predominantly agricultural country, even 
though recent years have seen contributions 
to the economy dominated by remittances, 
tourism and industrial outputs. Still, the 
country’s culture and national ethos is 
deeply agrarian. The agriculture of Sri Lanka 
is diverse and provides employment and 
livelihoods to many people. It has had im-
portant historical antecedents. Sri Lanka’s 
hydraulic civilization, dating from as early 
as 161 bc (Seneviratna, 1987), continues to 
be culturally and politically significant 
today.
The country’s rice-based irrigation settle-
ment systems date back as far as 200 ad, when 
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there was a sophisticated agrarian manage-
ment system for land preparation, irrigated 
rice cultivation, payment of taxes and sharing 
of labor (Hettiarachchi, 1982; Gunasinghe, 
1985; de Silva, 2005). The ancient irrigation 
system consisted of a cascade of man-made 
reservoirs that stored excess water and were 
refilled during the rainy monsoon period, be-
fore being released as required for rice 
farming during the dry periods. This ancient 
agrarian system was reinforced to some ex-
tent by the development of tank-based irriga-
tion systems introduced by British colonial 
rulers, who attempted to increase rice pro-
duction in the country.
The system was also transformed by the 
introduction of plantation crops such as cof-
fee, tea and rubber (de Silva, 1985a, 1985b). 
The plantations introduced by the colonial 
rulers transformed the predominantly agrar-
ian economy into a ‘dual economy’, with 
plantations exporting coffee, cinnamon, spice, 
tea, rubber and coconut, and small-scale 
farmers engaged in rice and other field crop 
cultivation on smallholdings primarily for 
home consumption and for local markets 
(de Silva, 2005). Crop farming in Sri Lanka 
has continued to be dominated by subsist-
ence smallholders (Abeysekera, 1985). They 
remain poor, since attempts to introduce 
high-value crops, market integration and 
commercialization have failed to produce 
improvements in incomes or lifestyles (Silva 
et al., 1999).
Agriculture in Sri Lanka is an important 
sector, currently contributing about 3% to its 
GDP, compared with 6.1% and 12.6%, re-
spectively, for the service and industrial sec-
tors (Table 6.4; Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 
2014). Although the relative contribution to 
GDP is low, the sector continues to be of so-
cial and economic importance to the country 
(Tables 6.4 and 6.5).
The highest proportion of employed 
people (33%) were engaged in agricultural 
activities in 2001 when the most recent cen-
sus was conducted (Table 6.5). However, the 
proportion of people directly engaged in 
farming and the contribution that agriculture 
makes to the economy have continued to di-
minish over the past six decades. This trend 
directly relates to the conflict, as agricultural 
activities in the north were disrupted.
The unemployment rate is currently 
about 10%, and the agriculture sector has 
been unable to absorb the growing number 
of people entering the labor force each year. 
An increase in opportunities for access to 
Table 6.4. Trends of contributions to GDP by agriculture and manufacturing sectors (US$ million). From 
Department of Census and Statistics (n.d.).
1999 2000 2001 2002
Sector Value % Value % Value % Value %
Agriculture 1422.2 17.3 1491.9 16 1592.3 15.4 1761.6 15.1
Manufacturing 1494.49 18.2 1723.4 18.5 1942.5 18.7 2210.4 19.0
Table 6.5. Percentage distribution of employed population by industry in selected sectors, 1953–2012. 
From Department of Census and Statistics (n.d.).
Census
Sector 1953 1963 1971 1981 2012
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 52.9 52.6 50.1 45.2 31.0
Manufacturing 9.7 9.2 9.3 10.1 17.7
Construction 1.9 2.7 2.2 3.9 8.4
Wholesale and retail sale 9.4 10.9 9.4 10.5 14.0
Transport, storage and communication 3.5 4.3 4.9 4.8 8.1
Finance, insurance, real estate and business services 2.2 0.5 0.7 1.1 3.5
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free public sector education, from primary 
to university levels, has created a large co-
hort of highly educated but unemployed 
young people. These educated youth could 
not be absorbed into the agrarian economy 
and had no other avenues for social or eco-
nomic mobility other than state sector em-
ployment. However, the introduction of a 
language policy favoring the Sinhala-speak-
ing majority limited access to state sector 
employment for Tamil speakers, maintain-
ing the feelings of marginalization and dis-
empowerment that previously led to the 
violent conflict which afflicted the country 
for several decades (Perera, 1999).
Agriculture in Sri Lanka is dominated 
by smallholder farmers in both the food 
crop and the export-oriented plantation sec-
tors (Table 6.6). A total number of 3,252,954 
agricultural landholdings exists in Sri Lanka, 
covering a land area of 4,797,004 ha. Small-
holdings (units of less than 0.1 ha) account 
for 45%, while only 2% of holdings are 
 larger than 8.09 ha. This has important 
 implications, such as production units being 
unable to generate sufficient surplus and 
agricultural incomes to ensure a middle-class 
lifestyle, and independent access to infor-
mation and inputs being heavily dependent 
on state and collective efforts. State agricul-
ture development policies and extension 
programs have to a large extent been shaped 
by this reality.
Agricultural extension
Agricultural extension has long been a part 
of the agricultural sector in Sri Lanka. 
Post-independence agriculture policies were 
highly sensitive to the needs of the rural 
peasantry (Sandaratne, 2004). Consecutive 
governments have attempted to improve 
conditions for smallholder subsistence farm-
ers. A major strategy has been to revitalize 
the ancient rice-based irrigation systems in 
an attempt to increase food production and 
achieve self-sufficiency. Extension services 
have been a component of this strategy.
There are several key stakeholders in 
agricultural extension, especially in the 
post-war context of northern Sri Lanka 
(Fig. 6.2). Each plays a crucial role and can 
have a major impact on successful outcomes. 
They include farmers, their families and 
the communities within which they oper-
ate. They often work collectively as CBOs 
such as farmers’ organizations or women’s 
rural development societies. The individ-
uals within these groups are direct benefi-
ciaries of agricultural extension services.
Agricultural research and extension 
services for the various agriculture produc-
tion systems are provided to farmers mainly 
by state agencies. The state operates two 
tiers of extension service providers, at na-
tional and provincial levels. These state 
agencies also act as the key regulators. The 
private sector and NGOs also play a role, 
but this is limited to specific geographical 
areas where their projects are implemented, 
or to marketing inputs or outputs (Sri Lanka 
Agricultural Extension Association, 1992). 
The non-governmental sector consists of 
local and international agencies. All NGOs 
offer resources, as well as strengthening 
local communities to help them engage 
meaningfully with the state so they can ob-
tain services such as advice, information, 
agricultural inputs and access to markets. 
Farmers also provide extension information 
Table 6.6. Number of holdings and extent of land under major crops as a percentage of total cultivable land 
(6.5 million ha). From Department of Census and Statistics (n.d.).
Sector Number of holdings Extent (ha) Percentage of total cultivated land
Rice 493,382 897,076 13.7
Tea 264,758 212,716 3.2
Rubber 83,497 287,814 4.4
Coconut 71,347 394,836 6.0
Total agriculture/farm holdings 3,252,954 4,797,004 73.1
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to each other, engaging in peer-to-peer ex-
tension of sorts.
Public sector extension
Public extension operates at many levels. In 
January 2015 the Ministries responsible for 
the agricultural sector were redefined, to-
gether with the various departments, insti-
tutes and divisions, as follows:
• Ministry of Mahaweli Development;
• Ministry of Plantation Infrastructure 
Development;
• Ministry of Irrigation and Water Re-
source Management;
• Ministry of Rural Economic Affairs;
• Ministry of Plantation Industries.
Different Ministries were assigned differ-
ent subsectors of agricultural production 
(Table 6.7). Farmers may be provided with 
public sector extension services by a multi-
tude of agencies depending on the combin-
ation of agricultural production they are in-
volved in. Specialized agencies and extension 
officers exist at the field level to provide 
advice and guidance with technology and 
know-how. Thus, a multi-enterprise farmer 
who has an apiary, livestock, pond fisheries, 
coconuts, tea and rubber will be served by six 
different field-level extension personnel, 
each directed by a different state agency.
The Ministry of Mahaweli Development 
and Environment is unique. A multipurpose 
irrigation settlement scheme was launched 
in 1979, with a target of providing irrigation 
and land settlement by diverting the largest 
river in the country—the Mahaweli. The vi-
sion was to provide irrigation to 365,000 ha 
of land, covering 55% of the country’s Dry 
Zone. Most settlers to this part of Sri Lanka 
were from the southern, Sinhala-speaking 
areas, and this has been a politically con-
tentious issue (Perera, 1999). All lands and 
settlers that come under the Mahaweli irriga-
tion system are managed by a specialized 
agency of the Ministry of Mahaweli Develop-
ment and Environment, the Mahaweli 
Authority of Sri Lanka, which has its own 
administrative system including research, 
extension and community development 
(Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka, n.d.). The 
agricultural extension system within this 
Farm families in communities
—receive extension services
to improve their livelihoods













sets national policy priorities
International development
agencies (e.g. FAO, DFID,




with local agencies to
provide communities with 
technical and financial help
CBOs (such as farmer
organizations) made of local 
community members—work





work in the north
Local NGOs—mobilize and 
empower communities to
realize their needs
Fig. 6.2. Key stakeholders in agricultural extension in north Sri Lanka. CBO, community-based organization; 
DFID, Department for International Development (UK); FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations; NGO, non-governmental organization.
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vast project has its own management hier-
archy and field presence in operational areas.
In the crop and livestock sectors, exten-
sion services are decentralized and are han-
dled by each of the nine provincial govern-
ments, known as provincial councils, each 
with a Provincial Director of Agriculture. The 
provincial agricultural extension services have 
their own recruitment, training and funding 
mechanisms. Their efforts are coordinated for 
effective management and administration at 
provincial, district and divisional levels.
In each district, agricultural extension 
work is managed by a District Director of ex-
tension, who oversees agricultural officers 
and instructors responsible for various agri-
culture extension activities. These different 
field officers provide extension services to 
farmers, as listed below:
• Rice and food crops: agriculture in-
structor of the Provincial Department of 
Agriculture.
• Livestock and veterinary services: live-
stock development instructors, live-
stock officers and veterinary surgeons of 
the Department of Animal Production 
and Health.
• Tea: tea inspectors of the Tea Small 
Holdings Development Authority or 
extension officers of the Advisory Div-
ision of the Tea Research Institute.
• Rubber: rubber inspectors of the Rub-
ber Development Department.
• Coconut: coconut inspectors and research 
officers of the Coconut Research Institute.
• Sugarcane: extension officers of the 
Sugar Research Institute.
In the fisheries sector, for both inland and 
coastal enterprises, fisheries development 
officers also undertake extension work.
In addition, the Extension and Training 
Division of the Department of Agriculture 
within the Ministry of Agriculture also pro-
vides extension services to farmers. It has 
several divisions that deliver specialized 
services (MoA, n.d.):
• In-Service Training Institutes;
• District Agriculture Training Centres;
• Sri Lanka School of Agriculture, pro-
viding 2-year professional training to 
Agriculture Instructors;
• Farm Mechanization Training Centre;
• Bee Development Unit;
• Agro-enterprises Development and In-
formation Service;
• Farm Women Agriculture Extension;
• Horticultural Training and Development 
Institute.
The plethora of agencies operating at nati onal 
and local government levels—attempting to 
service farmers and rural families with 
Table 6.7. Departments and institutes responsible for agricultural extension for the subsectors of agriculture. 
Compiled from respective Ministry websites.
Responsible for agriculture extension
Subsector Department Ministry




Nine provincial departments of agriculture 
(provincial councils) that come under  
provincial councils
Ministry of Agriculture (http://
www.agrimin.gov.lk/web/
index.php/en)
Spices, other export 
crops
Department of Export Agriculture Ministry of Primary Industries 
(http://mpi.gov.lk)
Tea Tea Research Institute. Tea Small Holdings 
Development Authority
Ministry of Plantation Industries 
(http://www.kppk.gov.my/
mpic/index.php/en)
Rubber Rubber Development Department Ministry of Plantation Industries
Coconut Coconut Research Institute Ministry of Plantation Industries
Sugar Sugar Research Institute Ministry of Plantation Industries
Livestock Department of Animal Production and Health, 
National Livestock Development Board
Ministry of Rural Economic 
Affairs
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meager resources—can be a source of con-
siderable confusion with regard to responsi-
bilities and accountability.
The public sector fills the main role in 
rebuilding post-war agriculture and provid-
ing agricultural extension. The main efforts 
made to rebuild agricultural extension ser-
vices fall into several categories.
Policy and planning are central to 
post-conflict extension. The Department of 
Agriculture of the Government of Sri Lanka, 
within the Ministry of Agriculture, remains 
the key agency responsible for agricultural 
development, particularly for the food crop 
sector. A master plan developed for the agri-
cultural sector envisages comprehensive re-
building and restoration of production, but 
also ensuring that farmers can contribute to 
the country’s agricultural GDP (Northern 
Provincial Council, 2010). The planners also 
recognize the need for public sector exten-
sion to enable farmers to increase their effi-
ciency, competitiveness and ability to com-
pete in a global market. Faced with strong 
competition, producers need a range of in-
formation and skills to be able to respond to 
market signals and constantly evolving mar-
kets. These conditions require extension 
programs to provide more diverse services, 
but also respond to changes in extension ap-
proaches that promote sustainable produc-
tion (Northern Provincial Council, 2010).
The effort to restart and/or resume in-
stitutional operations is another post- conflict 
extension approach used in Sri Lanka. The 
restoration of the governance and public ad-
ministration system to cover the war-affected 
areas, where these were paralyzed, is a cru-
cial first step. The previous mix of systems 
is being brought under one domain now 
that state power has been restored. In the 
past, open conflict meant that there were re-
gions where no state administrative system 
was present and operational. These systems 
needed to be re-established, re-staffed and 
supported to function again, and develop-
ing institutional infrastructures remains a 
key challenge in these areas (Marikar, 2012; 
IFAD, 2014).
Resuming institutional operations in-
cludes the provision of public extension ser-
vices. This institutional system was severely 
hampered by the war and is now being re-
stored through monthly meetings and im-
plementation of extension and development 
work programs. The Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
has provided support to restore agricultural 
extension work in the war-affected areas of 
the north, initially for a 4-year period (FAO, 
2009). This effort, coordinated by the pro-
vincial directors of agriculture, livestock 
and fisheries, consists of support for:
• the recovery and rehabilitation of crop 
production;
• the recovery and rehabilitation of live-
stock production;
• the recovery and rehabilitation of fish-
eries production;
• water management systems.
These support programs include stren-
gthening community-level participation; 
strengthening the recruitment and training 
of extension personnel; providing relief as 
well as production inputs to all three sec-
tors; assistance to rebuild required infra-
structure; and improving extension train-
ing capacity. Livelihood support in the 
form of relief, as well as inputs to strengthen 
or relaunch agricultural, livestock or fisher-
ies ventures, is also being provided by 
FAO, with the relevant Ministries coordin-
ating efforts with regional entities such as 
provincial councils.
The public sector is also charged with 
coordination of other development actors. 
National and international NGOs are key 
partners in development interventions. En-
abling responsible and accountable engage-
ment in post-war development efforts in the 
former war zone is a strategic requirement 
that the state should nurture and support. 
The NGOs bring essential human, technical 
and financial resources to the region. These 
must be judiciously used through effective 
coordination if optimum benefits are to be 
achieved. As agriculture is the main source 
of revenue for the majority of families in the 
north, the support the NGOs provide is crit-
ical. This assistance must be coordinated 
with overall development efforts in the 
north, particularly in the case of making 
agricultural extension efforts more effective.
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For these reasons, early post-war develop-
ment work—during the previous government— 
was coordinated and strictly controlled by a 
committee under the Ministry of Economic 
Development. This was the Presidential 
Task Force for the Development of the North, 
which approves all projects in the northern 
region of Sri Lanka, including any conceived 
by NGOs or international development 
agencies. These proposals, as well as the or-
ganizations submitting them, were subjected 
to intense intelligence scrutiny by the Min-
istry of Defence. All NGOs were required to 
be registered with the NGO Secretariat or 
other prescribed state administrative agen-
cies in the regions. All international staff 
working for such organizations had to ob-
tain clearance from the Ministry of Defence 
to work, travel to the north or obtain visas. 
Many were turned down, and some organ-
izations, such as the Berghof Foundation 
and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, were forced to 
terminate their operations in Sri Lanka. The 
current government has changed these dy-
namics somewhat.
NGO-based extension
NGOs have operated in all parts of Sri Lanka 
for many years, actively engaging in develop-
ment efforts before the war and continuing 
to serve farmers in conflict areas even dur-
ing the conflict period. NGOs are also dir-
ectly engaged in present post-war develop-
ment efforts (Box 6.1) and will continue to 
work towards development and agricultural 
extension in the future.
Many NGOs have contributed. Five key 
organizations that have played a critical 
role in the northern and eastern regions are 
CARE International, Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 
the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP), World University Service 
of Canada and ZOA. Their efforts are usu-
ally carried out in collaboration with Sri 
Lankan NGOs operating at national, provin-
cial, district or local village levels.
During the war, these organizations and 
other NGOs played a key role in relief and 
humanitarian work. Many engaged closely 
in strengthening livelihoods and attempted 
to fill the void left by the withdrawal or in-
effectiveness of state institutions (Box 6.2). 
NGOs have also been strong proponents of 
human rights and have earned the wrath of 
the government and the defence establish-
ment for these efforts. Some NGOs have had 
limited engagements, focusing instead on 
developing and transferring their capacities 
to local organizations.
After the conflict, NGOs’ work in the 
northern and eastern regions focused primar-
ily on issues regarding internally displaced 
Box 6.1. Opinion of a senior NGO officer in the north, January 2015. 
We have always worked in the north. The war did not deter us. At that time, the requirement was 
humanitarian relief, to help those affected directly by the war. At present, the need is to restore 
livelihoods, heal the wounds of war and help people to get on their feet. We need a human touch 
in the field, not officialdom. NGOs have an ethos of non-bureaucratic flexibility to address human 
needs. We find it difficult to work when the government officials and the military are suspicious of 
us and do not trust us. But there are some reasonable officers, and we manage to continue to do a 
little bit of work. Many have given up and left.
Box 6.2. Respondent in focus group discussion, Vavuniya, January 2014. 
We survived because of the food, shelter and medicine that the NGOs provided. Government 
agencies were practically non-existent during the long years of war. But often the NGOs gave us 
the same things in duplicate. We took them because it was free; we could use them later. We did 
not throw away or waste anything.
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persons and those directly affected by the 
war. This involved relief efforts, clearing 
landmines, and investigating disappear-
ances and human rights violations. Inter-
ventions have since changed in nature and 
scope. The work undertaken by NGOs in 
the formerly war-affected areas now falls 
into three categories:
Category A: Undertaken by most NGOs, 
these tasks are low risk and aim to meet the 
basic needs of families
• Helping returnees to resettle and rebuild 
their livelihoods, homes and families 
from within Sri Lanka and overseas.
• Assisting with rebuilding local com-
mon infrastructure, such as village 
schools, dispensaries, irrigation canals, 
water wells, roads, primary health clin-
ics and village markets.
• Restoring irrigation water reservoirs 
and distribution canals.
• Strengthening livelihoods and eco-
nomic support to agriculture, industry 
enterprises and marketing.
Category B: Undertaken by some inter-
national NGOs, with collaboration and ap-
proval from the state
• Obtaining land and homes acquired or 
encroached upon illegally, especially 
where the original legal documents have 
been destroyed.
• Tracing lost family members.
• Providing care and support to the mar-
ginalized, especially war widows, the 
physically disabled, orphaned children 
and single-parent families.
• Rehabilitating and mainstreaming ex- 
combatants.
• Restoring rightful ownership of livestock 
abandoned prior to the outbreak of war.
• Psychosocial support for those trau-
matized by war, including providing 
counseling and psychiatric or institu-
tional care.
• Reconciliation with past violators of 
human rights and the root causes of the 
war by restoring social relationships 
with different groups at local, regional 
and national levels.
Category C: Implemented by the state with 
technical and financial support from inter-
national NGOs
• De-mining lands to make them safe.
In the short term, NGOs will have a positive 
impact on the lives of people directly af-
fected by the war. Their livelihoods will be 
improved, the local infrastructure devel-
oped and institutional support to villagers 
restored. However, the long-term needs of 
reconciliation, healing and peace-building, 
as well as conflict prevention efforts, may 
need more concerted, professional and 
well-planned intervention of high strategic 
relevance.
Furthermore, the work of NGOs was se-
verely restricted by the government in the 
early post-conflict period through direct 
bans as well as by indirect means, even 
though these organizations have been in-
strumental in providing relief and rehabili-
tation as well as in providing inputs for agri-
culture, livestock and fisheries development. 
NGOs have worked closely with the provin-
cial administration but were not allowed to 
work independently in local communities 
and were required to be under the control 
and constant monitoring of the chief govern-
ment administrative officers of the province 
and districts, although these dynamics have 
changed somewhat in recent years.
Restrictions imposed by the government 
on NGOs and international development 
agencies severely hampered development ef-
forts and the restoration of agriculture in the 
conflict-affected areas of Sri Lanka (Sarava-
nathan, 2003). The agencies’ ability to func-
tion is affected by conditions created by the 
state, and the potential to achieve agricul-
tural extension outcomes in the post-war 
context is seriously limited.
Community-based and peer-to-peer extension
Other approaches to more informal agricul-
tural extension include CBOs and know-
ledge sharing among farmers. CBOs, includ-
ing rural development societies, women’s 
rural development societies, farmers’ organ-
izations, death donation societies, rotation 
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credit groups and labor exchange systems, 
all have long histories in Sri Lanka. These 
grassroots organizations, some of which are 
formal while others are informal, provide 
the social basis for collective action and 
solidarity in agriculture, but also more 
broadly to communities. Community-level 
social relationships have a strong bearing 
on the effective functioning of these struc-
tures. In most war-affected villages these or-
ganizations, which had been developed 
over long periods of time by generations of 
families providing mutual support, were 
dissipated. Rebuilding them, and strength-
ening their democratic and participatory 
ethos, is essential to addressing the deep- 
rooted causes of Sri Lanka’s ethnopolitical 
conflict. Proactive action is required in all 
sectors, including agricultural extension.
Successes and Challenges in Rebuilding 
Agricultural Extension for a Conducive 
Agrarian Environment
More than 25 years of war and tensions in 
the post-war period were not conducive to 
agricultural production, extension service 
delivery, marketing activities and agricul-
tural value chains. The damage done by the 
conflict and the conditions that followed it 
brought many challenges in rebuilding the 
sector and re-establishing rural livelihoods, 
particularly for displaced people. However, 
the post-conflict period also offered a 
unique opportunity for agricultural devel-
opment and extension, supported by polit-
ical will and external support. Sri Lanka has 
been successful, to some degree, in capital-
izing on this opportunity:
 1. Since the beginning of the accelerated re-
settlement process, led by the Government 
of Sri Lanka from October 2009 to December 
2012, more than 413,000 people have re-
turned to their homes in their district of 
origin or are staying with host families in 
the Northern province. This effort, coupled 
with the removal of landmines, allowed 
agricultural activities to resume in large num-
bers in former conflict areas, significantly 
 affecting production and rural livelihoods. 
The emergence of retail marketing agencies 
for direct purchase of agricultural produce 
has also provided a boost to farmers in the 
region, as supermarkets have started open-
ing up in the north, providing goods to con-
sumers and a market for fresh produce. The 
opening up of highways and modern retail 
markets in cities enables farmers to sell their 
produce directly to private retail companies.
 2. Despite large-scale disruption to services 
provided by key extension agencies of the 
Ministries of Agriculture and Livestock De-
velopment, where there was no serious 
fighting many farming families continued to 
grow crops, rear animals and sell produce in 
nearby markets. With the end of the war, the 
government extension services quickly re-
commenced their activities and connected 
with these remaining farmers. Extension ac-
tivities, including the distribution of seeds 
and fertilizer, field visits and farmer train-
ing, were delivered by the Department of 
Agriculture and the Department of Livestock 
Development without much delay after the 
fighting had ended.
Another major boost to creating a condu-
cive environment for the development of 
agricultural extension came in the shape 
and appropriateness of projects launched 
by the government in the conflict regions. 
These include:
• Provincial Accelerated and Medium-Term 
Development Programs;
• ‘Vadakkin Wasantham’ District 180-Day 
Northern Development Programs;
• World Bank-funded Re-Awakening 
Project.
These projects were successful because they 
targeted small-scale producers seeking to 
relaunch or step up activities in the agricul-
ture and livestock sectors, but also offered 
support to the fisheries sector. These pro-
jects also identified and provided crucial 
components to rebuild agricultural produc-
tion by providing inputs; repairing irriga-
tion systems, roads and markets; building 
infrastructure; helping to strengthen trans-
port; and also providing capital grants and 
credit to farmers (FAO, 2009). Specific pro-
ject efforts are listed in Table 6.8.
 Rebuilding and Reconciliation in the North of Sri Lanka 107
Table 6.8. Government project efforts to rebuild agriculture and fisheries, by sector.
Sector Project efforts
Food crops Revitalization of paddy and other field crop production
Promotion of carbonic fertilizers
Revival of home gardens
Community-based produce marketing
Provision of water pumps
Renovation of office-cum-training centers
Revival/development of seed production
Revival/development of fruit crops, vegetable crops, household farm forests
Promotion of organic food production
Promotion of sprinkler and drip irrigation systems
Revival of social institutions
Development of agro-based enterprises
Revival of agricultural extension systems
Renovation of district agricultural training centers and district farms
Livestock Rounding up of loose cattle
Establishment of dairy villages and animal banks
Strengthening/reorganizing livestock breeders’ cooperative societies
Establishment/renovation of milk sales outlets
Re-establishment of milk collection networks
Setting up chilling centers, mini-milk coolers, liquid milk processing facilities
Goat rearing and restocking
Backyard poultry restocking
Immunization program
Training of livestock farmers and artificial insemination technicians (including youth and 
ex-combatants)
Renovation of veterinary offices
Establishment of nucleus herds
Providing vehicles for livestock transportation
Setting up cattle and buffalo breeding farms
Establishment of goat breeding farms
Establishment/strengthening of range veterinary offices and quarters
Establishment/strengthening of regional and district animal production and health  
training centers
Fisheries Provision of fishing craft, gear, fish boxes and bicycles (for marine fishing and aquaculture)
Construction of shore facilities and block ice plants
Establishment of fish purchasing centers
Restocking of fingerlings in tanks
Re-establishment/establishment of Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (MOFAR), 
National Aquaculture Development Authority (NADA), Ceylon Fisheries Corporation 
(CFC) and National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency (NARA) 
district offices
Skills development for fishermen and fisherwomen
Re-establishment/strengthening of fisheries cooperative societies
Establishment of fish selling centers and development of market linkages
Undertaking a fisheries census and fishing boat registration
Fisheries resources survey
Zonal planning for shrimp farming
Rehabilitation of fisheries harbors
Provision of multi-day fishing boats
Establishment of aquaculture development centers
Construction of Department of Fisheries and Aquatic resources (DFAR) district offices, NARA 
regional centers and College of Fisheries and Nautical Engineering
Restoration of mangroves and salt marshes
Continued
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Prospects for positive change to rebuild 
the agricultural sector, including agricul-
tural extension, received a further boost 
after the 8 January 2015 presidential elec-
tions, when the incumbent president was 
replaced by a liberal social reformer. Sweep-
ing changes towards reconciliation and res-
toration of public life and confidence are 
underway, creating conditions conducive to 
community-level action and strengthening 
of agricultural extension activities.
Post-war development in the north, and 
agricultural restoration in general, also re-
ceived a major boost from the concerted and 
coordinated efforts of UN agencies through 
their Common Humanitarian Action Plans 
(CHAPs). The 2009 CHAPs, administered 
through the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), operated 12 
clusters/sectors led by specialized UN agen-
cies. FAO led the agriculture sector, with 
OCHA coordinating the economic recovery 
and infrastructure development efforts 
made by UNDP; food aid was provided by 
the World Food Programme; education was 
provided by UNICEF and Save the Children 
Sri Lanka; health issues were addressed by 
the World Health Organization; nutrition, 
water, sanitation and hygiene were sup-
ported by UNICEF; shelter, non-food relief 
items, camp management and protection 
issues were overseen by the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees; and se-
curity was provided by the United Nations 
Department of Safety and Security. This 
comprehensive approach provided a sound 
basis for families to benefit from the recov-
ery and rebuilding processes (FAO, 2009). 
Several international NGOs (e.g. ACTED, 
Asia Onlus, FORUT International, Inter-
national Relief and Development, Oxfam 
and ZOA) also collaborated in these efforts. 
Additional NGOs provided agricultural ex-
tension services, as discussed above.
Despite the successes, in the post-war 
period several key challenges can also be 
identified, which affect Sri Lanka’s efforts to 
restore normality in the conflict-affected 
areas, especially in agriculture and agricul-
tural extension:
 1. A major contributing factor has been the 
government’s historic and consistent failure 
to adequately support agricultural exten-
sion as a priority. The deterioration of agri-
cultural extension services due to low in-
vestment by the government has continued 
to take its toll on the presence and efficacy 
of extension personnel (Panabokke, 2002; 
Fernando, 2014). Reduction in recruitment 
levels for the extension services, and min-
imal financial allocations for extension pro-
grams, have also had a negative impact and 
make extension services inaccessible to 
many farmers and of low quality. The cur-
rent weak accountability and poor links be-
tween research outputs and extension ser-
vices must also be strengthened as part of an 
overall approach to making country-wide 
improvements to agricultural extension ser-
vices. Special focus should be placed on the 
war-affected areas.
 2. Development efforts in the affected areas 
soon after the end of the war were heavily 
dependent on donor support due to paucity 
of state funding. Often the financial commit-
ments made by donors were not followed 
up. Underfunding has had serious effects on 
the fragile efforts to rebuild these regions. 
Attempts to restore agricultural extension 
have been adversely impacted as well (FAO, 
2009). A related factor is that the donor 
funding flow is linked to identification of 
cycles of needs, with an implementation 
Sector Project efforts
Irrigation Rehabilitation of agriculture and irrigation infrastructure facilities to enable abandoned land 
to be cultivated
Promotion of new irrigation schemes
Construction of tube-wells
Improved water management practices
Table 6.8. Continued.
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phase that is often limited to 3 years. This 
time frame is completely insufficient to en-
able a socially transformative process to take 
place at the community level. Also, donor- 
implemented projects are often inadequately 
and ineffectively monitored and evaluated, 
and lessons learned are not used or shared 
to develop a body of knowledge, as stipu-
lated in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effect-
iveness (OECD, 2005).
Excessive state control over post-war 
development efforts and intense security 
arrangements combined to make the con-
ditions extremely difficult for develop-
ment agencies and NGOs to function at 
ground level. The work of the Presidential 
Task Force for the Development of the 
North was severely criticized for its arbi-
trary control of any external NGO- or donor- 
led development interventions. The pro-
cesses of scrutiny were not transparent 
and the assessment criteria were not made 
known to the public. There were no effect-
ive mechanisms for appeal. Despite the se-
vere need for agricultural development 
and efforts to restore farming and improve 
agriculture, governmental restrictions on 
activities by NGOs and international agen-
cies have slowed any progress made by 
these actors.
 3. The development of agricultural exten-
sion should be placed in the proper polit-
ical and social context and be addressed as 
part of the restoration, rebuilding and rec-
onciliation process underway in post-war 
situations. Such a broad perspective is 
essential to address root causes of con-
flict and as a long-term conflict-prevention 
measure. Agricultural extension should 
therefore be integrated with conflict trans-
formation and peace-building (CTPB) prin-
ciples. This will require a paradigm shift 
away from the notion that the purpose of 
agricultural extension is to increase prod-
uctivity and enhance farm incomes, to-
wards an approach that addresses the so-
cial needs of communities. Such needs 
are human security, peace, strengthening 
democratic space and citizenship for ef-
fective participation and inclusive ap-
proaches to governance and development. 
Agricultural extension must therefore 
undergo a substantial change in Sri Lanka 
and other post-war settings.
Recommendations and Opportunities  
for Improvement
There are several areas where agricultural 
extension in post-conflict Sri Lanka can be 
improved.
Planning and policy
The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation 
Commission (LLRC) report by the Govern-
ment of Sri Lanka explicitly recognized that 
any efforts to improve agricultural extension 
must be placed in the perspective of the eth-
nopolitical conflict and governance failure 
(de Silva et al., 2011). Agricultural exten-
sion program planning and human resource 
development must therefore be undertaken 
in this context. The LLRC report is con-
sidered a fundamental guide for crafting a 
peaceful Sri Lanka, in which all stake-
holders take responsibility for building a 
new future. The principles of ‘do no harm’ 
as advocated by former Irish President Mary 
Robinson, along with inclusion, good citi-
zenship and social integration, should be 
woven into a more holistic framework to de-
velop a broader perspective for agricultural 
extension in Sri Lanka (Ministry of National 
Languages and Social Integration, 2014).
However, the master plan for the north, 
as developed by the Provincial Government, 
does not fully recognize the importance of 
post-war reconciliation, the need to stren-
gthen community trust in social institutions 
and governance systems, or the need to in-
vest in democratic citizenship, as recognized 
by the LLRC (LLRC, 2011). Yet at the commu-
nity level, many agricultural activities and 
efforts are collective and require cordiality 
and trust if they are to be effective. Such 
qualitative transformation of communities, 
leadership and institutions must be planned 
for with a proper understanding of the past 
and present situations, as well as what is to 
be hoped for in the future.
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Coordination
The efforts of the many different develop-
ment and agricultural extension services 
must be consolidated so that the system is 
more efficient and accountable to stake-
holders (Somaratne, 2002). In the short and 
medium term, there needs to be close co-
ordination among the different agencies. In 
the long term, the organizational architec-
ture of agricultural extension must be critic-
ally assessed and a more rational system de-
veloped. Initiatives launched by the NGO 
sector should be well planned and coordin-
ated with governmental authorities at na-
tional and regional levels so that beneficiary 
needs are met efficiently and effectively.
Strengthening social relationships
Agriculture remains an intensely social and 
collective activity. It involves people coming 
together to work in the fields at the commu-
nity level, with farming families dependent 
on each other to meet many of their needs 
(Saravanathan, 2003). These include land 
preparation, preparing the irrigation canal 
networks for water supply, obtaining inputs 
and marketing produce, and planning the 
seasonal cropping calendar.
Farmers must coordinate collective ef-
forts that involve men and women bound 
by different social and economic relation-
ships. Traditions, social values and rituals 
color the multitude of transactions that take 
place in agriculture among the different 
people engaged in the sector. Agriculture 
therefore offers unique promise and the po-
tential to address deeply ingrained social 
divisions and the root causes of conflicts, 
and to heal and restore social harmony.
However, this outcome can be achieved 
only if agriculture and farming are recog-
nized as a social activity, with people placed 
on center stage. Such an approach requires 
that the stakeholders, as opposed to markets 
and technology, are given priority and are 
kept informed, engaged and in control, with 
all people able to assert themselves and to 
be treated as equals.
Stronger social relationships will also 
require efforts to rebuild trust. At commu-
nity level, farmers are trying to restore 
working relationships with each other and 
to continue to farm, rear animals and sell 
their produce to markets. However, some 
repercussions from the war culture con-
tinue to exert a negative influence. Fear, 
mistrust and hostility have long-term conse-
quences, and social interactions and col-
lective action that could be of mutual bene-
fit to communities may be compromised. 
There is a need to rebuild the subtle and 
often fragile social interpersonal relation-
ships as social capital for mutual benefit. 
Many agrarian families suffer from the ef-
fects of events during the war, when trust 
and goodwill were broken down (Box 6.3).
Nonetheless, for rural and agricultural 
communities to function and develop, ef-
forts to rebuild trust and social cohesion are 
essential. This responsibility, although not 
traditionally expected of agricultural exten-
sion service providers, might be a new and 
central element of their programming in 
post-conflict Sri Lanka and other countries 
emerging from war and social upheaval.
Resource mobilization
Continued dependence on donor funding is 
risky, particularly if there is no long-term 
Box 6.3. Respondent in focus group discussion, January 2014. 
One night in June 1990, all 90 families in our village, Samalankulam, fled because two families were 
killed and their houses were burnt. We left our belongings, particularly our livestock. Most of us had 
cattle and goats. Our cattle were branded for identity. We returned two years later. We are extremely 
unhappy that we can recognize our cattle, which are now owned and tended by our adjacent 
villagers. We feel helpless that we can’t claim our assets back.
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vision for self-development and reducing 
dependency. There is a serious need for the 
government to recognize the importance of 
more sustainable funding and to commit 
more funds to revitalizing and strengthen-
ing agricultural extension. Any attempt to 
restore livelihoods and lift people out of 
poverty will require serious commitment.
The beneficiaries targeted in war-affect-
ed areas are different from those in other re-
gions of the country. Their concerns will be 
distinct, given their experiences of living 
with the tension of conflict for more than 25 
years. There are over 20,000 war widows in 
the region, as well as a great many disabled 
people and families with no male breadwin-
ners. These demographic considerations 
will require more attention and state sup-
port to the region, in addition to extension 
programs tailored to their specific needs.
Market-driven extension
All agricultural and extension efforts need 
to create an enabling environment that sup-
ports market development and improves 
rural livelihoods. Farmers need market in-
formation on inputs and buyers for their 
produce, as well as knowledge about tech-
nology. The infrastructure currently being 
developed must extend to remote rural areas 
where farmers operate and harvests are pro-
cessed. Efficient storage and transport are es-
sential services that agricultural extension 
will need to coordinate if other aspects of 
agricultural improvement are to bear fruit.
Professional competencies
All extension professionals, trainers and 
program planners must develop a balance 
in their social as well as their technical 
competencies. This balance must be ex-
tended to their clients, who may be crop or 
livestock farmers, women farmers, young 
farmers or field extension officers. Women 
have been particularly affected by the war, 
and they remain a vulnerable group. When 
addressing their livelihood needs, a gender- 
and conflict-sensitive approach should be 
adopted. People may need special training 
in skills to work with women in post-conflict 
settings.
For example, agricultural extension 
personnel serving in post-conflict regions, 
both governmental and non-governmental, 
need to have strong CTPB skills to address 
the unique needs of farming communities 
in these areas. For this reason, any training 
program for extension officers must incorp-
orate CTPB training. Extension programs 
must be designed to reflect conflict-sensi-
tive and ‘do no harm’ principles. Indeed, all 
development interventions should be con-
flict-sensitive and underpinned by an 
awareness of how the efforts impact the dif-
ferent groups of beneficiaries, as well as of 
the benefits and costs of interventions.
Also, extension personnel must have 
competencies to support resettlement. Those 
who emigrated from the country as refugees 
will continue to return over the next few 
years. The return and resettlement process is 
often stressful, but can be used to build 
strong social relationships based on compas-
sion, forgiveness and inclusion, all vital in 
CTPB, if extension personnel develop the 
needed competencies. In a social context 
where nearly 40% of the population in the 
north are returnee displaced persons, the 
emphasis on addressing their needs in a con-
flict-sensitive manner is paramount. Agricul-
tural extension and other service delivery 
agencies in the north need capacity develop-
ment support to provide them with the com-
petencies required to address the needs of 
resettled persons (Buthpitiya, 2013).
Targeted programming
Agricultural extension must be properly 
targeted to serve the diverse groups that re-
quire services in post-conflict Sri Lanka. 
Smallholders are one extremely important 
audience. Given the size of their produc-
tion units, smallholder farmers have spe-
cialized needs for enterprise promotion 
and market integration that must be incorp-
orated into agricultural extension efforts. 
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Group approaches, collectivization and es-
tablishing federations to strengthen small-
holder farmers, especially women farmers, 
should be actively pursued as part of any 
social competencies and/or development 
strategy in a post-war setting.
There are also several groups of people 
who are direct victims of the war, and or-
ganizations and agencies—particularly state 
agencies—need to have mechanisms and 
processes to deliver services to a clientele 
quite different from those of the pre-war 
period. Widows, the disabled and mobil-
ized youth have special needs that must be 
recognized, and extension interventions 
should be crafted to respond to their needs.
For example, individuals who were dir-
ectly involved in LTTE as combatants are 
commonly ostracized and socially marginal-
ized. Several thousand LTTE ex-combatants 
have been rehabilitated and released, but 
most are shunned by other members of soci-
ety. Many of these men and women are from 
poor agricultural families and will need spe-
cial approaches to develop social accept-
ance and become mainstream members of 
community life once again.
However, the reintegration of ex-com-
batants through socio-technical agricultural 
enterprises can be very rewarding. Young 
people can be trained to develop technical 
skills with relative ease, but should also be 
encouraged to develop the social skills of 
communication, negotiation, bargaining, as-
sertiveness and management. These social 
competencies will be highly beneficial in 
the reintegration and mainstreaming pro-
cesses. Agricultural extension officers will 
have to facilitate integration and acceptance 
as part of their new approach to extension.
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Background on Myanmar (Burma)
Any discussion of agricultural extension re-
quires an understanding of the long history 
of struggles and armed conflict in Myanmar 
(previously named Burma). A country on 
mainland South-east Asia, Myanmar has 
struggled to develop as a nation state. This 
struggle has helped define its approach to 
nation-building and development.
Myanmar has often been at the cross-
roads of several powerful empires—the Mon-
gols, Chinese, Indian and Thai—and has been 
greatly affected by these countries politically, 
culturally and spiritually. Throughout Myan-
mar’s development, the Burmese Kingdom 
was threatened and occasionally subjugated 
by the many groups surrounding it. During 
the Mongol empire, China threatened the 
Burmese Kingdom. Later, the influence of 
 Indian kingdoms transformed the belief 
systems of Burma through the introduction 
of Hinduism and Buddhism (Myint-U, 2011). 
Many wars were fought with the Thai kings 
and the Mon peoples nearby until an uneasy 
truce was achieved (Hall, 1981).
For a time, despite the British expan-
sion into South-east Asia, Burma was free of 
control by the British Empire even as the 
British Raj was growing in neighboring India. 
Eventually, though, the British East India 
Company saw the advantage of subduing 
the Burmese Kingdom and making it part of 
British colonial holdings. After a series of 
wars, this process was completed. To rule 
Burma, the British undertook several ac-
tions that changed the complexion of the 
country. Indians were brought in to provide 
labor, implement police and military forces 
and help conduct civil affairs (Hall, 1981). 
This action brought in many from outside 
who had not traditionally been part of the 
Burmese Kingdom’s ethnic make-up. In 
addition, the British ruled the mountainous 
buffer-zone areas by empowering local eth-
nic leaders and bringing them into the armed 
forces (Ekeh and Smith, 2007). This action 
reinforced the perception among the moun-
tain ethnic groups that they were different 
and capable of self-rule.
World War II brought about the swift 
destruction of the British control of Burma. 
Several nationalist groups emerged which 
attempted to develop Burmese capabilities 
to rule themselves, under the protection of 
the Japanese. Burma was on the frontline of 
the fighting and suffered much infrastructure 
damage during this time. The British and 
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Allied forces eventually drove out the  Japanese. 
The nationalist groups welcomed the removal 
of the Japanese and expected the British to grant 
Burma freedom to rule itself (Maung, 1971).
After the war, the many ethnic groups 
were well armed because they had fought 
alongside the Allied forces against the  Japanese. 
These groups were not eager to disarm and 
place themselves under the rule of a nation-
alist Burmese government dominated by eth-
nic Burmese. With the assassination in 1947 of 
Aung San, the best-known nationalist leader, 
along with most of his cabinet, the country 
descended into a period of intermittent in-
ternal armed conflict. The result of this conflict 
was that, over time, politically key persons in 
the military gained more and more influence 
over the decision-making bodies of the state.
The period of military rule lengthened 
as the country first turned to the ‘Burmese 
way to socialism’ (Thuzar, 2013) and then 
transitioned to military rule under the State 
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) 
in 1988 (Lintner and Black, 2009). Battles 
continued with over 20 different armed in-
surgent groups. These insurgent groups 
were divided mainly along ethnic lines. 
Because of the excesses of the military lead-
ers, the USA placed a strict trade embargo 
on Burma. These factors led to an emphasis 
by the military government on national de-
velopment and an effort to pacify all the 
rebel areas where the armed ethnic groups 
were based (Steinberg, 2010; Clapp, 2015). 
The main strategy employed by the govern-
ment was the program of the ‘four cuts’, 
which was originally designed by the mili-
tary leader Ne Win as a counterinsurgency 
strategy (Joliffe, 2015). The ‘four cuts’ strat-
egy consisted of removing insurgents from 
their source of food, funds, intelligence and 
recruits (Smith, 1999). This often was done 
through forced relocation (Lintner and 
Black, 2009). This program was brutally ef-
fective and over time served to cause many 
factions to develop within the insurgent 
militia groups. Many of the militia groups 
were splintered along political and reli-
gious lines. Some groups began fighting 
alongside the government forces against the 
insurgent militia groups that still opposed 
the government. The Burmese government 
maintained a system of truces so that it 
could fight whichever insurgent group it 
wished when it was advantageous to do so 
(Lintner and Black, 2009).
In 1989, the Burmese military govern-
ment changed the name of the country to 
Myanmar (Steinberg, 2010). Around 2005, 
Myanmar slowly began opening up to mar-
ket interactions. After several setbacks, agri-
cultural production areas and markets that 
used to be affected by armed conflict were 
opened up to international interaction, and 
restrictions on open society have been eased 
(Asia Society, 2010; Thuzar, 2013). The in-
crease in demand for primary commodities 
in the region has meant that Myanmar has 
ready markets for exporting rice, maize and 
legumes to China and India (Byerlee et al., 
2014).
Yet, even now, there appears to be a bal-
ancing of the Western countries against the 
strong influence of China and India on 
Myanmar’s political leaders (Myint-U, 2011). 
Myanmar’s recent openness to opportunities 
with the Association of Southeast Asian 
 Nations (ASEAN) indicates these relation-
ships. Henley (2014) noted that Myanmar is 
different from other countries in South-east 
Asia, largely due to the long-standing eco-
nomic sanctions.
Also, unlike other countries in the re-
gion such as Thailand, Lao PDR and Viet-
nam, the political opposition parties have 
strong international links and strong do-
mestic support, and there is pressure for a 
federalist style of government because of 
the relative strength and proportion of the 
ethnic minority groups (Henley, 2014). 
Great conflicts raged between these differ-
ent groups from the early 1950s up to the 
present day. At the time of writing, an un-
easy truce has settled on the geopolitical ad-
ministrative states of Myanmar as the gov-
ernment maintains up to 16 different peace 
agreements (Pick and Thein, 2010). Through 
this divide-and-conquer strategy the coun-
try has been able to exert more and more 
control over its main cities and agricultur-
ally productive areas.
Despite increased control by the Burmese 
government, sporadic conflict is still com-
mon in the country. Myanmar continues to 
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experience conflict in many borderland areas 
of the country under the control of armed in-
surgent groups (Joliffe, 2015). The Myanmar 
government controls the areas around the 
main administrative towns and along the 
road networks, while insurgent militias ex-
hibit loose control over areas further from 
the main towns and the paved all-weather 
road system. In northern Shan State, for ex-
ample, ongoing conflict remains highly 
variable. The areas of influence of the mil-
itia groups has shrunk slightly since 2007 
(Joliffe, 2015). The country’s status as 
‘post-conflict’ is somewhat debatable. The 
patchwork of influence by the Myanmar 
government and the persistence of violent 
events also mean that the context for 
post-conflict agricultural development and 
extension in Myanmar is very complex with 
very different variables (Kalyvas, 2006; Eck, 
2015; Joliffe, 2015).
Background on Burmese Agriculture
Myanmar’s (Burma’s) agricultural history is 
equally influential on modern extension. 
Agriculture during the Burmese Kingdom 
period was based on lowland rice paddy 
systems that required large inputs of labor. 
This need for labor, and for products from 
the forests in the hills and mountainous re-
gions, meant that the Burmese Kingdom re-
lied on the peoples of the mountain fringes 
surrounding the Irrawaddy Delta and low-
lands (Scott, 2009). These mountain regions 
were the buffer boundary between the 
Burma, Thai and Assam lowland rice king-
doms. They were populated by many ethnic 
groups, the largest being the Shan, Mon, Kayin, 
Kachin, Chin, Wa and Rakhine peoples, 
who lived in the mountainous buffer zones 
between the lowland paddy rice-based cul-
tures (Scott, 2009). At times these groups 
were subjects of the Burmese kings and 
forced to provide labor for maintaining irri-
gation and paddy works. At other times these 
mountain peoples, reliant on shifting agri-
culture, were free from close control by the 
lowland Burmese Kingdom. Scott (2009) 
suggests that continual raids by the Burmese 
kingdoms to capture labor resulted in mountain 
peoples developing conflict- resistant, shift-
ing agriculture to avoid conflict and cap-
ture. These experiences left the Burmese 
with uneasy relationships with their neigh-
bors, both near and far. This history also left 
the peoples of the buffer areas wary of com-
ing under Burmese rule.
During the British colonial period, 
Burma became the rice bowl that fed the 
British Raj (Maung, 1971). Rice production, 
along with other agricultural and livestock 
production, created important ties with 
India, especially eastern India. British rule 
emphasized the extractive nature of the 
many different British companies that 
sprang up to benefit from Burmese natural 
resources. In addition to production of rice, 
staples and livestock, a major emphasis was 
on harvesting teak and other high-quality 
woods from Burmese forests (Walinsky, 
1962).
During the post-war period to 1960, the 
USA worked closely with Burma to help it 
develop as a country (Maung, 1971). Agri-
culture was affected as battles took place 
close to the capital. Agricultural production 
began to recover from the destruction that 
had occurred during World War II.
As Burma converted to socialism, 
 agricultural production suffered both from 
lack of investment and from the US trade 
embargo. Agriculture followed the socialist 
model of central control. Investment in 
agricultural technology for rice production 
and processing was minimal, and most 
technology was a carry-over from pre-so-
cialist times.
Impacts of Conflict
Conflict has affected agriculture in Myanmar 
(Burma) in a range of ways.
Conflict effects on agricultural lands
At the national level, paddy production ac-
counts for approximately half of the total 
production area (Kudo et al., 2013), although 
118 J. Ringer 
national statistics on agricultural produc-
tion during the conflict period are extremely 
unreliable (Haggblade et  al., 2014). How-
ever, defining the areas of conflict is perhaps 
more important for understanding which 
types of agricultural production have been 
affected most by armed conflict. During the 
1950s and 1960s, armed conflict occurred in 
many of the regions near the capital city of 
Yangon. This is the central delta and dry-
land zone of the country. Later, in the 1970s, 
as the government asserted control over 
many areas near the capital, most of the con-
flict in the delta and the dry zone areas of 
Burma subsided. The significant conflicts 
have instead taken place in the upland and 
mountainous areas, which were tradition-
ally controlled by the ethnic minorities.
The proportion of productive agricul-
tural land affected by conflict is approxi-
mately 40% of the arable land in the coun-
try. This includes Shan State, Kachin State 
and parts of Kayah State. The most econom-
ically viable agricultural land is the delta 
land used for rice production, which is not 
in the conflict-affected areas. The higher 
value-added cropping areas—coffee, tea 
and fruit production—are in conflict zones.
Conflict effects on farmers
Myanmar is still predominantly an agrarian 
nation, with 63% of the population in-
volved in agriculture in some manner (Cho, 
2013). However, most farmers in Myanmar 
are not directly affected by conflict. The 
farmers in the delta areas and the central 
dry zone, who make up about 70% of the 
farmers in Myanmar and produce the ma-
jority of its rice and major export crops, did 
not face the same conditions as the farmers 
living in conflict-affected areas (Wilson and 
Mwee, 2013). Numbers are difficult to ob-
tain, but an estimated 30% of the farming 
population, largely farmers from the ethnic 
minorities, were affected by conflict.
The farmers in Shan State and Kachin 
State comprise both paddy rice cultivators in 
the valley areas and shifting cultivators in 
the mountainside and upland areas. Data 
from research concerning value chains and 
post-conflict recovery (Ringer, 2014) reveal 
that there are innovators and early adopters 
of hybrid maize production within the eth-
nic minority farmers sub-group. While these 
farmers are not currently a large part of the 
country’s highest earning agricultural produ-
cers, they could have high earning potential 
once the upland cropping areas are devel-
oped, and significant production potential 
due to the size of Shan State and the other 
mountainous regions. However, using the in-
novation definitions of Rogers (2003), these 
farmers would be considered laggards com-
pared with farmers countrywide. Hybrid 
maize yields are quite low (e.g. 3 tonnes per 
hectare [t/ha]) compared with those of re-
source-rich farmers (e.g. 7–8 t/ha) who were 
not affected by conflict (Ringer, 2014).
There are many reasons for these differ-
ences. The following is a description of 
some of the main barriers these farmers face 
due to armed conflict.
Loss of animals and planting material
One factor affecting the post-conflict envir-
onment is that Burmese farmers have greatly 
diminished livestock and seeds with which 
to rebuild their production capacity. With-
out their traditional seeds and livestock, 
marginalized farmers have lost an important 
resource that they have preserved for hun-
dreds of years. This phenomenon is com-
mon in post-conflict settings, and develop-
ment practitioners have recognized that 
farmers recovering from armed conflict often 
need seed for replanting (Christoplos et al., 
2006). Any development approach needs to 
take into consideration the supply of live-
stock and seeds, but this assistance needs to 
be carefully considered as the wrong seed 
may be provided and at the wrong time.
Loss of markets
Markets in northern Shan State are not 
stable because of the ebb and flow of con-
flict. The potential for warfare to erupt at 
any moment causes farmers and farmers’ 
groups to pause when considering how to 
re-engage markets after conflict has subsided 
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in their area. As a result, most farmers com-
plain of the lack of sustained and reliable 
markets for their goods (Ringer, 2014). Conflict- 
affected farmers in northern Shan State 
commonly have limited knowledge of cur-
rent market rates. They are also hampered 
by limited buyers and have to accept low 
prices because of the trader’s risk in coming 
into armed conflict zones. The traders then 
reduce prices to compensate themselves for 
the high chance of losing both transport ve-
hicles and purchased products. These agri-
cultural traders could be described as ‘ conflict 
entrepreneurs’ (Eide, 1997).
Land and employment controlled by  
agribusiness, government military  
or insurgent militias
The actions of influential individuals 
within the foreign and local business com-
munity, insurgent militias and the Burmese 
military can also be seen as the actions of 
conflict entrepreneurs (Eide, 1997). Conflict 
entrepreneurs take advantage of armed con-
flicts to enrich themselves through force or 
influential relationships with powerful in-
dividuals.
The Myanmar military used a strategy 
of pacifying areas by removing villagers 
from remote regions controlled by armed 
insurgent groups and resettling them in vil-
lages near the main roads (Ferguson, 2014; 
Henley, 2014), thus reducing support for 
the insurgent groups. However, these paci-
fication programs also impacted the ability 
of resettled villagers to conduct agricultural 
activities and produce food and export 
crops, and gave their lands over to military 
control.
Another military strategy for the pacifi-
cation of conflict areas was through encour-
aging government soldiers to marry local 
women. Soldiers who complied would re-
ceive a parcel of land, and whole villages 
were formed to control territory with loyal 
soldiers (Pick and Thein, 2010). While not 
completely successful in all areas, the gov-
ernment has gained control of strategic 
lands including the main export route to 
China and to Thailand, which is vital for 
continued agricultural development.
Land confiscation is still a leading cause of 
conflict and protest countrywide (ALTSEAN, 
2014). Several key laws make land confisca-
tion a legal method of appropriating land for 
military, business and government use 
(ALTSEAN, 2014). Because farmers have 
been dispossessed due to forced migration 
and village removal from insurgent areas, 
they have lost access to their traditional 
lands. These lands provided the resources 
needed to sustain their families and provide 
sufficient food security (Than, 2005). Henley 
(2014) noted that there have been attempts 
to start large-scale land retitling, but the gov-
ernment did not have the capacity to imple-
ment the program effectively.
Conflict effects on food security  
and food aid
Food security through increased food pro-
duction is vitally important for Myanmar’s 
expanding population. Cho (2013) suggests 
that it will require 20 million tonnes of rice 
a year to feed Myanmar’s people. To meet 
this demand plus targets for rice exports 
will require a major expansion of produc-
tion and the rice-growing area (Cho, 2013). 
Although Myanmar has achieved national 
self-sufficiency in rice, there is still roughly 
65% of the population that has inadequate 
food intake for 2 months of the year ( Haggblade 
et al., 2014).
Food security has been a concern of the 
government, and the situation was made 
worse by low food production in conflict 
areas. Due to decreases in the country’s pro-
ductive capacity as a result of conflict, food 
aid continues to be important in Myanmar, 
especially in conflict zones. Food aid is 
needed mainly for internally displaced per-
sons (IDPs) due to armed conflict (UNCTAD, 
2011; USAID, 2015a). As an example, USAID 
provided significant food aid during 2015 to 
alleviate food scarcity among IDPs in Shan 
State and Kachin State (USAID, 2015a). 
However, this is becoming less necessary as 
the national agricultural system begins to 
become more food-resilient (Byerlee et al., 
2014).
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Conflict effects on agricultural extension, 
research and education
Agricultural extension
Agricultural extension has a long history 
in Myanmar (Burma), stretching back to the 
early 1920s (Cho, 2013). Extension has long 
been underfunded, particularly in regions 
far from the capital, where most of the armed 
conflict occurred (Robertson and Olson, 
2012). The World Bank’s Training and Visit 
(T&V) system was proposed and imple-
mented, but never developed beyond the ini-
tial pilot projects (Cho, 2013). During the 
transition to a socialist political system, the 
extension system de-emphasized inter-
actions with farmers and exerted most effort 
in collecting agricultural data for reports to 
the Ministry for central planning (Cho, 2013).
Agricultural extension suffered in 
many ways due to conflict. One direct effect 
of conflict was the dual reporting nature of 
district extension officers. These officers 
had to report to their superiors within the 
Ministry of Agriculture and to the District 
Government Military Commander (Cho, 
2013). Effectively this meant that the Exten-
sion Director for the district had to convince 
the military commander of the value of ex-
tension activities in order to receive work 
approvals. Military commanders were ro-
tated out of the district every 3 years, so the 
value of extension at the district level was 
undermined (Cho, 2013).
Agricultural research
A number of research institutes have been 
developed by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
These research sites provided information 
on the main crops produced but were gener-
ally underfunded (Cho, 2013). Increasing re-
search capacity is a major focus of current 
government efforts to develop Myanmar’s 
agriculture (Win, 2013; Byerlee et al., 2014). 
These efforts include research sites in conflict- 
affected areas in Shan State (Cho, 2013).
Agricultural universities and institutes
The military government often clashed with 
university students (Hedlund and Daw, 2008), 
and in the 1980s saw the universities as 
sources of resistance and protest against the 
government. As a result, many academic 
years of the university system were sus-
pended. Higher education institutions were 
closed during periods of civil unrest, includ-
ing 2 years after student protests in 1988, 
3  years after student strikes in 1996 and 
1998, and in Yangon from 1988 to 2000 for a 
period of 10 years (Lall, 2008: 132). This was 
a heavy blow to the training of qualified agri-
cultural extension staff. This university 
backlog and the lack of skilled agricultural-
ists have meant that the development of 
more efficient, market-oriented agriculture 
has been hampered by a dearth of trained 
personnel (Cho, 2013). A clear result of the 
armed conflict throughout the country, this 
situation is now slowly being rectified.
Conflict-Related Displacement  
of Peoples
Movement to safe areas and neighboring 
countries
The trauma of armed conflict often means 
that farmers lose the desire to rebuild in 
their previous location. Canavati et  al. 
(2011) estimated that up to 2  million mi-
grants moved to Thailand from Myanmar to 
escape fighting. Migration to neighboring 
countries is fraught with difficulties for 
young men and women, but despite the 
danger and exploitation that occurs it is 
seen as bearable compared with remaining 
in northern Shan State, where the future is 
not bright for young adults. The loss of the 
youth and young adults (aged 16–30) for the 
community, and the risks involved in mov-
ing, are described by the corrosive commu-
nity reaction theory of Freudenberg and 
Jones (1991), where social capital is lost 
after a shock to the community. Out-migra-
tion increases financial and personal risk 
for farm families that stay in northern Shan 
State (Bryceson, 2000).
This out-migration is not promising for 
further development because the younger 
generation are a key group for helping to 
develop agriculture. While the agricultural 
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opportunities in neighboring countries 
such as Thailand, China and Malaysia offer 
positive on-the-job training opportunities 
for these young people, the benefit will be 
realized in Myanmar only if they return 
home. Research indicates that the situation 
is not yet positive enough for young people 
to want to return to the post-conflict areas 
of Myanmar (Bacchin, 2012; Ringer, 2014).
Conflict and Community Resilience
Innovation and resilience
Because of poor extension services and the 
lack of trust in government information 
sources, local input dealers became the 
de facto opinion leaders concerning agri-
cultural innovation in many conflict areas 
of Myanmar (Rogers, 2003; Borgatti, 2006). 
At the same time, marginalized farmers be-
came more cosmopolitan and actively 
sought out agricultural information, leading 
to increased opportunities for extension act-
ors to work with them as they became more 
open to new ideas (Rogers, 2003). There are 
also indications that opinion leaders within 
conflict-affected communities are becoming 
more innovative and resilient as armed con-
flict becomes more common in their areas 
(Ringer, 2014). For example, some farmers 
are trying to grow new crops to respond to 
market demand from China.
Reliance on familial networks
Farm families rely on family members to 
mitigate the effects of conflict in ways that 
farmers in non-conflict areas do not. This 
can be described as reliance upon familial 
networks to provide early warning if vio-
lence is likely to occur and/or to negotiate 
for their village and fields being bypassed 
by warring groups. This use of family 
members in key places within society ties 
in with key player theory (Borgatti, 2006). 
These key family members act as import-
ant nodes of information and play the role 
of opinion leaders in Rogers’ diffusion of 
innovations theory (2003). Conflict man-
agement by family members using smooth-
ing and compromising approaches (Hamad, 
2005) is commonly seen among ethnic mi-
nority farmers affected by conflict (Ringer, 
2014). Smoothing and compromising ap-
proaches are used by less powerful groups 
with more powerful groups that empha-
size commonalities and minimize or sup-
press group differences (Hamad, 2005; 
 Mohammed and Karami, 2007). Although 
conflict  management theory describes sev-
eral approaches, including forceful ones, 
the only approaches seen among these mar-
ginalized farmers in post-conflict zones 
were smoothing and compromising. This is 
due to their weak position compared with 
other, more powerful members of society.
Post-Conflict Contextual Factors
Positives
Transition from acute- to chronic-focused 
agricultural development
The Ministry of Agriculture has been tasked 
with alleviating food insecurity throughout 
the country and is also closely coordinating 
the activities of international and local 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
which are predominantly focusing on im-
proving food security within the areas that 
have experienced armed conflict (Joliffe, 
2014; Ringer, 2014).
Indeed, progress has been made. As 
Myanmar has developed its agricultural pro-
duction and more conflict areas remain 
peaceful, there has been less need for acute 
food aid. Domestic and international NGOs 
(INGOs) helping farmers affected by conflict 
are shifting from acute emergency relief to 
working to solve chronic agricultural devel-
opment issues. The transition from acute to 
chronic aid assistance has been demon-
strated through the World Food Programme’s 
transition from providing food aid to help-
ing rebuild productive capacity. Similarly, 
the Myanmar extension service under the 
Department of Agriculture (DOA) has encour-
aged a quick transition to farming livelihood 
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assistance. One exception to this was Cyc-
lone Nargis, which had a major impact on 
the Irrawaddy Delta rice-producing areas in 
2008 (World Concern, 2013). Acute food aid 
was required while food supplies and pro-
duction were re-established.
In this shift it is important to offer farm-
ers ‘opportunity ladders’ (Christoplos and 
Farrington, 2004: 29). These are proactive 
attempts by agricultural development work-
ers and agricultural extension staff to de-
velop methods for farmers to engage in their 
own development quickly so they are less 
dependent upon foreign assistance.
Shift from agricultural deficiencies to surplus
Myanmar has focused on the effort to return 
once again to being a major rice exporter. The 
gains made in recent years are important and 
are now evident in the changes that have been 
made to reposition the agricultural extension 
service to better meet the rice production 
goals in the delta region (Cho, 2013). There is 
strong potential for growth in agricultural 
products. It is Myanmar government policy to 
see Myanmar once again as the rice bowl of 
Asia, and this has been the focus of many de-
velopment efforts. Several of the larger agri-
business interests in the region see Myanmar, 
and Shan State in particular, as one of the last 
large areas of arable, fertile agricultural land 
available for development in Asia (Bert Hicks, 
Winrock International, Yangon, 2013, per-
sonal communication). However, rice produc-
tion and agricultural production are still low 
compared with that of neighboring countries 
(Haggblade et al., 2014).
Kudo et al. (2013) noted that the Myan-
mar government has prioritized agricul-
tural growth. Currently agricultural pro-
duction is 36% of gross domestic product 
(GDP), employs a majority of the labor 
force and as of 2010 generated 30% of total 
exports. On 19 June 2012 President U 
Thein Sein stated that Myanmar was enter-
ing the second phase of reform strategy. 
This effort by the government is part of 
four economic policies, the first of which is 
‘sustaining agricultural development to-
wards industrialization and all- around de-
velopment’ (Kudo et al., 2013: 1). Myanmar 
has 12,441,000 ha of agricultural land (of a 
total area of 67,659,000 ha), and a popula-
tion of 48  million people, so there is a 
major need to increase land productivity 
and improve labor efficiency. The current 
average paddy rice yield is 4.12 t/ha, which 
could be improved. There are 8 million ha 
of rice paddy, in both conflict zones and 
non-conflict zones, although yields in the 
conflict zones need the most improvement 
(Kudo et al., 2013).
Large trading partners in China and India
Myanmar has natural geographic advantages 
for expanding agricultural production and 
trade. The country is well placed as the 
western outlet in China’s strategic plan to 
gain access to a reliable port on the India 
Ocean (Asia Society, 2010; Thuzar, 2013). 
Recent events have shown relentless growth 
in this area. The overland routes to India are 
not as developed as for China (Myint-U, 
2011), but Myanmar’s exports of agricultural 
products to India are large and growing.
Other areas of growth are in the expan-
sion of other Asian multinational agribusi-
nesses into Myanmar as a market to develop 
a production base for exporting into Asia. 
Some examples include the Thai multi-
national Charoen Pokphand Group (CP) and 
other, smaller Thai companies. Malaysian 
and Vietnamese companies also have grow-
ing interests in developing Myanmar’s vast 
agricultural potential. For example, there 
has been a surge in maize growing due to 
demand for animal feed and regional mar-
kets (Haggblade et al., 2014).
External demands and price increases
A positive for Myanmar farmers is the con-
tinued and growing demand for agricultural 
exports to China. This pull of the Chinese 
markets for agricultural products is felt not 
only in the post-conflict regions of Myan-
mar, near the border with China, but also in 
the dry zone, where demand for goat meat, 
melons, coffee, maize and soybeans means 
there is always a ready buyer. This does not 
guarantee high prices but it does provide 
farmers a consistent buyer of some kind. 
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The ongoing demand from Chinese markets, 
coupled with the development of transport 
and information thoroughfares, will make 
Myanmar’s agricultural products more ac-
cessible for the Chinese markets, with lower 
transportation costs. This will eventually 
increase prices received by farmers. How-
ever, there are indications that marginal-
ized population segments are being bypassed 
in order for this development to occur, and 
efforts to ensure more equitable benefits 




In the post-conflict areas of Myanmar there 
is a continued threat of renewed conflict 
(Ferguson, 2014). The Rohingya issue in 
Myanmar continues to grow as a conflict be-
tween ethnic Burmese, people in Rakhine 
and the Rohingya. These tensions pose a 
problem for stability in Rakhine State. Pol-
icies by the Myanmar government intended 
to stem the tide of perceived loss of ethnic 
Burmese/Rakhine land to the Rohingya 
have exacerbated and prolonged the con-
flict (Leavitt, 2007). These issues and in-
stances of violence continue to cause farm-
ers to flee their villages into IDP camps 
(USAID, 2015a) and set back agricultural 
development (Xinhua News Agency, 2013).
Large areas and population segments still 
under insurgent control
The patchwork nature of the post-conflict 
environment in Myanmar means that many 
areas and population segments are under 
insurgent militia control (AsiaPacific Uni-
versity, 2005; Joliffe, 2014). This may be so 
for the foreseeable future. There is a real 
possibility that armed conflict could break 
out again as the Myanmar government at-
tempts to assert control over the militia 
areas (Bacchin, 2012). This lack of control 
means that many areas and population seg-
ments do not receive any agricultural assist-
ance from the government. Instead, some 
NGOs are allowed access to provide infor-
mation about food aid but little else. Other-
wise, the only agricultural technical assist-
ance they receive is from fertilizer or seed 
dealers who have reached agreements with 
the insurgent militias’ ruling groups (Ringer, 
2014). The impact of these services is not 
likely to provide much support to conflict- 
affected farmers, however.
Internally displaced persons
Many of the issues with IDPs from the larger 
conflict period persist today. There are still 
many IDPs in Myanmar at the edges of the 
rebel-controlled areas. USAID estimates that 
there are at least 230,000 IDPs currently in 
camps in Rakhine, Shan and Kachin States 
(USAID, 2015a, 2015b), and these IDP camps 
are filled with marginalized ethnic minority 
farmers. For IDPs, the decision to return 
is often filled with anxiety (Kedir, 2011; 
Bacchin, 2012). The alternative choice for 
farmers is to move to the regional towns that 
are controlled by the Myanmar government 
(Ibiblio, 2010). One interesting finding is that 
IDPs were more likely to return to their 
village and resume farming if they had par-
ticipated in the early stages of an agricultural 
extension intervention—such as a Farmer 
Field School—either before or during their 
presence in the IDP camp (Ringer, 2014).
Citizen protests against land displacement  
by agribusiness companies
Land appropriation has occurred over dec-
ades (Henley, 2014: 4): (i) by the Myanmar 
military government for military purposes; 
and (ii) by the government for investment 
purposes. The main groups that benefit 
from this are Burmese agribusiness firms 
and foreign companies (TNI, 2013; Henley, 
2014). Marginalized farmers in northern 
Shan State have a growing sense that they 
have been pushed away from agricultural 
land that they believe belongs to them 
(Henley, 2014; Ringer, 2014). This issue will 
likely grow in importance as the Myanmar 
government encourages foreign agricultural 
investment. Landlessness is estimated at 
25–30% in the rural countryside, with most 
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of the landless poor employed as agricul-
tural laborers (Haggblade et al., 2014; Henley, 
2014). As marginalized farmers take part in 
off-farm labor, it will become more import-
ant for the agricultural extension service to 
provide training and skills development in 
worker safety and equitable wages.
Post-Conflict Extension Strategies  
and Actions
The slowing of conflict and the opening up 
of the country has meant there is a large em-
phasis upon developing agriculture. This 
has led to a range of extension activities and 
approaches in post-conflict Myanmar.
Public extension
Myanmar agricultural extension system efforts
The DOA is the government agency respon-
sible for providing agricultural extension 
services to Burmese farmers (Cho, 2013). 
There are two objectives of an effective, 
comprehensive agricultural extension sys-
tem: (i) maintaining national food security 
through technology transfer (mainly for 
staple crops) and training farmers to use 
sustainable natural resource management 
practices; and (ii) improving rural liveli-
hoods through teaching farmers to diversify 
farming systems to increase incomes and or-
ganizing farmers into producer and commu-
nity groups (Swanson and Rajalahti, 2010; 
Swanson, 2011). This is an appropriate lens 
through which to view the Myanmar Agri-
cultural Extension System.
The Myanmar Agricultural Extension 
System has focused closely on maintaining 
and improving national food security. The 
increase in domestic production of rice, 
maize, and legumes such as chickpeas indi-
cates that the technology transfer compo-
nent, at least in non-conflict zones, has been 
a success. However, most sources indicate 
that natural resource management more gen-
erally has suffered in both conflict-affected 
areas and non-conflict zones (Robertson and 
Olson, 2012). This gap is evident not only in 
agricultural production but also in forestry 
management (Ringer, 2014).
Improving rural livelihoods has also 
been a priority. The efforts by the Myanmar 
Ministry of Agriculture to diversify farming 
production and add value along agricultural 
value chains have been slow to progress but 
are showing signs of increasing (Cho, 2013). 
Conflict narrows the options for smallholder 
farmers because only low-risk crops can be 
grown and many other barriers to profitable 
production exist (Ringer, 2014). For example, 
marginalized farmers’ transition to growing 
hybrid maize provides the quickest route for 
cash income, but farmers in post-conflict 
areas struggle with access to these inputs and 
the costs associated with increased purchase 
and application of agrochemicals for opti-
mum growth. Maize production has been 
growing throughout the conflict areas, but 
production is still below regional production 
levels (Byerlee et al., 2014).
Only as the conflict-affected zones sta-
bilize will diversification of agricultural pro-
duction be able to improve farm livelihoods. 
The organization of farmers into producer 
and community groups has been taking 
place steadily over the past 10  years. The 
Farmer Field School methodology has 
helped encourage the growth of these groups 
and provided a form of grassroots organ-
ization that was palatable to the previous 
military- led government (Morris, 2009; Cho, 
2013; Mai, 2014). Progress has been slow, 
but over the past 3 years there have been 
promising signs in rural livelihood growth, 
especially with the involvement of NGOs.
Reassignment of extensionists from upland 
areas to rice-producing areas
Recently there has been a reassignment 
(termed retrenchment) of agricultural exten-
sion staff members in order to focus on rice 
production in the delta and the dry zone 
(Cho, 2013; Ringer, 2014). This retrench-
ment meant that fewer extension personnel 
were available to assist marginalized farm-
ers in the conflict-affected areas.
Retrenchment was part of the Selective 
Concentrative Strategy promoted by the 
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government to focus development on critical 
areas in agriculture (Cho and Boland, 2003; 
Cho, 2013). This strategy of retrenchment and 
refocusing extension field staff has been ef-
fective in enabling Myanmar to develop rice 
production and become a significant exporter 
of rice, even though it also removed extension 
officers from conflict-affected areas in Shan 
State and Kachin State. It has also been suc-
cessful in developing key areas along the agri-
cultural production value chain.
However, the strategy has also been 
criticized for failing to develop other, more 
conflict-affected regions in Myanmar. There 
remains a crucial need for agricultural cap-
acity to be rebuilt in the conflict areas in 
order to continue national agricultural de-
velopment, although there are signs that 
this is beginning to happen (Cho, 2013).
Government efforts to engage agribusinesses 
in conflict areas with profit potential
The government’s larger objective to in-
crease agricultural production includes the 
expansion of agricultural opportunities for 
larger companies (Thuzar, 2013). To benefit 
from the agricultural potential of conflict 
areas, the Myanmar government is encour-
aging domestic and international agribusi-
nesses to conduct business in conflict areas 
where there is moderate to intermittent sta-
bility. The Ministry of Agriculture and/or 
local agricultural/government officials pro-
vide opportunities for these companies to 
purchase land and import/export permits, 
and to conduct business, while the compan-
ies take on the risk of conducting business in 
a conflict area. This also saves government 
extension staff from needing to provide as-
sistance to either the contract farmers or the 
businesses. If armed insurgent groups attack 
one of these businesses, then the only loss is 
to the business itself (Ringer, 2014).
This strategy of encouraging foreign in-
vestment (Cho, 2013) has been successful 
from the government’s perspective because 
private businesses have encouraged the de-
velopment of infrastructure and provided 
opportunities for employment. The influx 
of businesses willing to take the risk of 
armed conflict and bear the taxes imposed 
by militia groups also has slowly changed 
the reality on the ground for the government. 
If it can maintain enough stability through 
truces and ceasefires with the armed insur-
gent groups, then agribusiness activities can 
continue with little cost to the government.
Drug eradication and opium-substitution 
programs
During the conflict, and especially over the 
past 3 years, there has been a return to opium 
production (Thuzar, 2013). The growth of 
high-value illegal crops is a common resili-
ence strategy in conflict and post-conflict 
countries.
Crop-substitution efforts have been in 
place for years, with mixed results (UNODC, 
2011). Some of the most important agricul-
tural extension activities in conflict and 
post-conflict areas occurred under the many 
crop-substitution programs funded by the 
USA and implemented by the Burmese 
military. For example, during the period of 
military rule, the USA partnered with the 
Burmese military government to eradicate 
opium production in the mountainous areas 
of Shan State and Kachin State, despite the 
ongoing US trade embargo. The Myanmar 
Agricultural Extension Service has also fo-
cused on crop substitution in recent years.
However, it is not known yet what im-
pacts the government’s agricultural exten-
sion service can have on this segment of the 
farming population over the coming years. 
Fuller and Moe (2015) reported that opium 
production has continued among many 
smallholder farmers in conflict areas con-
trolled by the militias. Ringer (2014) noted 
that many smallholder farmers will begin 
producing crops other than opium only if 
the economic return remains high and con-
flict is avoided.
NGO extension
NGO and donor community involvement
The Myanmar government has also followed 
a strategy of allowing NGOs and INGOs 
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(such as the UNDP, World Food Programme 
and World Vision) to engage farmer groups 
in relatively stable areas. This allows the 
government and the Ministry of Agriculture 
to have an influence over programming in 
areas where their extension staff are not wel-
come. Several local NGOs are based in the 
main business city of Yangon and are affili-
ated with one specific ethnic group. These 
local NGOs have inroads as ‘third party me-
diators/providers’ of extension services. 
This serves the purposes both of the armed 
insurgent groups that allow them to operate 
and of the Myanmar government, which 
does not have to risk its staff or expend re-
sources (Ghosh, 2009).
The issue of ‘donor shopping’, where 
government officials have limited capacity to 
absorb donor funding, is a concern (Rieffel 
and Fox, 2013). There are many NGOs rush-
ing into Myanmar, as in some other post- 
conflict countries such as South Sudan. This 
probably will result in many disjointed ef-
forts, which will not lead to building a strong 
agricultural extension system (Goodhand, 
2006). Many different NGOs working with-
out coordination is a concern of both the 
INGO community and the Myanmar govern-
ment (Saha, 2011).
To avoid potential issues, donors 
should slow down and conduct more joint 
operations. Efforts have been made to work 
in partnerships and to conduct joint moni-
toring and evaluation efforts. An example 
of this is the Food Security Working Group, 
a voluntary organization of local NGOs and 
INGOs that has helped provide joint learn-
ing and capacity building for NGO staff 
members. This organization and others 
like it have helped with coordination of ac-
tivities, specifically in the dry zone. The 
potential for the Myanmar Agricultural Ex-
tension Service to step into the coordinat-
ing role is strong.
Working groups and impact area coordination
In Myanmar there are strong interactions 
between the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
INGOs providing Overseas Direct Assistance 
(ODA) in agricultural development. There 
are two main ways in which the Ministry of 
Agriculture has worked with INGOs and 
local NGOs to coordinate NGO activity:
 1. Having working groups centered around 
important themes of the government’s na-
tional agricultural development plan. The 
benefit of these groups is that they allow 
NGOs to jointly develop training material 
and programs, share experiences and best 
practices and interact with the Ministry of 
Agriculture in a coherent manner.
 2. Coordinating impact area approaches 
that are in line with the Ministry of Agricul-
ture’s plan for a grouping of five to ten dis-
tricts. One NGO is designated the lead NGO 
which reports to the division’s (similar to a 
province) Ministry of Agriculture director. 
This means that programs are closely coord-
inated and meet Ministry of Agriculture 
goals (Cho, 2013). This impact area coordin-
ation is likely a carry-over from the time of 
the military leadership during which all 
NGOs were under close government scru-
tiny. This is now beginning to change since 
a new law liberalizing NGO activity in the 
country was passed in 2014. At the same 
time, NGOs do see the benefit of the impact 
area coordination effort and largely comply.
Accountability of NGOs
A concern often expressed in conflict areas, 
and in agricultural development in gen-
eral, is the lack of NGO accountability to 
the national government, and the govern-
ment extension service in particular. This 
is seen as undercutting the efforts of the 
government extension service. One major 
difference in Myanmar compared with 
other countries newly emerging from con-
flict is that the central government has re-
tained control over the national agricul-
tural structure in spite of major political 
turmoil. It was also a centrally planned 
economy in which control over every as-
pect of agricultural production was seen as 
a government prerogative. INGO approvals 
to work in agricultural development and 
extension were tedious and slow (Local 
Resource Centre, 2012). The government 
carefully controlled NGOs’ development 
activities, and INGOs were accountable to 
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the government; if they were not, they 
would lose the right to work in the country.
This is due in part to Myanmar’s history 
as a socialist, centrally planned country 
without space for a civil society free from 
centrally planned government control. How-
ever, local NGOs have played an important 
part in Myanmar by delivering agricultural 
advisory services to minority ethnic com-
munities that the government was unable or 
unwilling to reach (MacGinty and Richmond, 
2013). This area will grow as the restrictions 
on local NGO activity are removed follow-
ing the recent opening up and elections, 
which is the preference of staff members in 
the NGOs and the farmers they serve.
A growing and vibrant civil society is 
important for peace-building, and therefore 
the growth of civil society in Myanmar is an 
encouraging sign that a durable peace can 
be obtained (Christoplos, 2010; Clapp, 
2015). In a country like Myanmar, expand-
ing civil society with multiple actors leads 
to more voices being heard in agriculture, 
including those traditionally underserved 
by governmental agriculture services.
Technical expertise of NGOs
One concern of agricultural extension the-
orists and practitioners is whether NGOs 
and INGOs that provide agricultural advis-
ory services through their activities have 
the technical agricultural expertise relevant 
to the Burmese context that is necessary to 
provide quality services (Fowler, 2000). If 
so, there is the potential for NGOs lacking 
technical capacity to crowd out actors who 
might be more effective. This is a legitimate 
concern, but the indications are that INGOs 
often access technical capacity through hir-
ing retired Burmese agricultural professors, 
who are some of the most experienced tech-
nical agricultural staff in the country, ex-
panding the available technical agricultural 
capacity for extension stakeholders. The se-
cond way in which technical expertise is 
provided is by hiring private consultants to 
provide technical backstopping for projects. 
A third way is through joint staff and per-
sonnel development via working group co-
ordination, which often involves study 
tours throughout South-east Asia or in the 
West. Without this NGO activity, the quality 




The private and semi-private consulting 
groups active in Myanmar consist mainly of 
professors and development experts who 
predominantly are retired and have spent 
time in the Ministry of Agriculture or have 
worked for INGOs. Some of these individ-
uals built up their technical expertise while 
working for the Food and Agriculture Organ-
ization of the United Nations (FAO), the 
United Nations and the World Bank during 
the time of the military dictatorship. These 
consulting groups have provided valuable 
inputs to numerous NGO and INGO activ-
ities and to farmers. The tendency for these 
retired professors to move in and out of NGO 
jobs while maintaining close connections to 
the Ministry of Agriculture means there is 
considerable sharing of expertise and coord-
ination through informal channels. Salaries 
for NGOs are much higher than for govern-
ment agricultural extension positions, 
which does draw many exceptional persons 
from the government agricultural service 
into the NGO arena. At the same time, the 
government agricultural service remains at-
tractive because of the permanence of the 
positions, unlike NGO project-based work.
Producer groups and cooperatives
Since opening up the economy to outside 
investment, there has also been the forma-
tion of private and public–private national 
producer groups. Some of these groups 
focus on key commodities, such as the Live-
stock Federation, while others are formed to 
promote agricultural development in gen-
eral. The government still prefers to exer-
cise some form of guidance over these 
groups. Overall, the groups have become 
more active in encouraging new investment 
opportunities in agriculture, providing 
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information for producers and advocating 
for positive changes in policy.
Recommendations and Areas  
for Improvement
Engaging stakeholders
Coordinating agricultural extension activities
Considering the framework of Swanson 
(2011), efforts by the Myanmar government 
to play a coordination role in conflict areas 
can increase the effectiveness of agricul-
tural extension. It is not clear whether the 
government and Ministry of Agriculture 
will embrace the role of coordinator of 
NGOs’ agricultural activities, as have other 
countries (Cho, 2013). This is especially im-
portant given that the Ministry of Agricul-
ture is focusing on the delta and dry zones, 
and relying on NGOs and agribusinesses to 
develop agriculture in conflict zones. Better 
coordination of these actors would allow 
more opportunities for conflict-affected 
smallholder farmers to increase production, 
improve livelihoods and market goods, 
even though they would have to pass 
through the conflict boundary between the 
insurgent militias and the government mili-
tary forces. Improved coordination could 
allow more government agricultural devel-
opment goals to be realized without agricul-
tural extension field staff becoming the tar-
gets of insurgent militia retribution.
Decentralizing extension services
Research has shown that decentralized agri-
cultural extension systems are important for 
integrating farmers from disenfranchised 
communities. Decentralized systems have 
therefore been seen as important in the de-
velopment of countries with histories of 
conflict and with numerous ethnic groups 
(Rogers, 2003). Evans (2004: 31) described 
the importance of the ‘process of deliber-
ation vs. importing outside blue prints’. 
These processes will need to be managed by 
the agricultural extension services and 
closely integrated with NGOs.
In Myanmar there are several instances 
of how decentralization can change the per-
ception of government extension workers. 
For example, livestock officers in Kachin 
State are often given safe passage into Kachin 
Independence Army (KIA) areas because of 
the KIA’s concern for their own livestock, and 
in recognition that these extension workers 
are local rather than national representatives. 
This is an example of the value of decentral-
ized systems and how agricultural extension 
and technical officers can be more welcome 
in insurgent-controlled areas than are other 
government officials, who have been kid-
napped or prevented entry (Joliffe, 2014).
Community ownership of resources
An additional complexity is the need to re-
spect the natural resources that each of the 
ethnic minority groups believe belong to 
them. A clear example of this is the devel-
opment of Mithun cattle by an agribusiness 
in Chin State. This viable and legal business 
was shut down because the agribusiness 
was owned by individuals from the main 
ethnic group (Bhama). Influential members 
of the Chin ethnic group protested to gov-
ernment officials at the regional level and 
forced the closure of the business. The Chin 
saw the Mithun as belonging to them. In 
this case, a viable enterprise was shut down 
because of a sense of minority ownership of 
resources unique to their region. It is pos-
sible that economic ties and agricultural de-
velopment will eventually overcome these 
concerns and ease the political issues at 
stake. Government agricultural extension 
staff could play a role in mediating these 
concerns by balancing the goal of agricul-
tural business development and respect for 
disenfranchised ethnic groups (Myanmar 
Centre for Responsible Business, 2014).
Serving conflict-affected farmers
Identifying key players
In conflict and post-conflict areas, farmers 
should be approached with caution by both 
public and private entities. Potential farmer 
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participants have a high level of distrust to-
wards outsiders attempting to develop new 
projects through the government. Outside 
development agencies have needed to be 
cautious while interacting with marginal-
ized farmers in order to build trust. Some 
farmers are also still involved in illicit 
opium growing (Lintner and Black, 2009; 
Fuller and Moe, 2015). These factors all 
lead to the need to invest in trust-building 
before attempting agricultural activities.
Coordinating with the farmers who are 
key players or opinion leaders is vital in 
stimulating farmer participation in agricul-
tural projects. Key players and/or opinion 
leaders should be identified and engaged in 
the early stages of agricultural program devel-
opment in order to develop local enthusiasm 
and support for program activities. There is 
an effort to develop a more participatory agri-
cultural extension service, and the coordinat-
ing role may become even more important for 
the extension service (Cho, 2013). Many agri-
cultural development projects have noticed 
this reality and have focused on developing 
equitable business ventures that involve the 
leaders among otherwise marginalized farm-
ers (Ringer, 2014).
Targeting farmers’ groups
More emphasis on farmer interest groups 
and training of key farmers could have al-
lowed smallholder farmers and mid-level 
farmers to access the agricultural informa-
tion and resources they needed to progress. 
A common complaint is that there is loss of 
seeds and livestock during times of conflict 
(Ringer, 2014). Having agricultural advisory 
centers in central safe areas, where agricul-
tural extension staff could operate freely, 
would allow key farmers to travel from con-
flict zones, access what they need and then 
return. This would also allow the govern-
ment agricultural advisory services to gather 
agricultural information from insurgent 
militia-controlled areas.
Engaging IDPs in camps
With IDPs continuing to exist in large 
numbers in the conflict-affected zones, it 
is important that NGOs and/or govern-
ment extension staff begin agricultural re-
habilitation planning and training while 
people are still in the camps. Research 
from the Philippines has shown that train-
ing in IDP camps helped with post-conflict 
recovery and reintegration (Ongsiapco 
et  al., 2007). Ringer (2014) gathered data 
from a local NGO that showed farmers 
were more likely to return to villages if 
they had engaged with agricultural skills 
training in the IDP camps using a Farmer 
Field School approach. Similar efforts 
with Burmese IDPs should be expanded.
Addressing gender issues
Gender issues in agriculture and agricul-
tural extension are an important but often 
overlooked part of service delivery in 
post-conflict Myanmar. Traditional Burm-
ese society does not encourage equality be-
tween men and women. However, this has 
been changing as gender awareness has 
been a component of most INGO and local 
NGO training programs (Metta Foundation, 
2012; World Concern, 2013). Cho (2013) 
provided statistics on the government agri-
cultural extension service, which showed 
that 60% of farmer participants are females. 
However, extension field staff are still pre-
dominantly male (Cho, 2013). Armed con-
flict-affected zones could be a factor in this 
tendency towards male extension staff, due 
to the dangers of female extension staff 
being alone in an intermittent conflict area 
and facing the potential for rape and bodily 
harm. Nonetheless, this gender imbalance 
creates social issues that affect the quality 
of services provided to vulnerable female 
farmers.
Dealing with continual conflict
Armed conflict will continue to be an issue 
that must be engaged within Myanmar’s 
 development. As Barron et  al. (2011: 42) 
wrote: ‘The development challenge is not of 
limiting conflict per se but of managing it 
in constructive ways’. Dealing with armed 
conflict in a constructive way will be a diffi-
cult role for the extension service.
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Joliffe (2014) notes several areas of con-
tinued conflict in Myanmar that will serve 
to prohibit national cohesion and develop-
ment. These include issues with insurgent 
militias in the border regions, ethnic divi-
sions that have fueled much of the insur-
gent fighting, and religious divisions be-
tween Buddhists, Muslims and Christians. 
Agricultural extension staff will have to 
navigate these continued sources of soci-
etal friction. This will require attention to 
conflict-sensitive agricultural strategies and 
extension approaches that encourage equal 
access and participation by all types of farm-
ers in Myanmar, including those affected by 
conflict.
Promoting peace-building and social cohesion
Extension can play a role in peace-building, 
even in a context like Myanmar, where in-
surgent militia groups see government or-
ganizations and the INGOs that work with 
them as agents of the government (Joliffe, 
2014). Efforts to include multiple actors in 
any agricultural extension strategy are es-
sential, so that disadvantaged and disenfran-
chised segments of the population can have 
a say in their own agricultural development. 
Although chaotic at times, the involvement 
of many local NGOs in accessing and pro-
viding agricultural advisory services is a 
good sign of a growing civil society and the 
inclusion of local perspectives (Saha, 2011).
Agricultural extension activities must 
also build in a social cohesion component 
that promotes group interaction, shared 
benefits and reconciliation strategies. When 
coupled with agricultural livelihood ap-
proaches that enhance entire regions, exten-
sion can have peace-building impacts. Fur-
thermore, efforts to build sustainable value 
chains and effective institutions can con-
tribute to stability and longer-term develop-
ment. In these cases, instances of violence 
are less likely to occur.
Utilizing information and communication 
technologies and other extension technologies
Information and communication technolo-
gies (ICTs) are important for the development 
of agriculture in Myanmar. The coverage of 
smartphones has spread rapidly throughout 
rural areas since cell phone deregulation in 
September 2014, increasing the opportun-
ities to use this technology in agricultural 
extension activities. ICTs have also been in-
cluded in the USAID Value Chains for Rural 
Development Project, which has recently 
been funded and initiated in southern Shan 
State. This is especially important because 
agricultural information can be gathered 
and provided between safe zones and armed 
conflict zones without safety and security 
concerns. This is of course dependent on 
cell phone coverage, but, with recent gov-
ernment acceptance of liberalized cell 
phone access, ICTs have become a vital tool 
for the government extension service.
There is also an important role for gov-
ernment agricultural extension to provide 
simple, low-tech and appropriate technolo-
gies that fill the gap between hand tools and 
full mechanization. Examples include 
treadle pumps and simple weeding tools for 
upland rice and paddy rice cultivation. 
These types of technology could be serviced 
through a centralized town where the gov-
ernment can maintain stability, and also 
made available at a low cost to smallholder 
farmers.
Developing appropriate agriculture  
and extension-related policy
The worldwide trend towards a more plural-
istic, participatory and demand-driven agri-
cultural extension service is a positive devel-
opment for marginalized farmers (Swanson 
and Rajalahti, 2010), including those in 
post-conflict areas of Myanmar. However, 
these trends must be accompanied by agri-
cultural policy that is designed to develop a 
conflict-resilient agricultural extension sys-
tem. For example, Bryceson (2000) recom-
mended policies that develop the human 
capital of post-conflict farmers through pro-
grams that: (i) improve productivity using 
appropriate and inexpensive means; (ii) in-
clude participatory market assessments; and 
(iii) ‘provide services that help marginalized 
farmers capitalize on their comparative mar-
ket advantages’ (p. 12).
 Agricultural Extension in Post-Conflict Myanmar (Burma) 131
It is recommended that Myanmar’s 
agricultural extension policy makers ser-
iously consider the focus on agricultural 
innovation systems as a paradigm for de-
veloping agriculture in Myanmar, both in 
general and specifically in post-conflict 
areas. Agricultural innovation systems are 
‘networks of organizations, enterprises and 
individuals focused on bringing new prod-
ucts, new processes and new forms of or-
ganization into economic use, together 
with the institutions and policies that af-
fect their behavior and performance’ (Davis 
and Heemskerk, 2012; World Bank, 2012: 2). 
These systems provide more flexibility in 
order to meet the needs of industrial agri-
culture and agribusiness, along with pro-
viding appropriate networks for marginal-
ized resource-poor farmers who have 
experienced conflict (Requier-Desjardins, 
2013). Table 7.1 shows agricultural innovation 
systems policies applied to post-conflict 
agricultural extension.
The Myanmar Agricultural Extension 
Service will continue to have to deal with 
armed conflict situations. It is vital that policy 
makers and administrators recognize the im-
pact of appropriate policy in empowering 
the extension service to help farmers move 
beyond production constraints within their 
farming systems.
Conclusions and Lessons Learned
Although Myanmar is a unique post- conflict 
country in many ways, important lessons 
that apply to other situations can be found, 
especially for countries suffering from the 
realities of intermittent conflict.
Agricultural capacity needs to be rebuilt 
in a manner that focuses on the main areas of 
social friction that caused the conflict in the 
first place. This speaks to the important 
role of coordination and equity in agricul-
tural extension. To develop the capacity for 
Table 7.1. Agricultural innovation systems policies applied to post-conflict agricultural extension. Adapted 
from Davis and Heemskerk (2012): 188.
Policy issues Application to post-conflict agricultural extension
Proceed with extension 
reform without relying on 
a single grand model
The Selective Concentration Strategy may not fit for intermittent conflict 
areas, so design several models that are appropriate to each state or 
province
Move towards pluralism Allow multiple actors in the advisory services, including organizations that 
can bridge divides between the government and militia groups
Increase downward 
accountability
Include key farmers from farmer interest groups from villages in the 
conflict zones or insurgent militia zones to take part in participatory 
monitoring and evaluating activities and extension advisory councils
Create an effective and 
efficient market for 
service providers
Develop centralized locations for information-sharing in safe areas
Face the need for human 
capacity development
Increase use of Farmer Field Schools and other less costly extension 
training methods
Move away from projects to 
programs
Explore feasibility in post-conflict situations because of the influx of aid, 
and improve coordination so that international NGOs contribute to the 
overall government agricultural extension effort
Focus on institutions Identify viable institutions with a focus on plurality, and encourage 
government extension staff to interact at a distance because of political 
considerations
Move from standard 
packages to tailored 
services
Tailor services by working more with farmers’ groups and farmer group 
leaders, and support this by training field extension staff
Address equity issues Find ways to include different ethnic groups in the development of local 
extension strategies to avoid government extension staff being excluded 
from playing a role in intermittent conflict areas
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a coordination role, it is important that field- 
level agricultural extension units are set up 
as learning organizations. Each conflict area 
requires a different approach, so it is vital 
that agricultural extension program leaders 
encourage an atmosphere of identifying road-
blocks and areas of weakness, and adapt to 
changing realities on the ground. Most gov-
ernment agencies lack the ability to adapt to 
fluid, intermittent conflict situations.
Equity is also important. Agricultural ex-
tension services must be implemented that 
serve all segments of populations, including 
different ethnic groups, women, youth and 
other vulnerable peoples. These activities 
need to be carefully developed to avoid caus-
ing marginalized resource-poor farmers to be-
come more vulnerable and impoverished. 
Perceptions of bias can also exacerbate con-
flict and lead to further divisions. Myanmar 
has many examples of this occurring.
Another approach could be to loosen 
control of agricultural advisory activity to 
allow for a diversity of practice and struc-
ture within an overall structure and theme 
of progress and development. This would 
create a pluralistic system where different 
extension providers filled different roles. In 
Myanmar, NGOs and agribusinesses can 
work in conflict areas where government 
extension workers are unable to function. 
Similar strategies might be applicable in 
other post-conflict settings.
Overall, though, more research is 
needed on how to most effectively design 
appropriate responses to assist in agricul-
tural recovery after conflict. Extension will 
consistently need to learn from experiences 
in a diverse range of countries to identify 
effective approaches and strategies. The 
Myanmar experience can be one case to-
wards this goal.
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Background to Conflict
Agriculture first began in the eastern branch 
of the Fertile Crescent along the Tigris and 
Euphrates rivers 7000–8000 years ago, giv-
ing nurture to the Babylonian civilization. 
A feudal system of agriculture evolved and 
fed the region for centuries; even into the 
late 1950s ‘Iraq was self-sufficient in agri-
cultural production’ (Tharp, 2009). In 1958, 
however, the Iraqi monarchy was over-
thrown by Abdul Karim Qasim, who under-
took far-reaching land reforms. In 1963, 
fearing communist influence, Western allies 
supported the Ba’athist political party in 
overthrowing Qasim. A progressive leader 
and strongman in the Ba’athist government, 
Saddam Hussein—who eventually consoli-
dated his presidency in 1979—fostered 
sound investments in agricultural infra-
structure, research and extension. The 
country remained 67% self-sufficient in 
food production until the 1970s (Tharp, 
2009), at which time defense investments 
began to take priority. By 2009 Iraq im-
ported 80% of its food.
Iraqi Agricultural Extension and Conflict, 
1980–2002
Investment in agriculture declined sharply 
with the start of the Iran–Iraq War in 1980. 
The conflict ultimately developed into the 
20th century’s longest interstate war, result-
ing in over 1 million civilian and military 
deaths (Iran–Iraq War, n.d.). The increas-
ingly brutal oppression of segments of Iraqi 
society brought trade sanctions in 1994, to 
which the regime responded by placing 
most sectors of the agricultural economy 
under government control. During this 
time, the government provided free or heav-
ily subsidized agricultural inputs, pur-
chased most of the country’s agricultural 
products and even distributed a monthly 
basket of food to every child and adult. 
The  role of agricultural extension was less 
that of farmer education and information 
dissemination, and more that of distribut-
ing farm inputs and managing a heavily 
government-dependent agricultural sector. 
Extension agents were tasked with organizing 
farming communities and implementing 
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Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) strategic pri-
orities throughout the country.
With restricted policies and markets for 
petroleum, coupled with declining agricul-
tural production, deprivation and hunger 
became severe both in Iraqi cities and in the 
countryside. In response, the United Na-
tions mounted an oil-for-food program that 
opened import channels for food and food 
production inputs. While well intended, 
the program eventually became corrupt and 
further complicated an already weakened 
and distorted agricultural sector, with fraud 
permeating agricultural input supply as 
well as output management and utilization.
In the months leading up to the inter-
vention of multinational forces in 2003, the 
Iraqi extension service, as administered by 
the MOA and State Board of Extension Co-
operation, was an agricultural sector man-
agement organization that helped to provide 
agricultural inputs and services to farmers. 
The extension service linked farmers to 
state-owned seed companies, fertilizer im-
port and manufacturing, grain warehouses 
and mills, cotton ginning and oilseed pro-
cessing, cold storage facilities, custom till-
age, transport, slaughterhouses, veterinary 
services, diagnostic laboratories and other 
state-run services. The extension service 
was associated with a structure of farmer co-
operatives that served as a state-run appar-
atus for input supply and production man-
agement. The term agricultural ‘cooperative’ 
was later deleted from the lexicon of some 
international agencies that were attempting 
to assist in rebuilding Iraqi agriculture, be-
cause of the political and socio-economic 
connotation of the term.
A number of international security con-
cerns led a multinational force—including 
the US military—to overthrow the Ba’athist 
regime in a military campaign that began on 
19 March 2003. The Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) undertook all centralized 
government functions and administered 
agriculture through military civil affairs 
units, advised by a joint expatriate civilian–
military agricultural council, which was 
convened monthly in Baghdad (US DoD, 2007). 
The MOA was returned to Iraqi hands on 
5 May 2004 (Downer, 2004). Multinational 
military units continued their assistance to 
Iraqi agricultural authorities at all levels, 
particularly at provincial and local levels, 
and were joined by international organiza-
tions, including the US Department of Agri-
culture (USDA) and the US Agency for Inter-
national Development (USAID). The CPA 
and US agencies sought to return the Iraqi 
economy to a market-oriented approach in 
the hope of improving production efficien-
cies, creating opportunities for international 
trade and reducing centralized control. As 
part of this process, extension agencies and 
personnel no longer held managerial roles 
in the agricultural sector and were faced 
with learning new service roles in technol-
ogy delivery and information dissemination.
Iraqi Extension in the Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Environment, 2003–2014
Overview of international cooperation
Iraqi extension services were peripherally 
involved in many of the agricultural assist-
ance programs that emerged from multi-
national donors and agencies. A series of 
interrelated agricultural development pro-
grams, funded by the US government be-
tween 2003 and 2014, sought increased co-
operation with Iraqi agricultural agencies, 
colleges and universities. Key USAID pro-
grams included: Agricultural Reconstruc-
tion and Development for Iraq (ARDI, 2003–
2008), the Iraq Inma project (2008–2013) 
and the Harmonized Support for Agricul-
tural Development (HSAD) project (2013–
2014). The US Department of Defense (DoD) 
cooperated with USDA to place agricultural-
ists in Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRTs). These, coupled with agricultural 
components of the DoD Task Force for Busi-
ness and Stability Operations (TFBSO), de-
ployed to military forward operating bases 
(FOBs) in combat zones throughout the 
country. The capstone effort by the US gov-
ernment in rebuilding agricultural exten-
sion came with the launch of the USDA Iraq 
Agricultural Extension Revitalization (IAER) 
project, which was led by the Texas A&M 
138 E.C. Price et al. 
University System’s Texas A&M AgriLife 
Extension, in collaboration with extension 
programs at New Mexico State University, 
the University of California at Davis, Utah 
State University and Washington State 
University.
Three phases of extension rehabilita-
tion in Iraq took place in the succession 
of US government-supported agricultural 
programs implemented from 2003 to 2014: 
(i)  technology verification; (ii) needs assess-
ment and planning; and (iii) capacity building 
and information dissemination. The USAID/ 
ARDI program, which began in 2003, fo-
cused on applied research and extension. It 
made inroads in assessing infrastructure, 
building Western relationships with Iraqi 
government and community organizations, 
and testing and introducing improved agri-
cultural technologies (new crop varieties, 
intercropping practices, plastic tunnel 
horticulture, etc.). The program was created 
as a technological and institutional founda-
tion on which to rebuild extension, and 
while a variety of objectives was achieved, 
ARDI can be categorized as a more limited 
‘technology verification platform’. ARDI 
was constrained by insecurity in the coun-
tryside and therefore had limited access to 
farmers and rural areas in the north, central 
and southern regions of Iraq (USAID, 2006). 
Much of its work was carried out in Kurdi-
stan, the autonomous region in the north of 
the country, especially after 2005.
The subsequent TFBSO/Agricultural 
Team—consisting of personnel from DoD, 
USDA and the Texas A&M University Sys-
tem’s Borlaug Institute (also referred to as 
Team Borlaug)—was supported by multi-
national military assets and was able to 
reach farmers, communities and regional 
offices throughout the country. While this 
collaboration introduced a number of ad-
vanced technologies (improved fish stock, 
drip irrigation, a regional farmers’ and 
wholesale market, agricultural curriculum 
and others), its main contribution was ‘needs 
assessment and planning’: working with 
provincial councils to formulate provincial 
development plans for agricultural infra-
structure, institutions, technology and ex-
tension capabilities, based on more than 
10,000 interpersonal contacts across 13 prov-
inces (excluding Kurdistan). The senior author 
of this chapter was the principal investiga-
tor for this program.
The USAID Inma project continued to 
support technology improvement initiatives 
throughout this period. It focused on agri-
business, with a particular emphasis on 
agricultural enterprises without government 
involvement. It was not formally associated 
with the rehabilitation of government ex-
tension programs.
The USDA IAER project began in 2007 
and focused on rebuilding extension sys-
tems and capabilities, in partnership with 
Iraqi agricultural universities and the MOA. 
Training programs for extension workers 
were conducted mostly outside of Iraq due 
to the logistics associated with persistent 
security concerns. This phase was dedi-
cated to ‘capacity building and information 
dissemination’ (USDA, 2012).
After 2003, violent conflict continually 
erupted and abated in various Iraqi local-
ities, but never fully disappeared. Domestic 
agricultural programs, as well as inter-
national assistance in agriculture, were tem-
pered by the special constraints imposed by 
political insecurity. Iraq’s current system of 
agricultural extension, and the Iraqi agricul-
tural enterprise in general, owes much to 
the resilient farmers and entrepreneurs, a 
system of universities with many colleges of 
agriculture and the ministries of agriculture 
(MoAs) of both Iraq and Kurdistan, which 
asserted their own identity, authority and 
 responsibility despite the challenges of con-
flict. Kurdistan is a Federal Region under 
the Iraqi constitution. The central govern-
ment of Iraq based in Baghdad is responsible 
for international affairs of Iraq and for agri-
cultural affairs outside of Kurdistan, while 
the regional government of Kurdistan ad-
ministers agricultural affairs of Kurdistan.
In the following sections, the Iraqi in-
stitutional environment and the constraints 
on agricultural extension posed by conflict 
are discussed in more detail.
Public administration in Iraqi agricul-
ture reflects the greater divisions that pre-
vail throughout the government and soci-
ety. At the top, the MoA of the Iraqi central 
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government in Baghdad regards itself, and 
is regarded externally, as the country’s le-
gitimate national agricultural authority. 
Even so, the predominantly Kurdish prov-
inces of Irbil, Dohuk and Sulaimaniya come 
under the rule of the Kurdish Regional Gov-
ernment (KRG). As a ‘federal entity’ under 
the Iraqi constitution, with a capital in Ir-
bil, the KRG has authority over certain in-
ternal responsibilities, including agricul-
ture. As such, the KRG has its own Ministry 
of Agriculture and Water Resources 
(MAWR), which includes an extension ser-
vice. The respective authority of the Bagh-
dad-based and Irbil-based governments 
was and is continually debated, but as a 
practical matter, the KRG operates inde-
pendently of Baghdad.
Separately from this regional political 
distinction, the agricultural extension ser-
vice itself is divided between federal and 
provincial extension employees. To the 
farmer constituencies they are indistin-
guishable, but salaries and reporting struc-
tures are administered separately, at federal 
and provincial levels. Farmers’ associations 
have long been formally affiliated with gov-
ernment involvement in agriculture, but as-
sociations formerly dealt primarily with in-
put supply and product management.
Each of the 18 Iraqi provinces has a 
provincial agricultural office and a lead 
agricultural officer, and each office main-
tains a roster of farms. These rosters, in 
turn, guide agricultural input distribution 
and farm produce purchases. Prior to 2003, 
input distribution would have been the pri-
mary function of the provincial offices. Pro-
vincial agricultural extension workers still 
report to the provincial office and, more re-
cently, have been developing capacity for 
farmer technical advisory services, in add-
ition to fulfilling their former responsibil-
ities of input distribution.
Outside the KRG, some Iraqi prov-
inces—including Anbar, Basra and Najaf—
are also prominent in their own governance 
and exhibit some independence from fed-
eral and regional government influence. In 
Basra, a major petroleum production and 
shipping hub, there is a close alliance be-
tween private agriculture, business and the 
clergy. This alliance has been a greater source 
of stability and agricultural leadership than 
public institutions, and it is said that gov-
ernment officials occasionally take instruc-
tions from the clergy and private sector.
In Najaf province, the main city mosque 
provides training in business and agricul-
ture. It is important to note that Najaf houses 
the Holy Shrine of Imam Ali, which is the 
holiest place of Shia Islam. The Imam of the 
shrine, Sheikh Dhia Zain Aldeen, is highly 
knowledgeable about agriculture and asso-
ciates with the Dean of Agriculture of the 
University of Najaf.
The Governor of Anbar is an agricul-
tural entrepreneur who is highly influential 
in the sector. For example, he is able to im-
port and introduce improved crop varieties, 
occasionally bypassing the ‘mandatory’ 
4-year national testing and approval process 
for all genetic material. Anbar agricultural 
extension workers balance their allegiances 
between federal and provincial authorities.
Political divisions
An additional complication in internal Iraqi 
agricultural administration was that the 
leaders of Iraq’s State Board of Extension 
 Cooperation—one of the administrators of 
the Iraqi extension service—were also mem-
bers of the opposition Sadrist Party. The 
party had come to occupy the extension of-
fice following the assassination in 2005 of 
the previous Director General of Extension, 
Dr Awad Issa, outside his office. Dr Issa’s as-
sassination was part of a campaign against 
intellectuals. Of unattributed origin, by June 
2006 the campaign had claimed more than 
300 lives (Stone, 2006). At the first organiza-
tional meeting of the USDA-supported IAER 
project, held in Amman, Jordan, in March 2007, 
the Sadrist-led contingent of the Baghdad 
MoA extension staff exited the meeting on 
the first day of the event, protesting the 
order of speakers. They were persuaded to 
stay only after apologies were made and 
 accepted. The leader of the walkout, the 
 Director General of Extension, gave a mag-
nanimous address at the end of the workshop. 
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He was later murdered at the Sadrist Party 
offices in late 2007 or early 2008 (K. Whitney, 
personal communication, 24 July 2015). 
Sectarian issues also influenced selection of 
trainees for IAER training programs.
Tribal leaders
Most Iraqi farmers claim to have had little 
contact with or assistance from extension 
personnel in recent years. Many lament the 
decline in government distribution of inputs—
chiefly seed, fertilizer and custom tillage 
services. While the CPA attempted to ele-
vate the relevance and authority of govern-
mental agencies, tribal leadership remained 
strong throughout the presence of multi-
national forces. In rural areas, tribal leader-
ship remains the dominant influence and 
authority in the daily lives and affairs of 
farmers. Sheikhs—tribal leaders—are highly 
active in soliciting technical assistance for 
farmers in their communities, often invest-
ing their own assets in public goods and 
introducing new technologies to their com-
munities. Among matters arranged by tribal 
leaders is land access.
Iraqi government land institutions are 
in great disarray. Overlapping and contra-
dictory systems of land rights and access 
date back to the Ottoman Empire, overlaid 
by successive regulations promulgated by 
the monarchy, the revolutionary govern-
ment of 1958, the regime of former President 
Saddam Hussein and ultimately by the ad-
judication and edicts of tribal Sheikhs. In a 
private conversation with E.C. Price in 2008, 
former Prime Minister (now Vice President) 
Ayad Allawi, himself a major landowner, 
asserted that the most serious problem fa-
cing Iraqi agriculture was insecure rights to 
land. Insecure land rights led to deficiencies 
in the maintenance of farm resources, as il-
lustrated by widespread soil salinization, 
caused by the poor upkeep of drainage sys-
tems. When farmers are not assured of long- 
term access to land, they are less willing to 
invest in its improvement. Incidentally, the 
second most serious impediment, according 
to Vice President Allawi, was the lack of im-
proved crop genetics.
Farming families
About two-thirds of Iraqis derive their live-
lihood from agriculture. When farmers 
were asked where they learned about agri-
cultural practices, they invariably answered 
that they learned from their parents. During 
visits to farmers in their homes, they were 
often surrounded by their children. Farm-
ers generally expect their children to be 
farmers, and these children often confirm 
this career path—both young women and 
young men. Children expressed faith in the 
technologies handed down to them and 
often provided expansive views of how 
they would increase the size of their farms 
or flocks. Iraqi farming families in the Cen-
tral Region appear to be a modern excep-
tion to the pattern of dispersal of youth 
away from the family farm, based on a de-
cision to leave agriculture. Loyalty to the 
land, to family and to community is strong 
in rural Iraq. This does not mean that there 
is no rural-to-urban migration. While farms 
have been repeatedly subdivided to ac-
commodate successive generations, fam-
ilies are large and some family members 
move away.
Colleges of agriculture
Iraqi provinces typically have at least one 
public university, including a minimum of 
one faculty (college) of agriculture. Hith-
erto, universities had no official role in agri-
cultural extension, as they are administered 
through the Ministry of Higher Education 
rather than the MoA. Formal degree pro-
grams in extension education are offered at 
the University of Baghdad at BSc, MSc and 
PhD levels. Briers et al. (2011), however, ob-
serve that the degree programs offer insuffi-
cient practical application and state that 
there is little trust between the MoA and 
the university. Universities occasionally 
provide training for extension workers 
under agreements with the MoA, but oper-
ationally they are not well connected. Still, 
international agencies have occasionally 
tried to broker closer working relationships 
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between universities and Ministries, and 
these efforts have led to some useful infor-
mal professional relationships.
Extension Conditioned by Conflict
Conflict has placed a number of constraints 
on agricultural extension in Iraq. Some of 
these affect extension services indirectly be-
cause they impact the scope of technologies 
that are most needed, and that can be viably 
extended and supported. Other constraints 
directly affect the conduct of extension per-
sonnel and their operations. In this chapter 
we examine official government agricul-
tural extension, as well as extension pro-
vided by international aid projects, non- 
governmental organizations (NGOs) and the 
private sector. We commonly distinguish 
between extension with an upper case ‘E’, 
and extension with a lower case ‘e’. Exten-
sion with an upper case ‘E’ includes formal 
government extension services provided by 
line agencies, such as the federal MoA and 
State Board on Agricultural Extension, along 
with provincial agricultural offices. Exten-
sion with a lower case ‘e’ consists of agricul-
tural training and technical assistance pro-
vided by Iraqi NGOs and international 
agencies. For example, the Washington, DC-
based United States Peace Institute (USIP) 
mounted a poultry project in Baghdad pro-
vince (on-site interview of USIP staff by 
E.C. Price, 2008).
Resource Constraints
Direct constraints on Iraqi government ex-
tension services during conflict and early 
post-conflict include budgetary restrictions 
on salaries and operations, less obvious 
communications and security concerns, 
and high-level political differences regard-
ing agricultural policies. For example, sal-
ary payments to government extension staff 
were irregular during conflict, and workers 
complained of long periods without pay. 
Travel and program support funds were also 
scarce. This was all further complicated by 
uncertainty concerning the purpose of agri-
cultural extension. At the highest level of 
the Iraqi MoA, there were those who held 
out for continued programs of input subsidy 
and delivery, and others willing to under-
take the shift to technical advisory services. 
Such discord made programming govern-
ment budgets for extension difficult. In 
short, it was impossible to actualize any 
proposal for national campaigns to revital-
ize Iraqi agriculture.
Cost of doing business
Conflict imposes additional costs on most 
public and private transactions and also has 
an impact on agricultural extension. Simply 
put, everything costs more, including all 
transactions in agriculture. The additional 
costs come in many forms. The decline of 
law and order gives rise to illegal charges, 
such as bribes and protection fees paid by 
businesses. Insecurity requires increased 
vigilance, so that more people are needed to 
carry out routine tasks. More secure routes 
must be followed, which in turn increases 
travel times and restricts periods of travel. 
Costly and multiple face-to-face meetings 
are required, rather than simpler telephone 
or written communications. Personal secur-
ity concerns at production sites, in transit 
and at markets reduce productive activity 
and therefore the supply of goods and 
 services, increasing their prices as a result 
(US DoD, 2007).
Not only does the supply of services de-
cline, but demand may also increase dra-
matically, as international agencies with 
thousands of personnel and ample funding 
move into conflict and post-conflict econ-
omies to render assistance. Requirements 
for food, housing, transport, fuel, energy 
and labor for new expatriate communities 
in urban areas initially drive price increases 
in the cities, and then in rural markets as 
well. In short, the cost of doing one’s job in-
creases during conflict and carries over into 
the post-conflict environment. It reduces 
what extension workers can accomplish 
with their limited incomes and resources.
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Content of extension programming  
in conflict
Cost increases tend to shift the types of en-
terprises and technologies that farmers can 
profitably use, requiring revised content in 
extension programs. For example, insecur-
ity in Iraq contributed to a shift away from 
extensive production systems towards in-
tensive production systems.
Greenhouses and integrated poultry 
production systems flourished. One exten-
sion worker in the Central Region of Iraq 
introduced intensive cattle feeding in 2007, 
and later cattle and sheep feedlots spread 
into Kurdistan. The guideline expressed by 
several farmers was that they sought enter-
prises entirely independent of the govern-
ment, so that they could control as much of 
the value chain as possible. Government in-
volvement in a supply chain could make 
businesses vulnerable to the extraction of 
rents by public officials. Also, the impair-
ment of public services during conflict ne-
cessitates greater self-reliance.
Another feature of intensive agriculture 
that is advantageous in conflict regimes is 
the greater possibility of concealing or pro-
tecting an integrated value chain over a rela-
tively small space. It was observed that 
horticultural and poultry production met 
these requirements and flourished.
A less positive dynamic was observed in 
the broad collapse of public services in many 
rural communities, with the result that no 
single intervention was viable. The case of a 
village in Wasit province is instructive. In 
2008, schools had been closed since the war 
began in 2003, and the future appeared dim 
for a generation of children. Water treatment 
had ceased, and drinking water was scarce 
and impure. Crop yields were exceedingly 
low at 0.5 mt/ha; a crust of salt covered much 
of the land. Finding feed for a few thin dairy 
cows was clearly a source of concern for 
their owners. People were hungry, because 
they had sold their food allotments to pay 
medical bills, and many women were said to 
be ill. It was clear that any approach to im-
proving agriculture and livelihoods would 
have to be comprehensive, touching every 
facet of rural life. Interrelated weaknesses 
caused by conflict can implode rural econ-
omies. In such cases, integrated rural com-
munity development may offer the best op-
portunity for improvement.
Suppressed communications
Communications, the lifeblood of extension, 
were constrained by an induced culture of 
reticence and insecurity and a weak commu-
nications infrastructure. Iraqi dissent was 
suppressed during the 40-year Ba’athist rule. 
Civil organizations not directly managed by 
the government were discouraged, including 
professional organizations, as these were re-
garded as a possible threat to the regime. 
Interpersonal and intra-organizational com-
munications were suppressed. Agricultural-
ists could not easily share knowledge or build 
professional networks. Scientists, teachers, 
researchers and extension personnel worked 
in relative isolation. When Western develop-
ment organizations first became active in the 
economy and society after 2003, it was diffi-
cult for them to identify key players, convene 
groups or distribute information.
When the TFBSO/Ag Team members 
visited communities, offices and institutions, 
it was difficult for them to uncover institu-
tional linkages. Over several weeks spent in 
various provinces in 2008, the team often in-
quired about the existence and whereabouts 
of extension workers, but none of these work-
ers was ever acknowledged or introduced. At 
the University of Babil, 3 months into their 
rural reconnaissance, during a meeting with 
faculty and administrators, team members 
noticed a back row of five individuals who 
had said nothing throughout. Upon inquiry, 
it was discovered that they were provincial 
extension staff. Once they began talking, it 
became clear that extension workers were 
well dispersed in the countryside but simply 
not linked into a communications network 
with one another or to universities. Instead, 
their communications typically consisted of 
one-way contact, receiving information solely 
from their regional directors or Baghdad. 
Thereafter, by careful and focused inquiry, 
the US agriculture teams began to learn about 
and see more of the work of rural extension 
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workers. On the part of extension workers, 
there was likely some reluctance to meet 
with outsiders because the mission of their 
organization and their own responsibilities 
had become unclear and they were at a loss to 
explain their purpose.
Security and communications
Among Iraqis in general, and especially 
among extension workers, security concerns 
remained about meeting with Westerners or 
being seen in places away from their home 
localities. In order to travel to meetings con-
vened by Westerners, they traversed various 
waypoints to disguise their ultimate destin-
ation. When the call went out for applicants 
to a USAID-supported scholarship program 
to study in the USA, it took months for ap-
plicants to dare show their faces, and even 
then, they also took circuitous routes to 
reach the venues for interviews.
Translators who travelled with Western 
agriculturalists often had to take precau-
tionary measures as well, especially those 
who sought to contact farmers and exten-
sion workers in local communities; some 
wore masks so they would not be recog-
nized. Even so, there were many cases of 
Iraqis who paid with their lives when insur-
gents discovered they had been working 
with Westerners.
While internet connectivity grew slowly, 
communications benefited from the increased 
availability of cell phones. Still too costly for 
most farmers and extension workers, suffi-
cient phones were distributed among leaders 
for contacts to be made for scheduling meet-
ings. For security reasons, care was taken not 
to use place names, personal names, times or 
routings when communicating by phone or in 
writing. Among both Western workers and 
Iraqi personnel there was a heavy reliance on 
discreet word of mouth to set up meetings 
and appointments.
Communications across cultures
The challenge to foreigners attempting to 
elicit and understand the ‘felt needs’ of a 
rural community, in which trust has been 
eroded by violent conflict or oppression, is 
to achieve confidence that what one hears 
and articulates truly reflects the feelings of 
a client farmer or community. This is a 
complicated issue because extension services 
(and other development assistance), when 
rendered by international donors, are not 
linked to recipients through markets as is 
the case, for example, in the USA. There, 
recipients pay for extension services through 
taxes and signify their satisfaction (or lack 
of it) through their votes. When a provincial 
agricultural needs assessment was com-
pleted, TFBSO/Ag Teams first delivered 
their reports in the local language to com-
munities before submitting them to re-
gional, national or international bodies. 
One team appeared to hit the mark when, 
upon one such delivery, a local leader 
gave a tearful thank you and said of the 
report: ‘It sounds as if we are speaking’. 
The teams listened to thousands of farm-
ers, members of rural communities and 
local leaders and strove to relay their mes-
sage in words that local community mem-
bers called their own.
Foreign agricultural extension com-
munications in Iraq attempted to bridge 
ethnic divides as well as the gap between 
civilian and military identities. International 
extension programs were often carried 
out in Iraq by multinational military civil 
affairs units and by other foreign workers 
accompanied by military or military- style 
escorts. It is sometimes suggested that 
military-style protective gear, uniforms 
and weapons can present a barrier to 
communicating with farmers and other 
members of the rural community. There 
have been a few cases where high-level 
officials refused discussions in the pres-
ence of weapons and protective gear. How-
ever, rural community members showed lit-
tle aversion to military clothing and 
assets, and this issue was quickly over-
come. Curious children relished the op-
portunity to associate with visitors, and 
adults soon followed suit. Contact 
and communications with farmers were 
unimpeded by military armaments and 
uniforms.
144 E.C. Price et al. 
United States Government Efforts  
to Rebuild Extension
Four key agricultural initiatives were under-
taken by the US Government between 2003 
and 2012. Three of these included a focus 
on extension:
 1. USAID ARDI program, led by Develop-
ment Alternatives Incorporated (DAI) with 
Texas A&M University AgriLife Research as 
a partner, 2003–2008.
 2. US Department of Defense Task Force for 
Business and Stability Operations agricul-
tural component (TFBSO/Ag), led by Texas 
A&M AgriLife Research, funded by the DoD 
through USDA and known in the field as 
Team Borlaug (2007–2009).
 3. USDA IAER project, led by Texas A&M 
AgriLife Extension (2007–2012).
A further USAID effort, implemented through 
the International Center for Agricultural 
Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA), was 
the Inma project, which continued until 
2014 (HSAD Project, 2014; ICARDA, n.d.). 
This fourth project was largely directed to-
wards private agribusiness, with minimal 
emphasis on formal capacity building in ex-
tension or other government agencies.
Agricultural reconstruction and development 
for Iraq (ARDI)
In 2003, the ARDI project began to support 
rebuilding the agriculture sector in Iraq. It 
focused on many aspects of agriculture, in-
cluding field testing, the formation of 
NGOs and farmers’ organizations, strength-
ening the private sector and building the 
capacity of the extension service. It also 
introduced improved crop technologies, 
animal production and health, cadastral 
surveys and water management systems. 
Initially, all project activities were led from 
Baghdad. However, in December 2005 the 
center of activity was moved to Irbil in 
Kurdistan due to increased violence. 
Thereafter, much of the field activity took 
place in the provinces of Dohuk, Hawler 
(Irbil) and Sulaimaniya.
The principal theme in ARDI’s ap-
proach to strengthening extension, termed 
‘participatory extension’, consisted of ‘tak-
ing extension to farmers rather than bring-
ing farmers to extension’ (USAID, 2006: 
249). Visioning workshops were held at na-
tional and provincial levels, with the MoA 
and State Board of Extension involved, as 
well as universities and related government 
staff. By the end of 2005, farmer workshops 
were held to identify priorities and key 
needs. The history of strong government in-
volvement in agriculture emerged clearly 
through observations made by farmers and 
extension staff, who commented that the 
government should solve farmers’ problems 
and that the MoA should return to subsidiz-
ing tillage services, equipment, fertilizer, 
seed, pesticides and other inputs (USAID, 
2006). State Board of Extension leaders and 
Ministry officials in Irbil, Sulaimaniya and 
Dohuk agreed that people experienced in 
participatory methodologies—not univer-
sity faculty members—should train exten-
sion staff in participatory methods. Old in-
stitutional rivalries subsequently surfaced, 
with MoA officials asserting that univer-
sities should not play a role in extension.
Training-of-trainers in participatory 
methods was held in Egypt and subse-
quently in-country. Field extension work-
ers were trained and the methods applied 
in several technical areas: sheep breeding, 
crop production, horticulture, honey pro-
duction and integrated plant protection. At 
first, progress was slow because, although 
leaders had agreed to the new approach, 
the MoA was slow to approve the move-
ment of personnel and resources to imple-
ment the program. An essential point of 
participatory extension was that demon-
strations should take place on farmers’ 
fields, not at Ministry facilities. This was 
unprecedented. Finally, in September 2006 
the MoA issued instructions to the gover-
norates to implement the participatory ex-
tension system. In the space of 3 years, an 
official transformation of extension methods 
had begun. By the end of the project, ARDI 
had trained 191 extension workers in par-
ticipatory methods in all governorates of 
the country (USAID, 2006).
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Despite these successes, old habits and 
policies proved hard to change, and subse-
quent programs implemented by others 
had difficulty in finding evidence of these 
earlier in-field programs. It is likely that 
the new methods took hold only among a 
few progressive personnel. In the follow-on 
USAID agricultural program Inma, USAID 
eschewed contact with the ministry, opt-
ing instead for an entirely private sector- 
oriented program.
ARDI laid the groundwork for a new 
phase in farmer-oriented extension pro-
grams in Iraq. In cooperative crop trials 
with universities in Mosul, Irbil, Sulaiman-
iya and Baghdad, a number of verification 
trials provided new tools for extension in 
the ARDI project as well as for subsequent 
programs. Some of the advances were in 
greenhouse horticulture crops, field pro-
duction of tomato under plastic, improved 
potato varieties, barley–vetch mixes that 
proved advantageous for livestock produc-
tion and saline-tolerant wheat production. 
These were not all entirely new technolo-
gies, but war had isolated scientists from 
each other, from extension services and 
from farmers. ARDI provided the opportun-
ity for these technologies to be further field 
tested and disseminated to farmers.
DoD/TFBSO agricultural teams
From among the multinational forces oper-
ating at about 170 forward operating bases 
(FOBs) in Iraq, selected combat units were 
designated for ‘civil affairs’. Their job was to 
‘win hearts and minds’, which in its most 
productive interpretation was taken to mean 
economic development. The problems and 
opportunities seen by civil affairs units as-
signed to rural communities were often re-
lated to agriculture, but the units rarely had 
personnel who were trained in agriculture. 
This dilemma was compounded by the fact 
that the civilian agriculturalists working 
with USAID in the ARDI project were not 
accessible to the multinational forces, nor 
did they have the assets to operate in less 
secure areas. The State Department and the 
US military sought to remedy the issue in 
2007 by hiring agriculturists through USDA 
to serve on military–civilian hybrid PRTs, 
but the flow of personnel was slow.
Also in 2006 and 2007, a unit within 
the DoD—the TFBSO—was working to 
broadly revive Iraqi business and industry, 
but it too found agriculture to be especially 
problematic due to a lack of capable experts 
on hand to meet the population’s needs. In 
March 2007 the TFBSO supported a team of 
agriculturists from land grant universities 
and the USDA to assess the agricultural 
situation at selected US military FOBs 
around Iraq (US DoD, 2007). Their report to 
the DoD demonstrated the utility of having 
agriculturalists stationed at FOBs.
In early 2008, the US military com-
mand in central Iraq, through TFBSO, in-
vited Texas A&M AgriLife Research to field 
an agricultural team for a 6-month assess-
ment of agriculture, to assist civil affairs 
units in framing agricultural development 
plans and to implement selected programs 
in technology dissemination. The nor-
thern, western and southern commands 
soon followed with similar requests. Some 
of the team members had already worked 
with the ARDI project and were beginning 
to work with the IAER project as well. The 
difference with this TFBSO/Ag initiative 
lay in the fact that when embedded with 
the military, agriculturalists had access to the 
most remote and least secure parts of the 
country. The system enabled the TFBSO/Ag 
Teams (‘Team Borlaug’) to conduct what 
was probably the most comprehensive 
field-level external assessment of agricul-
ture ever conducted in modern Iraq. The 
work of the TFBSO/Ag Teams provided in-
sights concerning the impacts of conflict 
on extension, as presented earlier in this 
chapter.
The framework for conducting needs 
assessments and technology dissemination 
varied between different FOBs. At some 
FOBs, PRTs had been established. PRTs typ-
ically incorporated some or all military civil 
affairs units at a base, but also occasionally 
included personnel from other parts of the 
US government, including the Department 
of State, the Department of Justice, the Army 
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Corps of Engineers, USDA and USAID. 
Even so, it was rare that all these govern-
ment units were represented. The PRTs, for 
instance, were responsible to the US De-
partment of State, while the military civil 
affairs units and TFBSO/Ag reported to the 
military command. The PRTs were de-
signed to plan and execute integrated, com-
prehensive development strategies. If a FOB 
did not have a PRT, TFBSO/Ag worked 
solely with the military personnel. Regard-
less of the organizational structure, the TFBSO/ 
Ag Teams mobilized with combat units 
about 5 days a week, going into communi-
ties for discussions, training and project 
implementation.
Training was delivered on poultry man-
agement, animal health and nutrition, till-
age practices, oilseed processing, mechan-
ization, extension methods, aquaculture, 
water management, produce handling and 
grading, marketing and drip irrigation. Four 
key projects implemented were:
• Construction and management training 
for the Central Euphrates Farmers Mar-
ket and Training Center;
• Fish breed improvement for pond aqua-
culture;
• Drip irrigation production and demon-
stration;
• Curriculum improvement for agricul-
tural education.
Students were recruited and sent for gradu-
ate studies in the USA, with many drawn 
from the ranks of extension staff in the MoA 
(Baghdad) and the MAWR (Irbil). The aqua-
culture project was especially noteworthy, 
because it drew on substantial resources 
and cooperation from the US DoD, USDA 
and USAID.
TFBSO/Ag had excellent access to the 
MoA in Baghdad and served to inform the 
Ministry of opportunities and needs in re-
gions and subject matter areas to which it 
had limited access. The top ten priorities in 
agriculture that TFBSO/Ag summarized in 
its final report were:
 1. Crop seed quality and varieties;
 2. Animal breeds—cattle and fish;
 3. Diagnostic laboratory capability;
 4. Farmer knowledge:
 (i) tillage
 (ii) crop varietal management
 (iii) efficient water use;
 5. Youth programs;
 6. Land rights;
 7. Livestock forage and feed;
 8. Oilseed production and processing;
 9. Farmer credit;
 10. Management of saline soils.
TFBSO/Ag fielded 40 professionals across 
many disciplines of agriculture and made 
contact with more than 10,000 farmers, busi-
ness persons and leaders. Many contacts 
had been out of touch with agricultural pro-
fessionals throughout the period of  conflict. 
One contribution seemed clear: the simple 
act of recognizing farmers, community lead-
ers and families who had been isolated for 
years, often in fear, gave hope and stimu-
lated new determination to improve agri-
cultural techniques and rural lives.
Iraq Agriculture Extension  
Revitalization (IAER)
In 2006, the US Department of State funded 
the USDA, National Institute for Food and 
Agriculture (NIFA) and Foreign Agriculture 
Service (FAS) to work with US universities 
in strengthening the Iraqi extension system. 
The USDA entered into an agreement with 
a consortium of land grant universities led 
by Texas A&M AgriLife Extension Service 
(TAMU) to ‘(1) Increase agricultural capacity 
through science based extension training to 
Iraqi extension personnel; and (2) Foster ef-
fective interagency cooperation and collab-
oration among Iraqi government agencies 
to benefit Extension’ (USDA, 2012: 3). Other 
university partners in the USA included 
New Mexico State University (NMSU), the 
University of California–Davis (UCD), Utah 
State University (USU) and Washington 
State University (WSU). NMSU also worked 
with Diné College, a Native American 1994 
land grant school in New Mexico.
Adopting a train-the-trainer approach 
and operating largely outside of Iraq, the 
consortium trained 720 Iraqi extension and 
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university professionals, who in turn each 
reported training an average of 40 add-
itional colleagues. Training focused on five 
main areas: dryland cropping (WSU), water 
management (USU), horticulture (UCD), 
extension methodology (NMSU) and live-
stock (TAMU). For security reasons, the 
training was conducted in Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Syria. Later, training was con-
ducted in the KRG provinces of Irbil, Do-
huk and Sulaimaniya, and also in the USA 
(USDA, 2012).
An effort was made throughout the pro-
ject to include representatives of Iraqi uni-
versities and Ministries in training and 
planning exercises, in order to build profes-
sional relationships and increase cooper-
ation. Over the course of the project, 45 Iraqi 
university faculty members participated as 
trainers or trainees, along with government 
extension professionals. IAER’s most sig-
nificant achievement was to foster cooper-
ation between the Ministries of Higher Edu-
cation (Baghdad), Agriculture (Baghdad), 
Water Resources (Baghdad) and Agriculture 
and Water Resources (KRG). The project 
also succeeded in establishing a 1-year dip-
loma program at Baghdad University and at 
Salahaddin University in Irbil (USDA, 
2012).
Extensive materials on technology 
and extension methods were made avail-
able to the various Ministries in both 
Arabic and English. An innovative ele-
ment to help ensure their use was a com-
petitive mini-grant program sponsored by 
IAER during the early phase of training in 
Egypt and Jordan. Trainees were offered 
encouragement and assistance in writing 
proposals for demonstrations and other 
farmer training events, when they returned 
to their posts. The awardees, in turn, used 
their grants to reach more than 900 farm-
ers. The program built trust and credibility 
for the extension workers. However, at-
tempts to persuade the Ministries to ex-
tend and enlarge the initiative were un-
successful (USDA, 2012).
Evaluations conducted throughout the 
program (Abi-Ghanem et al., 2013) docu-
mented the following achievements (USDA, 
2012):
• Increased capacity of higher education 
institutions to support agricultural ex-
tension.
• Increased knowledge and skills of ex-
tension agents.
• Improved extension services and ma-
terials targeting women, youth and 
other specific audiences.
• Improved quality of extension services, 
with most agents saying they used the 
information they had gained from train-
ing to help their clients.
• Increased understanding of tech-
nologies among farmers and other 
clients.
• Increased use of improved agricultural 
practices by farmers.
IAER collaborating institutions made a num-
ber of recommendations for continued im-
provement of agricultural extension in Iraq 
(USDA, 2012), including:
• Continued strengthening of university 
relationships with extension.
• Improved internet connectivity for 
international learning.
• Reorienting Ministry programming to 
be driven by farmer needs and exten-
sion agent feedback, rather than by 
Ministry priorities alone.
• Improved programming for women and 
increased numbers of female extension 
professionals.
• Introducing programming for youth, 
previously regarded as unimportant.
• Exposing mid-level extension man-
agers to policy and management en-
vironments in the USA and other 
countries.
• Making resources available to exten-
sion workers for field demonstrations.
• Continued training in farm manage-
ment, marketing and agribusiness in 
order to replace dependence upon 
government with free-market prin-
ciples.
• Recognizing the greater responsiveness 
in KRG towards modern extension 
methods.
• Continuing to train, elevate and in-
crease programming support to exten-
sion within the MAWR.
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Opportunities and Limitations
The discussion above identifies a number 
of areas in which various interventions 
achieved success. For example, the IAER 
project evaluations identified six areas of 
achievement and made nine recommenda-
tions for improvement. The following para-
graphs outline the key concepts related to 
agriculture and extension that emerged dur-
ing Iraq’s period of conflict between 2003 
and 2012.
Transition from material inputs  
to educational services
Extension staff in the Iraqi MoA based in 
Baghdad, and those of the KRG MAWR, 
continued to serve the agricultural sector 
through the period of warfare that began in 
2003, which is an achievement in itself. 
Encouraged by international partners, 
these personnel transitioned from distrib-
uting farm inputs to guiding farmers to-
wards improved farming practices. Along 
with that shift, notable changes in produc-
tion technologies were also introduced—
albeit often with external assistance— 
including horticultural production under 
plastic, improved aquaculture and beef 
feedlot production. Nevertheless, on-farm 
extension services to farmers, youth and 
women remain weak and need to expand 
and improve. Better cooperation between 
government extension agencies and uni-
versity faculties of agriculture could be a 
resource for improved agricultural exten-
sion in Iraq.
On-farm extension services
A key achievement of the DAI-led ARDI 
project was to plant the idea at the highest 
levels of the MoA that extension services 
needed to shift towards providing on-farm 
education to farmers through participatory 
methods. The concept began to take hold 
and continued to be emphasized through 
subsequent international partnerships. This 
important approach is limited in Iraq, 
however, by the low level of funding for 
field operations for extension workers.
Extension on the ground during conflict
The DoD/TFBSO Agricultural Teams fos-
tered agricultural planning at the provincial 
level, based on intensive farmer contacts. 
The teams demonstrated that extension pro-
grams can work in areas of active conflict, 
with the cooperation of military personnel 
and civilians at the community level and in 
farmers’ fields. The assessment and plan-
ning teams each worked for a maximum of 6 
months in the central, northern, western 
and southern regions of Iraq. Nevertheless, it 
would have been useful if the farm, commu-
nity and provincial presence of the teams 
could have continued through the imple-
mentation of the agricultural plans that had 
been developed cooperatively by the TFBSO 
teams, community members and provincial 
authorities.
Competitive grants for extension services
A key innovation undertaken by the IAER 
project was the provision of small com-
petitive grants to Iraqi extension workers 
to carry out new initiatives in their re-
spective communities. After receiving the 
grants, the workers were guided by project 
staff. This program energized extension 
staff and achieved rapid impact in com-
munities. As a result, participating staff 
expressed a desire for the program to be 
expanded. This is a model that merits 
being resumed, but the MOA declined to 
advance the program, ending it after only 
one round of grants.
Challenges to extension posed by conflict
Conflict regimes impose special chal-
lenges requiring methods and technolo-
gies that differ from those appropriate in a 
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more peaceful context. Increased costs 
imposed by conflict shift the conditions 
that underlie supply and demand, which 
in turn may require changes in products 
and production methods. This means that 
extension workers need to retool for new 
conflict-responsive agricultural enter-
prises. Conflict also increases the cost of 
conducting extension activities on farms 
and in communities, straining local exten-
sion budgets.
Conflict is a public cost that cannot be 
recovered by firms in an economy with 
open borders and may require foreign as-
sistance or other injections of capital to as-
sist in the transition to more conflict-viable 
enterprises. Conflict-resistant products and 
methods (such as intensive poultry produc-
tion) need to be identified and introduced. 
Mistrust and insecurity alter how extension 
workers communicate with one another and 
with clientele.
International agricultural partnerships  
during conflict
During conflict, parents want to feed their 
children, farmers want to produce and entre-
preneurs want to thrive. It is incumbent on 
the international community to partner with 
agencies, communities, families and individ-
uals in conflict regimes, and to use the most 
direct and effective methods possible to aid 
in their survival. This may involve the use 
and further development of communication 
technologies appropriate for areas in conflict. 
It can also require the formation of, and reli-
ance on, policies and programs that support 
and protect those in the international com-
munity who are willing to work in communi-
ties during conflict. In the USA, it means 
there should be more effective cooperation 
between civilian and military agencies for the 
purpose of assisting communities on the 
ground in conflict regimes.
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The success of the aid system should be 
measured by its contribution to building 
the state rather than substituting for it. . . . 
As there is an emerging consensus that 
technical assistance is a very expensive, 
and yet ineffective instrument for addressing 
the problem of governance, the issue of 
capacity-building must be examined afresh.
Ghani et al. (n.d.)
Agriculture and Extension before  
the Conflict, Pre-1978
Dating back to 350 bc, Afghanistan has endured 
frequent foreign invasions, civil wars and con-
flicts (GFRAS, n.d.). Although it is one of the 
least developed countries in the world, Afghan-
istan’s people and rural farming systems have 
met these hardships with robustness, resilience 
and adaptability. Agriculture (including crop/
cereal production, horticulture and livestock) 
remains the largest and most important sector 
of the national economy. Of the employed 
population, approximately 40% are engaged in 
agricultural work and nearly 80% of all house-
holds depend on agricultural income. However, 
agricultural productivity remains low due to 
Afghanistan’s limited water resources, infertile 
soils and harsh climate (CSO, 2014).
Although public agricultural extension 
activities began in the 1920s, Afghanistan’s 
agricultural extension system was first for-
mally organized under a directorate within 
the Ministry of Agriculture in 1958. In 1959, 
this position was elevated to the level of 
General Directorate. In 1963, the name of 
the section was changed to the Production 
and Extension Department (PED); and in 
1966 it became the Research and Extension 
Department (RED). In 1970, RED was div-
ided into the Department of Agricultural 
Extension and Production and the Depart-
ment of Soil Sciences. In 1972, in response 
to a severe drought, agricultural extension 
was briefly relocated to the Rural Develop-
ment Department, under the direct control 
of the prime minister, but was subsequently 
returned to the Ministry of Agriculture 
(Wesa, 2009). At this time, the country’s 
agricultural research and extension system 
included 24 research stations, more than 
400 extension offices and more than 1000 
research and extension professionals, dis-
tributed across all provinces and provincial 
districts (World Bank, 2005).
By the 1970s, the Afghan government 
was providing agricultural research, exten-
sion and advisory services that allowed the 
country to meet national demand for cereals 
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and to sustain an export market in horticul-
tural products (Emadi et al., 2009). From 
1968 to 1978, the production of wheat in-
creased by about 13%, from 2,354,000 to 
2,652,000 tonnes (t). In 1978, an estimated 
85% of the 15 million people lived in rural 
villages, and most of the other 15% were 
connected with rural enterprises in some 
way (UNDP, 1993). Cereals were grown on 
approximately 87% of all cultivated land, 
with wheat (57%) as the principal crop. At 
180 kg/year, the per capita consumption of 
wheat in Afghanistan was one of the highest 
in the world (UNDP, 1993).
By the mid-1970s, the country was 
self-sufficient in food grains (Christensen, 
1995). Agricultural products were major 
 exports and totaled nearly 65% of pre-war 
export earnings, 30% of which came from 
dried fruits, principally raisins (UNDP, 1993). 
From 1974 to 1978, agricultural exports in-
creased in value from US$158  million to 
about US$232 million (FAO, n.d.).
Background to the Conflict, 1978–2002
Chronology of conflict
A timeline of key events during Afghanistan’s 
most recent conflict years is presented in 
Fig. 9.1.
Agricultural extension in conflict,  
1978–2002
Soviet influence
After the Soviet invasion in 1979, Afghani-
stan’s agricultural sector experienced a 
multitude of development challenges:
 1. Damage to human resources. In addition 
to the huge loss of life, many Afghans were 
displaced or forced to leave their homeland. 
Technical professionals either fled or were 
killed, and a whole generation grew up 
without access to proper education.
 2. The conflict limited the active participa-
tion of women—major stakeholders in Afghan 
agriculture—in agricultural employment.
 3. The damage to infrastructure and land 
destroyed ancient underground irrigation 
systems, as well as roads and bridges that 
once carried agricultural goods to market and 
fertilizer to farmers. Arable lands were indis-
criminately bombed, trees and orchards were 
burned, livestock once used to till the land 
vanished and landmines turned productive 
land into dead zones. Moreover, a decline in 
surface area of arable land, coupled with high 
inflation, high unemployment and the cen-
tral government’s inability to curb cultivation 
for illicit purposes, prompted farmers to grow 
large quantities of opium poppy in place of 
staple crops (Wesa, 2009).
In 1987, the direct effects of war caused an 
estimated decline in agricultural produc-
tion to 45–53% of 1978 levels. Availability 
of family labor fell by 20% during the same 
period and numbers of draft oxen fell by 
about 40%. The percentage of farmers using 
fertilizer declined from 76% to 53% in the 
case of urea, and from 57% to 33% for di-
ammonium phosphate (DAP). The total area 
of cultivated land fell by 18%, and cereal 
imports increased by a factor of 52. Small 
stock numbers fell by 70% in the case of kara-
kul flocks, and by 67% for sheep and goats. 
Opium poppy cultivation increased from an 
estimated 6000 hectares (ha) in 1978 to 
about 57,000 ha in 1992 (UNDP, 1993).
The Afghan agricultural research and ex-
tension system also experienced many chal-
lenges under the Soviet-sponsored Afghan 
government, the People’s Democratic Party 
of Afghanistan (PDPA). The PDPA’s agrarian 
land reform policies (e.g. Decree No. 8) were 
viewed by many farmers as anti-Muslim. 
For example, in 1979, agricultural lands 
were expropriated from any Afghan who 
owned more than 6 ha and redistributed to 
farmers who had priority for redistributed 
land. However, Afghan Muslims are forbidden 
to own others’ property without his or her per-
mission (Rubin, 2002). Also during the Soviet 
occupation, the number of agricultural research 
stations fell from 24 to 12. Only 80–90 exten-
sion units were functional—most of them 
without a full complement of staff—and pro-
fessional staff strength decreased from more 
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Fig. 9.1. Timeline of key events during Afghanistan’s most recent conflict years, 1978–2002.
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the quality of trained staff was depleted. 
During the 1970s the Department of Agricul-
tural Extension had over 40 postgraduates, 
whereas during the occupation postgraduate 
numbers dropped to 20 (Wesa, 2009).
Civil war influence
After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union 
from Afghanistan in 1989, the PDPA was left 
to fend for itself against the Mujahideen. 
The years of factional infighting that fol-
lowed during the Afghan civil war destroyed 
critical research and extension infrastruc-
ture and continued to drain qualified profes-
sionals from the service. Applied research 
efforts ceased, research and extension sta-
tions were looted, salaries were withheld 
from staff and the exodus of research and ex-
tension professionals accelerated.
Taliban influence
After 1996, under the Taliban government, the 
quality and coverage of the extension service 
continued to decline. Crop and animal pro-
duction fell by 50% and the number of exten-
sion workers dropped below 650 countrywide 
(Emadi et al., 2009). Most of the extension 
workers were Mullahs, with limited agricul-
tural technical knowledge or skills. The teach-
ing of agricultural subjects was undermined in 
favor of religious learning. No provision of in-
puts, such as seed or fertilizer, was provided to 
farmers from the skeleton extension service, 
nor were markets or private organizations 
regulated. Farmers were left in a weak, uncom-
petitive position with private businessmen 
(i.e. middlemen) and were unable to contrib-
ute to the national economy. The agricultural 
economy in general, and smallholder farms in 
particular, declined to subsistence level pro-
duction (Emadi et al., 2009).
The Post-Conflict Extension System, 
2002–2014
Afghanistan is experiencing a lasting food 
deficit and is primarily dependent on hu-
manitarian food aid. The country’s rain-fed 
cereal productivity—on which more than 
80% of smallholder farmers depend—is as 
low as 0.6 t per hectare (t/ha) and has re-
sulted in a large group of vulnerable rural 
poor. In fact, because of the persistent de-
cline in overall agricultural sector productiv-
ity, 35–45% of the population were unable to 
grow enough food for a healthy and product-
ive life in 2007–2008 (Emadi et al., 2009).
In the following sections we describe 
the post-conflict state of the national re-
search and extension services, as well as 
several initial efforts to restore Afghani-
stan’s agricultural capacity, infrastructure 
and self-sufficiency.
Afghanistan’s public agricultural research  
and extension system
Currently, Afghanistan’s research and exten-
sion system is administered under the Min-
istry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock 
(MAIL). MAIL has offices in all 34 provinces 
and in 364 of the 398 provincial districts. 
However, only 136 of these district offices 
have functioning extension units, and less 
than 5% of the entire workforce have spe-
cialized training. The national research sys-
tem has 18 research stations and substations, 
located in or near the provincial capitals. 
Unfortunately, staff at these stations have 
limited formal education, experience and/or 
knowledge of modern applied research and 
extension methodology. The same con-
flict-related issues that have weakened over-
all Afghanistan public institutions over the 
past 30 years have also severely diminished 
the rigor of the country’s university educa-
tion. As a result, the few professionals with 
graduate degrees from the national univer-
sities make up the bulk of professional tech-
nical staff within the research and extension 
system, but are ill-equipped to undertake ef-
fective applied research and extension activ-
ities (Emadi et al., 2009).
During the 1970s, when the country re-
portedly attained self-sufficiency in wheat 
and had a vibrant agricultural export mar-
ket, more than five extension workers served 
each district. Currently, some provinces are 
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without district-level extension workers; in 
other provinces only one or two extension 
workers serve each district. The exception is 
the Kabul extension service—the best re-
sourced extension service in Afghanistan—
which has 76 extension workers covering 
the province. However, despite the large 
staff, the Kabul-based service faces the same 
challenges (lack of transportation and other 
critical operational resources) that other 
provincial services endure. According to the 
2007 Afghan National Risk and Vulnerabil-
ity Assessment (NRVA) survey, ‘only 1.3% 
of Afghan farmers had contact with agricul-
tural extension services, including both gov-
ernment and non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs). Of this 1.3%, 60% received 
advice only once’ (WFP, 2009).
The various directorates in MAIL’s 
Kabul headquarters decide the technical 
programs. MAIL’s research and extension 
programs cover agronomy, horticulture, 
livestock, forage and forestry, plant protec-
tion, soils and agricultural mechanization. 
Some programs include international and 
private sector cooperation and collabor-
ation. For example, maize, wheat, rice and 
legume genotypes are provided by collabor-
ating international research centers, such as 
the International Center for Agricultural Re-
search in the Dry Areas (ICARDA) and the 
International Maize and Wheat Improve-
ment Center (CIMMYT). The Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Na-
tions (FAO), in collaboration with provin-
cial Directorates of Agriculture, Irrigation, 
and Livestock (DAILs) and private sector 
seed systems, obtains and multiplies the 
best released seed materials to produce 
high-quality foundation and certified seed, 
which farmers can then purchase (WFP, 
2009). However, the beneficiaries of this 
highly subsidized operation are largely 
 medium- and large-scale producers involved 
in mechanized farming—not the small-
holder producers who make up the majority 
of Afghan farmers and who need the most 
assistance.
MAIL’s Agronomy Program conducts 
research on a limited number of thematic 
areas; the benefits of outputs to local com-
munities have been insignificant. The 
Agronomy Program needs to integrate more 
effectively with other programs in key areas, 
such as that for cereal and horticultural 
products, and to emphasize on-farm adap-
tive research. The scope of plant protection 
research is narrowly focused on disease 
evaluations in the wheat nurseries.
The Soils Program is at an early stage of 
rebuilding and developing national plant 
and soil laboratories. The existing laborator-
ies lack both skilled laboratory technicians 
and properly functioning analytical instru-
mentation for providing effective analytical 
services. Thus, at present, plant and soil 
analysis capabilities are limited in MAIL 
and DAILs.
MAIL’s Horticulture Program is respon-
sible for research on trees and vines 
(almonds, apples, stone fruit and grapes) 
and vegetables (tomatoes, onions, carrots 
and cucurbits, especially melons). In 2005, 
Afghanistan reportedly exported US$127 
million worth of horticultural products, 
but  this export value has the potential to 
be much greater (Emadi et al., 2009). How-
ever, horticulture sector productivity is 
constrained by antiquated production 
methods, inadequate water supplies and 
lack of modern technologies (e.g. improved 
varieties, processing infrastructure and stor-
age facilities).
Research and extension interventions 
in the livestock sector focus on animal 
health, range management and dairy pro-
duction, through externally funded projects 
such as FAO’s Integrated Dairy Develop-
ment Project (2005–2008). These projects 
train farmers in improved dairy production 
and animal husbandry, vaccinate animals 
against known animal health threats and, in 
rare cases, provide drugs to treat common 
animal health conditions. Yet these activ-
ities are neither adequate nor strategically 
coordinated. The interventions, largely sup-
ported by external sources and implemented 
by expatriate employees on limited appoint-
ment contracts, fall far short of meeting na-
tional demand for such critical services. The 
national livestock research and extension 
system lacks human, financial and material 
resources to undertake meaningful exten-
sion or research interventions.
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International research interventions  
(2002–present)
After the fall of the Taliban in 2002, the Fu-
ture Harvest Consortium to Rebuild Agri-
culture in Afghanistan (FHCRAA) was es-
tablished, with support from the United 
States Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID), and in collaboration with 
the Afghan national research and extension 
system. The consortium consisted of more 
than 12 institutes from the Consultative 
Group for International Agricultural Re-
search (CGIAR), FAO and several US land-
grant universities— all with the capacity to 
rebuild MAIL.  FHCRAA reactivated a series 
of wheat varietal selection and seed multi-
plication centers and relaunched a seed 
distribution system (Emadi et al., 2009). It 
also implemented a series of resource as-
sessments for MAIL, including soil, water, 
livestock and rangeland. In addition, FH-
CRAA rebuilt five agricultural stations, lo-
cated in Baghlan, Kabul, Kunduz, Nangar-
har and Takhar (GFRAS, n.d.).
By 2003, experimental plots of wheat, 
barley, chickpeas, lentils, fava beans, toma-
toes, onions and peppers were established 
at the rehabilitated agricultural stations. 
Seeds lost during the past decades of con-
flict were also repatriated from duplicate 
collections from around the world. By 2007, 
41 barley landraces and 250 kg of seed from 
several Afghan cereal and legume landraces 
were returned, including 60 almond, 47 pis-
tachio, 14 pomegranate and 16 melon. Add-
itionally, fruit tree nurseries were estab-
lished at research farms in Baghlan, Kunduz, 
Nangarhar and Takhar (WFP, 2009).
Non-governmental organizations,  
2002–present
NGOs have played an important humanitar-
ian and development role in Afghanistan 
for many years. During the 1980s, more 
than 200 NGOs provided assistance to refu-
gees fleeing Afghanistan following the So-
viet invasion (Waisová, 2008). NGOs were 
also among the only providers of aid during 
the Taliban regime, as many donors, includ-
ing the United Nations, withdrew support 
from Afghanistan. After the fall of the Tali-
ban in 2001, the international community 
pledged large amounts of funds and forces 
for the reconstruction and peace-building 
in Afghanistan. This effort was coupled 
with a renewed influx of NGOs, and by 2005 
an  estimated 2400 NGOs were working in 
 Afghanistan (Olsen, 2006).
Because of the high visibility of NGOs 
and the public confusion between NGO staff, 
foreign government contractors and private 
security companies, NGOs were being blamed 
for the slow progress of reconstruction efforts 
and the squandering of billions of dollars. In 
2005, partly as a result of lobbying from NGOs 
and the donor community, the Afghan govern-
ment passed a new Law on Non-Governmental 
Organizations, which required all NGOs to 
 officially register. This registration helped 
 differentiate NGOs from private sector con-
tractors and remove any ‘fake’ NGOs (Olsen, 
2006). As of 2013, the country had 1857 regis-
tered, active national NGOs and 293 regis-
tered, active international NGOs (MoE, n.d.). 
Most NGOs are involved in providing emer-
gency relief and establishing health, educa-
tion and agricultural programs.
The Afghan government has also been 
very critical of the large amounts of off-budget 
donor funds (i.e. donated funds that are not 
managed through the Afghan treasury system) 
devoted to aid organizations. The government 
argues that these funds could instead be used 
by local firms or other government programs, 
such as the National Solidarity Program cre-
ated in 2003 by the Ministry of Rural Re-
habilitation and Development (MRRD) (NSP, 
n.d.), to provide similar services at lower 
costs. Additionally, the government believes 
that treasury management of these funds 
would likely prevent capable Afghans from 
moving away from government positions to 
take higher-paid positions with foreign aid 
agencies (Olsen, 2006).
From 2002 to 2012, the total external as-
sistance pledged to Afghanistan was US$119 
billion, of which US$70 billion was actually 
disbursed. The USA is by far the largest pro-
vider of assistance in Afghanistan at about 
US$48 billion (2002–2012); the next largest 
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is Japan at about US$4 billion (2002–2012). 
However, not all external assistance goes dir-
ectly to development. For example, of the 
US$13 billion disbursed in 2011, 68% was 
spent on security. Of the remaining 32% 
(US$4.1 billion), only 27% (US$1.1 billion) 
was delivered on-budget and mainly used to 
operate the government, while the major 
portion was delivered off-budget and was 
managed by the development groups. Off-
budget aid is a major funding source for 
many NGOs and can complement Afghan 
government development projects, but can 
also lead to conflicting agendas because the 
government has little control over off-budget 
projects.
In 2005, to avert the potential ‘Paradox 
of Plurality’ caused by the multitude of 
NGOs performing similar activities without 
mutual coordination, the Agency Coordinat-
ing Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) released 
a set of regulations. Called the Code of Con-
duct, these regulations aid communication 
among the Afghan government, media and 
NGOS, and among NGOs themselves for 
greater transparency, accountability and co-
ordination of NGO activities (Waisová, 2008). 
The ACBAR inspired other platforms and 
networks for Afghan and international NGOs, 
namely the American Council for Voluntary 
International Action (InterAction), the  European 
Network of NGOs in Afghanistan (ENNA), 
the Afghan NGOs Coordination  Bureau 
(ANCB), the Islamic Coordination Coun-
cil (ICC), the South West Afghanistan and 
Baluchistan Association for Coordination 
(SWABAC) and the Japan Afghan NGO Net-
work (JANN) (Waisová, 2008). Of these, only 
ACBAR has a formalized collaboration with 
the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA), while the others have established 
links with Afghan Transitional Authority 
(ATA) or local authorities.
Provincial reconstruction teams and  
agribusiness/agriculture development  
teams, 2002–2014
The US government also established  the 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and 
the Agribusiness (or Agriculture) Development 
Teams (ADTs), to provide technical support 
or reconstruction in agriculture.
PRTs were small teams (100–250 
people) of military and civilian personnel 
who began working in Afghanistan’s prov-
inces in 2002 to provide security for aid 
workers and to help with humanitarian re-
construction tasks. The teams did not en-
gage in combat operations, but the integra-
tion of military and humanitarian work 
enabled civilian experts to receive protec-
tion as they conducted activities in hostile 
regions. All PRTs eventually fell under the 
operational command of the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), while in-
dividual nations led the teams. ISAF com-
manded 26 PRTs with 14 separate lead na-
tions; the USA led 12 of these teams. PRTs 
had left Afghanistan by the end of 2014 
(Mitchell, 2015).
Conceptually, developing a team com-
prising military personnel and civilian ex-
perts seemed like a good way to distil the 
best from both worlds. However, differ-
ences in ideology, training methods and 
funding sources often caused internal im-
balances and friction between military and 
civilian personnel. Also, PRTs were per-
ceived by Afghan officials and NGOs as 
bureaucratic, top-down units that were too 
prescriptive and donor-driven. Both groups 
criticized ‘militarized aid’ as ‘fast-win’ 
charity-like projects that were poorly exe-
cuted, and they viewed this meddling as 
using ‘aid money as a weapon system’ 
(Stewart, 2014).
The Afghan government and the inter-
national aid community believed that de-
velopment efforts should be a ‘bottom-up’ 
grassroots-style process, involving local 
communities in small-scale projects. The 
USG acknowledged these criticisms and 
began improving the PRT mission. But, in 
2008, the US Army, in conjunction with 
various Army National Guard commands, 
also started anew by establishing special-
ized, grassroots US Army Agriculture (or 
Agribusiness) Development Teams (ADTs) 
(Stewart, 2014). These specialized National 
Guard teams comprised 12 soldier-experts 
who worked, when not deployed, as profes-
sionals in an agribusiness field such as 
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 veterinary science and pest management. 
Based on their expertise, ADTs trained and 
advised Afghan Ministries and universities. 
Additionally, ADTs operated from the bot-
tom up in rural areas, working with local 
communities on small, easily replicated pro-
jects that included educational components 
with follow-up assessments. All ADTs re-
ceived months of pre-deployment training in 
their home state or at training centers, for ex-
ample, the Agricultural Development for 
 Afghanistan Pre-Deployment Training (ADAPT) 
at California State University, Fresno, 
 California. ADTs were also able to ‘reach 
back’ to home states that were committed to 
remote assistance. For example, ADT mem-
bers used their experience and professional 
connections to access expertise from their 
state’s agriculture industry or land-grant uni-
versities (LGUs) and cooperative extension 
services. In February 2008, the US Army 
 deployed the first ADT in Afghanistan to 
augment the PRT located in Jalalabad. By 
2014, nine states supported the ADT mission 
and provided a total of 49 teams that oper-
ated in 15 provinces (Stewart, 2014).
US government efforts to rebuild  
agricultural extension
The US government’s agricultural strategy 
for Afghanistan is ‘to support the rapid tran-
sition of Afghanistan to a more stable and 
productive state through the promotion of 
democracy, rule of law and sustainable eco-
nomic and social development that is re-
sponsive to citizens’ needs’ (USAID, 2010). 
Programs designed to improve Afghan ex-
tension services supported this strategy 
through direct contribution to USAID’s 5th 
strategic objective: ‘a sustainable, thriving 
agricultural economy’, linked to intermedi-
ate result (IR) 5.3, ‘improved delivery of ag-
riculture-related public services as a result 
of USG assistance’, through sub-IR  5.3.2, 
‘improved government of the Islamic Re-
public of Afghanistan agricultural research 
and extension services’ and sub-IR  5.3.3 
‘improved MAIL core functions’. Specific-
ally, the USG’s agricultural extension re-
building efforts focused on (USAID, 2010):
• Properly training, equipping and de-
ploying hundreds of MAIL’s own exten-
sion workers and working with other 
extension providers.
• Rehabilitating MAIL research/extension 
stations and demonstration farms; im-
proving linkages between agricultural 
education facilities and government in-
stitutions; and training staff to support 
the transfer of improved agricultural 
production and on-farm water manage-
ment methodologies to farmers.
• Modernizing agricultural faculties in 
the public university system; building 
the capacity of faculty and staff with 
advanced degree educational training; 
transferring technology; modernizing 
agricultural science curricula; and men-
toring faculty members from partner 
universities, both in the USA and in the 
region.
• Implementing a change-management 
program that will help MAIL to define its 
roles and priorities, and providing assist-
ance to increase institutional capacity 
(e.g. in administration, project develop-
ment and oversight or procurement).
• Improving the capability of DAIL dir-
ectors to plan budgets and implement 
programs, and providing resources re-
quired to manage and coordinate pro-
gram execution on the ground.
Since 2002, USAID has supported the distri-
bution of vouchers for seed, fertilizer, tools 
and technology to hundreds of thousands of 
farmers in an effort to jumpstart production. 
By 2014, USAID interventions had generated 
more than US$306 million in sales and ser-
vices for farmers and agribusinesses. USAID 
also trained more than 1.5  million people 
and connected more than 24,600 households 
with access to credit, while providing finan-
cing to agribusinesses generating 2913 jobs. 
In total, USAID investments helped to create 
more than 358,968 new agricultural jobs. 
Furthermore, USAID investment in rehabili-
tating irrigation infrastructure has increased 
water availability for approximately 106,000 
ha of land (USAID, n.d.).
Early programs included the Rebuild-
ing Agricultural Markets Program (RAMP, 
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2003–2006), implemented by Chemonics 
International, Inc.; the Dairy Industry Revi-
talization Project (2004–2007), implemented 
by Land  O Lakes and Mountain Pastures 
Dairy Company; and the Participating Agency 
Services Agreement (PASA) with the US De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA), which al-
lowed USDA’s Agricultural Research Service 
(USDA-ARS) to staff USAID with agricultural 
science experts to oversee USAID programs. 
Current ongoing projects include:
• Afghanistan Agricultural Extension Pro-
ject II (AAEP II, 2014–2017), implemented 
by a consortium of US universities.
• Capacity Building and Change Manage-
ment Program II (CBCMP II, 2014–2017), 
implemented by the Volunteers for 
 Economic Growth Alliance (VEGA)— 
consisting of 23 economic development 
organizations.
• Commercial Horticulture and Agricul-
tural Marketing Program (CHAMP) (2010–
2016), implemented by Roots of Peace.
• Digital Integration to Amplify Agricul-
tural Extension in Afghanistan (DIAAEA, 
2014–2015), implemented by Digital 
Green.
To date, a total of 44 USAID-funded projects 
have been completed, and 11 projects are 
ongoing (USAID, n.d.).
Successes in rebuilding agricultural extension
Many US government and other programs 
have successfully addressed some of the 
farmers’ needs in Afghanistan. These suc-
cesses include identifying and implement-
ing alternatives to poppy production, estab-
lishing water management programs to assist 
farmers in efficient resource use and introdu-
cing new technologies to help farmers gain 
better access to international markets.
Afghanistan agricultural extension project
The AAEP was a program that developed 
out of USAID initiatives for building the 
capacity of MAIL and DAIL to deliver ex-
tension services and agricultural research. 
USAID hired Checci and Company Consult-
ing, Inc. to assess research and extension 
needs and to design capacity-building pro-
grams for the request for applications. AAEP 
and two other programs resulted from the 
assessment and design process. Of the three 
programs, the US$14 million AAEP was the 
largest and longest, spanning 3 years from 
2011–2014, with the goal of building the 
capacity of MAIL to deliver demand-driven 
extension services to four target provinces 
(Balkh, Herat, Kabul and Nangarhar). With 
USAID funds, AAEP was administered by 
the USDA and implemented by a consor-
tium of four universities—the University of 
California Davis (UC Davis), Washington 
State University (WSU), Purdue University 
and the University of Maryland. The six pri-
mary objectives of the AAEP were to:
• Strengthen technical skills of extension 
workers.
• Teach demand-driven extension methods.
• Elevate the role of women in agriculture.
• Rehabilitate agricultural research stations.
• Establish workgroups focused around 
priority commodities and livestock.
• Launch a mini-grant system to encour-
age agricultural innovation and tech-
nology transfer.
UC Davis served as the lead institution. In 
addition, the consortium contracted the 
Dutch Committee for Afghanistan (DCA) to 
implement the project’s livestock program-
ming. AAEP’s contract under USDA expired 
on 30 September 2014.
UC Davis implemented AAEP activities 
first in Balkh and Kabul, before adding sec-
ondary locations in Badakhshan, Jowzjan, 
Kapisa, Panjshir, Parwan and Samangan. 
WSU was responsible for programming in 
Nangarhar and later added activities in 
Kunar and Laghman. Purdue operated out of 
Herat and also trained extension workers 
from Badghis, Farah and Ghor. Finally, Mary-
land was responsible for the Women in Agri-
culture (WIA) program, which had activities 
in Kabul, Kapisa, Parwan and Samangan.
Aside from working in a specific geo-
graphic area, the consortium partners each 
specialized in a particular subject. The aim 
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was for each partner to provide training on 
that subject across the entire program. UC 
Davis focused on post-harvest and protected 
agriculture, WSU focused on Conservation 
Agriculture (CA), Purdue focused on Inte-
grated Pest Management (IPM) and grain stor-
age, and Maryland focused on WIA. Training 
sessions and demonstrations were provided 
across programming areas by permanent pro-
gram staff and experts from abroad.
The AAEP developed an overall model 
of extension delivery that was adaptable to 
the Afghan context and capable of reaching a 
large number of farmers. The program also 
provided a wide variety of training initia-
tives in both technical skills and extension 
delivery for extension workers. Since few 
Afghan extension workers had significant 
experience with livestock, the program pro-
vided basic training in livestock care and 
created linkages among communities, exten-
sion workers and private and public veterin-
ary services. The AAEP’s work with women 
developed a network of community leaders 
who were skilled in organizing kitchen gar-
dens that provide households with improved 
nutrition and supplementary incomes.
The AAEP extension-delivery model 
consisted of:
• Thematic workgroups to facilitate com-
munication within and across the agri-
cultural community and to implement 
mini-fund projects.
• Provincial model teaching farms (PMTFs) 
in each target province, where AAEP 
staff could demonstrate, and extension 
workers could practice, new techniques 
and technologies for farmers.
• Farmer Field Schools (FFSs) and farmer 
field demonstrations (FFDs), so that ex-
tension workers trained at the PMTFs 
could provide the same training and 
demonstrations for a group of district 
farmers, enabling them to duplicate 
new techniques on their own farms.
The AAEP’s accomplishments are listed in 
Table 9.1.
The program was also able to reach 
women in target areas, who built sustain-
able community organizations. Because 
 Afghanistan has very few female extension 
workers—accounting for less than 1% of the 
total extension workers currently on file—
the AAEP WIA program used a broader ap-
proach to extension for wider impact. In 
addition to training female extension work-
ers, AAEP also trained women community 
leaders to train and form FFSs. These train-
ing sessions were designed both for novices 
and for those with more experience, as the 
education level for women in Afghanistan 
is very low. ‘Support Group’ training was 
available for FFS that focused on develop-
ing skills and practices for women outside 
the agriculture sector, such as computer lit-
eracy and savings box programs. Savings 
boxes are community savings and loan pro-
grams which provide members access to 
capital for buying needed agricultural in-
puts or rebuilding livelihoods. AAEP also 
engaged female agricultural students to as-
sist with research at the PMTFs.
In addition to the on-the-ground compo-
nents of the AAEP, two Annual Extension 
Conferences were organized. The objective 
of these events was to showcase AAEP and 
MAIL/DAIL activities and to improve com-
munication across the national extension 
community. The first conference empha-
sized the concepts behind a demand-driven 
extension model and workgroups. Sixty par-
ticipants from Balkh, Kabul, Kandahar, Kun-
duz, Nangarhar and Paktia DAILs and repre-
sentatives from the Afghan Agriculture 
Research and Extension Development Pro-
gram (AGRED), DCA, USDA, the US Em-
bassy, VEGA/CBCMP and USAID attended 
the 3-day conference. The second conference 
Table 9.1. Outcomes of the AAEP (2011–2014).
Outcome Number
Extension workers trained 355






FFDs, farmer field demonstrations; FFSs, farmer field 
schools; PMTFs, provincial model teaching farms.
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attracted more than 300 people from DAIL 
REDs, NGO representatives and AAEP staff. 
The event showcased the work done by 
AAEP in different provinces and fostered 
dialogue among extension workers from 
around the country.
AAEP also sponsored a study tour that 
took place from 1 June to 21 June 2014 for 19 
participants, including representatives from 
AAEP, DAILs and MAIL. A majority of the 
participants were high-level officials from the 
Ministry and staff from AAEP. The objective 
of the tour was to increase participants’ 
understanding of the US extension system 
and to interact with extension experts on 
topics relevant to Afghanistan. The tour suc-
cessfully accomplished two goals: (i) improv-
ing participants’ understanding of the US ex-
tension system; and (ii) helping MAIL 
employees to develop extension work plans 
for their respective provinces. However, im-
plementing these work plans will be difficult 
for extension workers, unless MAIL sets aside 
the resources necessary to carry them out.
Ultimately, AAEP helped to build the 
technical and functional capacity of indi-
vidual extension workers to operate through 
its well-adapted model. AAEP’s success in 
implementing these models was reflected 
by the decision to name it as winner of the 
2014 USDA Secretary’s Honor Award for 
Exceptional Service.
AAEP II
AAEP  II is the ongoing, 3-year extension 
phase of AAEP. AAEP II will further build 
public confidence in the Ministry and dem-
onstrate that the Afghan government is de-
veloping the capacity to provide services 
that make a difference to local livelihoods. 
AAEP II land-grant university partners will 
further build the extension capability of 
MAIL and DAIL staff and contribute add-
itional technical resources for expanding 
program implementation activities. In add-
ition, AAEP  II will work with MAIL and 
DAIL to scale up these activities from the 
current 17 provinces to a total of 25, as the 
Ministry develops the capacity to work with 
the land-grant university team.
Challenges and lessons learned  
in rebuilding agricultural extension
Research and extension practice indicates 
that a single provider, whether a public ex-
tension agency, private firm or NGO, is gen-
erally unable and ill-equipped to deliver the 
full range of rural knowledge and informa-
tion services required. Rural farm commu-
nity needs are likely to be best served by a 
mix of private and public services. For ex-
ample, public institutions could provide 
knowledge and information services, while 
the private sector teaches the technologies 
that are most appropriate for farmers’ needs.
MAIL
MAIL’s research and extension systems are 
centralized, with programmatic, budgetary 
and personnel decisions generally originat-
ing from the upper administration. The ex-
tension service, in particular, was estab-
lished as a top-down, public sector agency 
to transfer new technologies to farmers. 
However, so far field-level extension ser-
vices have been largely dominated by the 
private sector or NGOs, due to the influx of 
externally funded development programs 
and projects. The Afghan government com-
petes with NGOs for these foreign funds, 
but because its capacity is so restricted, its 
competitiveness to secure and implement 
projects is also low. There is considerable 
rhetoric regarding cooperation and coordin-
ation, but little on-the-ground evidence ex-
ists for either.
Non-governmental organizations
Although the majority of NGOs are Afghan, 
the largest programmes are implemented by 
established international relief and devel-
opment NGOs, which are overwhelmingly 
staffed by Afghan nationals and a handful of 
expatriate staff. Some of the largest NGOs 
employ more than 1000 people, making 
these organizations a significant source of 
employment for Afghans (Olsen, 2006). 
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This employment opportunity has proved 
detrimental to government extension ser-
vices, as many qualified and professional 
staff have chosen to work for better pay with 
the NGOs (Wesa, 2009). Another factor is 
that, prompted by NGO programs, MAIL 
uses extension workers for many activities 
unrelated to its mandate.
Provincial reconstruction teams
The PRT approach was met with much cyni-
cism in the NGO sector, particularly on the 
part of Afghans working in the same regions. 
Distinguishing between the intentions of 
uniformed soldiers and civilian aid workers 
was difficult for Afghan farmers. Such blur-
ring of military and civilian efforts com-
promised the neutral, non-political image so 
carefully nurtured by the NGOs. The 2014 
Aid Worker Security Report (Stoddard et al., 
2014) revealed that 251 incidents of major 
violence against aid workers occurred glo-
bally in 2013, resulting in 460 workers being 
killed, kidnapped or seriously wounded. 
 Afghanistan alone was the scene of 81 such 
attacks, the highest number in 2013. Certain 
NGOs specifically attributed decreased aid 
worker security to the PRTs operating in 
 Afghanistan (Mitchell, 2015).
Additionally, few PRTs understood the 
delicate tasks of building trust, sustaining 
community cooperation and following 
other humanitarian principles. Without a 
sophisticated understanding of local power 
dynamics, these PRTs missed vulnerable 
groups and strengthened local entities to 
the detriment of the central government. 
The PRTs required no community contribu-
tions, so some NGO programs were aban-
doned for the ‘free handouts’ given by the 
PRTs. Thus, the PRTs probably undermined 
some ongoing projects that had taken years 
to establish.
Afghanistan agricultural extension project
The AAEP was widely appreciated by train-
ees and by both MAIL and DAIL leadership. 
Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that 
the program has had a positive effect on ex-
tension workers. However, in order to estab-
lish the actual impact with any certainty, 
AAEP (and AAEP  II) must create a strong 
record of activities, costs and results. This 
documentation will be vital to the sustain-
ability of activities and their transfer to 
MAIL. Improving communication across 
the program by further empowering in- 
country leadership will be crucial for transi-
tioning activity implementation to MAIL.
Recommendations and Opportunities  
for Improvement
Many recommendations for improving 
 Afghanistan’s extension services can be 
found in the literature. Often with each 
new donor project, whether on- or off-
budget, yet another extension model is de-
veloped and put forth. Currently, the  Afghan 
government has been trying to institution-
alize  locally elected development bodies 
known as Community Development Coun-
cils (CDCs). CDCs were initially created 
under the National Solidarity Programme 
(NSP) and are found in about 85% of  Afghan 
communities (361 districts in all 34 prov-
inces) (World Bank, 2015). The CDC elec-
tion process is currently organized by na-
tional and international NGOs acting as 
facilitating partners that have a contract 
with the MRRD. The specific functions of 
the CDCs are to identify community devel-
opment priorities, apply for project fund-
ing from the national development fund, 
and contribute to project monitoring and 
evaluation.
The recently elected National Unity 
Government plans to make the CDCs the 
primary vehicle to launch a Citizens’ Charter— 
 a commitment by the government to all its 
citizens guaranteeing a minimum set of core 
services. Ideally, this core set of services 
would be defined for each community, in-
cluding the types, access, timing and dur-
ation of the services, and the officials re-
sponsible for service delivery. The CDCs 
will be the government platform and entry 
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point through which other agencies, includ-
ing MAIL and agricultural extension and 
international NGOs, deliver local-level ser-
vices. This approach will help coordinate 
efforts and concentrate resources from 
international donors, but how agricultural 
extension and its role as rural educator and 
organizer will be integrated is yet to be de-
termined. Whatever the future brings, an ef-
fective Afghan extension system must be 
created that is realistic, given the country’s 
socio-economic situation. Furthermore, 
 capacity-building measures must be in-
cluded to reduce the substitution of tempor-
ary staff funded by off-budget donor pro-
jects for the system’s long-term sustainability 
and resilience. A few proposals that advo-
cate for such improvements now follow.
Increase on-budget spending for MAIL
The majority of development expenditures 
for agriculture extension come from off-
budget, bilateral donor-funded projects, 
leaving MAIL little discretion over their al-
location. Consequently, coordination efforts 
become complicated when deciding which 
extension services should be administered 
through MAIL and which should be supple-
mented by outside donors. This situation 
also contributes to the transmission of con-
fusing extension messages to farmers, as 
each extension group works with a different 
extension protocol for implementing pro-
jects. Ideally, international donors and MAIL 
should jointly plan the transfer of donor 
projects to the Ministry’s operational direct-
orates. Hopefully, this problem will be ad-
dressed as the CDCs are institutionalized 
within the government and serve as a focal 
point to prioritize and coordinate extension 
services.
Increase spending at the district level
Too much of the available funding is central-
ized and spent on administrative functions 
at central and provincial levels, rather than 
at the district level. As a result, many exten-
sion workers are paid a salary but do not 
have an operations budget for field interactions 
with farmers, and become demoralized. MAIL 
needs to develop a more transparent mech-
anism for allocating its budget to dis-
trict-level departments for service delivery. 
One creative way might be to establish a 
competitive mini-fund system, similar to 
that operated in AAEP  II. In this system, 
provincial workgroups of district extension 
workers, researchers and farmers submit 
proposals with a detailed budget of up to 
US$5000 for training and extension activ-
ities with farmers. Projects must be com-
pleted in a short time frame (less than 1 
year) and must include a presentation, final 
report and extension materials that can be 
used by other extension workers. Another 
mechanism to obtain money for extension 
projects could be working with the CDCs to 
apply for funding from the Afghanistan Re-
construction Trust Fund via the NSP.
Build capability of extension staff
MAIL has an ambiguous national training 
plan to improve the skills of existing exten-
sion staff. The inadequate technical cap-
acity of most extension workers and their 
limited capacity to disseminate skills se-
verely constrain agricultural extension. Part 
of the problem is attributed to recruiting ex-
tension workers from Afghanistan’s 25 agri-
cultural vocational high schools (grades 10 
[ages 14–15] and 12 [ages 17–18]) and two 
training institutes (more advanced training 
through grade 14 [grade 20–21]) (World 
Bank, 2014). These training centers are nei-
ther well equipped nor adequately main-
tained, and graduates lack effective exten-
sion skills. A curriculum or certified crop 
advisor-licensing program should be devel-
oped, guaranteeing minimum agricultural 
education standards for important com-
modities. A crop advisor-licensing program 
could be organized in a manner that gener-
ates income for MAIL through a fee system 
for initial licenses and renewals. Also, a 
joint work plan between the research and 
extension directorates should be developed 
to encourage the undertaking and sharing of 
new applied research that directly benefits 
farmers. The research directorate is cur-
rently delivering some training to extension 
staff at the Badam Bagh Research Station in 
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Kabul (and at its six other stations across 
the country). However, because very little 
applied research is actually being per-
formed at these research stations, the exten-
sion training is minimal. Continued support 
for staff capacity building, as provided by 
the more successful international govern-
ment, university and NGO extension pro-
grams, can help this transition to a more ef-
fective and resilient extension system.
Information and communication  
technologies
Afghan extension services are poorly 
equipped and have inadequate training to 
take advantage of modern mass communica-
tion technologies, even though these are now 
important sources of information for many 
farmers. Information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) include social media 
groups, e-learning, radio and video stream-
ing and cell phones, all of which can be used 
to engage farmers with extension activities 
and information. According to a survey by 
GSMA Intelligence (GSMA, n.d.), 68% of the 
Afghan population have a cell phone—about 
the same level as is observed in India. MAIL 
should begin dialogue with farmers through 
these newer communication platforms.
A web-based repository of agricultural 
knowledge is currently being adapted to the 
Afghan context, using UC Davis’ e-Afghan Ag 
site (UC Davis, n.d.) and other donor-funded 
websites as models. The General Directorate 
of Extension has established a link to the 
MAIL homepage (MAIL, n.d.) called the 
 Agriculture Knowledge Bank, but the site is 
not maintained and content is rarely added. 
Concrete plans should be developed by pro-
vincial offices to collect, vet and electronic-
ally post agricultural information that could 
be easily accessed and used by extension 
workers and farmers nationwide.
Increase the number of women  
in extension
As noted above, there are few female exten-
sion workers, and none at all in some prov-
inces. Without the capacity to reach women 
in farming communities, MAIL and DAILs 
will fail to reach half of the population. At-
tracting more women to agricultural educa-
tion is essential for increasing the number of 
female research scientists and extension staff. 
Moreover, 80% of Afghan women either own 
or have access to a cell phone (World Bank, 
2014). Use of cell phones could serve as a 
powerful channel through which female ex-
tension workers could reach women farmers, 
but female MAIL staff require training if they 
are to be successful in tapping into this new 
communication medium.
Strengthen crop improvement programs
Developing a crop improvement program 
will be essential to advancing new varieties 
and eventually to Afghan-based breeding 
programs, which currently do not exist in 
MAIL’s research system. Furthermore, 
MAIL urgently needs the capacity to form 
partnerships with relevant international 
and regional research institutions (e.g. CIM-
MYT and ICARDA) so that it can procure, 
evaluate, select and deploy improved var-
ieties and agronomic best practices in a sus-
tainable manner. Priority thematic areas for 
extension and applied research interven-
tions by the crop improvement program 
could include agronomy, varietal improve-
ment, pest and disease management, weed 
control, seeding regime, nutrient manage-
ment and comparative analysis of conserva-
tion agricultural practices.
Improve security
Obviously, MAIL/DAIL’s capacity to deliver 
services would be bolstered by ensuring a se-
cure environment. A recent survey of exten-
sion workers at the fourth annual MAIL ex-
tension conference (February 2016) suggested 
that security could improve if DAIL exten-
sion objectives were clear to religious lead-
ers, shuras (councils or assemblies of those 
who will be affected by a decision), tribal 
elders and media. Too often, extension work-
ers feel their safety is compromised when 
their work is mistakenly linked to political 
agendas. The current ambiguous nature of ex-
tension workers in the eyes of villagers could 
also be clarified through the help of the CDCs.
 Post-Conflict Rebuilding of Afghanistan’s Agricultural Extension System 165
Conclusions
Key to successful agricultural development 
in Afghanistan is an effective extension sys-
tem that provides farmers with the know-
ledge and technologies needed to increase 
production, identify markets and sustain 
limited natural resources. The 2009 
 Afghanistan National Development Strategy 
stated that ‘agriculture will determine 
whether Afghanistan will succeed or fail’. 
This statement rings true, given that an esti-
mated 75% of Afghanistan’s 33  million 
people live in rural regions, where agricul-
ture is the principal means of livelihood. 
Additionally, recruiting adequate numbers 
of female extension workers and commu-
nity leaders will be imperative for serving 
the large percentage of female growers. Re-
gardless of political or moral agendas, all 
players should ensure that all Afghans have 
the best possible access to sustainable agri-
cultural resources and knowledge and may 
again face the future with dignity.
While much progress has been made, the 
Ministry must still demonstrate its ability to 
continue delivering services to Afghan house-
holds across many provinces and districts, 
with limited donor funding and intervention. 
In 2009, MAIL’s former Minister Mohammad 
Asif Rahimi stated: ‘Donors helped us make 
plenty of plans for agriculture, it’s time for us 
to implement’. A new role for MAIL will need 
to be defined within the Citizens’ Charter and 
implemented through the CDCs. Continued 
outreach—including conferences and demon-
stration and teaching farm tours—will be vital 
to expanding the use of an adaptable and real-
istic extension model. Outreach can also pro-
vide participating DAIL staff with training 
and extension materials, using ICTs to en-
hance knowledge sharing.
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Introduction
Tajik farmers confront multiple technical, 
economic and environmental challenges. 
Their knowledge of animal and crop hus-
bandry is limited to ‘traces and fragments’ 
(Shtaltovna, 2016: 25). Farmers lack access to 
input and output markets and the country 
does not have enough skilled agricultural 
personnel. An evaluation of the knowledge 
of agronomists employed by the United 
States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) Farmer Advisory Services in Tajikistan 
(FAST) program as extension agents by a se-
nior faculty member from the University of 
Illinois found very large gaps in those profes-
sionals’ knowledge, even though they were 
competitively selected and had, as a group, 
considerable experience with previous tech-
nical assistance projects (Babadoost, 2014).
There was no need for any extension sys-
tem of the sort familiar in market economies 
under Soviet collectivized agriculture. The 
creation from scratch of extension systems 
must be part of the broader reform of the 
whole national economy and polity to move 
away from a command system (e.g. Karcz, 
1974) to a market-based one. The collective 
and state farms that were the foundation of 
the Soviet command economy and polity and 
were the key organizations in the countryside 
until the end of Soviet rule in 1991 have been 
largely dismantled. Decollectivization, how-
ever, also requires the creation, repurposing 
or strengthening of all other rural social and 
political institutions. Stronger, more effective 
local government would play a very import-
ant role in preventing future conflict in Ta-
jikistan. Extension, by providing a visible 
and valued service to village residents, can 
increase the legitimacy of the state and 
strengthen local government.
Tajikistan desperately needs modern 
agricultural education and extension. But 
so far, despite hard and dedicated work by 
many people and the expenditure of consid-
erable amounts of money, especially foreign 
aid, little progress has been made in build-
ing viable agricultural extension structures 
in Tajikistan.
Background
Soviet Tajikistan was effectively a colony. 
The Soviet authorities arbitrarily drew the 
boundaries of what is now independent 
 Tajikistan in 1924. Only after the collapse of 
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the USSR in 1991, however, did those lines 
on the map became real territorial boundar-
ies affecting people’s lives (Reeves, 2007). 
They enclose a heterogeneous population 
and territory with little historical unity bor-
dering China, Afghanistan and two other 
new post-Soviet states, Uzbekistan and 
 Kyrgyzstan.
Tajikistan is a mountainous country 
with abundant water but relatively little land 
that is suitable for agriculture. Most agricul-
tural land requires irrigation. The Soviet au-
thorities systematically built irrigation sys-
tems and regularly brought large new areas 
into cultivation. As new agricultural regions 
were developed, the planners shipped 
people to them to provide the needed labor. 
The southwestern part of the Khatlon pro-
vince, now the country’s principal agricul-
tural region responsible for about 40% of 
total agricultural output, was reshaped into 
an irrigated agricultural area optimized for 
cotton monoculture in a tremendous, 60-year 
construction effort (Aminjanov, 2012). Whole 
villages from elsewhere in Tajikistan and 
other Soviet republics were forcibly re-
located to Khatlon and other areas of Tajikistan 
newly opened for cultivation (Kassymbekova, 
2011).
Tajikistan suffered a post-independence 
civil war in 1992–1997 (e.g. Atkin, 1997). As 
many as 60,000 people perished violently in 
the war (Kuvatova, 2001: 128). Much of the 
built environment, particularly in the south-
ern Khatlon province, was destroyed. The 
educational system was particularly af-
fected. The fighters wrecked rural schools 
and murdered or drove away teachers. The 
restored national government was crippled 
by the loss of skilled personnel, what 
amounted to national bankruptcy was caused 
in part by its attempt to maintain subsidies 
to production agriculture during the war 
and suspicion between the former parties to 
the conflict. Under the circumstances, the 
United Nations, the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank were unusually 
important in supporting and funding the 
post-civil war government, and they ac-
quired an unusual amount of influence over 
the new state. Almost 20 years after the 
peace settlement, the government remains 
highly dependent on the international donor 
community.
Armed clashes between government 
forces and insurgents continue periodic-
ally. The most recent significant fighting— 
between supporters of a mutinous Dep-
uty Minister of Defense and government 
forces—occurred in and near the capital, 
Dushanbe, in September 2015. The state 
and civil peace are sufficiently fragile that a 
return to conflict is a real concern among 
analysts and Tajik citizens (e.g. ICG, 2016).
Tajikistan almost entirely lacks any 
tradition or experience of civil society or 
the rule of law. Until 1991 members of the 
Tajik national elites, unlike those of most 
African countries under colonial rule, were 
not free even in theory to study in or learn 
about metropolitan powers other than Russia. 
Their knowledge of anything other than the 
Soviet way of doing things was and is very 
limited—and all too often based on superfi-
cial understanding of the non-Soviet world. 
Groups opposed to the late Soviet- era pere-
stroika reforms—with their limited accept-
ance of liberal political values and market 
mechanisms—were the victors in the post- 
independence civil war. A quarter- century 
after independence, Tajikistan is still in an 
early stage of decolonization when former 
colonial and first-generation post-colonial 
elites are trying to maximize their own con-
trol of resources left from the colonial 
period, destroying many of those resources 
in the process.
Emomali Rahmon, first elected head of 
state during the civil war in late 1992, re-
mains the country’s leader after winning 
presidential elections in 1994, 1999, 2006 
and 2013. Since his first inauguration, Presi-
dent Rahmon has steadily strengthened his 
position (Global Voices, 2016; Lemon, 
2016). The US-based Freedom House char-
acterizes Tajikistan as ‘not free’ (Freedom 
House, 2016).
The contemporary Tajik state is for-
mally centralized and practically authori-
tarian, largely retaining Soviet institutional 
patterns. The national government is ex-
tremely suspicious of any reforms that ap-
pear to devolve real power to regional or 
local governments, as the rulers’ nightmare 
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is a return to the territorial fragmentation of 
the civil war (Matveeva, 2009). Although 
outwardly strong, the national Tajik state is 
actually quite fragile. It depends on citi-
zens’ habits of obedience and its coercive 
apparatus to ensure civil order and political 
stability, having little ideological appeal 
and providing little economic advantage to 
the vast majority of citizens. The national 
government largely relies on international 
donors to improve medical, educational 
and other social services, and to maintain 
and develop infrastructure, particularly in 
the countryside.
The specific political economy of Tajiki-
stan is crucial to the country’s continuing 
stability but also greatly hinders economic 
and political development. Tajikistan’s 
patrimonial political regime relies for its sta-
bility on distributing state and international 
donor-provided resources to a myriad of 
local and regional supporters in a complex 
and shifting set of rewards and punish-
ments. The government faces growing diffi-
culties mobilizing enough resources—
whether cash, government jobs, construction 
and development projects or control of agri-
cultural and industrial output—to keep all 
elite claimants satisfied.
The Republic of Tajikistan is the poor-
est and has been the least stable of the states 
that emerged from the collapse of the USSR 
in 1991. It is still the poorest post-Soviet 
state. In 2014, 32% of the population lived 
below the poverty line, including 16.8% of 
the population who lived in extreme pov-
erty, unable to supply themselves with 
enough food to meet the minimum daily en-
ergy requirement (Presidential Agency on 
Statistics, 2015: 21).
Agriculture
In his 2016 annual message to Parliament, 
President Emomali Rahmon stated that 
agriculture contributes on average 23% to 
the annual gross domestic product (Khovar, 
2016). More than 73% of Tajikistan’s popu-
lation lives in rural areas, where there is no 
work but primary agriculture. Agriculture 
provides 45% of total employment in 
 Tajikistan (Presidential Agency on Statis-
tics, 2015). Unpaid rural employment is 
hard to disentangle from paid rural labor. 
Most village residents work continuously 
on their own household farms and also re-
ceive nominal cash wages—and the right to 
cotton stalks and other waste which they 
can burn for cooking and heating—for work 
done on commercial farms at peak times 
such as harvest.
Tajikistan has been conducting a land 
and agrarian reform since 1992. It is now 
expected to be completed in 2020. From 
fewer than 1000 collective and state farms 
in 1991, some 143,653 farms had been cre-
ated in Tajikistan as of 1 January 2015 
(SCLM, 2015). Farm size data for the entire 
country are not available, but in the districts 
of the Khatlon province for which informa-
tion was available as of 1 January 2012, more 
than 60% of all commercial farms held less 
than 5 ha of arable land (Aliev and Van Atta, 
2013). The reform’s design had been largely 
developed in the Russian Federation, where 
irrigated agriculture is much less prevalent 
and where the political purpose of the re-
form was to eliminate the old communist 
elite’s power base in the countryside (Van 
Atta, 1993, 1994).
The reform’s design and implementa-
tion have not focused on ensuring that farm 
operation could be profitable for farmers. 
The commercial farms created by ongoing 
land reform from the Soviet-era collective 
and state farms have struggled to operate 
profitably, contributing substantially to the 
continuing weakness of the country’s econ-
omy (Van Atta, 2009; Eurasianet, 2016). Be-
fore 2007, the government cited the need for 
job creation to justify maintaining subsidies 
to the cotton sector, even as it was seeking 
donor support to pay the snowballing debts 
of farms to private suppliers of inputs and 
cotton traders (Van Atta, 2009). Following 
the financial collapse of the sector in 2008 
(IMF, 2008; Minder and Gorst, 2008; Ernst 
and Young, 2009) the government agreed to 
freeze cotton debts, systematically reduce its 
subsidies to the sector, pursue crop diversi-
fication and increase efforts to make agricul-
ture profitable for farmers over a 5-year 
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period in return for donor support (Alimar-
don, 2009; Rahmon, 2009; World Bank, 2011; 
GoTJ/DCC, 2012; World Bank, 2013: 26). 
The government largely carried out these 
commitments.
Household agriculture—very small-
scale ‘subsistence’ agriculture carried out 
by the families of collective farm members 
and state farm workers—was always a very 
important source of family food supplies 
and income in the Tajik SSR, as it was 
throughout the Soviet Union (Wädekin, 
1973). Household farms have become even 
more important for rural livelihoods in 
 Tajikistan since 1991. They hold about 25% 
of the country’s total arable land (Van Atta 
and Safaraliev, 2015). President Rahmon 
stated in 2014 that household farms pro-
duce more than 60% of the country’s gross 
agricultural output by value. Household 
farms hold 90% of all livestock and, in add-
ition to producing about half of the coun-
try’s total wheat, also contribute very sub-
stantially to the production of labor-intensive 
horticultural crops (e.g. Muminov, 2011).
The Village Community
As a result of the civil war and the accom-
panying collapse of government, village 
communities and local notables such as for-
mer civil war commanders, businessmen or 
former heads of successful state and collect-
ive farms—often the same persons—became 
the key providers of services and support to 
local residents.
Village organization and culture varies 
considerably within the country, and every-
where there is an unstable amalgam of 
pre-Soviet Central Asian forms and atti-
tudes, Soviet ones and post-Soviet forms of 
life (Ibañez-Tirado, 2015). However, trad-
itional, semi-formal community organiza-
tions, particularly the mahalla (neighbor-
hood, also originally the area whose residents 
all attended the same mosque), are the 
basis of community life beyond the house-
hold (Kikuta, 2016: 91–93). Mahallas exist 
in all residential areas of the country. They 
are legally recognized and regulated as ‘com-
munity self-activity organs’ (Zakon, 2008). 
That awkward phrase roughly approxi-
mates to ‘community-based organizations’. 
Every mahalla has a leader (raisi mahalla) 
who may simply be acknowledged by gen-
eral consensus or who may have been 
elected by the community. Higher author-
ities confirm the mahalla leaders in their 
positions. Most mahallas have a council 
that includes the mahalla leader, the former 
collective farm brigade leader, the school-
teacher, the mullah and others. In many lo-
cations, such as generally throughout the 
Zarafshon and the Rasht Valleys, the mahal-
las have become legal entities. As such, they 
are ‘community organizations’ (in Russian, 
‘obshchestvennye organizatsii’), the Tajik 
equivalent, legally, of non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs) elsewhere. This status 
allows them to have bank accounts and han-
dle money, including donor funds.
Ethnographic observation suggests that 
in most places where there is an elected or 
informally agreed local leadership, whether 
as a mahalla committee, a ‘village develop-
ment organization’, a Water Users’ Associ-
ation (WUA) management board or other 
community agency, the same people will be 
on all such local bodies as a result of com-
munity consensus or acquiescence (Sehring, 
2009; Levi-Sanchez, 2015). As John Heath-
ershaw noted, community-based organizations 
‘were typically composed of pre-existing 
groups within the community that were in-
visible to international programme officers 
(though not their local staff) and made their 
decisions informally, over tea in the mosque 
or community center out of the sight of the 
donors’ (Heathershaw and Megoran, 2011: 
608–609).
Migration and the Role of Women
The civil war and the lack of decently pay-
ing jobs in rural areas have caused massive 
emigration by skilled and unskilled labor 
alike to seek employment in the Russian 
Federation. The conventional estimate is 
that 1 million of the 8.5 million people of 
Tajikistan, mostly men, are migrants work-
ing outside the country. In recent years, 
 Tajikistan has depended more on migrants’ 
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remittances than any other country in the 
world. Current economic difficulties in 
Russia caused by international sanctions 
and collapsing oil prices have caused a 
decline in the number of people leaving 
Tajikistan to work in Russia in 2014 and 
2015 compared to 2013 (MEDT, 2015). But 
the expected wave of returning migrants has 
not yet occurred in the numbers expected—
or feared—most probably because there is 
no work other than subsistence agriculture 
for them in Tajikistan (Asia-Plus, 2016).
There is some room for doubt that men 
would take most of the jobs available in 
agriculture. Women do most of the work on 
household farms. They also do almost all of 
the manual and seasonal labor on the com-
mercial farms, where there is a preference 
for hand-picked cotton and an acute ab-
sence of machinery. Most of the seasonal 
and permanent migrants to Russia are men, 
so women are even more important in agri-
cultural labor than they would be if the mi-
grants were home. However, in most places 
they do not have formal power, and stories 
of husbands telling their wives how to 
 manage the farm by phone from Russia are 
 common (Giovarelli and Undeland, 2008; 
Mukhamedova and Wegerich, 2014). Although 
it is reasonable to assume that women have 
become more important as decision makers, 
USAID’s index of women’s empowerment 
in agriculture in Tajikistan notes particu-
larly that women have little autonomy in 
production decisions in agriculture (Malapit 
et al., 2014: 29), reflecting their status as 
casual workers, not skilled labor or man-
agers on the commercial farms. Observa-
tions by the FAST project indicate that 
women have some autonomous decision 
making power over household farms. Their 
freedom in that sphere seems to increase 
when they know more about how to suc-
cessfully manage them.
Government Administration  
of Agriculture
The national government has been continu-
ally pressured to reduce its spending and its 
staff, yet continues to see its role in agricul-
ture largely as directly organizing production. 
It has never taken the lead in developing or 
supporting public or private extension, al-
though individual senior officials have at 
times attempted to do so.
Coordination among cabinet-level agen-
cies on cross-cutting issues is supposed to be 
facilitated by multi-agency councils, includ-
ing a Council on Water Policy and a Council 
on Food Security (GoTJ, 2011). These cabinet- 
level councils rarely meet. As of the end of 
2015, the Food Security Council had met 
only once since the Law on Food Security 
mandated its establishment in 2010.
Several cabinet-level agencies deal with 
agriculture in Tajikistan. The Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade develops 
the annual official forecast for crop-sown 
areas. The Ministry of Agriculture exercises 
regulatory and production-monitoring func-
tions, although the Presidential Agency for 
Statistics reports on the fulfillment of pro-
duction forecasts. The State Committee on 
Land Management (SCLM) classifies and 
regulates the use of all agricultural land, 
conducts the land reform and ensures that 
agricultural land is used ‘for its purpose’ by 
all farmers.
The Ministry of Energy and Water Re-
sources is responsible for overall water pol-
icy, including the timing of water release 
from the country’s reservoirs for irrigation. 
It, however, reports to the prime minister or 
his deputy concerned with industry, not to 
the deputy prime minister responsible for 
agriculture and the environment. Although 
agriculture consumes about 95% of Tajikistan’s 
total water usage, the Ministry of Agriculture 
does not have a seat on the Cabinet Water 
Policy Council. The Presidential Agency for 
Land Reclamation and Irrigation constructs 
and manages all irrigation and drainage fa-
cilities except for those located directly on 
the territory of the former collective and 
state farms.
With the exception of the Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade, which 
grew out of the Soviet-era State Planning 
Committee, all these cabinet-level agencies 
are implementing bodies. They have little 
capacity to develop policy, to advocate the 
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interests of their constituents within the 
government or to provide public services.
The national agencies have sub-units in 
the country’s three provinces and 59 dis-
tricts. The provincial and district agricul-
tural agencies are small, with no more than 
a dozen staff members each. Agricultural 
agency personnel have subject matter ex-
pertise but are largely trained to oversee the 
operation of large farms. They generally 
consider their primary responsibility to be 
making sure that farmers fulfill their pro-
duction plans. Most of the 367 rural coun-
cils (jamoats) have a staff member respon-
sible for statistics, another for land surv eying 
and titling and a third for agriculture. Many 
of the jamoat agricultural ‘specialists’ have 
little or no formal training in agriculture. Be-
cause of their limited budgets and conse-
quent inability to travel, provincial, district 
and jamoat agricultural specialists are gen-
erally restricted to telephone contact with 
‘their’ farmers and farms. No government 
employees at any level have training in or 
formal knowledge of small-farm develop-
ment or business management, although 
many are also farmers themselves. Even if 
their jobs were redefined to require them to 
provide farm business management advice, 
they would not be competent to do more 
than recommend individual sources of in-
puts and possible market opportunities.
The Ministry of Agriculture has no legal 
responsibility to assist or oversee household 
farms, and normally it does not work with 
them, although this situation is slowly chan-
ging. The job descriptions of the jamoat-level 
agricultural specialists include many duties, 
one of which is to provide information and 
assistance to household farms. Interviews 
with those officials, however, suggest that 
they are mainly concerned with production 
plan fulfillment and tax collection as op-
posed to providing direct services and as-
sistance to farmers.
Local WUAs manage tertiary irrigation 
facilities. Although they fulfill a govern-
mental function and their collection of 
water charges and membership dues are ef-
fectively taxes, they are legally considered 
to be non-governmental, voluntary organ-
izations. Many WUAs do not really operate.
Agricultural Research and Education
Under Soviet rule, the Dushanbe Agricul-
tural Institute (now the Agricultural Univer-
sity of Tajikistan) prepared students for 
agricultural careers. Curricula were very 
narrowly specialized, for instance, to be a 
‘farm bookkeeper’ or ‘tractor driver’. The 
Ministry of Agriculture specified the num-
ber of persons to be trained in each spe-
cialty and directed each new specialist to a 
specific large farm where the new graduate’s 
services were needed. They were legally re-
quired to continue working where they had 
been sent for several years after receiving 
their diploma. The Institute also carried out 
in-service training and retraining, but had 
no research or extension function. The 
All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sci-
ences organized all agricultural research in 
the USSR (Nikonov, 1995). The Academy’s 
Central Asian Division and its network of 
research institutes and stations carried out 
agricultural research at the request of, and 
funded by, the Ministry of Agriculture. The 
Ministry also had its own network of labora-
tories and field stations, principally de-
signed to test and certify new equipment, 
plant varieties and seed and livestock 
breeds—all developed by the Academy—
for production use. The Ministry was re-
sponsible for introducing innovations it 
judged successful on all collective and state 
farms (Van Atta, 1990).
Formal agricultural education now 
largely runs on by inertia, mostly training 
students for jobs that no longer exist. The 
Agricultural University is still the major 
institution of higher education that trains 
agricultural officials, agricultural special-
ists and farm managers. Although it has 
added an ‘agribusiness’ department and its 
faculty now do some research, the Agri-
cultural University’s curriculum is largely 
unchanged from that of the Soviet era. 
Many of its graduates do not have the 
training either to operate farms in a market 
economy or to provide effective advice 
and assistance to commercial or subsist-
ence farmers.
The conclusions of a recent USAID- 
funded study of the agricultural education 
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and training (AET) system have serious im-
plications for extension:
[The] AET system in Tajikistan is not ready 
to absorb a multimillion dollar investment 
in infrastructure or curriculum development 
because it does not have the human or 
institutional capacity to absorb an investment. 
. . . [T]he AET system is currently under- 
valued and under-resourced within the 
educational and occupational context of 
Tajikistan, and is at risk of falling even 
farther behind, to the point of becoming 
irrelevant. . . . The loss of the capacity and 
potential at the university and technical 
college levels would greatly limit the 
possibilities for agricultural development 
and growth in Tajikistan, as these are the 
only institutions with curricula focused on 
the production side of agriculture.
(Jones et al., 2015: 17)
Without people trained to do the work of 
extension agents, no agricultural extension 
and advisory system, and no effective pro-
ject-level interventions in agricultural pro-
duction, are possible in Tajikistan.
The system of directed agricultural in-
novation and research that fulfilled some of 
the functions of an extension system before 
1991 has largely collapsed. The Academy of 
Agricultural Sciences of Tajikistan, established 
in 1991 from the units of the All-Union 
Academy of Agricultural Sciences located in 
Tajikistan, has been greatly reduced from its 
former size. The Ministry of Agriculture, 
which is still supposed to act as the principal 
customer for agricultural research, lacks the 
funds to support much research work. Al-
most all of the Ministry’s Soviet-era research, 
testing and training facilities have been 
abandoned for lack of funding. Their lands 
have largely been broken up and distributed 
to farmers as part of the land reform.
Efforts to build agricultural extension  
services in Tajikistan
The international donor community has 
driven efforts to create agricultural extension 
services in post-independence Tajikistan. 
Donor activities only began in 1996, and 
 extension activities did not become very 
significant until a decade later. Kazbekov 
and Qureshi (2011: 11–14) and FAST (2014a: 
17–21) briefly survey the situation.
Many humanitarian aid and technical 
assistance projects operating in Tajikistan 
have involved some form of localized agricul-
tural extension. In October 2006, the European 
Union (EU) and the Canadian International 
Development Agency held a public confer-
ence to consider how to coordinate efforts to 
develop agricultural extension more widely 
(Sheltinga and Coene, 2006). This event was 
one of the earliest public consultations among 
donors to systematize efforts to build an agri-
cultural extension system.
By 2008 the Ministry of Agriculture, 
with assistance from the EU but building on 
an earlier effort supported by the Food 
and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO), had established a working 
group to consider how to develop extension. 
The committee designed an extension system 
targeted at commercial farmers, proposing to 
create an Information Coordination Center 
within the Ministry of Agriculture that would 
work directly with a private extension pro-
viders’ peak association. That association, in 
turn, would facilitate the provision of agri-
cultural consulting services by agricultural 
cooperatives, independent farmers’ associ-
ations, private businesses and NGOs (SENAS 
et al., 2009; Dadabaev, 2010). A peak organiza-
tion, AgroDonish (‘Agricultural Knowledge’), 
established and supported by the international 
community, was then active.
In 2010, the World Bank Public Sector 
Reform Program supported functional re-
views of several Ministries, including the 
Ministry of Agriculture (Van Atta et al., 
2010a, 2010b). The review recommended 
that the Ministry fundamentally restructure 
itself, including the creation of an extension 
unit along the lines of the ‘information cen-
ter’ proposal. However, the Ministry of Agri-
culture rejected the reorganization pro-
posals, responding that the Ministry was 
structured to administer crop production, 
animal husbandry and agricultural engin-
eering, as well as to organize economic plan-
ning and production reporting. Its staff had 
no training or experience with client ser-
vice, economic analysis and market research 
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or most of the other functions proposed for 
the Ministry, including US- or European- 
style agricultural extension and consulting. 
Since people who did know about these 
subjects in Tajikistan did not exist or those 
who did were not willing to work for low 
official government salaries, and since the 
Ministry and government as a whole did not 
want to end the employment of the existing 
staff, the recommendations were rejected.
In 2011, continuing the activity of the 
Ministry working group, the government re-
quested assistance from the donor commu-
nity to create a national strategy to develop 
agricultural extension services for the com-
mercial farms created by the ongoing land 
reform (van Weperen et al., 2012). The 
 German development agency GIZ (Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
GmbH) took the lead role in this work from 
the donor side. According to persons in-
volved in the discussions, the strategy was 
left incomplete when the Ministry insisted 
that it should direct all extension activities, 
whether they were publicly funded or car-
ried out by NGOs. This reported Ministry 
position is probably a poorly explained re-
statement of the plan proposed in 2010 for 
the Information Coordination Center, but it 
is likely that the dispute also concerned 
who, if anyone, would evaluate the quality 
of extension agents and the reliability of 
their advice. Before the disagreement could 
be resolved, the donor technical assistance 
project that supported the work ended, and 
the ministry stopped active work on the 
document.
In 2013, the Ministry of Agriculture, 
with advice and encouragement from the 
FAO, established an agricultural extension 
department. A ‘department’ is the smallest 
recognized unit within a Tajik Ministry. 
It must be composed of no fewer than two 
professional employees. At present, the 
Ministry’s Extension Department has two 
employees.
Ministry officials have indicated that if 
funding were to become available—which, 
because of the Ministry’s limited budget in 
practice means if an international donor 
were willing to pay—the Ministry would be 
interested in developing greater extension 
capacity at national and regional levels. Se-
nior officials of the Agency for Land Rec-
lamation and Irrigation have also recently 
stated that they would like to develop the 
capacity to advise and direct farmers on 
crop production, viewing that as a profit 
center for the Agency.
Donors’ approaches to agricultural extension 
in Tajikistan
Donors have supported a variety of ap-
proaches to extension. All of them have 
been tied to specific projects, although they 
intend to design and demonstrate activities 
that, after successfully showing results in a 
relatively small geographic area of the coun-
try, could be taken over by government or 
the private sector and scaled up to achieve 
national coverage. However, to date these 
efforts have almost entirely failed. Exten-
sion services have been limited in space to 
the areas covered by a project’s funding, 
and in time to the life of donor support.
There is general agreement that house-
hold and commercial farmers welcome ex-
tension services and that commercial farm-
ers would in principle pay something for 
them if they could not receive services free 
(Engel et al., 2015). But the government’s 
limited resources, the difficulties of the 
business climate, the general unprofitability 
of agriculture for producers, and farmers’ 
expectations after 20 years of international 
assistance that donors should and will give 
them things free of charge, make it very dif-
ficult for donor initiatives in extension to 
take root. These limitations are generally 
understood by international and national 
staff in Tajikistan. As one international or-
ganization employee commented to a visit-
ing project designer in 2014: ‘You should 
still be able to find some of the extension 
NGOs that worked with that project. It just 
ended, so they won’t have disappeared yet.’
The donor community in Tajikistan de-
bates whether agricultural extension ser-
vices should be self-supporting based on 
fees for service or paid for by the govern-
ment. At one level, this reflects a difference 
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between the US model of agricultural exten-
sion and the one now common in Western 
Europe. At another level it reflects a debate 
about the role of government. As a USAID 
employee commented once during a discus-
sion of extension among USAID employees 
and contractors in 2010: ‘If you say that the 
government is to support it, that’s not sus-
tainable!’ This statement was made not be-
cause of the very considerable fiscal diffi-
culties of the Tajik government but because 
the speaker did not believe in government 
provision of such services.
‘Fee or free to farmers’ is a false dichot-
omy. Any extension system should require 
some contribution from the farmers it 
serves, although not necessarily a monetary 
one and very likely not full cost-recovery.
The Tajik state is not willing or, as its 
Ministry of Finance asserts, able to fund an 
extension system, although some progress 
has been made in convincing some policy 
makers that it should because it would be a 
public good, serving almost everyone in Ta-
jikistan. Farmers have not been able to fully 
pay the costs of extension, as the tendency 
of extension NGOs to become moribund as 
soon as donor funding ends shows. What-
ever their stated approach, donors have 
paid for most of the costs of all the exten-
sion activities discussed in detail in the fol-
lowing section.
Extension efforts in Tajikistan have pro-
vided different kinds of services. Most offered 
training on specific agricultural topics, for in-
stance, pruning or greenhouse construction. 
Some models followed those topics with a 
specific group through a growing season or 
production cycle. All these efforts seem to 
have been limited to a single crop, product or 
value chain. So far as can be determined, no 
extension effort in Tajikistan has sought to 
provide training on integrated farming sys-
tems or on designing, operating and man-
aging a multi-activity farm business.
Other extension activities were narrower, 
or ‘extension-like’, in that they sought to 
reach a rural audience, but with messages 
that might not be traditional for extension. 
Their experience can inform extension 
 efforts in Tajikistan. Sometimes donors 
have sought to copy mechanically their 
 experience for agricultural extension proper, 
with mixed results.
Most extension efforts in Tajikistan have 
been aimed at commercial farmers who re-
ceived their land through the land reform. 
Commercial farmers, especially those who 
attend training events, are overwhelmingly 
male. There does not seem to have been 
much attempt to differentiate target audi-
ences based on farm size or specialization. 
Given the circumstances, it probably would 
have been unreasonable to require such a 
narrow focus, since the attendees at many 
extension efforts were and are those people 
who happened to find out about the event, 
not an audience or group of participants 
picked by the extension activity. When the 
audience was selected, the local authorities 
generally made the choices. For instance, the 
Khatlon provincial authorities instructed the 
heads of local NGOs to attend a training ses-
sion sponsored by FAST and the US Farmer- 
to-Farmer program by calling each NGO’s 
leader. Since it is hard to adequately publi-
cize events in Tajikistan, the authorities were 
helping their farmers and the event by in-
forming others about it. But, for a local resi-
dent, the authorities’ request to attend the 
event was an offer that could not be refused.
Since women do most of the work but 
the bosses are overwhelmingly male, activ-
ities for commercial farmers train the 
bosses, not the laborers. The male head of 
household has considerable power over the 
household farm, but it is worked almost ex-
clusively by women. So extension aimed at 
household farmers must be tailored to reach 
women. Doing so requires constant care, as 
male trainers may not always be welcome in 
women’s groups. When groups include both 
men and women, they stand separately by 
gender with the women generally in the 
back or to the side, and trainers tend to 
speak to the men and ignore the women.
Extension services, in Tajikistan and 
elsewhere, can be distinguished by the 
length and type of the contact between the 
extension worker and the audience. One-off 
advice, answering specific questions when 
someone walks in to an extension center or 
purchases a product from an agricultural in-
put store, or purchases of a product from an 
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agricultural input store (an ‘agro-shop’) are 
the contacts with the shortest duration. 
 Depending on the question and the answer, 
it may be very effective or have little impact. 
One-time classes, such as presentations by 
US Farmer-to-Farmer volunteers, may be 
very useful if the speaker and the audience 
are well matched. Short courses, such as 
those provided by USAID’s Water Users As-
sociation Support Program, have longer con-
tact time. Farmer Field Schools extending 
over a whole growing season involve still 
more contact and begin to allow follow-up. 
If the purpose of the extension activity is to 
transfer skills, contact that continues over 
more than one growing season, in order to 
allow interaction and to show improvement, 
is clearly preferable.
Many of the extension activities in 
 Tajikistan have relied on town-based cen-
ters, which required farmers seeking exten-
sion to travel to them. Input-supply stores, 
similarly, require travel, although in their 
case the travel has more than one purpose 
(to buy an input, as well as to seek advice). 
It is reasonable to assume that extension 
 activities that require the farmer to come to 
the extension center generate less interest 
and effect than activities performed at the 
farm or in the village.
Specific extension projects
This section briefly reviews specific exten-
sion projects carried out in Tajikistan. The 
analysis is based on a review of available 
literature, discussions with knowledge-
able Tajiks and international specialists, 
and the author’s own knowledge. The re-
view suggests that despite repeated donor 
affirmations that extension programs are 
vitally needed, most ‘extension’ efforts in 
Tajikistan actually have been brief training 
sessions or public awareness campaigns 
with little continuity or follow-up.
Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA)
The National Association of Family Farms 
of Tajikistan is a quasi-governmental body 
dedicated to representing the interests of 
commercial farmers to the Ministry of Agri-
culture and elsewhere in the government. 
Some of its district branches employ one or 
two extension agents, usually working from 
the district administration building. As part 
of a general commitment to strengthening 
farmers’ associations, JICA joined with the 
Association to train those agents and pre-
pare agricultural production training mater-
ials in 2008–2011. The Association still has 
much of the equipment, and the training 
materials are still in circulation. It is not 
clear how many of the district level advisors 
continue to function.
World Bank
From 1996 on, the World Bank, almost en-
tirely through its soft-loan window, the 
International Development Association, has 
provided major funding for land reform, ir-
rigation works and agricultural develop-
ment (World Bank, 1996). Many of these 
project designs have included some exten-
sion services. In most cases, this require-
ment was satisfied by one-off training clas-
ses for direct beneficiaries, organized by the 
project management unit (PMU) either 
through direct hires or through subcon-
tracted NGOs. Although participants in 
such training events always express their 
appreciation for them, and there is no doubt 
that the information provided is useful to 
participants, there is little reason to think 
that such one-time efforts have much long- 
term impact.
The World Bank’s Farm Privatization 
Support Project (FPSP, 2000–2005) paid for 
the refurbishment of a building for use as 
the National Agricultural Training Center. 
The facility survives as a fee-for-service 
subsidiary of the Ministry of Agriculture. It 
now rents its meeting facilities to anyone 
who will pay and does not concentrate on 
extension training.
At the request of the government, the 
donor community devoted considerable 
efforts to reviving cotton production in 
Tajikistan in 2000–2007. One of the most 
recent activities devoted specifically to 
the sector was the joint Asian Development 
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Bank Sustainable Cotton Subsector Project 
(SCSP, 2007–2012) and World Bank Inter-
national Development Association’s Cotton 
Sector Recovery Project (CSRP, 2007–2013). 
The two efforts shared a PMU (GoTJ, 2007) 
and largely operated as a single unit.
According to the project’s Implementa-
tion Completion Report (World Bank, 2013), 
eight NGOs each trained ten trainers-of- 
trainers ‘to implement community outreach 
and farmer extension programs in project 
districts’ (p. viii). Those trainers conducted 
seven awareness campaigns. A reported 
6800 people benefited from public aware-
ness campaigns (p. vii). The report said 
elsewhere that 10,120 people benefited 
from community outreach programs, and 
5251 people benefited from farmer exten-
sion programs (pp. vii–viii). (It appears that 
these several numbers are various ways of 
counting the same contacts, not a cumula-
tive number of persons reached.) The Im-
plementation Completion Report further 
states that four Training Information Cen-
ters (TICs) (p. 23) were established and 
would continue:
These NGOs (19) that have received 
technical assistance and training under 
CSRP will continue to work with the 
farmers in terms of outreach, training and 
advice. The TICs that have been established 
will continue their operation, and have 
already started to recover the operational 
costs by charging for services to farmers. 
The PMU has also taken a number of 
measures to ensure financial sustainability 
and transition to self-financing of all 
created TICs.
(pp. 7–8)
The same Implementation Completion Re-
port later said that the PMU worked with 32 
NGOs (p. 19).
The Khatlon province authorities asked 
USAID’s FAST to cooperate with the CSRP 
TICs to help them continue operations. 
However, FAST was unable to help because 
the TICs concentrated on cotton produc-
tion, and, so far as FAST staff could deter-
mine in 2014, the TICs had ceased operations. 
It is likely that some of the NGOs mentioned 
also worked with the Tajik Agricultural Fi-
nancing Facility (TAFF, see below), which 
assisted in disbursement of cotton farm fi-
nancing provided under CRSP.
Asian Development Bank
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has 
supported some extension as part of its in-
vestments in rehabilitating irrigation, the 
cotton sector and overall rural develop-
ment. It appears that most ADB efforts, too, 
were one-off training events by contracted 
NGOs. An evaluation of its projects in agri-
cultural and rural development covering 
the period 1998–2013 suggested that ‘farm 
capacity development and the establish-
ment of quality extension services needs to 
be given greater attention in order to maxi-
mize the impact of irrigation works’ (ADB, 
2014: 13). The ADB reduced its emphasis 
on agriculture in Tajikistan after 2008 and 
now appears to be principally impacting 
Tajik agriculture as part of climate change 
resilience activities.
Land projects
Several donors, particularly USAID, have 
supported land rights consulting centers at 
various times and for various periods since 
2000. Following the US government’s decision 
to concentrate its local efforts in 12 districts 
of Khatlon province under its Feed the 
Future Strategy for Tajikistan (Feed the 
 Future, 2012), the USAID-funded Land 
 Reform and Farm Restructuring Project 
( LRFRP, 2013–2016), supported consulting 
centers in the 12 district centers and repre-
sentatives (tashabuskors—rural correspond-
ents) in many jamoat buildings (LRFRP, 
2014a, 2014b). Although these land special-
ists are not trained as extension agents, they 
distribute written materials and pass on ques-
tions. The LRFRP has supported Neksigol’s 
publication of a bi-weekly paper for farmers 
that its centers and representatives distrib-
ute, as well as circulating extension litera-
ture produced by USAID FAST.
These centers and advisors are working 
on contract to a USAID project, so there is no 
real intention or expectation that they will 
endure as centers or professional land rights 
advisors beyond the life of USAID support.
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Water projects: USAID’s Water Users’ 
Association Support Program and Family 
Farming Program
USAID supported the creation of Water 
Users’ Associations through a stand-alone 
Water Users’ Association Support Program 
(WUASP) (WUASP, 2004–2011) and then as 
a major component of its Family Farming 
Program (FFP) (FFP, 2011–2015). Commer-
cial farms are, by law, the members of WUAs. 
WUASP conducted comprehensive training 
on WUA organization and management for 
commercial farms’ managers and specialists 
(Mendez England and Associates, 2010, 
annex 8). It also provided agricultural train-
ing, both field days and short courses, for 
commercial and household farmers in areas 
where it was establishing WUAs, particu-
larly in its initial years when it was a multi- 
country activity (WUASP, 2006a, 2006b).
Nutrition messaging
The US government’s Feed the Future strat-
egy foresees that nutrition should be com-
bined with agricultural development, since 
the end purpose is to improve both health 
and income of people living through agri-
culture. USAID Tajikistan included a nutri-
tion component in the FFP. However, the 
FFP design turned out to be too complex to 
execute fully, so the nutrition education re-
sponsibility was transferred to the inter-
national NGO Mercy Corps. In 2013–2015 
Mercy Corps carried out Feed the Future’s 
nutrition education as part of its long-term 
Maternal and Child Health program in 
 Tajikistan. In 2016, USAID launched a Feed 
the Future Tajikistan Nutrition Activity 
building on Mercy Corps’ experience, indi-
cating that nutrition will continue to be a 
separate activity from agricultural develop-
ment under the overall Feed the Future 
 Tajikistan umbrella.
Like agricultural extension, USAID’s 
nutrition work was aimed at rural residents. 
Health and nutrition training would ideally 
be offered to all villagers. However, given 
gender roles and sensitivities, in practice it 
is usually done for schoolchildren and vil-
lage women. The Mercy Corps model relied 
on village organizations (the mahallas) to 
gather groups of women for 1-day instruc-
tion sessions on specific nutrition messages. 
The groups had no organized existence or 
continuation beyond being gathered for the 
specific event. The program judged and re-
tained its instructors in part on their ability 
to gather large numbers of village women 
for these training sessions (author’s inter-
views, 2014).
The instructors, called ‘Community 
Health Educators,’ were normally govern-
ment employees, usually doctors or nurses 
in the local clinics or schoolteachers. They 
received additional training on the specific 
messages to deliver and some token of ap-
preciation for their efforts (author’s inter-
views, 2014–2015). Since the nutrition in-
struction was in addition to their regular 
duties, they were not violating the usual 
international prohibition on paying govern-
ment employees to do their jobs, while the 
training helped them to improve their skills 
and do their regular jobs better.
According to the State Committee on 
Investment of the Republic of Tajikistan, 
Mercy Corps reported that in 2 years it had 
created 500 village development commit-
tees in the 12 Feed the Future focus districts 
of Khatlon province (SCI, n.d.). The claim 
that these committees were newly created is 
surprising and may be a translation error. It 
is clear from discussions with Mercy Corps 
management that these committees were in 
fact the legally mandated mahalla commit-
tees or groups called together on the author-
ity of the mahalla head on an ad hoc basis 
to support the nutrition activity.
Mercy Corps recruited and trained 1000 
Community Health Educators. They held 
training sessions on health and nutrition 
with 234,049 people (SCI, n.d.). There is far 
too little knowledge of basic nutrition and 
public health in Tajikistan. This was very 
good and useful work. USAID Tajikistan in 
recent years has repeatedly praised this sys-
tem. However, it has also indicated that it 
should be applied to agricultural extension. 
It may be doubted that the Mercy Corps 
model really constitutes ‘extension’ as the 
term is usually understood in agricultural 
development. There appears to be some 
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confusion of ‘messaging’ about specific, 
important, but invariant topics with the 
development of agricultural knowledge in 
a constantly changing natural and eco-
nomic environment. The way in which 
Feed the Future results are largely ex-
pressed in, and judged by, quantitative tar-
gets for outputs may also contribute to this 
misunderstanding.
Even if applying the Community Health 
Educator model to extension is desirable, it 
is difficult to do. The Ministry of Health and 
the Ministry of Education have positions in 
every village—not always employees, as the 
pay is very low and the conditions are often 
very difficult. As a result of decollectiviza-
tion, the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
Land Committee no longer have specialist 
employees in every village who, for rela-
tively small compensation after brief in-
struction, would undertake specific training 
analogous to the nutrition and public 
health ones. Persons with some agricultural 
knowledge can be found in most villages 
in Tajikistan. When asked, they say that they 
provide occasional agricultural advice to 
their neighbors because neighbors do so for 
each other as a matter of course. But since 
they do not already have jobs, these local 
experts will act as the equivalent of Com-
munity Health Educators, or lead farmers, 
only if they are paid a living wage or given 
some other fairly substantial compensation.
SughdAgroServis/Neksigol
The International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) and other donors supported the estab-
lishment of the SughdAgroServis (SAS) 
company to provide commercial funding, 
input supply, production advice, process-
ing and marketing services to cotton farms 
in the northern Sughd province (IFC, 2004). 
Donors supported its extension into Khatlon 
as described in the next section. SAS, re-
named ‘Neksigol’ in late 2014, is now en-
tirely Tajik-run.
Neksigol’s affiliated firm, Neksigol Con-
sulting, offers extension advice on a fee-for-
service basis, largely by providing trainers 
for class and field instruction to anyone 
willing to pay (OO SAS Consulting, 2015). 
It also has a fee-based mobile telephone 
 service reporting agricultural and weather 
conditions (PO Neksigol Mushovir, 2015). 
The senior management of Neksigol view 
the consulting operation as a risk because 
 Neksigol Consulting remains dependent on 
donor projects for most of its income; so 
Neksigol split Neksigol Consulting from its 
core input-supply business to protect the 
overall firm if consulting and fee-for-service 
extension turns out not to be viable ( author’s 
interviews, 2015).
Extension provided by input suppliers 
(‘agroshops’)
One major form of agricultural extension is 
advice and assistance provided by input 
dealers to their customers. Almost all Tajik 
farmers get their inputs from the bazaars. 
Neksigol is the only private source of legally 
sourced, certified inputs in Tajikistan. With 
funding and training assistance from the 
USAID Productive Agriculture Project in 
Tajikistan (ProAPT, 2009–2014), Neksigol 
expanded its network of input stores (‘agro-
shops’) into Khatlon and now has six com-
pany-owned input stores and five affiliated 
stores there. Each Neksigol store has a staff 
agricultural advisor who has received at 
least 40 hours’ training (ProAPT, 2015: 25–
26). Neksigol paid 76% of the cost of these 
activities (ProAPT 2015: 26), indicating that 
the firm finds commercial value in this ac-
tivity and intends to sustain it.
The USAID-funded Tajikistan Stability 
Enhancement Program (TSEP, 2009–2012) 
supported the opening of one agroshop in 
Khatlon and one in Sughd. Those stores 
planned to provide product use advice for 
customers. In addition to its direct partner-
ship with Neksigol, ProAPT also worked to 
upgrade the five stores that eventually affili-
ated with Neksigol in Khatlon (ProAPT, 
2015: 27), one of which appears to have been 
a store initially supported by TSEP. That 
store was planning to hire a staff agronomist 
when FAST staff visited it in 2013. Accord-
ing to a World Bank staff member, the World 
Bank Emergency Food Security and Seed 
Import Project (EFSSIP, 2008–2013) also 
ended with the establishment of a network of 
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agroshops in Khatlon. However, most of 
those stores seem to have ceased operations 
fairly soon after donor funding ended.
No data are available on the number of 
clients reached by any of the agricultural in-
put stores.
Farmer-to-Farmer
The US Farmer-to-Farmer (F2F) program 
has operated in Tajikistan for at least 10 
years under the management of the same 
local staff. A partial survey of volunteers’ 
reports indicates that the same specialists 
have returned repeatedly, some as many as 
ten times. The volunteers conduct field 
days for audiences gathered from announce-
ments through the local authorities and by 
cooperating USAID projects. Given the lack 
of modern knowledge in the national agri-
cultural extension and training system, F2F 
has been a very important means of upgrad-
ing the skills of Tajik agricultural specialists. 
However, the limits of having short-term 
volunteers conducting 1-day sessions are 
obvious. F2F is not a substitute for improved 
initial training and continuing refresher 
courses for extension agents.
Extension NGOs: EU SITAF and Support to the 
Establishment of a National Agricultural 
Advisory Service, USAID ProAPT and Family 
Farming Program
Several donors have supported projects de-
signed to build the capacity of NGOs that 
provide fee-for-service extension consult-
ing. In 2005–2010, the EU supported two such 
technical assistance projects: (i) the Support 
to the Setting Up of a Structure to Provide 
Information, Training, and Advice to 
 Farmers and Other Rural Businesses in the 
 Khatlon Region of Tajikistan (SITAF) pro-
ject; and (ii) the Support to the Establishment 
of a  National Agricultural Advisory Service 
(SENAS) project. These projects trained NGOs 
to conduct extension work and supported 
the creation of a national organization of 
private and NGO extension providers—
AgroDonish—to create a ‘platform’ where 
public and private extension service providers 
could meet and exchange information.
A 2010 listing and map of agricultural 
extension providers prepared by AgroDon-
ish and Oxfam Tajikistan lists 46 private 
sector and NGO agricultural extension pro-
viders. Fourteen of them were located in or 
around Khujand, the capital city of Sughd 
province; 13 others are in or around 
 Dushanbe (AgroDonish and Oxfam Novib, 
2010). The remainder were scattered in 
provincial capitals and cities throughout 
the country. From their locations, it ap-
pears that they all relied on having farmers 
come to them, rather than providing ser-
vices at the farm. The former SENAS team 
leader surveyed the state of extension 
NGOs in Tajikistan, concluding that, in 
order to flourish, they would need much 
further support as well as a more benign 
business climate for agriculture in general 
(Geraedts, 2011). Several of the extension 
NGOs listed in 2010–2011 continue limited 
operations, but most have become mori-
bund because of the end of donor financing. 
AgroDonish maintains an office but is 
otherwise inactive.
The USAID ProAPT and FFP projects 
had large training components for commer-
cial farmers. ProAPT contracted NGOs. FFP 
used both its own staff and contracted 
NGOs. Both projects found that local NGOs 
required a great deal of organizational 
strengthening and oversight to carry out 
their contracts to a high standard and to 
meet international reporting requirements. 
Having found that the project design was 
too complex to execute well given the level 
of management skill and organization avail-
able, even with the best efforts of very good 
people, USAID Tajikistan eventually de-
cided to end FFP’s agricultural training 
component before the conclusion of the 
overall project.
TAFF and Sarob
Probably the most successful sustained ex-
tension effort for commercial farmers in Ta-
jikistan has grown out of the donor response 
to the collapse of the cotton sector in 2007. 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, with core funding from 
the EU and additional funds from the UK’s 
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Department for International Development 
(DFID), and GIZ, supported TAFF (TAFF, 
2007–2012). Initially:
TAFF . . . used specialized NGOs for 
advising farmers who received credit. The 
results were limited and the option for 
massively expanding the advised area 
would have been far too expensive and 
unfeasible from the NGO capacities point of 
view. In cotton, NGOs cost approximately 
160 to 200 USD per hectare for advising 
farmers during one production period. 
The results in terms of yield increase were 
relatively low (10 to 15%) as this service 
was too training-oriented and insufficiently 
based on providing concrete advice for 
individual farmers.
(GIZ Tajikistan, 2013: 1)
To improve the provision of agricultural ad-
vice to the farms to which it lent, TAFF 
began the ‘Technical Advisory Group’ sys-
tem in 2011 (Dziurman, 2012; GIZ Tajikistan, 
2013). TAFF hired qualified agronomists—
often former collective farm agronomists 
who had worked on the same fields under 
Soviet rule—and crop scouts to work with 
the agronomists to improve cotton produc-
tion on farms whose operations were fi-
nanced by on-lending donor funds through 
TAFF and Tajik commercial banks. The 
agronomists advised on production prac-
tices and monitored their implementation, 
duties much as they had done under the 
collective farm system. Crop scouts ob-
served fields and brought problems to the 
attention of the agronomists. Farms were re-
quired to act on the agronomists’ advice as a 
condition of their loans.
At the conclusion of TAFF, the exten-
sion agents formed a cooperative, ‘Sarob’, 
named for the mountain resort where it was 
founded. With continued but declining 
support from GIZ and others, Sarob has 
sought to expand its model of extension to 
other crops beyond cotton, and to smaller 
farms. A study commissioned in 2014 
found that commercial small farmers in 
non-cotton regions of the country were in 
principle willing to pay for extension ad-
vice from Sarob (Engel et al., 2015). The 
viability of Sarob without donor subsidies 
is still uncertain.
USAID’s Modernizing Extension and Advisory 
Services Field Support Activity and FAST
The USAID Tajikistan Country Office, as 
part of its preparation for implementing the 
US Government Feed the Future Country 
Strategy for Tajikistan (Feed the Future, 
2012), adjusting other existing agricultural 
sector projects to fulfill that strategy and 
 designing follow-on efforts, requested the 
Modernizing Extension and Advisory Ser-
vices (MEAS) program to establish a short-
term project in Tajikistan, the MEAS Field 
Support Activity (MEAS FSA, July–December 
2012). The MEAS FSA was to support USAID 
in facilitating the Donor (later Development) 
Coordination Council’s working group on 
agriculture in ensuring the coherence of 
donor activities in the sector and maximiz-
ing their common contribution to develop-
ing a vibrant, prosperous, farmer-driven 
agricultural sector. It was also to advise on 
the design of a pluralistic extension and 
advisory system in Tajikistan based on earl-
ier MEAS scoping studies in Tajikistan. 
Those studies had emphasized the need for 
a combination of public and private extension 
and advisory providers and for an enduring 
system (Swanson et al., 2011; Swanson, 
2012).
The MEAS FSA was asked, within its 
6-month life, to develop, design, document 
and prepare all training materials for a par-
ticipatory, pluralistic extension and advis-
ory system as outlined in the MEAS scoping 
studies cited above that could be pilot- 
tested in the 12 Feed the Future districts in 
Khatlon province. The FSA developed a 
design based on the MEAS core principles. 
Extension workers would travel to the 
 farmers. With the approval and assistance 
of the jamoat authorities and the local com-
munity (the mahallas), farmer groups would 
be organized. The group facilitator would 
host a small demonstration plot that would 
be the site of a Farmer Field School, which 
would continue for at least the crop’s grow-
ing season. The plot owner would receive 
a small amount of free inputs and the advice 
and aid of the project-paid agronomist who 
conducted the Field School. The system 
would be structured from the province level 
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downward, with a project employee in each 
jamoat working in tandem with the jamoat 
agricultural specialist so that eventually the 
agricultural specialist, a government em-
ployee, could take over most of the burden 
of frontline support of the farmer groups. 
This design would provide a form of pub-
lic–private partnership into which govern-
ment employees and extension NGOs could 
be integrated. It would ensure both commu-
nity and government commitment to the 
system and would help to strengthen local 
government by developing and providing a 
tangible and apolitical service to the rural 
communities.
In correspondence and discussion, US-
AID representatives expressed concern 
about the time and cost needed to imple-
ment the farmer demand-driven, participa-
tory elements of the design. They also ex-
pressed the desire to have the groups endure 
longer than a single season so they could be 
used as the basis for many kinds of training 
and outreach, including more general farm 
management and nutrition education. They 
suggested that the group-building schema 
developed by Catholic Relief Services and 
MEAS in an earlier version of the Skills 
for Marketing and Rural Transformation 
(‘SMART skills’) (MEAS, 2016) should be 
the basis of the extension design. How to 
achieve quick results while also engaging in 
long-term group-building activities was a 
continuing tension in the development and 
testing of the EAS design.
USAID then approved a follow-on pro-
ject, FAST (FAST, 2013–2015) project. 
FAST was to continue as a general Feed the 
Future support project. It was also, within 
1 year of its inception, to complete and pilot 
test the extension system so a follow-on 
project could roll it out for the entire Feed 
the Future farm constituency in the 12 focus 
districts of Khatlon province. That constitu-
ency included both small commercial farms 
and household farms. FAST was also to 
demonstrate to the Government of Tajikistan 
that the state should support the extension 
system in the near future and organize such 
state support.
The FAST pilot extension system fo-
cused on household farms because of their 
importance for food security and gender 
issues, which meant that the same general 
system needed to be implemented very dif-
ferently for household (women-run) and 
commercial (male-managed) farms (FAST, 
2014a, 2014b). Since household plots are 
physically within a household’s home com-
pounds, the target group became all village 
women, especially those younger ones—
each household’s daughters and daughters- 
in-law—who work the plots and are the 
commercial farms’ manual laborers. Given 
the very limited time available to develop 
the system and train initial staff, it was also 
felt that concentrating on household farms 
filled an obvious gap in USAID program-
ming. USAID’s ProAPT was already work-
ing with commercial farmers in the 12 focus 
districts and continued to do so through the 
original end date of FAST’s extension pilot. 
The model anticipated that, eventually, vil-
lage level extension agents, who would 
emerge from the group facilitators, could be 
sustained by allowing them to charge for in-
put supplies for household farms; however, 
that part of the model was never success-
fully developed or piloted.
As the FAST cooperative agreement 
did not include a grant or sub-contracting 
component, and as it was judged that the 
best way to develop extension capacity was 
to begin by training project employees with-
out the added difficulty of managing an NGO 
as an intervening entity, extension workers 
for the pilot were project employees. Agron-
omy is traditionally a male profession in 
Tajikistan. Most Tajik agronomists have a 
narrow, technically focused skill set, so the 
design quickly evolved to allow for the fact 
that the subject matter specialists who back-
stop the jamoat-level extension specialists 
are almost all men. They would therefore 
coordinate closely with female extension 
facilitators, who would work most closely 
with the farmers’ learning groups, composed 
almost entirely of women.
Nine months after its beginning, FAST 
was asked to continue its extension compo-
nent for a second year, as an expanded pilot, 
due to delays in designing and contracting 
the follow-on project. Over its brief lifetime, 
the FAST extension pilot organized and 
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worked with more than 200 household farm 
learning groups (HFLGs) in ten districts of 
Khatlon province. Table 10.1 summarizes 
its quantitative impact.
Household budget data are notoriously 
unreliable in Tajikistan, especially when 
the household is consuming much of the 
increase, as the project participants did. 
However, FAST staff estimated from obser-
vation that overall household income in-
creased. Participants repeatedly and posi-
tively stated that they were able to produce, 
consume and sell more of their household 
farm output.
Following the conclusion of USAID’s 
ProAPT Project, during its unexpected second 
year of extension activity, FAST expanded 
to work with small commercial farmers. 
However, time and resources did not allow 
the full adaptation of the group model to 
that clientele. Most of FAST’s work with 
commercial farmers was limited to one-off 
training events, often in cooperation with 
Farmer-to-Farmer volunteers.
The Khatlon Province’s first deputy 
governor, who is responsible for the prov-
ince’s agriculture, praised the work of FAST 
and said that it helped him to realize how 
important household farms were for the 
country. He repeatedly requested that it be 
extended to more learning groups and pro-
vided significant—if non-monetary—support 
for the project. Similar requests came from an 
array of other groups active in Khatlon and 
from many rural residents in the region.
At the end of the project, USAID stated 
that FAST had met all of its goals. However, 
as a result of budget cuts, belief that house-
hold farms were becoming less important in 
Tajikistan as a result of the success of the 
land reform and development of commer-
cial farms, and the need to concentrate on 
introducing a very small number of innov-
ations as widely as possible (EAT, 2014), the 
previously intended generalization of the 
FAST system was abandoned. The follow-on 
project returned to a focus on working with 
commercial farms using publicly announced 
open field days for any commercial farmers 
who chose to attend (USAID, 2015).
FAST emphasized important issues and 
sought to satisfy real needs and requirements 
both for the Tajik population and the funder. 
In retrospect its design and tasks were clearly 
overambitious given the constraints on inter-
national donor projects in Tajikistan at pre-
sent. However, the issues the FAST experi-
ence raises, particularly about the need for 
systematic extension to support agricultural 
development in Tajikistan and how to in-
volve farmers as more than just passive con-
sumers of messages, remain.
Lessons Learned
The review of the situation in Tajikistan and 
efforts to develop agricultural extension there 
suggest a number of general lessons applic-
able to other post-conflict and post-transition 
countries. Many of the lessons are familiar 
to analysts and practitioners of social and 
economic development and apply in many 
low- and moderate-income countries.
Clearly define agricultural extension and its 
relation to overall agricultural development
The various attempts at ‘agricultural exten-
sion’ in Tajikistan have actually tried to do 
quite different things. The extension mech-
anism needed depends on the content to be 
Table 10.1. FAST HFLG pilot cumulative impact, 2014–2015. From Van Atta (2015).
Households Women Men Total individuals
Direct beneficiaries 3,795 3,758 140 3,898
Same-household beneficiaries Not applicable 12,334 12,334 24,668
Secondary beneficiaries 30,360 30,064 1,120 31,184
Total beneficiaries 34,155 46,156 13,594 59,750
FAST, farmer advisory services in Tajikistan; HFLG, household farm learning groups.
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‘extended’, how it is to be done and the in-
tended and actual audience. Clarity on 
whether what is intended is simply top-
down one-time technology transfer; helping 
rural communities that rely on agriculture 
increase their capacity to help one another; 
making farmers the driving force of a modern 
agricultural knowledge system; or something 
else, is necessary for the activity to work.
Agricultural extension is part of an 
AET system. It is also part of an overall agri-
cultural knowledge system, including pri-
mary and applied research, education, 
training and an institutional orientation to-
wards providing service to farmers so they 
can prosper. An extension system that ex-
ists in isolation from the other institutions 
and processes needed for productive, pros-
perous agriculture has little value.
Agricultural extension needs to be part 
of an overall strategy for agricultural devel-
opment and improving rural livelihoods. 
The donors, and the Government of Tajikistan, 
generally treat these as two different object-
ives. The separation appears logical because 
agricultural development is usually meas-
ured and judged by macro-economic indica-
tors such as an increase in national agricul-
tural output, while improved livelihoods 
are measured in micro-economic indicators 
such as an increase in household income or 
improved household nutrition. In Tajikistan, 
this separation is often further institutional-
ized because agricultural development 
projects aim at commercial farms and are 
usually implemented by major for-profit 
cons ulting companies, while livelihoods ef-
forts are often seen as emergency, ‘humani-
tarian’ efforts that are led by international 
NGOs. Yet both approaches are needed in 
combination, and the role of extension in 
both should be clearly understood.
Much of what has been done in recent 
years has confused ‘messaging’—seeking to 
convey to farmers a particular piece of new 
knowledge, specific training or a particular 
innovation that a government official, inter-
national donor or expert believes would be 
helpful—with extension, in which farmers 
interact with educators, researchers, offi-
cials and service providers as part of an agri-
cultural knowledge system. Most extension 
efforts in Tajikistan have also been forced to 
accept the temporal and spatial limitations 
of specific internationally funded projects 
and have not seriously addressed how to 
create an extension system or systems that 
could endure. Given the length of an agri-
cultural season and the need to continu-
ously adapt to changing natural and eco-
nomic conditions, the focus on single 
messages and the time limitations have par-
ticularly limited agricultural development 
and the institutionalization of extension.
Government leadership of agricultural reform 
and extension efforts
Unless Tajik policy makers understand re-
form and development programs, and un-
less they lead and effectively coordinate 
those efforts, the programs and the consid-
erable sums of money invested in them can 
at best only keep things from getting worse. 
Since independence, the Government of 
Tajikistan has focused most of its efforts in 
the agricultural sphere on simply keeping 
the sector operating in order to maintain 
rural employment. The government has 
agreed to reform efforts when donors im-
posed conditions, but senior political lead-
ers have never developed an understanding 
or vision of what a reformed, market-oriented 
agricultural and food sector in Tajikistan 
should be. They continue to think in terms 
of fulfilling production targets. Given their 
focus, typical of government officials every-
where, on just coping with day-to-day crises 
and maintaining the flow of resources on 
which political stability rests, this lack of 
vision is hardly surprising. But since the 
national leadership does not understand 
what the systemic result of market-oriented 
reforms could be, they generally give them 
only lukewarm support.
The centralized Tajik political system 
makes it necessary to convince one or more 
top leaders before any general change is pos-
sible. The success of those leaders in win-
ning the civil war and maintaining power 
and relative stability since its end suggests 
that they are politically sophisticated enough 
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to recognize when an initiative or a program 
is in their interest. Agricultural extension 
can flourish in Tajikistan if the leadership 
sees that, on balance, it benefits them with-
out posing a substantial threat.
Extension can build support for the regime 
and reform
The Tajik regime is harsh to its opponents 
because its leadership knows, and fears, 
how uncertain the situation is. The national 
government has been very hesitant to sup-
port any institutional changes or economic 
development that could give more autono-
mous power to regional and local actors, be-
cause it continues to fear losing control of 
the countryside and a recurrence of the re-
gional conflicts of the civil war. The current 
elite does not want to lose its position. Pre-
sented with reasonable alternatives, no Tajik 
citizens want to return to civil war. Yet the 
average citizen has little reason other than 
the desire for civil peace and order to sup-
port a state that has little contact with its 
citizenry except to demand production and 
to collect taxes from them. Villagers avoid 
interactions with government as much as 
possible, relying instead on informal local 
institutions for services. This hollowing out 
of the state threatens its legitimacy and 
offers an opening for insurgents, of whatever 
kind, to gain support.
Donor-supported reforms, especially 
the ongoing land reform, have inadvertently 
contributed to this weakening of the Tajik 
state’s authority and legitimacy. The gov-
ernment runs land reform from the center, 
according to quantitative targets. Given that 
many families who are eligible for land have 
adult working-age males in Russia, lack 
knowledge of how to run a farm business, 
depend on uncertain input supplies, have 
limited ability to reach markets and that in 
most cases agriculture is unprofitable for 
small commercial farmers, there is little in-
centive for people to support the land reform. 
Officials of the SCLM, which is responsible 
for it, admit that their role is limited to sur-
veying, demarcating boundaries and titling. 
But when a farm has been chosen to be 
broken up into individual smallholdings, 
its former workers get land plots and are ex-
pected to manage an independent farm by 
themselves. Without help, the new recipi-
ents of land for farming are unlikely to be 
successful, and they, and their neighbors, 
are unlikely to support the reform no matter 
how much donor money is spent in raising 
people’s consciousness of their right to land.
Since 2007, donor—and to a great ex-
tent, government—attention has moved away 
from efforts to rehabilitate cotton monocul-
ture to supporting other potentially more prof-
itable agricultural value chains. However, 
these efforts remain top-down, with little at-
tention being paid to the vast challenge of 
making more new farmers good at the tech-
nology and business of agriculture. A national 
policy of building profitable small-farm busi-
nesses, a policy in which agricultural exten-
sion would be key, can build support for re-
form. If the state develops a capacity to 
impartially and effectively serve those farm-
ers, the rural population’s support for the 
government should increase, strengthening 
the state overall and stabilizing the country.
Far from all rural residents will want to 
run their own farms beyond their existing 
household farms, but some will. If enough 
villagers see that they can make money from 
expanding their existing household oper-
ations and that they will be helped to do so 
by effective government services, then the 
demand for land, and the demand for land 
reform and effective regulation of land ten-
ure, will increase but can be directed and 
channeled without fundamentally threaten-
ing existing political arrangements.
An effective agricultural knowledge 
system—combining research, extension and 
sensible public investment in the agricul-
tural sector—would create a different kind 
of bond between the state and the villager, 
one based on the interests of the villagers in 
both peace and plenty. An effective exten-
sion system would be both a key institution 
and a visible symbol of this changed rela-
tionship between state and society. If care-
fully done, it could provide both employ-
ment for regime supporters and real benefits 
for everyone.
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Given the very large number of rural 
residents and farmers and the importance of 
the agricultural sector in the national econ-
omy, it is reasonable that Tajikistan should 
consider the provision of extension services 
to be a public good, something that benefits 
everyone and should at least in part be 
funded by the state. The enormous potential 
demand for extension services, and the wis-
dom of having multiple sources of informa-
tion, suggest that a directly government-run 
extension system could and should coexist 
with private extension providers.
Coordinate within government  
and among donors
The political system and government ad-
ministration are fragmented into narrow 
administrative verticals (‘stovepipes’), 
which concentrate on particular tasks ra-
ther than the overall picture. For example, 
Khatlon province’s first deputy governor 
commented in an interview that there are 
nine deputy governors for the province. 
Each one, including the first deputy, is re-
sponsible for his own set of issues. The 
provincial governor and his very small 
staff must coordinate all of the activities of 
these subordinates since the deputies have 
no staff and only limited knowledge of 
what other parts of the provincial govern-
ment are doing. As a result, agriculture and 
nutrition activities are poorly coordinated, 
because one falls under the first deputy 
governor and the other under a separate 
deputy governor. The international com-
munity has done little to analyze and help 
the Tajik government ameliorate such 
structural problems and, as a result, their 
efforts are fragmented and less effective 
than they could be.
The donor community follows the 
government’s divisions. Since the donors 
must have institutional counterparts, and 
those counterparts are fragmented, indi-
vidual projects have little choice; so the 
donor community should address the prob-
lems of fragmentation through higher-level 
consultations.
Develop institutional memory
Government personnel are focused on their 
immediate administrative and fiscal tasks. 
Most international staff in Tajikistan are only 
there for a 2- or 3-year tour of duty. Tajikistan 
lacks a generation of middle-level, mid-
dle-aged specialists because the civil war 
prevented them from being trained or they 
perished in it. Low government salaries, lack 
of opportunity in the private sector for spe-
cialists except in international projects and 
the impermanence of those projects all drive 
the best people to seek work abroad; so it is 
difficult to train and retain Tajik specialists 
who know their situation well and choose to 
stay in the country to work. The international 
community tends to bring in ready-made so-
lutions designed elsewhere or by short-term 
consultants with limited familiarity with the 
country. Local specialists who know the situ-
ation are generally very careful about ex-
pressing their opinions to international pro-
ject designers and managers. As a result, the 
same approaches to problems tend to be 
tried repeatedly, with little awareness of the 
lessons learned from previous applications 
of similar ideas.
Tajik leadership and ownership can be 
increased by directly improving the institu-
tional memory and coordination of the 
government through such means as donor 
support for creating agricultural policy 
capacity. This is difficult but has succeeded 
in Eastern European transition economies 
and, to a lesser extent, in the Russian Feder-
ation, where the government structure and 
institutions were and are similar to those 
of Tajikistan.
Consider the specific situation in the country
Because of the Soviet institutional heritage 
and the specific political economy of Tajiki-
stan, institutions and activities that at first 
glance appear to be similar to those in de-
veloped market economies or other devel-
oping states may in fact be quite different. 
As an international consultant considering 
agricultural privatization once commented 
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over breakfast: ‘farms aren’t farms, banks 
aren’t banks, government isn’t government. 
Nothing is what it seems here.’ Develop-
ment tactics and suggested reforms need to 
be carefully considered in the Tajik context 
rather than simply replicated from else-
where because they gave good results in 
that environment.
For instance, donor agencies and inter-
national staff who have experience with agri-
cultural extension in post-colonial regions of 
the world, such as most of sub-Saharan  Africa, 
often assume that the appropriate way to 
build extension capacity in Tajikistan is to 
work though NGOs. A considerable number 
of NGOs have been organized in Tajikistan 
to meet this donor demand. But private 
 enterprises and NGOs are a new concept 
in  Tajikistan, since they were forcibly 
repressed—and when found, treated as crim-
inal conspiracies—until 1988 and did not 
really begin to spread until the international 
community sought them as partners after the 
civil war. The line between for-profit busi-
nesses and NGOs is hazy, with most organ-
izations having dual legal status in order to 
maximize potential business profits while 
remaining able to pursue grants as NGOs. 
Few Tajik NGOs have solid management or 
accounting systems, as a number of donor 
projects, including several USAID efforts, 
have discovered to their cost. Tajik business 
and NGO legislation and standards are quite 
different from those in developed market 
economies. Few Tajiks have much experi-
ence with accounting and business manage-
ment in market systems. The expectations of 
donors and local people about what for-profit 
businesses and NGOs can and should do are 
very different in Tajikistan.
Consider community politics
Extension is by definition a community- 
based activity. However, few extension ac-
tivities in Tajikistan have explicitly paid 
attention to community politics, informal 
institutions and power relationships. Given 
the way in which the population has been 
forcibly moved from place to place in the 
past 85 years, considerations of the spe-
cifics of each community are particularly 
important for a successful development 
intervention.
Train agricultural specialists in modern 
agriculture and economics
The donor community tends to assume that 
technical agricultural knowledge of the 
kind extension requires is readily available 
in Tajikistan. Yet, when the level of know-
ledge of agricultural professionals is impar-
tially assessed, it usually turns out to be 
low. Given the destruction of the rural pri-
mary and secondary education system dur-
ing the civil war, the dispersal of remaining 
research facilities and farmland as part of 
the land reform and the limited abilities of 
the higher educational and research institu-
tions in the sector, this should come as no 
surprise. Government officials generally are 
aware of their own limited knowledge. But 
they and indeed most Tajik specialists have 
no real knowledge of best world practices. 
At best, they may have been given a short 
course by a donor.
The problem of improving training and 
knowledge for people working in agricul-
tural development, whether for government, 
donors, NGOs or donor projects, is rarely ad-
dressed systematically. The AET system 
must be fundamentally rebuilt—a 30-year 
project since new teachers will need to be 
trained first. But, until that reconstruction 
is underway, the fundamental requirements 
for successful agricultural extension—a 
cadre of people who can train extension 
workers and knowledgeable extension work-
ers themselves—will be critically lacking.
Extension takes time
Tajikistan has never had an agricultural 
 extension and advisory system. Given the 
variety of clients and needs, the ‘system’ 
should not be a Soviet-style ‘one-size-fits-
all’. The basis for such a system cannot be 
created within the lifetime of a single donor 
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project, nor by a single donor. As a USAID 
evaluation of its rural advisory systems ef-
forts worldwide commented in 2015: ‘Insti-
tutional and human resource capacity 
building is a long-term activity that needs 
sustained funding for at least the medium- 
term to ensure sustainability of the extension 
and advisory system initiatives in Tajikistan’ 
(Uphaus et al., 2015: 28).
Specific efforts, such as Neksigol, a few 
of the extension NGOs, USAID’s FAST pro-
ject and, in cotton-growing areas, Sarob, have 
been well received by their clients and gener-
ally supported by the government. One clear 
reason for this acceptance and relative suc-
cess in working with farmers is that they have 
not been institutionally limited by the short-
term time horizon and narrow goals typical 
of development projects, seeking to lay the 
basis for institutions that could endure.
Multi-project, longer-term efforts such as 
the Feed the Future strategy and the EU’s 
Rural Development Programmes in Tajiki-
stan are much more likely to be successful 
than stand-alone projects. However, for such 
overarching schemes to have a chance of suc-
cess, they need to be understood and devel-
oped as long-term efforts. Feed the Future in 
Tajikistan seems currently to be missing this 
opportunity, as institutional demands from 
the donor agency and that agency’s shortage 
of personnel on the ground have caused it to 
return to a narrow project orientation.
Take the rhetoric of farmer-driven change 
seriously
Tajikistan is a post-Soviet, post-colonial 
and post-conflict country. Its integration 
into the world system as an independent 
country, its transformation to a market 
economy, the shift of its agriculture from a 
dual economy—large monoculture farms 
and very small subsistence farms to feed the 
large farms’ labor force—to commercial pro-
duction, and the alterations in the political 
system that will accompany those changes, 
are only beginning.
Best practice in agricultural extension 
begins from the recognition that farmers 
know best what they need, want and can do, 
and that their demands should shape exten-
sion activities. All the proponents of reform 
have argued that changes must be market- 
driven. That means giving the people of Ta-
jikistan the space and the support to develop 
appropriate knowledge and skills and to 
make their own decisions. Life is messy, and 
not all Tajik citizens will make the ‘right’ de-
cisions. But they will make better decisions 
about their lives than government officials 
in Dushanbe or development bureaucrats in 
Washington, Brussels or Beijing. The results 
will not be as clear-cut as monitoring sys-
tems might like, but they will be enduring, 
making the real changes for the better that 
everyone needs.
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Introduction
Georgia is one of the former Soviet republics, 
located on the southern slopes of the Great 
Caucasian Mountains. It occupies an area of 
69,700 km2 and shares borders with Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkey; its western 
coastline lies on the Black Sea. The population 
of Georgia in 2013 was estimated at 4.47 mil­
lion (World Bank, 2013). The climate in the 
western part of the country is subtropical, 
while it is more arid in the eastern region. 
The country has suffered both politically and 
economically since the fall of the Union of So­
viet Socialist Republics (USSR), and to date it 
has been unable to reach fully its develop­
ment objectives in the areas of market liberal­
ization, livelihood and energy security.
Agriculture in Georgia
Georgia has a complex landscape and di­
verse mix of soil conditions, divided into 
13  zones, each with a specialized form of 
agriculture which includes viticulture, horti­
culture, fodder production, livestock pro­
duction, tea growing, subtropical crops 
and tobacco cultivation (Mosashvili, 2007). 
Hazelnuts, fruit (including citrus), spirits, 
wine and mineral water, as well as early­ 
season vegetables and fisheries, were the main 
regional outputs in the Soviet period and have 
remained the country’s main export crops 
(interviews, Tbilisi, 2013, 2015).
Agriculture has played an important 
role in the Georgian economy, for many 
years representing the single most important 
sector of the gross domestic product (GDP) 
and employing around half the population 
(USAID, 2011). Agricultural production in 
Georgia was severely disrupted, first by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and 
then by the civil war in 1992. The agricul­
ture sector’s contribution to the GDP over the 
past 20 years has declined significantly, from 
30% in 1990–1991, to 21% in 2000 and to 
7% in 2010 (USAID, 2011).
The potential of the sector is under­
utilized, with only one­third of the nation’s 
2,270,000 hectares (ha) of arable land cur­
rently in use (interview with S. Kereselidze, 
Head of the National Information Consult­
ing Centers [ICC] Network, Tbilisi, 2015). As 
an important element of transitioning from 
a socialist state, Georgia has undertaken a 
series of land­reform measures involving the 
transformation of ex­Soviet collective­ and 
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state­owned large­scale farms, which were 
subject to centralized management and con­
trol, into private property and by leasing land 
to private individuals (Ebanoidze, 2002). 
Land qualifying for a privatization fund has 
been distributed free of charge to rural house­
holds. The maximum area transferred to pri­
vate ownership in the lowlands was 1.25 ha 
per person, while up to 5 ha per farmer was 
distributed to eligible households in the 
highlands. Most state agricultural land was 
distributed to private households immedi­
ately after independence. At the current time, 
Georgia has 640,302 farmers, each with an 
average of three separate 1.25 ha plots spread 
across different locations (interviews, Tbilisi, 
2013, 2015).
The process of land privatization itself 
has generally been regarded as a successful 
reform in Georgia, with some acknowledg­
ing it as an important step in building a 
democratic state and moving towards a mar­
ket economy (Salukvadze, 1999). However, 
the pace and performance of this process 
have been far from satisfactory, for a range 
of factors (Gogodze et al., 2007).
One crucial factor is the concept of the 
Georgia ‘farmer’. In Georgia, the ‘farmer’ is 
an autonomous entity that appeared only 
during the transition period. Thus, farmers 
usually do not have the experience or cap­
acity, in agriculture or management, to play 
the role ascribed to them by Western agri­
cultural economists and development prac­
titioners (Lerman, 2008; Beniwal et al., 
2010; Bliss, 2012; Djanibekov et al., 2013; 
Van Assche et al., 2013; Shtaltovna, 2015). 
As a result of land privatization, almost 
everyone in Georgia received land and so 
everyone has become a farmer, including 
doctors, teachers, accountants and others 
engaged in professions wholly unrelated to 
agriculture (Shtaltovna, 2013; Shtaltovna 
2015). Those who make a profit from agri­
culture consider themselves to be farmers. 
Those who do not make a profit do not con­
sider themselves farmers but rather as sim­
ply cultivating a small plot of land for their 
own consumption and maybe making a 
small income (interviews, 2013, 2015). 
Thus, the Western notion of a ‘farmer’ does 
not really match the situation of those who 
have emerged in  Georgia and in most for­
mer Soviet countries after independence.
Also, the range of agricultural measures 
introduced by different governments in 
Georgia in the past 20 years (distribution of 
vouchers for inputs, etc.) demonstrates that 
agriculture and rural development were 
never top priorities for the nation’s govern­
ment and that agricultural development has 
seen a good deal of variety and experimen­
tation (interviews, Tbilisi, 2013, 2015). 
 Reforms have taken place without any guid­
ance (interview with Oleg Shatberashvili, 
Georgian Federation for Information and 
Documentation, Tbilisi, Georgia, 2013). In 
addition, agriculture is heavily politicized 
and is a populist cause in terms of modern­
ization; thus, many initiatives that take place 
are strongly linked to political campaigns. 
These campaigns seemingly target improv­
ing the livelihoods of rural dwellers, but are 
usually launched just before parliamentary 
or presidential elections with the main goal 
of collecting votes. They are not designed to 
contribute to the welfare of the people or to 
improve agriculture (Roeing, 2016).
As a result, the agricultural sector has 
struggled to develop. Farmers find them­
selves operating small­scale and fragmented 
farms (some 90% of farmers have less than 
1 ha of land) (interviews, Tbilisi, 2015), con­
strained by limited knowledge and experi­
ence, insufficient access to agricultural infor­
mation, poor access to markets, minimal access 
to financial resources, a deteriorating road 
network, lack of technical equipment and in­
adequate infrastructure (processing, storage 
and irrigation), all of which result in low 
prices, low productivity and poor sector 
growth (interviews, 2013, 2015; Lerman 
and Sedik, 2009; Pavliashvili, 2009; USAID, 
2011; Van Assche et al., 2016b; Roeing, 2016).
Agricultural production is far from suf­
ficient to provide food security to the coun­
try. The agricultural sector has become syn­
onymous with poverty, effectively serving as 
an ‘employer of last resort’ (interview with 
O. Shatberashvili, Director of the Georgian 
Federation for Information and Documenta­
tion, Tbilisi, 2013; USAID, 2011). The ma­
jority of farmers pursue a mix of different 
maintenance strategies, such as subsistence 
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farming, migration, claiming pensions, en­
gaging in other professions or barter (Trevisani, 
2008). The situation has become unsustain­
able both for the agricultural sector and for 
the rural population, where farmers occupy 
the poorest segment of the population and 
are sometimes regarded as a cause of in­
stability (USAID, 2011; Fey, 2012; interview 
with O. Shatberashvili, 2013). Also, there is 
a large outflow of young people from rural 
areas to the cities, as they do not want to be 
farmers, and people very often start to prac­
tice agriculture only when they lose their job 
(interview with Soso Tedeashvili, farmer, 
Breti village, 2013).
However, since 2013 agriculture has be­
come one of the most important develop­
ment areas for the Georgian government, for 
reasons linked to the development of the 
 Association Agreement between the EU and 
Georgia in 2012. One of the Association 
Agreement’s priorities is to improve agricul­
ture and rural development. The document 
states that its objectives include ‘improving 
the competitiveness of agricultural produc­
tion, by fostering economies of scale via 
market­oriented agriculture cooperatives, by 
developing advisory and systems to increase 
production and augment exports’ (EU, 2014: 
24–25). Based on this document, a strategy 
for agricultural development for 2015–2020 
was developed (MoA, 2015), which elabor­
ates in detail the development of efficient 
agricultural extension services, and thus ways 
of increasing farmers’ knowledge. Georgia’s 
recent willingness to collaborate with the 
EU has resulted in a tremendous shift in the 
development of Georgian agriculture, and of 
the agricultural extension and advisory ser­
vices in particular.
Agricultural Extension in Georgia
Georgia has a unique history with agricul­
tural extension and advisory services. During 
the Soviet period, instead of extension Geor­
gia had a different system of knowledge pro­
duction and sharing. A comprehensive net­
work of agricultural universities, colleges, 
research institutes, the Ministry of Agriculture 
(MoA) and other actors involved in agricultural 
production were responsible for knowledge 
production and were linked directly to kol-
khozes and sovkhozes—the main production 
units of collectivized Soviet agriculture. 
However, since the end of the Soviet Union 
this system has undergone many changes.
Formal extension is a new concept in 
Georgia and was introduced by the inter­
national donor community in the 1990s. 
Numerous international donor organiza­
tions offered ground­based relief and devel­
opment programs in agriculture during this 
period. In addition, a number of domestic 
NGOs emerged, funded by donors through 
different development projects. As a result, 
extension services are currently provided in 
Georgia largely by international donors, and 
more recently by the government, NGOs, 
the Academy of Agricultural Sciences and 
commercial input providers (Goldberg et al., 
2011; Kazbekov and Qureshi, 2011; Roeing, 
2016; Van Assche et al., 2016a). Farmers 
benefit from these donor projects and state 
programs.
In addition, farmers receive knowledge 
from television, the internet, commercial 
service centers (which provide seeds, fertil­
izer and small­scale machinery) and advert­
isements. Having grown up in villages, 
farmers also continue to rely on their own 
experience and on personal networks, in­
cluding neighbors and former kolkhoz 
agronomists for agricultural information 
and extension (interviews, 2013, 2015; Fey, 
2012; Fey, 2016; Van Assche et al., 2016b).
The Role of Agricultural Institutions
The Soviet system of knowledge production 
and sharing functioned well, organized 
through a complex network of agricultural 
ministries, agricultural universities, acad­
emies of agricultural sciences, research cen­
ters, kolkhozes and sovkhozes (Kazbekov and 
Qureshi, 2011; Shtaltovna, 2015; Hornidge 
et al., 2016; Van Assche et al., 2016a). Know­
ledge was generated in these institutions, 
based on state production targets, as well as 
in the specialized research institutes of the 
Academy of Agricultural Sciences and the 
MoA, with some variations across different 
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Soviet republics and years (Morgounov and 
Zuidema, 2001). Later, knowledge generation 
was channeled to the kolkhozes/sovkhozes 
through local and regional departments of 
the MoA. Every kolkhoz/sovkhoz had a set of 
trained experts—engineers, agronomists and 
accountants—who regularly attended courses 
to update their knowledge.
This system of knowledge production 
and sharing was changed by the post­Soviet 
transformation process. The Soviet network 
of education and research in Georgia has 
been partly sustained and partly reorgan­
ized or dissolved due to a lack of state sub­
sidies (Beniwal et al., 2010). The transform­
ation period therefore had a negative effect 
on the quality of research and education in 
the country. The main concerns of Georgian 
scientists include a decline in research live­
lihoods (e.g. poor salaries, shrinking staff 
numbers); barriers to entering the English­ 
dominated international scientific commu­
nity; and the reorientation of research focus 
from a Soviet knowledge­production sys­
tem to one that is market­oriented. Conse­
quently, agricultural science has become an 
unattractive area for young people to either 
work or study in (interviews, 2013, 2015; 
Van Assche et al., 2016b). One serious chal­
lenge that needs to be overcome is reorient­
ing knowledge production from a small 
number of large, powerful and autonomous 
kolkhozes to a large number of small, vul­
nerable, under­financed and under­skilled 
farms (Shtaltovna et al., 2012; Van Assche 
et al., 2016a). Finally, there is no mechanism 
to link and coordinate knowledge and in­
novation provided by national agricultural 
research (research institutes, academies of 
science, universities and others) and agricul­
tural producers (Morgounov and Zuidema, 
2001; Beniwal et al., 2010; Shtaltovna, 2013; 
Shtaltovna, 2015).
Since 2013, the Georgian government 
has worked to strengthen agricultural re­
search and establish a nationwide extension 
system throughout the country. After 22 years 
of independence, Prime Minister Ivanishvi­
li sought to establish a national network of 
extension services, although the main trig­
ger in this process was the EU rather than 
the Georgian government. The government 
established 54 ICCs around the country as a 
component of the rural and agricultural de­
velopment program, to complement the As­
sociation Agreement signed between the EU 
and Georgia (EU, 2014). There are now 1100 
staff and an office and a car in every district 
center (interview with S. Kereselidze, Head 
of National ICC Network, Tbilisi, 2015). The 
functions of ICCs are:
• Forming and supporting cooperatives.
• Providing consultations and training 
farmers on a diverse range of topics (e.g. 
state agricultural priorities, agricultural 
techniques and plant production methods, 
livestock management).
• Helping find solutions to farmers’ issues 
and connecting them to the necessary 
resources.
• Spreading the word about different 
MoA programs currently available to 
farmers.
• Connecting farmers and central govern­
ment.
• Following up on farmers who receive 
state subsidies.
The main sources of knowledge for ICCs 
are information and literature provided by 
the newly established Scientific­ Research 
Center at the MoA (discussed below); don­
ors, projects and NGOs that provide exten­
sion training; the private sector; and new 
research from other post­Soviet republics 
(e.g. Ukraine). Often, staff at ICCs rely on 
their own practical experience, and they con­
stantly learn from farmers (interviews, 
2015).
Established only 2 years ago, ICCs are 
still in the process of formation and face 
challenges in becoming multiprofile experts 
that can meet the many problems of farm­
ers. The ICCs currently lack the personnel 
to reach huge numbers of farmers and are 
burdened by extra administrative tasks is­
sued by the government. ICC personnel also 
require capacity building to develop the 
professional expertise demanded by their 
clients. Such skills include learning to be cli­
ent oriented; connecting farmers with other 
actors in the value chain, such as input sup­
pliers and processors; searching for sales op­
portunities; and assisting in receiving loans. 
 Development of Extension Services in Post-Soviet, Post-Conflict Georgia 197
They also receive little to no feedback from 
farmers on whether the consultation pro­
vided was of any use (interviews, 2015). Fi­
nally, future funding for the ICCs has not 
been secured and their sustainability is still 
questionable, especially given the political 
context.
However, establishing the ICCs is a great 
breakthrough in Georgian agriculture. As a 
positive effect of this initiative, more atten­
tion is now being paid to the agricultural 
sector than ever before, and much effort is 
being expended by donors, the government 
and other actors to make the ICCs a success. 
Furthermore, the EU Association Agreement 
has played an important role in advancing 
the reorganization process in terms of na­
tional research and the education system.
At present, the following agricultural 
scientific institutions can be regarded as the 
main knowledge and innovation sources for 
the functioning of agriculture in Georgia: 
the Academy of Agricultural Sciences, the 
National Agricultural University, the Tech­
nical University of Georgia and the Scientific­ 
Research Center of the MoA.
The Academy of Agricultural Sciences 
has been one of the main sources of know­
ledge for the newly established extension 
centers and the umbrella institute for most 
agricultural research bodies in Georgia for 
many decades. This institution has many 
scientists who formerly worked with the 
 Soviet Union and have high levels of expertise, 
but on average they are 70 years old. In add­
ition, the academy is mainly involved in re­
search but not in teaching, although it does 
have a few research institutes that provide 
training. Thus, the knowledge held within 
the academy might be regarded as outdated 
(Shtaltovna and Van Assche, 2013). Nonethe­
less, the Academy of Agricultural Sciences 
remains active. For example, it has contrib­
uted to the national strategy of agricultural 
development for 2015–2020 by developing a 
training program on various themes for the 
newly established extension service. In add­
ition, the academy is making efforts to open up 
new research programs through international 
collaboration (interviews, 2013, 2015).
The National Agricultural University, 
together with the majority of its former 
 research institutes, was privatized in late 
2012. Since then, the university has been 
modernized by focusing mainly on provid­
ing a better quality of education, keeping the 
best staff, significantly improving infrastruc­
ture and facilities, and making its educa­
tional offerings fee­based to afford to provide 
better teaching (interviews, 2013, 2015). Such 
dramatic developments, and the political 
circumstances under which it was privat­
ized, have brought about changes to the uni­
versity. On one hand it has gained popularity 
with students, while on the other hand there 
is now barely any dialogue between the MoA 
and the National Agricultural University. 
The government refuses to cooperate with or 
utilize either the educational programs or re­
search efforts of the National Agricultural 
University, due to perceptions of the univer­
sity’s quality. While in some areas of agricul­
tural education the overall level of profes­
sionalism has increased significantly, in other 
areas of agricultural education and research 
it has declined considerably. For a university 
in Georgia, it is extremely hard to maintain 
even a minor part of what used to be offered 
by the Soviet agricultural research institutes 
(Shtaltovna and Van Assche, 2013). This has 
implications for the future of agricultural ex­
tension, at least if it is to be based partly on 
new Georgian research.
Furthermore, the National Agricultural 
University does not intend to link with 
farmers because ‘it is a task of government’ 
(interview with L. Baramidze, Agricultural 
University, Tbilisi, 2015). The view is that 
while knowledge and innovation produced 
at the university can and should be trans­
mitted to agricultural producers, this is the 
responsibility of the government, not the 
universities. Conversely, the main focus of 
the university is on providing strong educa­
tion and research, innovating, etc. As for the 
link between the university and production, 
the National Agricultural University pro­
vides different services that could be of 
interest to producers, such as laboratory 
testing, breeding and selling different var­
ieties of fish and innovation patents.
Given the situation regarding agricul­
tural education and research in Georgia, the 
government wants to create a new system. 
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Two attempts have been made in this re­
spect. The first is at the Technical Univer­
sity of Georgia, which has opened a number 
of agricultural faculties and is attempting to 
bring students and lecturers together. How­
ever, it will take time and resources before 
the university establishes itself as a bona 
fide agricultural institute.
Second, in 2014–2015 the Scientific­ 
Research Center of the Ministry of Agricul­
ture was established at the MoA. It has 12 
departments (MoA, n.d.) covering all areas 
of research that used to be carried out as part 
of the Soviet scientific system, in addition 
to newer elements such as extension, inter­
national relations, risk assessment, stand­
ardization, quality control and agricultural 
economics. The staff come mainly from the 
previous Soviet system. In addition, the 
Center attempts to hire young people from 
the Agricultural University, Technical Uni­
versity, Telavi Agricultural Institute and the 
Caucasus Institute. According to the Center’s 
Director: ‘Now, it is at a stage of rehabilitating 
what was lost in previous years, since the end 
of the Soviet Union, and adaptation to cur­
rent needs’ (interview with L. Ujmajuridze, 
Director of the Scientific­Research Center of 
the MoA, Tbilisi, 2015).
To summarize, Georgian research insti­
tutes faced many barriers as the country 
moved into a market economy in the post­ 
Soviet, post­conflict period. Nevertheless, 
many new institutions are currently being 
established, which highlights the amount of 
progress made in the country’s agricultural 
research and education system.
The Role of Donors and Projects
Reconstructing and strengthening agricul­
tural extension systems is essential to post­ 
conflict agricultural development (UNEP, 
2002; Zaur, 2006; Longley et al., 2007; USIP, 
2013). As noted above, extension is a new 
phenomenon in Georgia. The concept was 
introduced and financed by donors as a part 
of agricultural and rural development projects 
in the post­civil war period, at which time nu­
merous international donor organizations 
offered development relief aid (Goldberg 
et al., 2011; Kazbekov and Qureshi, 2011). 
Domestic NGOs were funded by donors 
through various development projects and 
also provide agricultural knowledge to farm­
ers. Even in this context, extension is rarely 
the main goal of many development pro­
jects but rather is often one component of 
larger agricultural and rural development 
objectives. Thus, in addition to the national 
research and education institutions dis­
cussed above, there are a number of donor­ 
related extension providers in the country: 
international donor organizations, NGOs 
and, more recently, the ICCs organized by 
the government.
A number of extension­related projects 
are funded by USAID, one of which is the 
New Economic Opportunities (NEO) pro­
gram. Among other project responsibilities, 
NEO implements a value chain approach 
to agriculture, of which extension is a part. 
The value chain strategy targets beekeeping, 
fruit growing (strawberries, raspberries, ap­
ples, vegetables, grapes and hazelnuts), and 
livestock husbandry, and is disseminated 
among 85 communities in the country, ac­
counting for about 500 villages. To promote 
knowledge generation, NEO runs training 
sessions on modern technologies and pro­
vides grants for a select number of farmers to 
start up demonstration plots. Farmers who 
are not covered by the project can also visit 
and learn from the plots. NEO also provides 
farmers with nursery seedlings, saving them 
money on importing or purchasing seed­
lings on the open market. Farmers who own 
the greenhouses later sell their products 
to other farmers. As part of the value chain 
 approach, NEO connects farmers with po­
tential consumers, mainly Georgian hotels 
and food outlets. NEO also helps farmers to 
access microcredit, with loans ranging from 
500 to 15,000 lari (1 lari = US$0.42 in August 
2015). The program also provides collateral 
for farmers, demonstrating to the bank that 
farmers are involved in the food supply 
chain and will be able to sell their products.
In addition, NEO cooperates with farm 
service centers, supplying them with spe­
cialized equipment for soil and leaf testing 
and helping them to improve their services 
to farmers. Soil testing is provided free of 
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charge, but when a farmer purchases fertil­
izer or seeds from the center’s shop, the 
price includes a consultation fee and a 
charge for the testing equipment. In Gori, a 
meteorological station for the farm service 
center was installed with the help of NEO. If 
there is a risk of adverse weather, pests or 
plant diseases, information is sent out via 
SMS to the 1000 farmers subscribed to the 
service. NEO has also focused significantly 
on supporting the development of the pri­
vate sector, believing this to be a more sus­
tainable approach in a country like Georgia 
(interviews with Kirk Ramler, Chief of Party 
of NEO, Tbilisi, 2013, 2015).
Another project financed through US­
AID is the Strengthening Extension and Ad­
visory Services in Georgia (SEAS) project, 
implemented by the Modernizing Extension 
and Advisory Services (MEAS) project at 
the University of Illinois. The goal of SEAS 
is to support the efforts of the Georgian MoA 
to further develop its recently implemented 
public agricultural extension and advisory 
service system (MEAS, n.d.). A major com­
ponent of the SEAS project is the develop­
ment of staff training, mentoring and continu­
ing education programs for MoA employees 
who work directly with farmers to improve 
their agricultural knowledge and to better 
promote technology transfer. The overall 
project objective is accomplished through the 
use of activity­ funded technical advisors, who 
work closely with the MoA in developing 
and implementing a multi­year strategy to 
enhance the capacity of ministry leadership 
and relevant field employees to provide ef­
fective, public­ funded agricultural extension 
and advisory services to farmers in Georgia.
Through its activities, SEAS also co­
operates closely with MoA, as well as with 
54 extension centers, the National Agricul­
tural University and the Scientific­Research 
Center. By doing so, it plays an important 
role in reinvigorating the connections between 
these actors (interview with Ben  Mueller, 
SEAS project, Tbilisi, 2015), which is cru­
cial in building a viable extension system. 
This activity brings long­standing US experi­
ence in extension to the country, the main 
aim being to identify farmers’ problems and 
help them find solutions to these issues.
Although the SEAS project is still rela­
tively new, it has promising goals and is one 
of a number of donor initiatives making a 
positive contribution to building a public 
extension system in Georgia. Furthermore, 
with the support of the SEAS project, the 
national government has initiated donor co­
ordination meetings to consolidate efforts 
around projects dealing with agriculture 
and extension. Participants in the group in­
clude the Dutch embassy in Georgia, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO), the Swiss Develop­
ment Agency, USAID and the World Bank. 
Whereas the MoA should be a leading party 
in this process and tell donors what should 
be done and where, its leadership is cur­
rently lacking.
A number of foreign development agen­
cies and international organizations have 
played a positive role in extension during the 
first post­conflict stage of transition in Georgia 
and other post­Soviet countries (Salukvadze, 
1999; Roeing, 2016), as they have incentiv­
ized and mobilized many actors, such as 
NGOs, and prompted action at the local 
level (Shtaltovna, 2015). Given the import­
ance of agriculture and bearing in mind the 
problems in rural areas, the provision of ex­
tension services by development projects is 
a significant contribution to rural develop­
ment in the country. Nonetheless, despite 
making a great contribution to constructing 
extension services, there are a number of 
shortcomings in the work of these agencies. 
For instance, many of the projects are short 
term, the efforts of donors are not coordin­
ated and the projects do not always meet local 
needs. Donors, when implementing develop­
ment projects, play their geopolitical roles 
in the region (Roeing, 2016), and to this end 
they are new and important actors in the 
knowledge and development field.
The Role of NGOs
Many NGOs emerged in the country as a re­
sponse to societal problems caused by the 
civil war and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, as state institutions were unable to 
solve problems of agricultural and rural 
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 development or to implement donors’ projects 
(Shtaltovna, 2015). International projects and 
donors mobilized many actors through es­
tablished NGOs, some of which have become 
a platform for active and knowledgeable 
people, including former socialist special­
ists in diverse fields. Additionally, NGOs fill 
a big gap in the rural economy of Georgia, 
similarly to other ex­Soviet states (Shtaltovna 
2015; Roeing, 2016). By implementing de­
velopment projects, NGOs and their staff 
often provide services and agricultural 
 advice that were previously delivered by 
 kolkhozes but also try to solve many other 
problems in the socio­economic transform­
ation process.
One example of an NGO providing ex­
tension in Georgia is the biological farming 
association Elkana, a Georgian NGO founded 
in 1994 (Elkana, 2011). At that time, villages 
in the country were completely devoid of 
means of production and also suffered from 
an acute shortage of information and know­
ledge. No government or public institution 
was capable of assisting farmers with quali­
fied farming advice, and modern technolo­
gies were very few and far between in the 
country, so Elkana was established to assist 
farmers. Activities were initially limited to 
providing advisory services for farmers. 
Today extension is carried out through its 
advisory and economic division, and the as­
sociation provides consultation services to 
over 900 members on issues relating to farm­
ing and business planning. Elkana’s key ex­
tension services include:
• Planning to convert farms to biological 
methods of farm management.
• Conducting economic planning and op­
timization of farms.
• Providing consultations for organic 
farming.
• Consulting on business planning and 
marketing issues.
• Supplying seed to farmers and support­
ing the planting of traditional/local var­
ieties.
• Conducting training and workshops on 
organic agri­production, business plan­
ning, community mobilization, rural 
tourism and biological safety.
NGOs in Georgia face several challenges. 
The essential factor in the survival of any 
NGO in Georgia is funding, as farmers are 
not yet ready to pay for consultations, mainly 
due to the small amount of readily available 
money. Furthermore, there is a high level of 
competition for donors’ money, as there is 
little or no support for the NGO sector from 
government sources. This creates financial 
issues that affect the extension services 
NGOs can provide. To sustain their efforts, 
NGOs adopt different strategies such as sell­
ing agricultural tools and seeds/seedlings, 
providing text message­based weather infor­
mation and other kinds of paid services.
NGOs also struggle to impact many 
farmers. Donor organizations provide strong 
backup for NGO activities, thus helping 
them to contribute to the rural economy. 
However, the coverage by projects is sparse. 
Despite the significant work done by NGOs, 
they cannot replace the state, nor can they 
create the environment of stable institutions 
and predictable law enforcement needed to 
create anything resembling a capitalist dem­
ocracy (Van Assche et al., 2013; Van Assche 
et al., 2016a, 2016b).
The Role of the Private Sector
There are minimal private sector extension 
or advisory services in Georgia. However, 
two additional sources of knowledge and 
innovation for farmers are agricultural shops 
and farm service centers (agro kartli). As well 
as offering a range of inputs and tools for 
agriculture, they also provide agricultural 
consultations. These are mainly targeted at 
promoting some of their products. There are 
hardly any independent agronomists left 
now whom farmers could contract for agri­
cultural advice.
Conclusion
Georgia is characterized not only as a post­ 
conflict country, but also as a country in tran­
sition from socialism to capitalism, which 
is  important when discussing the role of 
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 extension in rebuilding after the conflict. 
This factor adds an extra layer of difficulty 
when analyzing post­conflict extension 
and considering potential options for future 
 development.
Nonetheless, extension can play a role 
in rebuilding agriculture in post­conflict 
and post­transition countries such as  Georgia. 
Before its relatively recent introduction, the 
Soviet system of knowledge production and 
sharing differed from Western concepts of 
extension. Although the process was not 
specifically referred to as ‘extension’, the 
knowledge­transfer goal was similar in that 
it was a functioning agricultural knowledge 
and information provision system, organ­
ized through a complex network of agricul­
tural ministries, agricultural universities, 
academies of agricultural sciences, research 
centers, kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Until re­
cently, many research institutes, as well as 
the Academy of Agricultural Sciences and the 
National Agricultural University, functioned 
in a similar manner, providing some elements 
of extension in the process. However, these in­
stitutions were forced to change, mainly be­
cause they previously served the needs of 
collective agriculture and therefore had to 
shift direction towards a market­driven 
economy. In addition, the financing of these 
institutes has declined dramatically since 
the end of the Soviet era. Despite these hur­
dles, former Soviet research institutes still 
contribute to the overall picture of know­
ledge and innovation production in  Georgia.
After the cessation of a number of civil 
wars in post­Soviet Georgia, extension was 
introduced and provided by international 
donor agencies and NGOs, as a component 
of larger agricultural projects. Through de­
velopment projects, international donors 
provide knowledge, inputs and services for 
farmers. While implementing a wide range 
of agricultural projects, donors and NGOs fill 
an important gap in services that were previ­
ously provided by the Soviet agricultural 
system. Despite their successes, donors and 
NGOs should be expected to complement ra­
ther than substitute for government agricul­
tural services (Van Assche et al., 2013; Van 
Assche et al., 2016b). The experience of 
other post­Soviet countries (e.g. Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) dem­
onstrates that, without governmental will, 
there can be no development in any sector.
Similarly, in Georgia extension (and 
the agricultural sector as a whole) was not a 
priority following independence. However, 
since 2013 and with the signing of the col­
laboration agreement with the EU, changes 
have been made in Georgian agriculture for 
the first time since 1991. The regional ICCs 
were established to provide support to 
farmers and are already producing impres­
sive results. Credit is also due to donor or­
ganizations which assisted the MoA with 
staff training and by providing different 
kinds of support to the ICCs. Successes by 
the ICCs and other extension­related efforts 
have pushed the MoA to support the ICCs, 
as well as to meet the requirements of the 
EU agreement, with dynamism and enthu­
siasm. The same triggers have given im­
petus to further reorganization of the na­
tional research and educational system, 
including the establishment of the Scientif­
ic­Research Center at the MoA as well an 
agricultural faculty at the Technical Uni­
versity. There is also space for private ex­
tension, which has emerged in recent years, 
and for these two bodies to cooperate 
(interview with Ben Mueller, Director of 
SEAS project, Tbilisi, 2015). These are 
good signs.
The Georgian extension system pro­
vides a good example for other countries 
seeking to pursue a similar course. The key 
learning point here is that the process was 
externally driven, in this case by the Associ­
ation Agreement with the EU. However, to 
maintain these good intentions, the back­
ground processes should not be overlooked. 
For example, several unresolved problems 
remain concerning the lengthy process of 
reorganizing and funding the national agri­
cultural research system. No funding is cur­
rently provided to libraries and research in 
the Academy of Sciences or other national 
research institutions. The situation has 
been exacerbated by the ongoing political 
conflict between the National Agricultural 
University and the MoA, which affects the 
generation of agricultural research and 
knowledge.
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Regarding ICCs, it will take some time 
before they become real extension providers, 
and people who became extensionists still 
have to be retrained as agricultural experts 
to proactively help farmers find solutions to 
their problems. The task of these ICC per­
sonnel is both extremely important and very 
difficult, since they have to collect widely 
scattered knowledge from various places 
and actors (as previously described) and de­
liver it to a new customer—the ‘farmer’—
who may be located across the length and 
breadth of Georgia, and who is currently 
neither ready nor able to pay for the ser­
vices provided. Time and resources are re­
quired to address these concerns.
Given that extension is a new notion 
in Georgia, it needs to be very context­ 
specific, fit with the political and histor­
ical context of the country and meet the 
needs of different kinds of farmers, espe­
cially those who are smallholders and vul­
nerable if Georgian agriculture is to con­
tinue operating and growing in the future. 
At this point the question of sustainability 
arises, given that the EU is the main trigger 
in the process of public extension system 
development. After its goals have been 
achieved, Georgia will need to find justifi­
cations for maintaining the system, sup­
porting the ICCs and providing services to 
farmers. Sustaining the dynamism and 
enthusiasm generated in the post­conflict 
and post­transition period is crucial, not 
just for Georgia but for other countries 
 facing similar situations.
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Introduction
Guatemala and the Western Highlands
Guatemala is an exceptionally beautiful 
Central American country with a population 
of around 14 million people, approximately 
40% of whom are indigenous Mayans (USAID, 
2011). Mayans are by far the largest group 
of indigenous peoples in Guatemala and are 
the majority population residing in the West-
ern Highlands. There are extremely small groups 
of indigenous Xinca and Garifuna who reside 
in southeast Guatemala and the Caribbean 
Coast, respectively.
Unfortunately, Guatemala’s beauty is 
not reflected in its current indicators of well- 
being. About half of the population lives in 
poverty and an equal percentage of children 
under 5 years are chronically malnourished 
(USAID, 2011). Years of strife and violence 
have left their mark on Guatemala, particu-
larly in the Western Highlands, a mountain-
ous area of high altitudes, volcanoes, forests 
and lakes. Feed the Future (FTF), the US 
government’s global hunger and food secur-
ity initiative, operates in five departments 
in the Western Highlands: Totonicapán, San 
Marcos, Huehuetenango, Quetzaltenango and 
Quiche. The sixth department, Solola, is not a 
priority FTF department. Collectively, these 
departments have the highest density of poor 
and food-insecure people in the country 
(USAID, 2011). Their poverty and health in-
dicator rates are among the very worst in 
the world. About three-quarters of the Maya 
population live in poverty and over two-
thirds of children under 5 years are chronically 
malnourished (Dworkin, 2015). The reasons 
for such dismal statistics are complex. Ac-
cording to Dworkin (2015) from the USAID/
Guatemala Mission, they include not only 
poverty but also insufficient knowledge of 
nutritional needs and how to meet them, his-
toric social exclusion and corruption, as well 
as low levels of investment in the region.
Agriculture is a key to Highland liveli-
hoods even though most of the population is 
landless or land poor. Guatemala has the 
most inequitable and concentrated distribu-
tion of land ownership in Central America 
(USAID, 2010). Large farms (2.6% of the total 
number of farms) control 65% of agricultural 
land, while small farms (88% of all farms)—
the majority of which are located in the 
Western Highlands—control only 16% of 
agricultural land (Lastarria-Cornhiel, 2003). 
In spite of this, and due to severely limited 
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alternatives, the main occupation of at least 
one family member in 70% of Western High-
land households is farming (48%) or working 
as a farm laborer (22%) (Angeles et al., 2014).
The dominant Western Highlands farm-
ing system is maize-based, with most cultiva-
tion occurring on deforested and eroded hill-
sides. The large majority of Highland farmers, 
predominantly Mayans, are subsistence maize– 
bean farmers (Buena Milpa, n.d.a). Maize has 
been cultivated in Guatemala by indigenous 
peoples since ancient times (Wellhausen 
et  al., 1957). The production methods they 
use—including the use of hoes, machetes and 
planting sticks—have changed little over the 
centuries. Farmers tend to store their seed 
from year to year and yields are low.
According to hearsay, Highland farmers 
may be planting less maize or paying less at-
tention to the maize they plant these days 
due to competing demands on their time, 
and other factors. Planting less maize could 
be due to smaller landholdings because of 
land distribution within the family or use for 
non-agricultural purposes. At the same time, 
research by the Strengthening Partnerships, 
Results, and Innovations in Nutrition Glo-
bally (SPRING) project (2015) in the Western 
Highlands indicates that since maize is the 
basis of the diet, most families feel it is es-
sential to grow maize to help ensure that the 
family will have something to eat. In short, 
the more maize they grow and are able to 
store successfully, the less money they will 
need for maize purchases. Even for those 
who grow most of their own maize, purchase 
of maize is their single largest food expense 
(SPRING, 2015). The SPRING study sug-
gested that decisions about production are 
usually taken jointly by men and women in 
the household, confirming that both play im-
portant roles in maize production. Women 
are largely responsible for backyard farming, 
producing a variety of agricultural and live-
stock products (Ruano and Zambrano, 2006).
Background to the Conflict
Land and ethnicity are central themes in Gua-
temala’s frequently turbulent history. Under 
Spanish rule, indigenous peoples—mainly 
Mayan—were forcibly removed from their 
homes and lands and required to provide 
labor to the Spanish conquerors and colon-
ists (Lovell, 1988; Kramer, 1994). The estab-
lishment of large plantations and the emer-
gence of debt peonage began during this 
time (Lovell, 1988), with the indigenous 
population coerced onto ever-smaller plots at 
higher elevations (USAID, 2010). This period 
also saw the beginning of the mixed-race 
Spanish/indigenous mestizo population, re-
ferred to as Ladinos and commonly meaning 
non-indigenous Guatemalans. The 1800s, 
while an important period for some liberal 
economic reforms, were beset by constant 
conflicts between liberals and the conserva-
tive landholding class who came to dominate 
politically, economically and socially. Over 
time, most indigenous land was expropri-
ated, resulting in the concentration of land in 
the hands of the very few at the expense of 
the great majority (Brown et al., 2005).
In 1952, the newly elected President 
Jacobo Arbenz initiated a large-scale land re-
form designed to spur Guatemala’s economic 
development. He looked towards ending the 
latifundio system (large landholdings by the 
elite few), which included lands held by the 
United Fruit Company (one of the largest 
landowners in the country), and distributing 
land to ‘thousands of peasants’ (United Fruit 
Historical Society, n.d.: 2). He ran abruptly 
foul of the wealthy landholding minority, 
who controlled extensive sugar, coffee, ba-
nana and livestock plantations, and of the 
US government, which became involved 
on the side of United Fruit. Against the 
backdrop of the Cold War, the USA viewed 
Arbenz as a communist, and the toxic mix of 
large-scale landholder and US interests 
along with Cold War politics led to a 1954 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-backed 
attack on the Arbenz government and its 
consequent collapse (United Fruit Historical 
Society, n.d.). Subsequently, the Arbenz re-
forms were reversed. Within 6 years, Guate-
mala’s internal armed conflict had begun. A 
root cause of the conflict was lack of access 
and unequal distribution of land (Brown 
et al., 2005; USAID, 2010), which was also a 
principal cause of poverty in Guatemala 
(Lastarria-Cornhiel, 2003).
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Thirty-six years of conflict: 1960–1996
The Guatemalan conflict is complex, under-
pinned as it is by the systematic historical 
discrimination and social exclusion of the 
Mayan population. This became the driving 
force behind the efforts of anti-government 
forces. The beginning of the 1960s saw the 
growth of a leftist, socialist political move-
ment that led to deadly confrontations be-
tween the government and indigenous people, 
students and the Church (Pillay, 2007). The 
horrors of the ensuing civil war are detailed 
in ‘Guatemala: Memory of Silence’ by the 
Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH), 
established in 1994 by the United Nations 
(CEH, 1999). Over the years of the conflict, 
an estimated 200,000 men, women and 
children—including babies—were killed 
and an additional 50,000 disappeared (CEH, 
1999; Levinger, 2015).
There are enormously varying esti-
mates suggesting that up to 1 million people 
were displaced in the 1980s as a result of 
the government’s scorched-earth policy against 
the Mayan people (CIA, 2008; Rothenberg, 
2012). Over 600 massacres occurred. There 
was torture, rape and execution. Whole vil-
lages were burned, including houses, crops 
and animals; and, in their own words, 
 Mayans were hunted down like animals 
(CEH, 1999; Levinger, 2015). The CEH in its 
extensive review of testimony and docu-
mentation found that 93% of all atrocities 
committed were by the government— 
primarily the army—and 3% were by the 
guerrillas (CEH, 1999). The Commission 
stated with clarity that genocide against the 
Mayan people occurred, particularly during 
1981 and 1983 at the zenith of atrocities (CEH, 
1999). The great majority of the victims— 
83%—were Mayan (Rothenberg, 2012).
The Peace Accords and Contemporary 
Guatemala
Armed conflict ended with the signing of 
the Peace Accords in December 1996. One 
of the tenets of the accords was access to 
land and rural development (Klick, 2015). 
Unfortunately, the Peace Accords have yet 
to meet expectations. While some progress 
has been made (e.g. the reintegration of war- 
affected populations, less repression and 
more open expression of views in public and 
private), Guatemala has been unable to im-
plement many of the agreed-upon compo-
nents of the accords (Pillay, 2007; Klick, 2015).
Guatemala continues to suffer from 
‘pervasive racism towards indigenous 
peoples on the part of both the economic 
elite and the non-elite Ladino population’ 
(USAID, 2012: 4). Political discord con-
tinues with rampant corruption at the high-
est levels of government (Malkin, 2015). 
There has been far less structural change 
than is needed to break the hold on the 
country by the powerful few (Pillay, 2007).
Security remains a major issue, with con-
cerns about military involvement in internal 
security and crime and violence high. In a 
2010 survey, close to one in four Guatemalans 
reported having been the victim of a crime in 
the previous year (Taft-Morales, 2014). A fea-
ture of post-conflict Guatemala is illegally 
armed groups which commit or threaten 
to commit violent criminal acts. They are re-
portedly an arm of an interconnected, yet hid-
den, powerful body of Guatemalans who 
have influence both within and outside the 
government and use their political connec-
tions and violence to protect themselves from 
prosecution in cases of corruption, drug traf-
ficking and other forms of organized crime 
(Peacock and Beltrán, 2003; Pillay, 2007). The 
International Commission against Impunity 
in Guatemala (CICIG), created in 2006 in col-
laboration with the UN, is charged with as-
sisting Guatemala to investigate and pros-
ecute serious crime and corruption in the 
country (McKibben, 2015). Ensuring security 
and strengthening judicial and legal systems 
is critical to securing peace in post-conflict 
countries (Dobbins et  al., 2007; UN Depart-
ment of Peacekeeping Operations, 2010).
Pre-Conflict Agricultural Extension
Preceded by the establishment of the 
Ministry of Agriculture in the early 
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1900s, agricultural extension was for-
malized in the 1950s. Extension focused 
on non-formal education and the provi-
sion of agricultural advice in support of 
smallholder farmers. The original model 
was influenced by the US Cooperative 
Extension Service model, in that exten-
sion teams were comprised of an agricul-
tural extensionist, an educator for the 
home and a youth club promoter (Ortiz 
et al., 2011; FAO, 2014). However, unlike 
in the USA, research and extension were 
not under the umbrella of a university 
but  rather each in their own respective 
 institution.
In the 1960s, the extension focus 
turned to larger commercial farmers 
(Hernández, 2014). This was reversed in 
the 1970s by a return to serving smaller 
farmers through a new multi-institutional 
approach that  included refocusing exten-
sion on smallholder farmers and the 
 establishment of agricultural financing 
and marketing institutions. Within the 
 Ministry of Agriculture, extension was 
assigned to the General Directorate of 
Agricultural Services (DIGESA), with 
live stock extension under a different dir-
ectorate. In the 1970s and 1980s, links 
between DIGESA and the National Agri-
cultural Research Institution (ICTA) were 
strengthened through working together to 
test, among others, improved seed and 
fertilizer recommendations (Ortiz et al., 
2011).
Extension activities were carried out 
in some areas during the years of the con-
flict. Budget cuts in the 1980s, precipitated 
by structural adjustment along with the 
violence of the armed conflict, led to the 
total closure of Guatemala’s public sector 
agricultural extension service in 1990. It 
was believed that the private and civil so-
ciety sectors would fill the gap left by pub-
lic sector extension. This did not happen 
(Ortiz et al., 2011), although some donor- 
funded projects and non-governmental or-
ganizations’ (NGOs) extension activities 
continued after 1990. The subject of exten-
sion was dropped from the curricula of 
universities and agricultural schools at 
this time.
Re-Establishing Agricultural Extension: 
The System
Development
Nearly 20 years after public sector exten-
sion was disbanded and 12 years after the 
signing of the 1996 Peace Accords, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and 
Food (MAGA) moved towards re-establish-
ing a public sector National Agricultural 
Extension System (SNEA). This began 
around 2008 and was given further im-
petus by the government’s 2009 National 
Framework for Comprehensive Rural De-
velopment. Ultimately, most components 
of SNEA were incorporated in a newer, lar-
ger system of  extension, the National Rural 
Extension System (SNER), established in 
2013 (see Hernández, 2014). The basic dif-
ference between the two systems is that 
SNER provides for a pluralistic extension 
system ( including public, private and civil 
society sector service providers), whereas 
SNEA only dealt with public sector exten-
sion. The following describes the SNER 
system, specifically the public sector Rural 
Extension Service (RES). It is worth noting 
that SNER was established 26 years after 
public sector extension was disbanded 
and 17 years after the formal end of armed 
conflict.
Framework
Figure 12.1 shows the SNER framework. 
It is anchored by the RES, which falls 
under MAGA. Inputs to the system in-
clude technical information and strategy, 
incentives and financial resources. The 
primary outputs, representing the overall 
purpose of the system, are self-managed 
farmer organizations, technically compe-
tent producers and families with a higher 
quality of life. The framework links to-
gether research and educational institu-
tions, such as the national research insti-
tution, agricultural universities and schools, 
farmers’ organizations, and the special-
ized directorates of MAGA including 
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 horticulture, animal health and agricul-
tural infrastructure.
The specialized directorates, function-
ing as subject matter specialists, provide 
technical backup to extension activities. 
International assistance is incorporated in 
the system along with municipal govern-
ment services and support by NGOs.
Public sector extension
Currently, public sector extension drives 
the SNER system, although it is designed as 
a pluralistic system. Within SNER, the RES 
is the administrative home for all MAGA 
extensionists, who are typically referred to 
as MAGA rather than RES extensionists. 
Other actors in the pluralistic system are 
discussed later in this chapter.
Staffing and coverage
Within the context of the public sector, Gua-
temala has 22 departments (roughly equiva-
lent to a US state) and 334 municipalities 
(equivalent to a US county). At the depart-
ment level, the Department of Regional 
 Coordination and Rural Extension channels 
and coordinates all MAGA services, includ-
ing extension. At the municipal level, a Mu-
nicipal Extension Agency (AME) is respon-
sible for field-level extension and is staffed 
by a team of three MAGA extensionists in 
each municipality. There is a Rural Devel-
opment Extensionist (usually male) who 
has administrative/supervisory responsibil-
ities, supports farmers’ group development 
and interacts with non-public actors in the 
extension system. A Family Farming Exten-
sionist (typically male) focuses on partici-
patory assessments of the agriculture- related 
needs of farmers and training volunteer ex-
tension promoters (local farmers called pro-
motores) to support farmers’ group activities. 
The third team member is a Healthy House-
hold Extensionist (almost always female) 
who addresses issues related to the home, 
including backyard gardening and nutri-
tion, and works with farmers’ groups that 
consist primarily of women.
All AMEs are reportedly staffed; thus, 
MAGA currently has around 1000 field ex-
tensionists who have been brought on board 
since 2013. Qualifications required for field 
extensionists range from 12 years of educa-
tion to a Bachelor’s degree. Although Gua-






























Fig. 12.1. Framework of the National Rural Extension System (SNER). From MAGA (2013).
210 V.A. Sigman 
various government functions, MAGA has 
not been decentralized, and extensionists at 
the municipal level report to regional- or 
national-level MAGA officers rather than to 
municipal officials. There are exceptions to 
this however. Municipal officials, particu-
larly mayors, play a large role in extension 
in some municipalities.
Even though there are three extension-
ists in every municipality, the number of 
farm families who are eligible to receive ex-
tension services, estimated at 1.5 million, is 
far greater than MAGA extensionists alone 
can serve. SNER thus embraces an approach 
to extension that is designed to broaden its 
coverage to the extent possible.
Approach
SNER promotes a farmer-to-farmer approach 
which, at its most basic level, involves train-
ing extensionists, who subsequently support 
and develop the capacity of volunteer ex-
tension promotores, who then work directly 
with groups of farmers to improve their live-
lihoods. The approach is less linear than 
it may seem, with feedback and dialogue 
among the different elements of the system 
and other capacity development activities 
occurring alongside training. As further de-
tailed below, SNER promotes: (i) organizing 
farmers’ groups through establishing Centers 
of Learning for Rural Development (CADERs); 
(ii) developing the capacity of volunteer 
 extension promotores selected to provide 
guidance and capacity development to the 
CADERs; and (iii) using a cascading training 
system to develop capacity and technically 
backstop the system as a whole. The farmer- 
to-farmer approach improves coverage be-
cause integrating volunteer promotores in 
the system adds considerably to the number 
of farmers that extensionists can reach. It also 
localizes extension processes by substan-
tively engaging local volunteers in import-
ant positions within the system. Figure 12.2 
depicts the approach.
CADERs are neither physical locations 
nor facilities. They are groups of people or-
ganized around community challenges and 
opportunities. More specifically, members 
of CADERs share an interest in improving 
their agricultural or livestock production, 
processing and/or marketing and liveli-




























































Fig. 12.2. SNER approach: municipal level. From MAGA (2013).
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doing—building on their existing knowledge 
and acquiring and applying new learning and 
skills. The SNER framework suggests a min-
imum membership of ten members per CADER. 
Many CADERs are much larger.
Municipal-level extensionists are charged 
with organizing CADERs and with training 
CADER promotores. The group promotores 
and an extensionist lead a set of participa-
tory diagnostic exercises to identify the needs 
of farmers in the CADER. These needs are 
prioritized by the CADER and used to for-
mulate a group plan. Group plans are con-
solidated into a Municipal Agricultural 
Plan, which is part of the Municipality De-
velopment Plan, an official document of the 
municipality. Thus, SNER is a demand- driven 
system. The expectation is that ultimately 
CADERs that share interests will join to-
gether to form larger, more formal, rural 
producer associations which are able to pro-
vide extension and other services to their 
members.
Volunteer extension promotores are se-
lected by their group. They are involved in 
the capacity development activities led by 
extensionists and, in turn, relay the know-
ledge, skills and attitudes they learn back to 
their group. While promotores working with 
public sector CADERs are not paid, they may 
receive incentives such as inputs for dem-
onstration plots and training as well as rec-
ognition in their communities.
Capacity development
The capacity development of public sector 
extensionists takes place through a cascading 
training system that begins at the national 
level. National-level staff provide training 
to extensionists at the department and/or the 
municipal level. Department- level specialists 
from the specialized MAGA directorates 
also train municipal-level extensionists. 
Municipal-level extensionists then train pro-
motores who train their CADER groups. An-
nual capacity development plans are devel-
oped at the various levels.
Capacity development for extensionists 
includes both technical agriculture and ex-
tension methodology and covers subjects 
ranging from crop production, home gar-
dens, conservation agriculture and CADER 
plan development to demonstration plot es-
tablishment and facilitation. MAGA has led 
the development of several comprehensive 
guidebooks for use in training extensionists 
and for use by extensionists in their everyday 
work (MAGA, 2014; MAGA and FAO, n.d.).
Other actors in the pluralistic  
extension system
SNER is a system for extension and al-
though it is largely driven by the public sec-
tor at the present time, it is designed to 
 provide entry points for public, private and 
civil society sector engagement. Ideally and 
by design, initial entry points for the vari-
ous actors are through interactions with the 
staff of municipal-level extension agencies 
(the AMEs). Municipal-level development 
plans and CADER group plans then help to 
identify where there is a match between 
what the community wants (as expressed in 
these plans) and what public, private or 
civil society sector extension actors have 
to offer.
There are various actors in the pluralis-
tic extension system. Notably, not all exten-
sion service providers in Guatemala use the 
Spanish word for extension (extensión) to 
describe their activities, nor does everyone 
who works in extension in Guatemala iden-
tify themselves as extensionists. The reasons 
for this likely relate, at least in part, to the 
history of conflict and continued tensions 
between civil society and the government, 
leading some providers to distance them-
selves from association with the government. 
The Spanish words used by some extension 
providers to identify their work, such as 
‘acompañante’, do not translate well into 
English and thus ‘extension’ and ‘extension-
ists’ are used in this chapter.
An overview of extension research, 
specific extension-related projects and the 
key NGO extension service providers con-
tributing to the pluralistic extension system 
in the Western Highlands is provided below. 
There have been reports of some private 
sector engagement in extension in the 
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 Western Highlands but this type of engage-
ment primarily takes place in other parts of 
the country and involves commercial crops.
Research
Institute of Science and Technical  
Agriculture (ICTA)
ICTA, Guatemala’s national research insti-
tution, did not close in the 1990s along with 
extension and other government depart-
ments but continued to operate, albeit on a 
more limited scale, due to its status as a 
semi-autonomous institution. ICTA’s work 
during the armed conflict was constrained 
by security concerns related to the ongoing 
violence.
ICTA’s purpose is to contribute to Gua-
temala’s agricultural development through 
science and the development of technolo-
gies for sustainable agricultural production 
systems. Its clients fall under the three cat-
egories of farmers Guatemala characterizes 
as: (i) less than subsistence; (ii) subsistence; 
and (iii) surplus.
ICTA and MAGA extensionists have ex-
perience working together in carrying out 
field activities. ICTA also works with some 
NGOs and seeks linkages with bilateral don-
ors, private sector extension and other sec-
tors of the government. For example, prior 
to SNER, ICTA engaged in projects with the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) and the Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization of the United Nations (FAO) to 
train extensionists in production technolo-
gies. ICTA has also trained Rural Health 
Workers from the Ministry of Health and 
agricultural staff of various NGOs. ICTA 
currently has a program underway to train a 
new generation of researchers. The program 
gives some consideration to the role of ex-
tension in agricultural  development.
ICTA scientists have had considerable 
success in substantially improving commer-
cialized maize yields in the Pacific Coast 
area of Guatemala using hybrid seed and 
other inputs. However, they have had much 
less success in improving maize yields in the 
Highlands. This prompted the development 
of a small program focused on local know-
ledge systems and traditional and alternative 
systems of food production. The program is 
championed by a senior ICTA scientist inter-
ested in agricultural innovation systems.
For many years, ICTA has used a phased 
approach to conducting research and the in-
stitute expects to continue to do so, although 
the approach is currently under review to 
identify any needed modifications. The re-
search process has feedback and evaluation 
loops and is informed by agricultural and 
socio-economic studies and information. 
The process involves five phases:
• Phase One: Experimental work is carried 
out on experimental stations to generate 
new technologies under ICTA- controlled 
conditions.
• Phase Two: On-farm experiments con-
tinue to generate and adapt technologies 
following their evaluation by ICTA.
• Phase Three: On-farm testing occurs 
under farming conditions with farmers 
evaluating the technologies. ICTA as-
sesses the acceptance level by farmers 
of the technologies.
• Phase Four: Technologies are promoted 
by farmer collaborators who use the 
technologies on their own farms. Typic-
ally, ICTA begins involving extension 
services during this phase.
• Phase Five: Production is expanded as 
greater numbers of farmers adopt the 
technologies. This phase is facilitated 
by extension services.
Value could be added to the process by in-
volving extension services during Phase 
Three. This would provide hands-on learn-
ing opportunities for extensionists, which 
would improve their capacity to understand 
and discuss the technologies with farmers. 
Extension could also facilitate and provide 
further feedback to ICTA regarding farmer 
perceptions of the strengths and potential 
weaknesses of the technologies under review.
The Buena Milpa project
‘Buena’ in Spanish means ‘good’. Milpa is a 
Mesoamerica cropping system that trad-
itionally produces maize, beans and squash. 
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Milpa also refers to a field. The Buena Milpa 
project, a USAID FTF initiative, began in 
2015 and is led by the International Maize 
and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT). 
The objective is to contribute to improving 
food security and decreasing malnutrition, 
while increasing the sustainability and re-
silience of maize-based farming systems in 
the Western Highlands of Guatemala (Buena 
Milpa, n.d.b).
The conceptual framework for the pro-
ject is the agricultural innovation system 
(AIS). This is defined by the project as ‘a con-
cept that describes the organization of inter-
acting and evolving groups of stakeholders 
(farmers, extension agents, researchers, insti-
tutions, companies, etc.) that work together 
around a common agricultural problem to 
stimulate innovation and change towards 
solving the problem’ (Buena Milpa, n.d.a: 6).
The project focuses on improving as-
pects of maize-based farming systems, in-
cluding conserving genetic diversity, nat-
ural resource management and farm system 
diversification. It emphasizes social inclu-
sion to ensure that Mayan women and men 
and other marginalized groups are included 
in Buena Milpa activities. It is meant to be a 
scaling out activity, which implies a major 
emphasis on extension activities. Previously 
studied technologies, practices, processes and 
models are to be scaled out (Buena Milpa, 
n.d.b). The underlying rationale is to move 
away from a linear technology transfer and 
delivery model whereby researchers develop 
technologies that extensionists then dissem-
inate to farmers, and towards an acknow-
ledgment that innovation emerges from 
interactions among multiple actors and has 
organizational and institutional as well as 
technical dimensions (Nederlof et al., 2011).
Buena Milpa staff do not work directly 
with farmers. The project has developed an 
innovation platform (IP) whose members im-
plement, along with farmers, the research 
and extension work of the project. Buena 
Milpa refers to this body as an ‘innovation 
network’ to distinguish it from the term ‘in-
novation platform’ used by a larger CIMMYT- 
led project in Mexico (MasAgro). The latter 
functions somewhat differently from the 
Buena Milpa network but informed the 
 development of the Buena Milpa project. 
The Buena Milpa network performs func-
tions largely as an IP and is referred to as 
such in this chapter.
Referred to as collaborators, IP mem-
bers are not subcontracted entities per se, 
although the project manages a small grants 
program to finance collaborative activities. 
Collaborators include representatives from 
the national research institution ICTA, 
MAGA extension services, universities and 
various NGOs providing extension services. 
The overarching idea is to use the strengths 
of different members of the IP, including 
farmers and their groups, to jointly learn, re-
fine, test and promote the uptake of innov-
ations (technologies, practices and processes). 
For example, IP members are involved in 
carrying out bean seed variety validation 
trials, establishing community-based maize 
seed banks and diversifying maize-based 
farming systems by integrating them with 
amaranth and poultry.
ICTA leads several on-farm trials re-
lated to Buena Milpa focus areas to fine-tune 
existing technologies and practices. Over 
time, as challenges arise in the implementa-
tion of field activities by IP members, ICTA 
will be a major contributor to developing 
research-informed solutions.
The primary role of Buena Milpa is that 
of innovation systems broker (also referred 
to as innovation facilitator). Innovation bro-
kers are persons or organizations that pur-
posefully catalyze innovations by bringing 
together actors and facilitating their inter-
action (Klerkx and Gildemacher, 2012). Col-
laborators in the IP have their own extension 
approaches, which Buena Milpa strengthens 
through training and other capacity devel-
opment activities. IP collaborator approaches 
to extension largely mirror the SNER ap-
proach, whereby extensionists are trained 
to work with promotores who then work 
with organized groups of farmers.
FAO
In line with its global mission to eradicate 
hunger in the world, the FAO works closely 
with Guatemala’s Secretariat of Food and 
Nutrition and is a major ally of MAGA. 
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The FAO assisted in the development of the 
SNER system and promotes its implementa-
tion. It has supported institutional develop-
ment to strengthen MAGA’s capacity to 
function at the center of the SNER system 
and has supported the Ministry in various 
other extension activities. These include, 
for example, designing a capacity develop-
ment plan for MAGA extensionists, training 
them and developing learning materials for 
extensionists to use. The FAO and MAGA 
have previously implemented several ex-
tension projects in the Western Highlands, 
including a small farmer livelihoods project.
Tropical Agriculture Research  
and Learning Center (CATIE)
CATIE is a regional institution, headquar-
tered in Costa Rica and, similar to a US land 
grant university, offers graduate education 
in agriculture. CATIE is also involved in re-
search and outreach programs. Organiza-
tionally it has three divisions: an Educa-
tional Division, which operates its graduate 
school and training programs; a Division of 
Research and Development, which manages 
various projects around the themes of agri-
culture, forestry, livestock, environmental 
management and climate change; and a Div-
ision of Outreach and Development, which 
administers CATIE’s Country Offices, Com-
munication and Policy Office, and Manage-
ment and Service Offering Unit. CATIE has 
a country office in Guatemala.
CATIE, in partnership with MAGA and 
with funding from Norway, implements an 
innovative extension-oriented project with 
the lengthy title ‘Knowledge management for 
sustainable rural development innovation in 
Guatemala: strengthening family agriculture 
and farmer economy’ (CATIE, 2013). The pro-
ject operates in the Central Highland’s de-
partments of Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz and 
Chimaltenango. Among its objectives are to 
strengthen SNER and to design and imple-
ment a new structure within the SNER system 
called Local Systems of Extension (SLEs).
An SLE is essentially a coordinating 
unit for pluralistic extension actors who come 
together at the municipal level to coordinate 
all extension activity in the municipality. 
Each SLE is led by the municipal-level ex-
tension agency and is closely aligned with 
the work of the Municipal Commission of 
Food and Nutrition Security. SLEs were 
introduced to increase synergies, improve 
information sharing and reduce duplication 
of services among extension actors.
CATIE’s Knowledge Management pro-
ject has its own staff of extensionists who 
work in concert with MAGA extensionists. 
To date, the project has developed the cap-
acity of around 70 MAGA extensionists in 
extension methodology, agrobiodiversity, 
gender issues in extension and seed bank 
development. Close to 400 promotores have 
been trained, the majority of whom are 
women (60%). Using Field School method-
ology, the project works with around 400 
CADERs. The project has helped the CADERs 
to develop their group and municipal devel-
opment plans with subsequent training 
based on their identified priorities. The ma-
jority of CADER members are also women. 
CATIE is considering a study to determine 
the factors influencing women’s participa-
tion as promotores and as CADER members. 
A working hypothesis for this chapter is that, 
due to emigration and migration of men from 
communities, the role and participation of 
women in agriculture is becoming increas-
ingly important and visible.
Más Fríjol
‘Más fríjol’ means ‘more beans’ in Spanish. 
Tortillas and beans have been the major 
staples of Guatemalan diets for many dec-
ades. Served together in the right quantities 
they are a good form of protein in diets even 
though they do not provide certain essential 
micronutrients. Currently, Guatemalans are 
eating fewer beans and traditional veget-
ables than previously, which negatively im-
pacts their nutritional status. The price of 
beans has increased in recent years, and few 
improved varieties are available which are 
adapted to the microclimates of the High-
lands. In addition, there have been changes 
in dietary preferences with less nutritious 
snack food growing in popularity.
The Más Fríjol project, a USAID/Guatemala 
FTF activity implemented by Michigan 
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State University, is designed to address these 
production and consumption-related chal-
lenges. Project objectives are to increase the 
production of beans in the Western High-
lands and to improve the nutritional quality 
of diets through increased consumption of 
beans in combination with other nutritious 
vegetable and animal-sourced foods. The 
project uses a training-of-trainers approach. 
Más Fríjol provides training for project part-
ners on nutrition-sensitive agriculture, fo-
cusing on the production and value of beans 
in the diet and ways to increase dietary 
 diversification. The partners, who include 
MAGA extensionists, public sector health 
workers and staff from NGOs, then work 
with farmers’ groups and their families to 
increase the production and consumption 
of beans.
Food for Progress
Food for Progress, a US Department of 
Agriculture-funded initiative, which began 
in 2012, is another activity in USAID/ 
Guatemala’s portfolio of FTF programs. 
Counterpart International implements the 
project along with its partners MAGA, 
Guatemala’s University of San Carlos 
School of Agriculture, the Zamorano Pan- 
American Agricultural School in Honduras 
(established in the early 1940s by the presi-
dent of the United Fruit Company) and the 
University of California at Davis. The pro-
ject’s goal is to increase sustainable agricul-
tural knowledge and to improve livelihoods 
among rural communities in the Western 
Highlands.
Food for Progress supports local farm-
ing cooperatives and CADERs, farmer finan-
cing via cooperation with a local credit 
union and the strengthening of SNER. The 
project carries out diagnostics of coopera-
tives, assists them with organizational de-
velopment and with developing business 
plans and provides targeted training. A cost- 
sharing arrangement with a Guatemalan 
credit union has expanded financial ser-
vices to cooperative farmers, with more 
than US$3 million in loans made over the 
life of the project. Food for Progress has a 
small grant program to support CADERs 
and MAGA extensionists in carrying out 
their field activities.
Extension training opportunities, limited 
in the first instance, were much diminished 
during the armed conflict. In 1990, the ex-
tension curriculum was totally removed 
from university offerings. To address this 
gap and as part of its support for SNER, the 
Food for Progress partners have developed 
a certification training program for SNER 
extensionists. This 4-month training pro-
gram emphasizes development policies and 
plans relevant to agriculture and extension, 
extension methodology (including adult 
learning and monitoring and evaluation), 
low-cost agricultural technologies, and food 
security and nutrition. Four cycles of train-
ing have been delivered since the beginning 
of the project with 283 certified extension-
ists graduating. The project held talks with 
MAGA in a pre-emptive move to address 
the issue of whether certified extensionists 
would continue to hold their MAGA posi-
tions over time, rather than potentially being 
removed after their annual contracts expired. 
This resulted in MAGA signing an agree-
ment to keep certified extensionists on staff, 
barring disciplinary problems. Project esti-
mates are that 80% of certified graduates 
continue to work in MAGA extension posts, 
although some believe the rate to be much 
lower. Discussions are underway with Gua-
temala’s San Carlos University to determine 
the feasibility of including the certification 
training in its diploma-level offerings.
The Food for Progress project has a 
small cadre of extensionists who work with 
volunteer promotores and CADERs using 
SNER’s farmer-to-farmer approach. The in-
centives for promotores to participate in-
clude training, possible inputs for demon-
stration plots and increased status in the 
community. Food for Progress emphasizes 
recognizing the accomplishments and con-
tributions of men and women promotores, 
finding that such acknowledgment from 
municipal and MAGA authorities, as well 
as from the project, plays an important role 
in encouraging and sustaining promotores’ 
participation. Over three-quarters of farm-
ers benefiting from Food for Progress activ-
ities are women.
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NGOs
association of organizations of the  cuchamatanes 
(asocuch). Established in 1994, the Associ-
ation of Organizations of the Cuchamatanes 
has grown to be an umbrella organization 
which works with numerous associations 
and cooperatives with the aim of empower-
ing rural men and women, farmers and 
youth—a majority of whom are indigenous 
Maya. ASOCUCH has five focus areas:
• Building a strong network of local or-
ganizations and developing social 
 capital.
• Improving local competitiveness and 
promoting local economies.
• Promoting natural resource manage-
ment, community tourism and local en-
vironmental management.
• Stimulating citizen participation and 
promoting gender equity.
• Strengthening financial sustainability 
and efficient management.
ASOCUCH provides various services to its 
member groups. These include adminis-
tering project finances and subcontracts, 
representing the organizations in fora such 
as the National Indigenous Committee on 
Climate Change and annual planning of 
activities. The organization has an online 
monitoring and evaluation system to track 
its various activities including extension 
services.
ASOCUCH supports agricultural exten-
sion activities primarily through training ex-
tensionists. Specialists train extensionists 
who work in ASOCUCH member associ-
ations or cooperatives. Training spans 1 year 
and covers technical subjects and  extension 
methodologies, including diagnostics to 
identify farmer problems. Each association 
or cooperative has two extensionists, paid 
either by the entity or through a project man-
aged by ASOCUCH. These  extensionists—
about 10% of whom are women—work dir-
ectly with farmers’ groups. They speak both 
Spanish and local Mayan languages.
The farmers’ groups associated with 
ASOCUCH are involved in vegetable, potato, 
onion, coffee and sheep production, as well 
as reforestation and other natural resource 
management activities. Some groups have 
participated in the Collaborative Program 
on Participatory Plant Breeding in Mesoa-
merica. This collaborative program is a re-
gional initiative, is funded by various donors 
and is designed to strengthen the participa-
tion of farmers in the conservation and util-
ization of genetic resources, breeding (selec-
tion, validation and seed production) and 
the sustainable management of crops.
cooperation for rural development of the west 
(cdro). Cooperation for Rural Development 
of the West emerged in 1984 in response to 
the most devastating years of the armed 
conflict. Its history begins with indigenous 
leaders of two Mayan communities in To-
tonicapán. Looking to maintain their indi-
genous identity and to help their communi-
ties, these leaders created an approach to 
development based on Mayan precepts of 
the interconnectedness and interdepend-
ency of their communities and the related 
principles of total community participation 
and locally driven development. This ap-
proach continues to inform CDRO activities 
and is a unique feature of its identity.
CDRO’s mission is to promote the com-
prehensive development of rural communi-
ties in western Guatemala using its unique 
approach and to empower communities to 
establish their own organizations in har-
mony with nature. Changes in the cycles of 
the organization’s growth and retrenchment 
are largely a function of its donor funding 
base. It currently supports development ac-
tivities in over 40 communities, working 
with around 20 organizations.
CDRO’s activities target a wide range 
of subject matter areas, including organiza-
tional capacity development, education, 
health and natural medicine, natural resource 
management and food security. Gender is a 
cross-cutting issue in all of these areas.
CDRO’s extension activities are imple-
mented using a farmer-to-farmer approach 
similar to that employed by SNER. Agricul-
tural technicians from CDRO work directly 
with volunteer promotores and community 
groups. CDRO has its own training system 
whereby promotores are trained in an agro-
ecology school for 2 days every 2 months. 
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Participants are provided with transporta-
tion and food. Follow-up training for pro-
motores is delivered on a periodic basis.
CDRO technicians and/or promotores 
train farmers’ groups in various technical 
subjects. Demonstration plots are frequently 
used teaching tools with promotores and 
groups establishing plots using inputs usu-
ally provided by CDRO and the farming 
community.
A majority of farmer group members 
are women, particularly in groups led by 
women promotores. Because they are un-
able to make a living from the land available 
to them, and the extremely limited employ-
ment opportunities in their communities, 
many men—youth in particular—have emi-
grated from the country. Others migrate to 
undertake seasonal wage labor on Guatemalan 
plantations. Over 1 million Guatemalans 
live and work—legally and illegally—in the 
USA (World Bank, 2014). The remittances 
they send home to their families are very im-
portant sources of income for those remain-
ing behind. It has been estimated that remit-
tances represented 10% of Guatemala’s GDP 
in 2013 (World Bank, 2014). The majority of 
remittance recipients are rural women, and 
around 50% of remittance monies are used 
for consumption with the remainder used 
for human and physical investments (World 
Bank, 2014). Such investments might in-
clude investing in children’s schooling—by 
paying school fees—or financing improve-
ments to agricultural production. Emigra-
tion and migration seem to be resulting in 
agriculture at the household level becoming 
more feminized. Nonetheless, it has been 
noted that as group activities prove to be 
successful, the men who live in the commu-
nity become increasingly interested in par-
ticipating.
legal and social services (serjus). Legal and 
Social Services was founded in 1987 in re-
sponse to the armed conflict and to support 
indigenous communities to overcome the 
years of violence and repression. It is now 
an umbrella social activist support and co-
ordination organization for community- 
based organizations located, for the most 
part, in the Western Highlands. SerJus also 
works with organizations in other regions of 
Guatemala and Central America. It has an 
exceptionally strong orientation towards 
supporting the under-represented Mayan 
people.
SerJus provides a wide array of support 
and coordination services to its constituent 
organizations. This ranges from economic 
development activities and legal advice to 
dissemination and capacity development on 
theoretical and methodological approaches 
to community organization, social empower-
ment and popular education as influenced 
by Paulo Freire (1972), which encourages in-
dividuals to take control of their own learning 
towards advancing social change (Barroso, 
2002). SerJus works towards a just, equitable 
and democratic society through organizing 
and developing the capacity of communities 
to develop themselves and empowering them 
to influence government at local, municipal, 
regional and national levels.
SerJus is involved in a number of agri-
cultural development activities and has its 
own agricultural extension staff. Many Ser-
Jus member organizations also have agricul-
tural extension activities. SerJus is overtly 
opposed to the use of genetically modified 
seeds and participates in efforts to improve 
local maize varieties. Its agricultural exten-
sion approach is similar to SNER’s. SerJus 
extension staff work directly with volunteer 
promotores, who engage directly with farmers’ 
groups. Promotores install on-farm demon-
stration plots to assess technologies and 
practices and use the plots as teaching tools 
for their groups.
Although SerJus utilizes a farmer-to- 
farmer approach that has much in common 
with the approach used by NGOs and SNER, 
there are substantive underlying differences 
that inform SerJus extension services. These 
include SerJus’s history, its political orien-
tation, its vision of development and its em-
phasis on popular education. These elem-
ents influence how SerJus extensionists work 
and with whom. These differences tend to 
constrain possibilities of positive working 
relationships between SerJus and the gov-
ernment, which have social justice and em-
powerment perspectives that have historic-
ally (and presently) been at odds.
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save the children (save). Save the Children 
opened its Guatemala office in 1999 and 
ever since has been helping Guatemalans to 
overcome the impact of the armed conflict 
through various education, health, nutri-
tion, livelihoods, natural resource man-
agement, and democracy and governance 
 programs. Its farmer-to-farmer extension ap-
proach is similar to that of SNER. Two key 
people constitute the extension services at 
the community level: an agricultural leader 
(akin to an extensionist) and a promotore. 
The agricultural leader works in two or 
three communities, each of which has two 
or three promotores. Under the supervision 
and with support from the agricultural 
leader, each promotore works directly with 
around 30 farmers. The leaders and promo-
tores are supported by Save’s technical spe-
cialists, who provide capacity development 
in both technical subjects and extension 
methodologies. Capacity development is 
based on adult non-formal education meth-
odologies and emphasizes learning by doing. 
Manuals and brochures are available for use 
in capacity development activities.
Key Achievements
Strengthening the provision of agricultural 
services by public institutions and other 
 organizations involved in the agricultural 
sector is an essential part of the post- 
conflict reconstruction and normalization 
process (Dobbins et al., 2007; USAID, 2009). 
Guatemala has made, and is expected to 
continue to make, important progress in 
this regard.
The creation of a national extension 
system took only about 3 years, no small en-
deavor. In a very short time, MAGA man-
aged to recruit and place over 1000 people 
in extension posts across the country. There 
is now a cadre of public sector extensionists 
who have experience and have received 
some capacity development. The extension 
system explicitly includes farming and farm 
household extension services, which ad-
dress production for markets and consump-
tion as well as family nutrition. The latter 
is not typically included in government 
 extension services and represents a laud-
able component of the system.
While quantitative data are lacking re-
garding the quantity, quality and benefits of 
SNER’s achievements in extension, the 
achievements are real: CADERs have been 
organized; farmer needs assessments have 
been carried out; group and municipal de-
velopment plans have been formulated and 
have informed extension activity; and ex-
tension activities have been implemented 
with farmers and farm families. There is a 
network of promotores who have been 
trained and who now work directly with 
farmers and their households. Extension 
materials to backstop extension fieldwork 
are available in Spanish and in several 
Mayan languages. SNER continues to 
evolve, and its evolution is a dynamic pro-
cess that will be informative and interesting 
to follow as an example of a post-conflict 
national pluralistic extension system.
Within the framework of the national 
system, new ways for research and exten-
sion to work together are being collabora-
tively pursued by the national research in-
stitution ICTA and an innovative scaling 
project focused on improving maize-based 
farming systems in the Western Highlands. 
The project facilitates an IP that brings to-
gether researchers, extensionists and other 
development workers from government in-
stitutions, NGOs and the academic commu-
nity. IP members apply themselves to agri-
cultural problems in which they all have a 
stake and that are unlikely to be resolved by 
any one group acting alone. This type of col-
laboration represents a major achievement. 
International and regional actors are ac-
tively supporting extension through build-
ing the capacity of various groups, including 
government extensionists, local promotores 
and organized farmers’ groups. Linkages are 
being made with Guatemalan institutions of 
higher education to reintroduce extension 
as an area of study in the university curric-
ulum. Attention is being paid to the import-
ance and improvement of Mayan traditional 
foods and to improving nutrition as well as 
to increasing production.
Civil society has become an increas-
ingly dynamic force in Guatemala. NGOs, 
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which have a long history of working for the 
Guatemalan people, continue to build social 
capital and empowerment in communities. 
These NGOs, several of which were founded 
and are maintained by indigenous Mayans, 
provide key extension-related services to 
farm men and women. For example, to em-
power members and strengthen the market 
position of farmers, they promote the devel-
opment of cooperatives and associations 
and support the training of local promotores 
who directly work with farmers’ groups to 
improve farm family livelihoods. Several 
NGOs are especially adept at involving 
women in their agricultural extension pro-
grams. In light of the difficult context of pre- 
and post-conflict Guatemala, all of these 
achievements are noteworthy.
Key Challenges
Although it has been almost two decades 
since the signing of the Peace Accords, 
many extension challenges can still be 
linked back to the armed conflict. Some are 
similar to challenges faced by extension sys-
tems in other post-conflict countries; others 
are more specific to Guatemala. These chal-
lenges—described below—are intercon-
nected. For the purposes of this chapter 
they are categorized by the relative strength 




Politicization is viewed as endemic in Gua-
temalan institutions and organizations and 
is certainly not unique to MAGA. Nonethe-
less, the most frequently heard critique of 
public sector extension is that it is highly 
politicized. This is a significant challenge 
shared by many post-conflict countries 
(Hoove and Scholtbach, 2008). Political 
leaders and their associates are often in a 
position to control access to resources due 
to limited accountability. Political patronage 
and cronyism in government institutions 
frequently continue in post-conflict situations 
(Hoove and Scholtbach, 2008). In Guatemala, 
there are claims that staff positions in pub-
lic sector extension are distributed based on 
party affiliations, with the result that exten-
sion staff who do not have the requisite 
qualifications are hired and subsequently 
perform poorly. Reports indicate that staff 
are compelled to campaign for, or otherwise 
promote, a given party or candidate or offi-
cial. The distribution to farmers and farm 
families of agricultural inputs, or other 
goods such as basic foodstuffs, in which ex-
tension is involved is also politicized, with 
those in the ‘right’ party receiving them and 
others less so. Politicization tends to gener-
ate resentment and intensify distrust among 
the different actors in the  extension system.
System components
The Municipal Extension Agency (AME), 
which is central to the effective operation of 
SNER, is weak. This reflects a characteristic 
of post-conflict contexts, that of fragile gov-
ernment institutions (Hoove and Scholtbach, 
2008). Concerns range from AME’s lack of 
interaction with other official bodies at the 
municipal level to its limited interaction 
with NGOs. Public sector extensionists re-
port to MAGA at the regional or national 
level, which could limit their interactions 
with authorities at the municipal level. NGOs 
may not see the value in cooperating with 
the government extension agency. On the 
contrary, based on historical reasons related 
to the armed conflict, they may see cooper-
ation with government as inhibiting the po-
tential success of their activities. Nonethe-
less, within the SNER framework, AMEs are 
the initial entry points for NGOs to work 
with communities. The purpose of SNER as 
a pluralistic national system is undermined 
when there is limited interaction and 
limited collaboration among extension pro-
viders operating in the same location.
Capacity development opportunities
On balance, extensionists receive less cap-
acity development than they need to effi-
ciently and effectively carry out their jobs. 
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Their ability to apply extension method-
ologies and plan their work programs is re-
portedly quite limited. While teaching and 
learning materials are available, some exten-
sionists receive materials without explan-
ation or training in how best to use them. 
Again, this crucial limitation can be related 
to the armed conflict. There were singularly 
few opportunities for extension capacity de-
velopment, particularly from 1990 until very 
recently. There was no public extension ser-
vice through which to channel capacity de-
velopment, and agricultural extension had 
been removed from the higher education 
curriculum. This points to one of the indir-
ect costs of conflict, the lack of human re-
source development.
Staff stability
It is not clear that all public sector extension 
posts are affected by the challenge of staff 
stability. However, municipal-level posts 
definitely are. The large majority of exten-
sion staff are currently not civil servants and 
they do not enjoy job security. They are typ-
ically hired on an annual basis with annual 
renewal unassured. In 2016, a new govern-
ment will be elected in Guatemala and it is 
highly likely that there will be many changes 
in public sector staff. This means a break in 
continuity in both staff and the work of ex-
tension from year to year and as administra-
tions change. New staff will require train-
ing, and the benefits of previous investments 
in staff training may not accrue to public 
sector extension and those they serve if cur-
rent trained staff are not rehired or retained. 
While there is discussion of using perform-
ance metrics to inform hiring decisions, the 
performance evaluation system is very weak 
and ineffective at this time. Although the 
government document describing SNER 
calls for permanent positions for all public 
sector extension staff (MAGA, 2013), this is 
currently not the case.
Experience shows staff stability to be a 
multifaceted issue. While the popular re-
sponse is to make all extensionists civil ser-
vants, this will not have the desired result 
unless there is unqualified assurance that 
there are sufficient program funds to support 
their work. The post-conflict context exacer-
bates these complications due to constrained 
budgets, the weakness of the civil service and 
the need to rapidly build a new SNER system.
System-wide challenges
Politicized maize
In Guatemala, there are sensitivities related 
to genetic property rights and seed patents that 
impact maize seed development ( Bilaterals, 
2014) and there have been cases of commu-
nities not welcoming institutions that work 
on maize breeding (CIMMYT, 2015). This has 
led to the politicization of maize in parts of 
the country, particularly in the Highlands. 
Due to the centrality of maize in Mayan cul-
ture, indigenous populations in the Western 
Highlands may view maize breeding activ-
ities as a threat to their native maize and 
thus to their culture.
Distrust and lack of confidence
Often, the actors in the SNER system do not 
trust or have much confidence in each other. 
Underlying this distrust and lack of confi-
dence is the reality that Guatemala is a 
post-conflict country with all the complica-
tions associated with that status. Further-
more, NGOs are generally better resourced 
than MAGA extensionists, which tends to 
create tensions between the two. The ques-
tion of whether international donor resources 
should flow to government institutions or 
NGOs is a sensitive one. There are NGOs 
that refuse to work with public sector exten-
sion based on their direct or indirect experi-
ences during the armed conflict or  because 
they have differing philosophies of devel-
opment. Others do not engage with public 
sector extension due to the challenges asso-
ciated with doing so. Some extensionists 
advise that it is difficult to develop trust 
with the farm families they work with and 
that trust is critical to their work. This ap-
pears to be less a case of distrusting specific 
individuals working in public sector exten-
sion than of the government they represent. 
Public mistrust of government  institutions 
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is characteristically high in post- conflict con-
texts (Hoove and Scholtbach, 2008; Klick, 
2015, Panić, 2008), and this is reportedly 
the case in Guatemala.
Coverage
Estimates suggest that MAGA extension can 
reach 20–30% of the 1.5 million farm fam-
ilies who should benefit from extension ser-
vices. As a pluralistic system, SNER is de-
signed to increase coverage and increase 
over time the number of farmers and other 
stakeholders that it serves. However, the co-
ordination of extension actors and activities 
in the extension system is quite limited as 
are collaborative extension activities. This is 
the case even though MAGA endorses the es-
tablishment of strategic alliances with others 
in the system. At the same time, MAGA has 
yet to develop the capacity and establish its 
legitimacy to coordinate actors in the system, 
nor is a national extension policy in place to 
guide extension in general and support 
such coordination. Distrust, stemming in 
part from years of conflict, challenges aspir-
ations to collaboration and the establishment 
of alliances among extension actors.
Inclusion
Increasing the participation of indigenous 
and Ladino women and of indigenous men 
in extension remains a challenge. The need 
to strengthen women’s participation in eco-
nomic and social development is enshrined 
in the 1996 Peace Accords, as are the rights 
of indigenous peoples. Some extension pro-
grams have made important progress towards 
including women as beneficiaries, and it is 
likely that many clients of current programs 
operating in the Western Highlands are indi-
genous Mayan women. Even so, there are few 
indigenous women extension agents working 
specifically in agriculture. Notably, women 
serve as Healthy Household Extensionists, 
who focus on essential home-based activities, 
including backyard gardening and nutrition. 
Currently, limited numbers of indigenous 
women hold mid- to high-level positions in 
MAGA, donor projects or extension-oriented 
NGOs, with this situation for Ladino women 
being somewhat better than for indigenous 
women. The pool of indigenous women 
qualified for these posts may be compara-
tively small given that females have less 
chance than males to pursue and complete 
their education. Thus, gender and ethnicity 
converge—such that being female reduces 
the likelihood of being in school—as does 
being indigenous (Edwards, 2002). The total 
enrollment of non-indigenous students is 
minimally higher than that of indigenous stu-
dents at the primary level, much higher at the 
secondary level and overwhelmingly higher 
at the university level (Edwards, 2002).
Resources
The resources available for public sector ex-
tension are inadequate to provide the com-
petitive salaries, level of capacity develop-
ment, facilities (offices and equipment) and 
communications support needed to develop 
and secure a vibrant, effective and sustain-
able system. According to a number of 
NGOs, donor funding has decreased sub-
stantially from the levels obtained around 
the time of the Peace Accords. This, while 
unfortunate for the NGOs, is a feature of 
post-conflict funding: large initial invest-
ments that decrease over time.
Recommendations
The recommendations that follow are linked 
to the challenges confronting extension. As 
with the challenges, the recommendations 
are decidedly interconnected. While the 
history, causes, nature and outcomes of con-
flict differ among countries, some post-con-
flict countries are likely to share experi-
ences similar to those of Guatemala. In such 
countries, these recommendations will res-
onate among those involved in the compli-
cated work of rebuilding extension systems.
Politicization
Corruption is generally understood to mean 
the misuse of public services for private 
gain (World Bank, 1997); in other words, 
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the abuse of entrusted power for private 
gain (Spector et al., 2015: 1). Nationally, 
corruption is fought through CICIG (the 
International Commission Against Impun-
ity in Guatemala), which has investigated 
and tried several of Guatemala’s high-level 
officials, including former presidents (WOLA, 
2015). While patronage and cronyism at MAGA 
are not of the same magnitude as the crimin-
ality of the CICIG investigations, their ac-
tions send a message that corruption can be 
addressed, and its cost to those involved 
can be very high.
USAID has developed a guide for anti- 
corruption programming that suggests a 
wide range of actions to target corruption 
(Spector et al., 2015). The anti-corruption 
actions that relate most directly to exten-
sion include standardizing government 
agency operations to reduce opportunities 
for corruption, and increasing transparency 
and public awareness of government oper-
ations, enabling civil society to identify and 
report corruption (Spector et al., 2015). The 
first action applies to MAGA’s contractual 
arrangements. Standardizing these arrange-
ments, along with developing mechanisms 
and capacities to monitor standardization, 
offers a reasonable approach to addressing 
the politicization of MAGA.
The second action—increasing transpar-
ency and involving civil society—is more 
problematic as it could be risky for civil so-
ciety actors. Developing a reform- oriented 
strategy offers a plausible way to address 
transparency and civil society involvement 
(de Asis, 2000) within the context of exten-
sion. Strategy development should involve 
a participatory process that brings together 
public sector reformers and civil society to 
highlight corruption-related problems in ex-
tension and ultimately develop and imple-
ment an action plan to address problems 
identified. Diagnostic work by an independ-
ent firm or group to identify specific key 
problems arising from corruption minim-
izes the risk to local actors.
Problem identification should be fol-
lowed by a participatory workshop where 
the results are presented and action plans 
are developed collaboratively between gov-
ernment and the community (de Asis, 2000). 
In Guatemala, this could be carried out at 
department and municipal levels with the 
government extension entities and civil so-
ciety. Strategy development and implemen-
tation requires political will, technical as-
sistance and financial support. Given the 
impact of politicization on effective exten-
sion, a justifiable case can be made for using 
extension and NGO resources and technical 
assistance to support these processes. This 
leaves the question of political will in limbo. 
Where sufficient political will exists, there 
are strategic tools that can contribute to di-
minishing the effect of politicization on de-
velopment and delivery of extension services.
Distrust and lack of confidence
Corruption is closely related to distrust, 
since it is the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain (Spector et al., 2015). Thus, a 
path towards trust requires decreasing cor-
ruption, as discussed above. Lack of confi-
dence in public sector extensionists is also 
related to corrupt hiring practices, to some 
degree, also discussed above. Still, creating 
trust and instilling confidence are thorny 
challenges that actors in the SNER system 
face. Recommendations include investigat-
ing studies of trust and collaboration theor-
ies, and approaches to identify experimental 
ways to build trust among SNER stakeholders 
(see Wood and Gray, 1991; Kramer and Tyler, 
1996; Mattessich et al., 2001; Sloan and 
Oliver, 2013).
At the local level, a key recommendation 
is to create safe haven space for increased 
interaction among various extension stake-
holders: NGOs, projects, farmers and gov-
ernment extensionists. In practice, this could 
include creating a citizens’ committee to 
 advise on extension; holding community- 
based fora with communities to review and 
discuss extension activities; convening small 
group discussions between extension and its 
stakeholders to discuss issues of trust and con-
fidence and their impacts on mutually shared 
goals; experimenting with team- building 
exercises; and actively modeling trust in 
 relationships. Broader recommendations, 
based on global experience, point to addressing 
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a deficit of trust following conflict by ensur-
ing inclusivity in the peacebuilding process, 
building institutions and sustaining inter-
national support (Ban, 2012).
System components
To address weaknesses in municipal-level 
AMEs, it is recommended that investments 
in this component of the SNER system be 
prioritized. This includes clarifying—
through job descriptions—the expected 
interactions of AME staff with other govern-
ment entities at the municipal level and 
earmarking funds to support such inter-
actions. To encourage NGOs to support and 
engage with AMEs, it is recommended that 
SLEs be introduced at the municipal level. 
SLEs, prototyped by CATIE and discussed 
earlier, provide a tested mechanism for en-
gaging all extension actors in a municipal-
ity to carry out their work in a coordinated 
manner.
Capacity development opportunities
MAGA’s extension services currently have 
capacity development plans which are con-
strained by funding gaps. Thus, the recom-
mendations focus on leveraging existing 
training and reallocating some capacity de-
velopment funds. For example, almost all 
projects and NGOs provide capacity devel-
opment for the extensionists involved in 
their specific activities. It is recommended 
that MAGA request that NGOs and projects 
routinely include government extensionists in 
such initiatives as co-trainers or participants, 
providing financial support if necessary.
High-level MAGA advocacy to reintro-
duce the study of extension in university 
curricula would add considerable weight 
to ongoing efforts and is recommended. 
Cross-training of agricultural Family Farm-
ing Extensionists and Healthy Home Exten-
sionists is also recommended to expand their 
capacities and add complementary content 
to the focus of their respective activities. 
 Finally, it is recommended that the use of 
ICT for capacity building be explored and 
that a pilot program to test ICT learning and 
teaching innovations be put into place. Ex-
tension learning and teaching materials—
developed by other actors in the global ex-
tension system including the MEAS project, 
regional extension networks and the Global 
Forum for Rural Advisory Services 
(GFRAS)—are now readily available on the 
internet and may be used to support ICT-
based capacity development.
Staff stability
The major recommendation with regard to 
staff stability is to commission a study of the 
cost/benefit of the two current scenarios— 
annual contracts or the incorporation of 
 extension agents into the civil service— and 
use the results to inform decisions on this 
issue. It is also recommended to strengthen 
the performance management system so 
that hiring decisions can be based on evi-
dence of performance.
Politicized maize
While politicized maize will not be an issue 
in all post-conflict countries, similar culture- 
related issues may exist with other crops, 
livestock or agricultural practices. Recom-
mendations to facilitate extension work with 
Guatemalan farmers and communities in 
maize breeding and breeding-related activ-
ities include using best practices to approach 
targeted communities and emphasizing trans-
parency in community relationships. For ex-
ample, prior to initiating activities, involve 
respected community members or leaders 
who have participated in maize breeding ac-
tivities in introducing and explaining any 
proposed activities to the community; ob-
tain the permission of local authorities to 
carry out participatory activities and in-
volve them in the activities; and convene 
community meetings to answer questions the 
community may have, explain benefits of 
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activities and discuss what will be done by 
whom and when.
Coverage
Effectively and efficiently responding to the 
extension-related needs of vast numbers of 
farmers and others along the value chain is 
challenging for most countries, especially 
in post-conflict contexts. Building on the 
SNER framework and significantly expand-
ing the use of ICTs are the recommendations 
put forward to address the coverage chal-
lenge in Guatemala.
As a framework for the extension sys-
tem, SNER is anchored by the government 
extension service. To improve system cover-
age, it will be necessary to develop the cap-
acity of MAGA to coordinate the system. 
This is in line with the earlier recommenda-
tion to introduce SLEs which would func-
tion as coordination mechanisms at the mu-
nicipal level. The formulation of a specific 
national extension policy, collaboratively 
developed by extension stakeholders, is also 
recommended. Among other issues, the pol-
icy should clarify the roles of the public, pri-
vate and civil society sectors in extension 
activity with an emphasis on articulating co-
ordination and collaboration guidelines.
The current use of ICTs to address 
issues of coverage and to support extension 
activities is minimal. This is due in part to 
the limited ICT capacity of actors in the ex-
tension system. Investing some capacity- 
developing funds to increase the use of ICTs 
in extension is recommended, as is pilot 
testing of approaches designed to expand 
coverage and improve impact. The private 
sector offers a potential source of co- funding 
for ICT-related efforts through public–private 
partnerships. In concert with face-to-face 
extension, possible ICT applications in-
clude providing helpline services and tech-
nical, marketing and weather-related infor-
mation to farmers; stimulating interactions 
between government and civil society; in-
forming programming through rapid collec-
tion of data; and supporting monitoring and 
evaluation processes.
Inclusion
The overarching recommendation is to take 
measures to include women—both indigen-
ous and Ladino, but prioritizing the inclu-
sion of Mayan women—and indigenous 
men in all extension organizations and ac-
tivities. To implement this recommenda-
tion: address inclusion in the proposed na-
tional extension policy; empower women to 
make decisions about extension program-
ming that will affect them and their fam-
ilies; use and build on existing channels to 
reach women and indigenous populations 
by engaging with local indigenous NGOs; 
provide secondary- and university-level 
scholarships to increase the pool of quali-
fied women to undertake field- and higher- 
level extension posts; design and support 
leadership development opportunities for 
women; review hiring practices to remove 
possible constraints to hiring qualified 
women; and develop cross-cultural and 
gender-sensitive training to be delivered to 
a broad audience of extension stakeholders. 
Finally, develop or use existing tools to 
monitor the diversity of extension staff and 
of participants in extension activity. A re-
commended tool is USAID’s Women’s 
 Empowerment in Agriculture Index, which 
measures the inclusion of women in project 
activities as well as women’s empowerment 
and agency.
Resources
Building institutions and other 
 peacebuilding tasks can take a generation. 
This highlights the need for sustained 
international political and financial 
support. It also underscores the importance 
of mutual accountability over the long term, 
which creates a more balanced partnership 
between donors and recipient governments.
Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General, 
20 December 2012
Ultimately, governments are responsible for 
financing public services such as extension. 
In post-conflict countries, their capacity to 
do so contributes to their legitimacy and 
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demonstrates that the peace process con-
tinues to move forward. Guatemala is pro-
gressing along these fronts. Still, many rural 
farm families are receiving less extension 
advice and fewer services than they need to 
measurably improve their livelihoods, and 
this is particularly so for the indigenous 
Mayan population. Additional funding is 
needed to strengthen Guatemala’s extension 
system, through increasing the government’s 
budget allocation to extension, reallocating 
existing funding or—in light of the UN 
Secretary- General’s statement—through seek-
ing international financial support.
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Introduction
This chapter looks at the lessons from this 
volume and other literature regarding the 
conditions for developing extension ser-
vices in post- and chronic-conflict settings 
and the results that have been achieved. 
The analysis seeks to situate the findings 
from the preceding chapters in the context 
of what we know about recovery processes. 
In essence, this chapter seeks to understand 
the processes of rebuilding extension from a 
political economy perspective, highlighting 
the various paradigms of resilience that 
underpin these efforts.
The first section of this chapter looks at 
the historical context of the processes under 
way, particularly how the role of the state is 
perceived and pursued. The tensions between 
the economic heartlands and the  hinterlands 
that frame agricultural policies are described, 
together with the factors that  determine how 
pluralism and markets are perceived.
The following section scans the different 
meanings applied to the currently popular 
catchword ‘resilience’. Although the chapters 
in this volume do not explicitly frame their 
analyses in terms of resilience, the different 
ways in which states, farmers and aid agencies 
pursue rebuilding extension implicitly reflect 
these underlying paradigms.
The next section looks directly at the 
empirical experience of the largely aid- 
driven extension reform efforts. Emphasis is 
on what can be learned from the relatively 
fragmented efforts to pick up the pieces of 
weakened bureaucracies and perversely in-
centivized market actors amid a scramble 
for political influence and resources. A crit-
ical perspective is applied to the applicabil-
ity of ‘best practice’ in extension in light of 
these prevailing conditions.
The chapter concludes with a set of 
what may appear to be out-of-the-box re-
commendations, which draw more on les-
sons learned from capacity-development 
efforts in fragile states than on conventional 
agricultural extension toolboxes. The im-
portance of a clear ethical stance is stressed.
Historical Context and the Role  
of Extension
Institutional histories
The chapters in this volume amply illustrate 
the importance of the historical legacies 
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 regarding the role (or absence) of the state in 
directing agricultural change in general and 
extension in particular. As will be analyzed 
below, this is easily forgotten by those plan-
ning post-conflict programs in their search 
for new paradigms for resilience, whether 
in terms of bouncing back to ‘normalcy’ or 
in ‘building back better’.
The cases here illustrate how the strength 
and fragilities of the state long before the 
most recent conflicts steer perceptions about 
what kind of state should be rebuilt. Inten-
tions to re-establish agricultural services are 
also thus related to dreams of the past, be they 
related to ‘scientific socialism’ (Myanmar, 
Georgia, Tajikistan) or surprisingly similar 
developmentalist paradigms of the 1970s, 
when grand infrastructure programs, tied with 
massive investments in technology transfer 
(of which extension was a part), were ex-
pected to transform ‘backward’ societies into 
‘modern’ ones through irrigation, mechan-
ization and industrialization (Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Liberia). Even if the conditions for such 
ambitious transformations are in no way 
present in landscapes of chronic conflict, 
the dirigiste visions of authorities may be re-
kindled, especially with the arrival of large 
financial investments and donors eager to 
spend money quickly.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, 
the pre-conflict decline in the accountabil-
ity of the state and its social contract with the 
population was often a precipitating factor 
in the conflict. This is particularly important 
with regard to marginalizing and disenfran-
chising the youth (Sierra Leone). Failures in 
pre-conflict extension may be just a symp-
tom of this broader breakdown of legitim-
acy, but as a frontline service it is a sentinel 
indicator of this collapse.
One notable, and perhaps rather sur-
prising, aspect of the role of the state is that 
the involvement of the military has not 
 always just emerged during the conflict 
(Myanmar). The role of the military in agri-
culture may be ‘off the radar screen’ and 
profoundly disturbing for most of those 
 involved in state reconstruction and rural 
development, but it is a fact on the ground 
that must be confronted. This includes both 
the continuing role of the armed forces in 
 farming and land acquisitions and the as-
sumptions around agriculture’s contribu-
tion to processes of disarmament, demobil-
ization and reintegration (DDR) of former 
combatants (South Sudan, Myanmar). Aid 
to agriculture is part of the calculations of 
the generals, who often have no intentions 
of returning to their barracks.
A finding in several of the chapters is 
the need to consider the role of the bureau-
cracy in countries where genuine extension 
may be unknown. If agricultural bureaucra-
cies have traditionally focused on deliver-
ing inputs, buying produce (Iraq, Georgia, 
Afghanistan, Liberia) and/or just gathering 
data (the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
[DRC], Myanmar), then the extent of com-
mitments to this unfamiliar role is likely to 
be weak. The concept of the bureaucracy ac-
tually serving farmers, as opposed to giving 
directives or extracting rents, may also be 
unknown. When extension is a concept that 
has been entirely introduced by donors (Georgia, 
Iraq, Tajikistan), this creates profound obs-
tacles to moving beyond a donor-driven 
agenda. At best, generating commitments to 
extension may require considerable time, a 
rare commodity in the short-term funding 
windows of most chronic- and post-conflict 
programming.
Hopes may be placed in civil society 
and farmer organizations as advocates for 
such a shift to serving farmers, and in some 
cases there is some evidence of a historical 
role in this regard, but the cases suggest that 
a foundation for this is usually not present. 
Distrust towards collective action and non- 
governmental organization (NGO) competi-
tion for aid resources to undertake service 
provision stand in the way of hopes for a 
new role for civil society. Overall weak-
nesses in societal trust resulting from the 
horrors of the conflict may mean that the 
preconditions for collective action are not 
present, particularly where the state partici-
pated in these abuses (true for most of the 
cases, Sierra Leone in particular).
Similarly, the role of the private sector 
that is envisaged in ideals of pluralistic ex-
tension is generally not something that had 
existed in the past. Ideas about sharing of 
responsibilities with the private sector may 
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be looked upon with considerable suspi-
cion. The very concept of pluralism in agri-
cultural and extension services is thus not 
something that can be revived, but must 
start from scratch.
Given the often massive influx of aid in 
post- and chronic-conflict contexts, it is easy 
to forget that states have differing histories 
of donor relations. All have a major rela-
tionship with donors, though with some it 
has involved confronting sanctions (Iraq, 
Myanmar, Afghanistan), others as ‘donor dar-
lings’ (Liberia, Georgia). In some instances, 
donors have kept a certain distance from the 
state due to distrust in its readiness to sup-
port the population (Sierra Leone) and the 
general desire to maintain humanitarian 
principles during the conflict.
Some countries have been party to ef-
forts to enhance aid effectiveness (Mozam-
bique). Most, however, have been out of the 
loop of discussions on how to harmonize 
donor efforts and align them with national 
priorities. This isolation from the aid effect-
iveness agenda is again partly due to distan-
cing from the state as part of applying the 
principles of neutrality and impartiality 
during the humanitarian phase.
These factors delineate how state sover-
eignty is perceived in relation to leading 
the development agenda and influence how 
governments attempt to manage aid flows. 
The cases presented here suggest a tendency 
to play aid agencies off each other, rather 
than evoking principles of harmonized and 
aligned aid provision.
Tensions between Heartlands  
and Hinterlands
Beyond the institutional histories, there are 
historical geographies that profoundly in-
fluence the space for agricultural trans-
formation and, with this, extension. Grossly 
 simplified, the visions and plans for post- 
conflict extension reflect how highly pro-
ductive areas and hinterlands are perceived 
to contribute to and/or threaten national de-
velopment. Differentiated extension strategies 
for the heartlands and hinterlands thus directly 
contribute to realizing national development, 
and in many respects even symbolize the 
distinctive social contracts that exist for dif-
ferent categories of citizens. In some cases, 
this dichotomy reflects concerns about feeding 
the population and/or contributing to export 
income through investments in high-potential 
areas, versus maintaining control over regions 
that have traditionally held little allegiance 
for the state-building project (Liberia and 
Myanmar stand out, but there are elements 
of this in all the cases). Furthermore, this 
dichotomy is also reflected in ethnic dif-
ferences (Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri Lanka) and 
even who is recognized as a  citizen (Myanmar, 
Sri Lanka).
The highly productive areas may re-
quire hydraulic bureaucracies (Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Myanmar, parts of Sri Lanka) capable 
of managing complex irrigation regimes and 
ensuring that farmers adapt their produc-
tion calendars and choose crops accord-
ingly. Control in the hinterlands often has 
more to do with preventing the production 
of illicit crops and smuggling (Afghanistan, 
Myanmar), or mere benign neglect of the 
agricultural sector due to more pressing pri-
orities such as mineral extraction (Sierra 
Leone). In some countries the dichotomies 
are about plantations (e.g. perennials such 
as rubber) versus smallholder subsistence 
farming (Liberia).
Land laws and the extent to which the 
state has tolerated or even encouraged dis-
possession of land from poor smallholders 
(Myanmar, and a growing concern else-
where) also reflect the types of support that 
are expected to be provided to large com-
mercial and small subsistence farmers in 
different areas. Land consolidation may also 
be seen as a precondition for effective ex-
tension in countries where fragmentation of 
landholdings is extreme (Georgia, Tajikistan, 
also Bosnia—see Christoplos, 2007). How-
ever, promoting land consolidation is inev-
itably a very sensitive topic, perhaps too 
sensitive to address in delicate chronic- and 
post-conflict contexts.
These various factors have meant that 
rural insurgencies are often (but not univer-
sally) based in the hinterlands (Liberia, 
Myanmar, to some extent in the other cases), 
and approaches to agriculture in these areas 
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reflect different approaches to counter- 
insurgency. Goals may be about either 
‘hearts and minds’ or repression and land 
dispossession—approaches that are not al-
ways mutually exclusive.
An inevitable result is that virtually all 
the countries reviewed in this volume could 
not be said to have had a single extension 
service even before the conflict. They have 
rather had a patchwork of very different 
types and structures of agricultural services 
that reflect both the varying agro-economic 
systems and the intentions of the state in 
different localities.
Continuity and Change
The chapters in this volume present differ-
ent perspectives on the ways in which con-
flicts have affected agricultural livelihoods. 
In most of the cases displacement has been 
severe. In some, a considerable proportion 
of the population remains in conflict zones 
(Afghanistan, Iraq, Myanmar), frequently 
retreating back to subsistence production. 
Subsistence may be the only option where 
populations have lost access to urban mar-
kets, which may have shifted to reliance on 
cheaper imports. Large-scale commercial 
farms generally collapse (Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone), not only due to dir-
ect conflict but also as a result of disappear-
ing subsidies, irrigation maintenance and 
labor. From other literature it is obvious 
that gender roles change, often with women 
taking on greater responsibilities, especially 
for subsistence production, while men 
are fighting or migrating (Coulter, 2009). 
In some countries the focus of agricultural 
development during the conflict shifts from 
former extensive systems to more intensive 
methods in limited safe zones (Iraq). The 
comparative advantages of illicit production 
increase in the hinterlands (Afghanistan, 
Myanmar). ‘Conflict entrepreneurs’ are able 
to profit through the changing and often 
great differences in prices of commodities 
and services. It would be fallacious to as-
sume that markets disappear, but they 
certainly change in ways that do not bode 
well for a post-conflict return to normalcy, 
as war economies become entrenched and 
sustain themselves.
Another potentially long-term change 
emanating from conflict concerns acceler-
ated rural–urban migration, particularly among 
the youth (emphasized in Sierra Leone and 
Sri Lanka, but presumably relevant in all). 
The chapters present different pictures of 
the extent to which youth may be interested 
in returning after the conflict (with an eager-
ness to return in Iraq, but less evidence of 
this elsewhere). Even if displaced people do 
return, their farming skills may be minimal 
after decades or generations of displace-
ment (Afghanistan), or periods in the past 
when they worked as laborers on large farms 
(Liberia, Georgia, Tajikistan). Land distribu-
tions have meant that even those with pro-
fessions totally unrelated to farming have 
received land and are expected to become 
‘farmers’ (Georgia, Iraq, also Bosnia—see 
Christoplos, 2007). This does not mean they 
are necessarily interested in becoming skilled 
farmers, though. In some countries farming 
is seen to be a last resort livelihood (Georgia), 
or a hobby to provide a modest addition to 
other forms of employment (Bosnia—see 
Christoplos, 2007). The Sierra Leone chapter 
stresses the factor of ‘forgetting by not doing’ 
as generating massive challenges (and needs) 
for extension after displacement.
All of these factors converge in the 
needs, demands and assumptions regarding 
the role of extension. Already weak know-
ledge of markets among extension staff (in 
all cases) is aggravated by the fact that the 
new chronic- and post-conflict markets are 
different and opaque. Demand for training 
of displaced farmers (and their descendants 
in long-running conflicts) is so far beyond 
the prevailing capacity of extension staff 
that it is hard to see where to start. A com-
prehensive approach to training (both basic 
and in-service support) is required, but this 
cannot be achieved through short-term and 
ad hoc NGO-led early recovery efforts. At 
the same time, private extension for illicit 
crops may have expanded greatly, driven by 
enormous profits (the vast geographical ex-
pansion of opium in Afghanistan being an 
obvious example). Several of the chapters 
point out that the pressures on the societal 
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fabric have generated distrust regarding the 
intentions of rent-seeking authorities who 
may be more interested in controlling rather 
than developing markets (Afghanistan, Georgia, 
Iraq, Sierra Leone, Liberia).
Contrasting Paradigms of Resilience
Resilience applied to post-conflict transitions
To understand the ways in which authorities, 
planners, donors and farmers perceive the 
expected and desired recovery process, it is 
important to unpack the different meanings 
of an overly popular catchword—resilience 
(Bené et al., 2014). Perhaps the most com-
mon default assumption about what resili-
ence means (but also the most misleading) 
is that society should and could be supported 
to ‘bounce back’ to a pre-conflict state. Many 
conflict-weary farmers and bureaucrats are 
nostalgic for a past ‘normal’ life. The changes 
described above raise major questions about 
the extent to which this is at all realistic, but 
this does not prevent people from placing 
their hopes on a return to normalcy. This 
may also generate distrust towards out-
siders advising them that they should in-
stead embrace a ‘brave new world’, exem-
plified by a shift to pluralistic extension 
services with many actors. There may be a 
desire to return to a strong state with a so-
cial contract that existed (or is imagined to 
have existed) in the past.
Those promoting these brave new worlds 
often draw their inspiration from concepts 
of resilience deriving from the ecological 
sphere (Bené et al., 2014), wherein crises are 
seen as opportunities and pressures to im-
prove and evolve in ways that address the fac-
tors that generated the crisis in the first place. 
Among politicians and aid agencies this is 
often referred to as ‘building back better’.
However, this ‘better’ is a disputed and 
problematic concept. In some of the coun-
tries a continued securitization of the devel-
opment agenda is part of this, as the role of 
the military is not diminished and security 
concerns influence what forms of recovery 
are favored (Myanmar, South Sudan). These 
aspects may be intertwined with the DDR 
agendas mentioned above. These concepts 
of resilience have also been extensively 
criticized as favoring those with the capaci-
ties to build back better, ignoring and mar-
ginalizing the poor who are written off as 
not being resilient enough for the programs 
on offer (Bené et al., 2014). The reason for 
this is the tendency of resilience models to 
distract attention from the factors of power 
and politics that determine ‘whose resili-
ence counts’ (Cannon and Muller-Mahn, 
2010). Furthermore, it has been noted that 
outsiders pursuing a resilience agenda may 
mistake small attempts to cope with a des-
perate situation as signs of building back 
better, even if such forms of resilience do 
not contribute to ‘better’ livelihoods in the 
long run (Pain and Levine, 2012).
This myopic perspective on building 
back better may be aggravated by pressures to 
show quantitative and fast results (Christoplos, 
2014), sometimes by focusing on ‘picking 
winners’ (Bosnia—see Christoplos, 2007). 
The tendency for such demands to lead to an 
elite bias in extension, as it is easier to achieve 
results with wealthier farmers, has long been 
recognized (Christoplos, 2010).
Institutional resilience
Extension services are generally withdrawn 
during conflicts, with some notable excep-
tions. Areas under government control, 
often near urban areas, may continue to re-
ceive support and may even be considered 
vital for food supplies for these areas ( Liberia, 
Myanmar). Some NGOs keep extension 
going by providing their own services, ei-
ther for dispersed internally displaced per-
sons (IDPs) or those in camps, even if these 
services remain secondary to input provision 
(emphasized in Myanmar and Sri Lanka, but 
presumably in most cases). The post-conflict 
period is characterized by an ambiguous 
process wherein these NGOs either seek ways 
to merge their efforts with those of the gov-
ernment, or merely make token and hurried 
efforts to ‘hand over’ programming to woe-
fully underequipped extension structures 
(Uganda—see Wairimu et al., 2015).
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For donors, building back better has 
sometimes been seen as a matter of using 
the recovery process as a vehicle for public 
administration reform; that is, getting rid 
of bloated bureaucracies and inappropriate 
subsidization schemes, a paradigm often not 
shared by local farmers, bureaucrats and 
politicians (Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia). The 
efforts of post-conflict states to rebuild a so-
cial contract with their citizens may be sty-
mied by donor demands for creating a ‘lean’ 
state. Governments looking to solidify public 
support are generally suspicious of vague 
references to a greater role for a private sec-
tor that they distrust and which may not be 
interested in licit investments in agriculture 
(Afghanistan, Iraq).
In general, it seems that the international 
community often speaks with a forked tongue 
regarding the trade-offs between different re-
silience models, sometimes calling for lean 
structures to create more efficient bureaucra-
cies that reflect the principles of New Public 
Management, whereas at other times invest-
ments in public service provision are stressed 
as the foundation for state legitimacy and 
peace building. However, the empirical 
bases for the latter claims have been increas-
ingly recognized as shaky (Denney et al., 
2015). New research suggests that the link 
between state legitimacy and service provi-
sion relates to the extent to which expect-
ations exist about a role for the state in a 
given service (McLoughlin, 2014). This would 
suggest that health and education, where the 
role of the state is seen as self-evident, might 
be more important for legitimacy than agri-
culture in countries where farmers are largely 
accustomed to fending for themselves. The 
fact that extension was in some cases already 
failing to provide useful and effective ser-
vices to farmers in the decades before the 
conflict (Guatemala, Sierra Leone) may re-
inforce these low expectations of the relative 
importance of extension.
In countries where agriculture has re-
ceived considerable public investment in the 
past, this may have been in the form of infra-
structure, input supply and marketing rather 
than extension per se. The cases in this vol-
ume display a wide variety of farmer expect-
ations regarding extension and generally 
show that farmers have largely given up on 
(if they ever had hope for) accessing exten-
sion. This would suggest that the link with 
legitimacy is likely to be tenuous unless ex-
tension is linked to ‘hard’ services in terms 
of subsidized inputs or infrastructural 
 rehabilitation.
Plans for a leaner bureaucracy may not 
just be about promoting efficiency and plur-
alism. These plans may merely reflect exas-
peration with the extreme weakness of the 
public service, paired with a recognition 
that, due to a lack of tax revenues and deci-
mated human resource capacities, there is 
no longer enough left of the public service 
to even begin to be built back better. Even if 
there is distrust regarding the sustainability 
and accountability of the NGOs providing 
services, and recognition that the private 
sector is too weak and uninterested to in-
vest in advisory services, NGO-led service 
provision may be seen as the ‘least bad’ op-
tion. Some resilience approaches reflect an 
unspoken approach that could be referred 
to as ‘pluralism by default’, giving less atten-
tion to public agencies while waiting (per-
haps indefinitely, judging from the cases in 
this volume) for better alternatives to emerge 
for supporting public sector development 
in conjunction with broader economic and 
societal recovery.
Market drivers of resilience
Market-driven recovery is part and parcel of 
the pluralistic ‘building back better’ narra-
tive. A major motivating factor behind this 
narrative is the assumption that there are 
huge, unexploited potentials for profitable 
agriculture (Liberia, Myanmar, to some ex-
tent in all cases). These ‘low-hanging fruit’ 
assumptions are often based on availability 
of underutilized land (Sierra Leone), prox-
imity to major markets in more stable coun-
tries and the potential of recapturing export 
markets of the past (e.g. dried fruit in 
 Afghanistan). Furthermore, there is often an 
assumption that China (and other emerging 
economies) will be interested in both pur-
chasing agricultural products and providing 
much-needed investments.
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Another important aspect of assump-
tions regarding market drivers is that there 
are potential entrepreneurs who, with sup-
port from extension (particularly market- 
oriented extension and business develop-
ment services), will be able to rebuild the 
economy. These entrepreneurs include both 
commercial farmers and other value chain 
actors. The narrow focus on entrepreneurs 
in recovery programming has recently been 
criticized as ignoring how power and polit-
ics, rather than inherent entrepreneurialism, 
steer impacts on the livelihoods of the poor 
(Sri Lanka—see Kapadia, 2014). Efforts to 
pick winners in the agricultural sector often 
lack a clear theory of change regarding how 
the benefits accruing to those individuals 
will diffuse or trickle down to the rest of the 
population (Longley et al., 2006; Bosnia—
see Christoplos, 2007). Donor priorities 
often contribute to this blind spot.
The studies in this volume all note the 
weakness of the public sector as a driver of 
market-oriented recovery. There is a lack of 
faith that the public extension service can 
be reformed or trusted to pursue a market- 
oriented agenda (Iraq, Liberia). Sometimes 
this leads to hopes that value chain actors, 
including input dealers and traders, will act 
as opinion leaders and fill the breach (Georgia, 
Myanmar).
Resilience and aid
Resilience in aid programming has long 
been associated with linking relief, rehabili-
tation and development (LRRD) (Christoplos, 
2014). According to its most rudimentary 
(and perhaps most common) interpretation, 
the LRRD challenge is about making the aid 
architecture work by ensuring that humani-
tarian programming and ‘early recovery’ 
contributes (or at least does not create obs-
tacles) to development efforts. It is often 
about finding opportunities to work with 
government agencies, such as extension, to 
begin building their capacities even if pro-
gramming remains dominated by aid actors.
A common criticism in this volume and 
elsewhere of LRRD in relation to agriculture 
is that food aid, distributions of free inputs 
and related efforts undermine the market 
drivers of resilience. These forms of aid may 
undercut the efforts of entrepreneurs or re-
inforce their dependencies and linkages 
with unsustainable and soon-to-be discon-
tinued aid programs (emphasized in Liberia 
but inherent in all cases to some extent).
These fears, paired with a realization 
that humanitarian needs for such subsidies 
still prevail, have led to a search for com-
promise solutions. A major solution is to 
look for ways to link procurement, extension 
(sometimes) and quasi-markets for products 
and inputs—for example, the World Food 
Programme’s Purchase for Progress initia-
tive and associated warehouse receipt sys-
tems (Liberia). Another approach is to trans-
form handouts of inputs into seed fairs, 
often using vouchers linked to labor input 
in public works (Uganda—see Remington 
et al., 2002; Wairimu, 2014). Some of the 
analyses in this volume acknowledge that 
modest extension reform efforts could be 
 effectively piggybacked onto NGO-led agri-
cultural rehabilitation programs focused on 
input distribution (Sri Lanka). These are seen 
to add hard content to softer information 
provision, thereby enhancing acceptance 
(Mozambique).
As mentioned above, another aspect of 
such hybrid LRRD efforts is searching out 
the potential entrepreneurs who are expected 
to drive market recovery and providing 
them with considerable amounts of capital 
and investment (Bosnia—see Christoplos, 
2007; Sri Lanka—see Kapadia, 2014). This 
is expected to both kick-start their produc-
tion and turn them into entrepreneurial 
models for other actors in the value chain. 
A concern here relates to the tendency to 
focus resilience efforts on those who are al-
ready resilient, ignoring and further margin-
alizing others.
The backdrop for much of the LRRD 
processes in the cases in this volume is the 
declining role of NGOs as the focus of efforts 
shifts from rehabilitation to development. 
It is generally recognized that rebuilding 
public sector agricultural institutions will 
involve a downsizing of competing NGO 
structures. This is driven by concerns about the 
lack of accountability of NGOs, the  assumed 
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greater efficiencies of (lower-paid) public 
sector agencies and the need to rebuild the 
social contract between the state and its citi-
zens. The cases here show that this is not 
a  linear process. Some NGOs are agile in 
shifting from humanitarian to development 
modalities and thereby retain a justification 
for their presence (Sri Lanka, Uganda—see 
Wairimu et al., 2015). Where government 
services are not being revived, but where 
agriculture is recognized as central to recov-
ery processes, NGOs may retain a major role 
long after the conflict has ended (Sierra 
Leone). Some international NGOs hand over 
their service-provision roles to national NGOs 
and concentrate on raising funds for these 
services.
Public agencies, and particularly exten-
sion, frequently fail to fill the gap created by 
downsizing NGOs, and this LRRD process 
may therefore be less about the proclaimed 
‘handovers’ and more about a collapse of 
services due to donor fatigue. Some NGOs 
may see the LRRD process as a shift out of 
service provision and into advocacy. Such 
shifts may not be welcomed by states that 
are increasingly distrustful of advice from 
foreigners. In many chronic- and post- 
conflict transitions, the space for inter-
national NGOs and local civil society is 
shrinking fast.
Finally, a chief (but often overlooked) 
aspect of LRRD efforts in general, and exten-
sion support in particular, is the hope that 
pilot projects mounted during the rehabili-
tation phase will be scaled up, scaled out 
and replicated. Explicit and implicit theor-
ies of change are built on assumptions that 
‘somebody’ will learn from the many suc-
cessful pilot efforts being mounted in the 
post-conflict transition and apply them at a 
scale that will make a considerable dent in 
the existing needs gap, become part of gov-
ernment plans and policies, or otherwise 
achieve sustainability and measurable im-
pact. As discussed below, there is little evi-
dence that these theories of change are accur-
ate. Pilots are often followed by more pilots in 
a serial process, with uncertain ultimate ends. 
Expensive methods (such as Farmer Field 
Schools in Afghanistan, the DRC, Myanmar 
and Sierra Leone) are commonly promoted, 
despite recognized challenges in moving 
these methods beyond pilot phases even in 
non-conflict countries.
Patterns in Picking up the Pieces  
through Aid Interventions
An aid-driven agenda
An overarching finding of the cases in this 
volume is that, despite the extremely varied 
contexts and conflicts, rebuilding extension 
is an aid-driven agenda. Extension is appar-
ently not a top priority for states, even in 
those cases where agriculture more gener-
ally is given primacy (Iraq, Liberia). Given 
the absence of political commitments and 
capacities to cover the recurrent costs of ex-
tension activities, aid-financed service provi-
sion is therefore the norm. Even if programs 
are justified based on claims of the import-
ance of building sustainable institutions, 
the tendency is to invest the majority of re-
sources into this direct service-provision 
role. This reflects the need in chronic- and 
post- conflict countries to find an appropri-
ate balance ‘between the exercise of capacity 
and building it’ (Brinkerhoff, 2010: 69).
This is not to claim that national actors 
are passive. The cases provide ample ex-
amples of various forms of ‘donor shopping’, 
often by local authorities or individual Minis-
tries looking to strengthen their own sphere of 
interest (Iraq, Myanmar, South Sudan). This 
leads to different forms of aid-driven ‘Balkan-
ization’ as individual donors or NGOs ‘take 
 responsibility’ for a given geographical area 
(Mozambique, Myanmar), value chain ( Liberia) 
or population (Guatemala). This may be a 
pragmatic response to the need to manage 
shifting aid responsibilities in an LRRD en-
vironment where aid resources dominate. 
However, it leads to fragmented reform and 
capacity-development efforts. As noted above, 
the cases show little evidence of commit-
ments to aid effectiveness principles. In the 
one exception that proves the rule, a sector- 
wide approach in Mozambique led to a dis-
investment in extension as the Ministry was 
not very interested in extension.
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These tendencies are aggravated by the 
ways in which aid agencies actually weaken 
local institutional structures by poaching 
the most qualified staff and creating enor-
mous and disillusioning resource differen-
tials between government (and even national 
NGO) structures and international organiza-
tions (Afghanistan, Liberia, Myanmar, also 
Sri Lanka after the South Asian tsunami—
see Christoplos, 2006). Extension seems to 
be particularly affected as the best staff flee 
to organizations with far higher salaries, 
more vehicles and higher operational 
budgets so that they can do their jobs. Re-
lated to this, some of the cases note that 
employment opportunities emerge for ‘re-
tired professors’ who are able to return to 
work in extension activities, sometimes as 
private consultants who are perhaps ex-
pected to form the nucleus of a future pri-
vate extension service. Furthermore, in 
some cases extra work for NGOs may pro-
vide much- needed ‘top-ups’ to encourage 
grossly underpaid staff to remain in their 
jobs (Sierra Leone, Uganda—see Wairimu 
et al., 2015).
Other disincentives to making con-
certed efforts to rebuild extension involve 
the search for quick wins and fast, meas-
urable ‘results’. Services are judged on 
what and how quickly they can deliver, 
not on their contributions to institutional 
sustainability. ‘Instead of strengthening 
institutional capacities, many agencies 
still try to simply “do livelihoods” by 
handing out predetermined assets’ (Hilhorst 
et al., 2010: 1113). In fragile states where 
state capacities are weak, so-called ‘tech-
nical advisors’ are often pulled into man-
agerial and operational roles, sometimes 
even outnumbering those who they are ex-
pected to advise (Danida, 2011; UN, 2013). 
In some respects, this is valid given the 
need to provide visible results so as to re-
build confidence in the state and to ad-
dress the acute needs of the population 
(Christoplos et al., 2014b), but it does have 
a downside. When ministries are treated as 
mere implementing partners wherein their 
capacities are rented rather than built, the 
prospects for ownership are extremely poor 
(Hilhorst et al., 2010).
Confronting a changed(?) landscape
The fallacies described above regarding a 
simple return to normalcy are underlined 
by how programming is designed to respond 
to a very different agrarian landscape than 
that which existed before the conflict. Inter-
ventions involve confrontations between 
different policy paradigms. This is most ob-
vious in the statist versus market-driven 
ideologies, where state institutions, particu-
larly those governments with a socialist or 
developmentalist history, tend to distrust 
the New Public Management models often 
promoted by donors (Minogue et al., 1998; 
Afghanistan—see Christoplos, 2004). The 
aforementioned nostalgia for a strong state 
is common and may stand in the way of so-
called bottom-up methods (and even the 
idea of extension altogether) if there is a 
preference for a more dirigiste approach to 
the agricultural sector.
These ideological disputes often play 
out in parallel with jockeying for influence 
among different ministries, regions and in-
dividuals (Iraq, Myanmar, South Sudan). 
Extension, as a frontline service visible to 
the population, is sometimes seen as a valu-
able pawn in these power plays with poten-
tially significant political benefits (Georgia). 
In some countries these power plays in-
clude the military, who are not interested in 
returning to their barracks, but rather in 
reaping some of the benefits of the post-war 
economy through direct involvement in 
agriculture (Myanmar, South Sudan).
An important aspect of the changed en-
vironment for extension is the transformations 
that have occurred in the agro-economy. 
Factors such as the emergence of new retail 
(especially supermarkets) are seen in some 
cases as an opportunity for farmers (Sri Lanka), 
presumably with appropriate extension 
support. Others (perhaps more realistically) 
see these developments as raising serious 
questions about the ability of smallholders 
to reach changing markets, even with the 
help of extension (Bosnia—see Christoplos, 
2007). An important factor here is that local 
agriculture may have shifted (back) to sub-
sistence (Liberia, Sierra Leone) and petty 
trading, often led by women, whereas the 
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demands of supermarkets may require links 
to male-dominated formal value chains.
The gap between the state of existing 
structures on one hand, and the needs de-
scribed in the cases on the other, raises at-
tention to questions of what can be accom-
plished with the short-term projects described. 
Extension- to-farmer coverage in almost all of 
the cases was abysmal at the outset of the 
interventions, and the programs described 
do not seem likely to make a significant or 
sustainable dent in these figures. It would 
appear that many interventions lack realistic 
theories of change that reflect well-known 
findings regarding the time required for cap-
acity development (Boesen and Therkildsen, 
2004). Program designs instead appear to re-
flect the limits of quasi- humanitarian fund-
ing windows and exit strategies. The LRRD 
concept suggests that this can be addressed 
by designing these  inevitably somewhat 
piecemeal efforts to focus on opportunities 
for modest contributions to rebuilding cap-
acities for longer-term development. This is 
certainly possible but requires a reorienta-
tion from measuring results according to ser-
vices delivered to instead emphasizing these 
capacity-development outcomes.
The lack of a realistic theory of change 
is aggravated by the fact that there are some 
cases where the recovery process involves 
retrenchment rather than expansion of the 
public sector (Georgia, Myanmar), or a con-
tinued decline in salaries and logistical cap-
acities for public extension agents (Sierra 
Leone). Staff may be concentrated to higher 
potential areas (Myanmar) leaving the hin-
terlands to ‘somebody else’ (perhaps the 
 humanitarian agencies).
Extension efforts are usually linked to 
efforts to respond to the needs and realities of 
 returnees. These may be IDPs or refugees from 
neighboring countries who have not been farm-
ing for decades or even generations (Afghanistan, 
South Sudan). They may have been urbanized 
(Liberia, Sri Lanka). Some donor countries have 
hopes that agriculture will generate em-
ployment opportunities which can help reverse 
refugee flows (Bosnia—see Christoplos, 2007). 
Hopes are sometimes placed in engaging the 
well- educated diaspora in agricultural  efforts 
(Somalia—see IFAD, n.d.; Hradsky et al., 2011).
A further factor in the changed land-
scape is that of making decisions about 
what forms of agriculture to support. Some 
efforts reflect a desire to return to past large- 
scale commercial production on plantations 
to generate revenues and attract investors 
(especially China). Other countries recog-
nize that building on smallholder food crop 
production is essential to address national 
food security concerns and to satisfy the de-
mands of the large number of smallholders, 
some of whom have taken over former 
plantations. Renovation of irrigation schemes 
is a common priority that is expected to 
contribute to both.
In all these efforts there may be a clear 
need for some form of collective action in 
the form of cooperatives, water-users’ associ-
ations (Central Asia—see Christoplos, 2012), 
or farmers’ organizations, all of which are 
seen as entry points for extension. Where land 
fragmentation is severe, donors have some-
times seen cooperative promotion to be a 
precondition for effective extension services 
(Georgia). However, most of the cases note a 
strong level of distrust for most forms of col-
lective action, as described above. In a notable 
exception, the Mozambique case highlights 
how private extension linked to out- grower 
schemes in cotton (and later tobacco) has 
been an effective way to work with a large 
group of farmers without the baggage of deal-
ing with mutual distrust.
A final related aspect of the dynamics 
around smallholder versus plantation agri-
culture is that of land concessions and other 
forms of large-scale land acquisitions (par-
ticularly stressed in Myanmar, also relevant 
in Cambodia—see Christoplos et al., 2014c). 
Many politicians and even the military see 
lucrative opportunities in the chaotic post- 
war context, with widespread displacement 
and uncertain land titles. Even if they are 
not ready to become agro-entrepreneurs them-
selves, they may pursue rents from provi-
sion of land concessions to investors. In 
addition to the direct financial benefits, 
they can show ‘development’ as forests are 
replaced with rubber plantations and other 
commercial crops. This can generate moral 
quandaries for international agencies when 
decisions on extension investment must be 
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made that can aid and abet investments 
which could lead to further conflict and dis-
placement, as well as environmental de-
struction, but where these farms may be the 
only way of working with the rural popula-
tion in the affected areas.
Experience with applying ‘best practice’  
in extension
The findings described above raise critical 
questions about the applicability of conven-
tional assumptions regarding ‘best practice’ 
extension in chronic- and post-conflict con-
texts. Questions need to be asked about what 
works where and when, and what needs to 
be modified. It is important to consider the 
plausibility of standard theories of change 
in these contexts, and also the risks and eth-
ical dilemmas that may come to the fore. The 
gap between needs and capacities in fragile 
states has often evoked a dysfunctional ten-
dency among international agencies to come 
up with grossly unrealistic ‘long list of 
“things that must be done”’ (Grindle, 2007: 
559). The search for ways to apply best prac-
tices is symptomatic of this tendency.
In general, the cases in this volume de-
scribe efforts to promote a shift in policy 
paradigms together with grand capacity- 
development efforts in what are clearly un-
realistic time frames. The imperatives of 
 crisis response take precedence over real-
ism and application of well-known lessons 
learned about the long-term commitments 
required to achieve policy engagement and 
capacity development (Boesen and Ther-
kildsen, 2004). The aims of these programs 
might be relevant if they were implemented 
within a more comprehensive commitment 
(particularly to capacity development) and 
incremental time frame, but are out of sync 
with both the immediate realities and the 
plausible influence of small and time-bound 
projects. The needs and problems of exten-
sion in conflict zones are not amenable to 
quick fixes, but apparently that is usually 
all that is on offer.
Pluralism is one of the concepts that 
frames much best practice advice in exten-
sion (Christoplos, 2010). The experiences 
described in this volume do not question 
this as a long-term goal, but the findings de-
scribe situations where pluralism is being 
achieved more by default than by design. 
Indeed, the goal of a pluralistic and decen-
tralized extension service may even be win-
dow dressing for inevitable failures to con-
trol and coordinate the fragmented settings 
of pilot projects and political fiefdoms. 
Fragmentation may be inevitable, but the 
best way to move towards pluralism by de-
sign is to design and implement programs 
based on a recognition of their niche within 
wider agricultural innovation systems. This 
can create awareness of where related in-
vestments are needed, for example, in other 
aspects of value chains, research and train-
ing of extension staff.
Most of the programming described in-
volves value chain development. In these 
programs extension is part of a package of 
subsidized services designed to link poten-
tial entrepreneurial farmers with other act-
ors in the market. In many respects this is 
certainly appropriate, given the fractured 
market chains and the need for a broader 
perspective on extension’s role in the agro- 
economy. The difficulties described in per-
suading extension services and their minis-
tries to think in broader perspectives indicate 
the need for a value chain approach. How-
ever, the tools at hand are not necessarily 
the right ones. The weak, amorphous and 
frequently nefarious nature of the private 
sector suggests that deeper and blunter ana-
lyses of the actors and interests are needed. 
In some cases, this may involve looking for 
ways to ‘use long spoons when dining with 
the devil’; for example, by developing mar-
kets without subsidizing warlords. In others 
it may mean acknowledging that the private 
sector is simply not there and we do not 
know when it may emerge. There may be 
potential to develop value chains through 
contract farming and out-grower schemes.
A final overarching aspect of applying 
best practices is that, even in stable con-
texts, these models have been developed 
and applied in a rather naive manner. Insuf-
ficient attention has been paid to the polit-
ical economy of policy reform processes, 
both at the national level and within the 
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micro-level dealings, which determine how 
the relationships between farmers and ex-
tensionists emerge. Faith in the applicabil-
ity of policy templates is out of place in any 
context. Given the massive risks that exist 
in conflict situations and the diversity in 
the contexts described in this volume, such 
faith is absurd and dangerous.
Recommendations: Ethics and Evidence 
in Approaching Agriculture amid  
Chronic Conflict
This author suggests that an overarching 
recommendation for developing extension 
in chronic- and post-conflict contexts is to 
anchor plans in a solid political economy 
analysis, taking close account of the drivers 
of conflict. This should not just stop with a 
study. Tried and proven tools exist for ap-
plying these analyses in practical decision 
making in conflict zones, most notably the 
so-called ‘do no harm’ approach (Anderson, 
1999). Lessons can be drawn from the pro-
vision of other services where such methods 
have been applied, as well as from broader 
research into the role of services in chronic- 
and post-conflict settings (SLRC, n.d.; Jackson, 
2015; Mallett and Denney, 2015). Existing 
research on service provision in conflict can 
help extension planners to think outside of 
their boxes.
Through such analyses, it is possible 
to draw certain ethical red lines where the 
risks of feeding into conflict tensions, ethnic 
and gender discrimination, and inappro-
priate large-scale land acquisitions can be 
avoided. Choices in post-conflict agrarian 
transitions also have huge implications for 
the hinterland–heartland dynamics that gen-
erally contributed to the conflict to start 
with. Sometimes programs contradict their 
stated objectives when interventions, justi-
fied based on peace building, effectively ex-
clude sections of the population that are 
prone to be drawn into or most affected by 
renewed tensions. Consulting with actors 
(such as think tanks) specializing in conflict 
dynamics can help extension planners 
avoid pitfalls and perhaps even contribute 
to reconciliation by bringing parties to the 
conflict together in market transactions.
Plans for strengthening extension ser-
vices need to confront the facts on the 
ground—including food aid, subsidized in-
put provision through agricultural rehabili-
tation programs and the proliferation of 
NGOs—and not just decry their negative ef-
fects. Support to agricultural extension is part 
of the LRRD architecture and not above it. 
A useful starting point is to bring the hu-
manitarian agencies into a dialogue on what 
they have learned about opportunities for 
supporting agriculture through existing ex-
tension (even if this has been mostly for 
helping with distributions) and respecting 
the NGOs’ understanding of vulnerabilities 
in the local population. It is important to 
avoid assumptions that ‘the humanitarian 
phase is over, now it is time for develop-
ment’. The two modalities can work side by 
side—transparency and cooperation are the 
most important tools to synchronize modal-
ities to avoid undue salary differentials and 
subsidy levels. Modalities such as Commu-
nity-Driven Development efforts promoted 
by the World Bank and others have often 
struggled with similar challenges and can 
provide some support in finding appropri-
ate programming norms.
Efforts should shift from visions of best 
practice to principled but ‘good enough gov-
ernance’ (Grindle, 2007). Here, too, broader 
and constructive engagement with the wide 
range of aid actors can provide a way to pos-
ition these efforts to reflect the modest foot-
print of extension interventions and respect 
the fact that much of the population may 
remain acutely food insecure and not be 
ready to have their livelihoods built back 
better (Christoplos and Hilhorst, 2009). 
 Solutions can be found in advocating for a 
broader palette of services wherein govern-
ments and donors are held accountable for 
both social protection and economic growth 
objectives. This may involve supporting both 
subsistence or petty trade-oriented women’s 
agriculture, and more commercial agricul-
ture which can create jobs that may be pri-
marily for men. Too often, Ministries of Agri-
culture have been encouraged to ignore the 
most vulnerable sectors of the population, 
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simply leaving them to humanitarian agen-
cies or social services. Extension agencies, 
in turn, have ignored those populations 
which have not been interested in the ser-
vices on offer as being ‘laggards’. Humani-
tarian agencies are sometimes complicit in 
the failures where handouts are perceived 
to be more in their comfort zones, and where 
they lack trust that donors will support pro-
gramming that questions narratives about 
markets as the solution. Efforts to analyze 
and focus on common concerns for the vul-
nerability of the population to both food se-
curity and market risks can provide a basis 
for more inclusive programming.
Another area where greater cross-learning 
and constructive collaboration may be found 
is by linking agricultural information system 
efforts with other communication initiatives. 
Extension efforts have focused unduly on 
technical fixes (including information and 
communications technology (ICT) and par-
ticular training methods) without looking 
enough at broader information flows. Media 
(social and conventional) are becoming part 
of peace building as a way of promoting 
greater transparency and public account-
ability. There are indications that, in a 
post-conflict context, attention may shift 
from using these interventions to raise at-
tention to human rights abuses, to focusing 
instead on social and economic rights 
( Zimbabwe—see Christoplos et al., 2014a). 
Existing community (and even pirate) radio 
stations may be eager to respond to their lis-
teners’ demands for information about how 
to secure their land tenure, what aid can offer 
and whether ‘the Chinese are coming’. Exten-
sion programs do not need to reinvent the 
wheel if they can see how their content can 
be integrated into these wider efforts to create 
a more open post-conflict society. Several of 
the chapters bring out the importance of us-
ing available media outlets, but greater atten-
tion is needed to more ambitious efforts that 
not only provide technical information, but 
also create a more transparent public debate 
on priorities in agricultural development and 
enable farmers and their organizations to de-
mand accountability from extension.
The tunnel vision in many interven-
tions is indicative of a broader problem 
with the illusory nature of project-driven 
extension. The massive gap between needs 
and the size and scattered nature of the pro-
jects described suggest that there is a neces-
sity to reflect closely and pragmatically on 
the sphere of influence of these modest 
interventions. By looking at how these projects 
fit into the overall processes underway, it is 
possible to judge how potential contribu-
tions can be maximized. This involves mov-
ing from pluralism by default to finding 
small entry points for pluralism by design 
wherein the existing capacities of different 
actors are accepted as the point of depart-
ure, but where there is a realistic vision and 
strategy for developing the differentiated 
capacities that will be needed in the future. 
It is also about recognizing the factors that 
may generate or obstruct ownership (by 
ministries, extension agents, local govern-
ment and farmers) of the reform processes 
and models on offer.
By breaking out of project tunnel vi-
sion, it will also be possible to differentiate 
the winners and losers in the agrarian tran-
sitions that are underway. It is a way of 
 targeting those who must be included in 
the desired post-conflict society, rather 
than  targeting those who can most easily 
benefit from new markets. All the actors in-
volved in post-conflict extension efforts 
have a responsibility to investigate the 
winners and losers in different agricultural 
recovery scenarios. A gender and youth 
lens that reflects lessons about how exclu-
sion was an initial driver of the conflict is 
essential. It is also important to assess if 
and how returning migrants may (re)engage 
in farming and the extent to which they 
have ‘forgotten by not doing’, and therefore 
require particular attention. Furthermore, 
by looking at broader recovery trajectories 
and obstacles it is possible to assess how 
new retail and other changes in markets 
may have profound implications for who 
may potentially win and lose from agricul-
ture in the future. Climate change demands 
additional foresight, as the vulnerabilities 
that existed before the conflict may not re-
flect the future.
Going beyond studying these issues, it 
is important that these analyses are used to 
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advise (and even confront) governments 
and donors about the consequences of their 
decisions. Transplantation of market models, 
expectations about private sector-led efforts 
and other norms from more stable contexts 
are rarely appropriate. Decision makers 
in capitals and donor countries need to 
be  held accountable for responding to the 
on-the-ground realities of poverty and 
 vulnerability.
A final, overarching aspect of a realistic 
approach to post-conflict extension is to ac-
knowledge the often dire state of public fi-
nances and the unlikelihood that state rev-
enues will cover the costs of a ‘handover’ of 
responsibilities for recurrent costs. There is 
no magic formula to transform exit strat-
egies into more than statements of ‘goodbye 
and good luck’, but a realistic perspective 
on project contributions to long-term pro-
cesses is the place to start.
Central to shifting the focus to financial, 
human resource and other capacity con-
straints is for donors to recognize the disincen-
tives they create when their ‘results agenda’ 
focuses only on the impacts of  services and 
not on the capacity-development outcomes 
that will determine sustainable, longer-term 
effectiveness. If agencies receiving aid are 
judged based on indicators related to contri-
butions to these capacities, this will be the 
foundation for an incentive structure to 
break out of the aid-financed service provi-
sion cul-de-sac.
These recommendations for combining 
ethics and pragmatism can be summarized 
as a call for a human rights-based approach 
(Sida, 2015) to extension amid conflict. 
Such an approach, built on principles of 
participation, transparency, accountability 
and non-discrimination, would highlight 
both the opportunities and the risks in-
volved in using extension to strengthen 
the voice and capacities of farmers, as well 
as the accountability of states, civil society 
and donors. Furthermore, a more explicit 
focus on the principle of non-discrimination 
would bring out how extension can help 
initiatives avoid a narrow focus on resili-
ence for those (men) who are most resilient, 
and thereby reduce the risk of marginaliza-
tion which can feed into future conflicts.
References
Anderson, M.B. (1999) Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—or War. Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 
Colorado.
Bené, C., Newsham, A., Davies, M., Ulrichs, M. and Goodfrey-Wood, R. (2014) Review article: resili-
ence, poverty and development. Journal of International Development 26, 598–623.
Boesen, N. and Therkildsen, O. (2004) Between Naivety and Cynicism: A Pragmatic Approach to 
Donor Support for Public Sector Capacity Development. Danish Institute for International Studies, 
Copenhagen, Denmark.
Brinkerhoff, D. (2010) Developing capacity in fragile states. Public Administration and Development 
30, 66–78.
Cannon, T. and Muller-Mahn, D. (2010) Vulnerability, resilience and development discourses in con-
text of climate change. Natural Hazards 55(3), 621–635.
Christoplos, I. (2004) Out of Step? Agricultural Policy and Afghan Livelihoods. Issues Paper. Afghanistan 
Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul.
Christoplos, I. (2006) Links between Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development in the Tsunami Response. 
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, London.
Christoplos, I. (2007) Between the CAPs: Agricultural Policies, Programming, and the Market in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. HPG Background Paper. Overseas Development Institute, London.
Christoplos, I. (2010) Mobilizing the Potential of Agricultural and Rural Extension. Food and Agricul-
ture Organization, Rome.
Christoplos, I. (2012) Agricultural information amid conflict: for whom and for what? In: Özerdem, A. 
and Roberts, R. (eds) Challenging Post-Conflict Environments: Sustainable Agriculture. Ashgate, 
Farnham, UK.
Christoplos, I. (2014) Resilience, rights, and results in Swedish development cooperation. Resilience: 
International Policies, Practices and Discourses 2(2), 88–99.
242 I. Christoplos 
Christoplos, I. and Hilhorst, D. (2009) Human Security and Capacity in Fragile States. Occasional 
Paper 01. Disaster Studies, Wageningen University, Wageningen, the Netherlands.
Christoplos, I., Nilsson, A., Maradze, T. and Persson, K. (2014a) Review of the Strategy for Swedish Aid 
Initiatives in Zimbabwe: January 2011–December 2014. Sida Decentralised Evaluation 2014:31. 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Stockholm, Sweden.
Christoplos, I., Engstrand, K. and Liljelund Hedqvist, A. (2014b) Capacity Development Literature 
 Review. UTV Working Paper 2014:1. Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 
Stockholm, Sweden.
Christoplos, I., Funder, M., McGinn, C. and Wairimu, W. (2014c) Human rights perspectives on climate 
change adaptation: civil society experiences and opportunities in Cambodia and Kenya. DIIS Re-
port 2014:30. Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, Denmark.
Coulter, C. (2009) Bush Wives and Girl Soldiers: Women’s Lives through War and Peace in Sierra 
Leone. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.
Danida (2011) Addressing Capacity Development in Danish Development Cooperation—Guiding 
Principles and Operational Steps. Danida Technical Advisory Services, Ministry of Foreign 
 Affairs of Denmark, Copenhagen, Denmark.
Denney, L., Mallett, R. and Mazurana, D. (2015) Peacebuilding and Service Delivery. United Nations 
University Centre for Policy Research, Tokyo, Japan.
Grindle, M. (2007) Good enough governance revisited. Development Policy Review 25(5), 553–574.
Hilhorst, D., Christoplos, I. and van der Haar, G. (2010) Reconstruction from below: a new magic bullet 
or shooting from the hip? Third World Quarterly 31(7), 1107–1124.
Hradsky, J., Boesen, N., Land, A., Baser, H., Guizzardi, S. and Sorgenfrei, M. (2011) Perspectives Note 
on Capacity Development in Fragile Situations. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
 Development, Development Assistance Committee, Paris.
IFAD (n.d.) Diaspora Investment in Agriculture (DIA) Initiative. Financing Facility for Remittances, 
International Fund for Agricultural Development, Rome.
Jackson, A. (2015) Politics and Governance in Afghanistan: Nangarhar Province. SLRC Briefing Paper 
9. Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, Overseas Development Institute, London.
Kapadia, K. (2014) Sri Lankan livelihoods after the tsunami: Searching for entrepreneurs, unveiling 
relations of power. Disasters 39(1), 23–50.
Longley, C., Christoplos, I. and Slaymaker, T. (2006) Agricultural rehabilitation: mapping the linkages 
between humanitarian relief, social protection, and development. HPG Research Report 22. Overseas 
Development Institute, London.
Mallett, R. and Denney, L. (2015) After Ebola: Towards a Smarter Model of Capacity Building. SLRC 
Briefing Paper 12. Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, Overseas Development Institute, London.
McLoughlin, C. (2014) When does service delivery improve the legitimacy of a fragile or conflict- 
affected state? Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 
28(3), 341–356.
Minogue, M., Polidano, C. and Hulme, D. (eds) (1998) Beyond the New Public Management: Changing 
Ideas and Practices in Governance. Elgar, London.
Pain, A. and Levine, S. (2012) A conceptual analysis of livelihoods and resilience: addressing the 
 insecurity of agency. HPG Working Paper. Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development 
Institute, London.
Remington, T., Maroko, J., Walsh, S., Omanga, P. and Charles, E. (2002) Getting off the seeds and tools 
treadmill with CRS seed vouchers and fairs. Disasters 26(4), 316–328.
Sida (2015) A Human Rights Based Approach to Sustainable Livelihood Systems. Swedish Inter-
national Development Cooperation Agency, Stockholm, Sweden.
SLRC (n.d.) Secure livelihoods research consortium: researching livelihoods and services affected by 
conflict. Available at: www.securelivelihoods.org (accessed 23 January 2017).
UN (2013) United Nations guidance note for effective use and development of national capacity in 
post-conflict contexts. United Nations Inter-Agency Team on National Capacity Development, 
New York.
Wairimu, W. (2014) Food insecurity and agricultural rehabilitation in post-conflict northern Uganda. 
In: Christoplos, I. and Pain, A. (eds) New Challenges to Food Security: From Climate Change to 
Fragile States. Routledge, London.
Wairimu, W., Christoplos, I. and Hilhorst, D. (2015) From crisis/relief to development: the policy and 
practice of agricultural service provision in northern Uganda. Agriculture and Human Values 1–14. 
DOI: 10.1007/s10460-015-9665-0
Index
Page numbers in bold type refer to figures.
Page numbers in italic type refer to tables.
 243
Academy of Agricultural Sciences 197, 201
advisory centers 129
Afghanistan 151–166









Afghanistan Agricultural Extension Project 
(AAEP) 159–161, 160, 162




Agricultural Code (2009) 46
Agricultural Coordination Committee (ACC, 
Liberia) 8–9, 13






see also extension systems
Agricultural Extension System (AES, DRC) 37–38






field staff 38, 40–42, 54
Integrated Agricultural Research for  
Development (IAR4D) 51
integrated multipronged communication 
approaches 51–52
IPs 51
NAIP 49–50, 50, 57
National Extension Service (SNV) 38, 
39–40, 46
















Agricultural Reconstruction and Development 
for Iraq (ARDI) 137, 138, 144–145, 148
Agricultural and Rural Management Councils 
(CARGs) 46, 49, 54–55
244 Index
Agricultural University of Tajikistan 172
Agriculture Development Teams (ADTs) 157–158
agro-economy transformations 236–238







see also extension services; food aid
Allawi, A. 140
Americo-Liberian minority groups 1
Anbar 139
animal husbandry 155
Anya Nya Civil War (1963–1972) 62
aquaculture project 146





Association Agreement (2012) 195, 196, 201
Association of Organizations of the  
Cuchamatanes (ASOCUCH) 216
Badam Bagh Research Station (Kabul) 163–164
beans 214–215
Belgian colonial rulers 41
biological farming 200
border controls 96–97
breadbasket counties (Liberia) 3, 10





Buena Milpa project 212–213
building back better narrative 232, 233
Burma see Myanmar
capacity-building extension policies 18–19
and farmers 6–7
CARGs (DRC) 46, 49, 54–55
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) 65–66
cattle raids (2013–2014) 63
cell phones 71, 130, 164
Centers of Learning for Rural Development 
(CADERs) 210–211, 210, 214
changed landscapes 231–232, 236–238
chickens 80
Chin ethnic groups 128
China 122–123
CIALCA Knowledge Resource Centre  
(African Great Lakes) 52




involvement in strategy 222
Liberia 5
Tajikistan 168
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA, Iraq)  
137, 140
cocoa bean exports 25
coffee exports 25
collaborations 51–52, 55, 72, 234–235, 237
communication initiatives 240
Guatemala 215
innovation platforms (IPs) 213
plant breeding 216
combatants 95–96, 97, 97, 112, 229






Community Development Councils (CDCs)  
162–163
Community Health Educator model 178–179
community politics 187
community-based organizations (CBOs)
Sri Lanka 97, 105–106
Tajikistan 170
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme (CAADP) agreement 3–4,  
7, 49
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) 62
conflict entrepreneurs 119, 231
conflict management theory 121
conflict transformation and peace-building 
(CTPB) principles 109, 111
conflicts





effects on education 120
effects on food security
Myanmar 119
effects on nations’ development xii
internal xi





Consortium for Improving Agriculture-Based 





































Department of Rural Development, Extension 
and Research (DRDER, Liberia) 4
diet 214–215
Dinka tribes 63, 69
disarmament, demobilization and  
reintegration (DDR) of  
combatants 229, 232











Liberia 3, 4, 5, 8, 11–12
Sri Lanka 108–109
Tajikistan 173–176, 186–187
Ebola epidemic 2, 4, 13
education
conflicts effect on 120
nutrition 178–179
see also agricultural institutions
Eelam war (1983) 95–96, 96
Elkana 200




Guatemalans to USA 217
see also migration
employment statistics
Sri Lanka 99–100, 99
ethics 239–241
ethnic divisions
Sri Lanka 95, 98
European Union (EU)
and Georgia 195, 196, 201
exit strategies 241
Extended Agricultural Training (EAT)  
project 67–69, 70, 71
extension administrators/officers


















safety/security 69, 71, 142, 143
Sierra Leone 29–30
staff stability 223
training 69–70, 163, 199, 215, 216, 231
see also field staff





best practice 188, 238–239
in changed landscapes 236–238
debates about 174–175
















pluralism and coordination 8–9
policy and planning 5–7
recommendations 15–19
Mozambique
challenges to 77–78, 85–87




challenges to 29–30, 31–32
current 29–31
post-conflict 27–29




Sri Lanka 100–101, 101
challenges/successes 106, 107–108, 
108–109
community-based and peer-to-peer 
extension 105–106
NGO-based extension 104–105, 104








farm service centers (agro kartli) 200
Farmer Advisory Services in Tajikistan 
(FAST) 167, 177, 182–183, 183




farmer-based organizations (FBOs) 229
DRC 42
Sierra Leone 31
farmer-led extension services 145
Sierra Leone 31
farmer-to-agent ratio 38, 39
farmer-to-farmer approach 210–211




















see also household, farms; smallholder  
farms
fatalities 36
FED project (Liberia) 8
Feed the Future initiative 8, 178, 180, 182, 188
Guatemala 205
female-headed households 2, 3
fertilizer market 30









see also extension administrators/officers
fisheries sector 102
Five-Year Plan (DRC, 1986–1990) 43





transition acute to chronic 121–122










Myanmar 119, 121, 124
South Sudan 67, 72




forward operating bases (FOBs) 145
funding 241
DRC 39–40, 53







Sierra Leone 25–26, 31
South Sudan 63–64
gender







extension services 195, 201
Information and Consulting Centers 
(ICCs) 196–197, 201, 202
NGOs 199–200
Gori (Georgia) 199
government involvement 142, 144
Tajikistan agriculture 171–172, 184–186
Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) 23, 26–27
grants 148












Tajikistan 170, 175, 182–183, 183
women’s role 171, 175
income from chickens 80
wealth 36, 111
see also smallholder farms
humanitarian agencies 240
India 122















South Sudan military project 67
Sri Lanka 106, 107–108
Inma project (2008–2013) 137, 138
innovation platforms (IPs) 51, 55
DRC 42
Guatemala 213
Myanmar 118, 131, 131
Institute of Science and Technical Agriculture 






Integrated Agricultural Research for  
Development (IAR4D) 51
integrated multipronged communication 
approaches 51–52
integrated soil fertility management (ISFM)  
51–52
intensification (smallholder production) 82, 88
intensive agriculture 142
internally displaced people (IDPs) xiii, 77,  
231, 232
in camps 129
Myanmar 120–121, 123, 129
Sri Lanka 98, 106
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and Sierra Leone 25
international non-governmental organizations 
(INGOs)
Liberia 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14










Iraq Agricultural Extension Revitalization (IAER) 
project 137–138, 146–147, 148
irrigation systems
Liberia 3
Sri Lanka 99, 101
jamoats (rural councils) 172, 177, 181
Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) 176
John Garang Memorial University of Science 
(JG-MUST) 66–67
Kabul extension service 155
Kachin State (Myanmar) 118, 123
key player theory 121
Khatlon province (Tajikistan) 168, 169, 175, 
177, 181, 186
Kivu Lake region 51
kolkhozes 195–196
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) 139















Legal and Social Services (SerJus) 217
Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission 
(LLRC) report (Sri Lanka, 2011) 109
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
movement 95–96, 97, 97, 112
Liberia (Republic of) 1–22
conflict background 1–2










Local Systems of Extension (SLE) 214
mahallas 170, 178



















migration 98, 217, 231
effect on communities 120–121
Myanmar 120–121
see also emigration
military involvement 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 237
and civilian experts 157
marrying local women 119
Myanmar 116, 119, 229
Milpa cropping system 212–213
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 
(MASA, Mozambique) 76, 90
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food 
Security (MAFFS, Sierra Leone) 23, 28
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Tourism, 
Animal Resources and Fisheries 
(MoAFTARF, South Sudan) 64–65
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock 
(MAIL, Afghanistan) 154, 155, 158, 161, 163
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries 
(MINAGRI, DRC) 38, 38, 39
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Food 
(MAGA, Guatemala) 215, 221, 224
capacity development plans 223
coverage 221
field extensionists 209–210
Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG, Mozambique)  
76, 79, 80




Modernizing Extension and Advisory Services 
(MEAS) xiv–xv, 199
Tajikistan 181–182


















impacts of conflict 117–120
recommendations 128–132, 131
Najaf Province (Iraq) 139
National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP, 
DRC) 49–50, 50, 57
National Agricultural University (Georgia) 197, 201
National Directorate of Agrarian Extension 
(DNEA, Mozambique) 76, 86, 90
national extension effort
Mozambique 77














Neksigol Consulting 179, 188
New Economic Opportunities (NEO)  
program 198–199
Newcastle disease 80
Njala University (Sierra Leone) 27

















Sri Lanka 100, 101, 103, 104–105, 104
categories of work 105
restrictions imposed 105, 109
Tajikistan 180, 187
technical expertise 127




Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA, Sri Lanka) 108
oil palm exports 25
oil-for-food program 137
on-farm extension services 148
opinion leaders 121





Peace Accords (1996) 207
Peace Agreement (1992) 74, 76, 90
peace-building 130
and media 240
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
(PDPA) 152
pilot projects 235


















political, economic, social, technological, 
environmental and legal (PESTEL) 
analysis 68–69, 68, 70
250 Index
political opposition parties 116
politicians 237












programmatic targeting see targeted programs
promotores 210–211, 215, 216–217, 218




public sector extension 233
capacity development 211
Guatemala 209
Mozambique 75–76, 87, 88
Myanmar 124–125
resources available 221, 224–225
Sri Lanka 101–104, 102
public services 142




























see also agricultural institutions







market drivers of 233–234
to transitions 232






Myanmar 119, 122, 124–125
swamps
Sierra Leone 23–24, 27, 32
road rehabilitation 80












Sarob cooperative 181, 188
Sasakawa Global 82
Save the Children  218
savings and internal lending communities 
(SILCs) 32
Scientific Research Center (Georgia MoA) 198, 201
scientific socialism 229
security/safety 69, 71
extension workers 142, 164
Guatemala 207
see also food security
seeds 79
supply of 118
Selective Concentrative Strategy 124–125
Shan State (Myanmar) 118, 120, 123
Sheiks 140
Sierra Leone 23–34
civil war background 26–27
recommendations 32–33





Sri Lanka 100, 100
Tajikistan 170










South Kivu (DRC) 52
South Sudan 62–73
background to conflict 62–64
Southern Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) 63
Soviet Union 152, 153, 154
and Georgia 193, 195
and Tajikistan 167–168, 169
sovkhozes 195–196
Sri Lanka
agriculture history 98–99, 99











State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC) 116
Stevens, S. 24, 26
strategy development 222
Strengthening Extension and Advisory Services 
(SEAS) 199
student protests 120
Sub-Saharan Africa Challenge Program (SSA-CP) 51
subsistence 231
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) 62, 63, 72
agricultural activities 64, 65, 67


















Task Force for Business and Stability  
Operations (TFBSO) 137, 142,  
143, 145–146, 148
Technical University of Georgia 198, 201
technological innovations 50, 130
Iraq 145











train-the-trainer approach 144, 146–147
training 231
curricula 67, 70, 215
EAT project 67–68
extension administrators/officers 69–70, 
163, 199, 215, 216, 231
farmers 66
field staff 41–42
public sector extensionists 211
Sri Lanka farmers 102
Tajikistan 172–173, 187
training-and-visit (T&V) system 42
Mozambique 76, 87–88
Myanmar 120
travel restrictions 96–97, 104
tribal leadership 140
Tropical Agriculture Research and Learning 





Unified Extension System (SUE) 82




United States of America (USA)
and Afghanistan 156–161
and Iraq 137–138, 144–147
252 Index
vaccines 80, 82






village savings and lending associations 
(VSLAs) 28, 32




Tajikistan 170, 172, 178







extension roles 32, 56, 71, 111, 129, 164
farmers 56, 71–72, 111, 129
inclusion of 214, 221, 224
Tajikistan 182
role of 171, 175
World Bank
funding of Green Revolution  
technologies 1
Implementation Completion Report 
(2013) 177
Tajikistan 176–177
World Food Programme (WFP) 13, 52
Purchase for Progress initiative 234
World Vision International (WVI)
Sierra Leone 28, 32
South Sudan 66
and women farmers 71
World War II (1939–1945) 115–116
youth
agricultural employment xiii, 3
reintegration 112, 120–121
in rural communities 32
Zairianization movement 43

